LIBERAL PEACE

Selected essays

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

Liberal Peace

Comprising essays by Michael W. Doyle, *Liberal Peace* examines the special significance of liberalism for international relations. These essays shed light on one of the leading debates in the field: whether democracies should and do maintain peace with each other.

The volume begins by outlining the two legacies of liberalism in international relations – how and why liberal states have maintained peace among themselves while at the same time being prone to making war against non-liberal states. The essays that follow both engage with international relations theory and explore the policy implications of liberal internationalism. Engaging theory, the author highlights differences among liberal imperialism, liberal pacifism and Kant's liberal internationalism. He also orients liberal theory within the panoply of international relations theory.

Exploring policy implications, the author focuses on the strategic value of the inter-liberal democratic community and how it can be protected, preserved and enlarged, and whether liberals can go beyond a separate peace to a more integrated global democracy. Finally, the volume considers when force should and should not be used to promote national security and human security across borders, and argues against President George W. Bush's policy of "transformative" interventions. The concluding essay engages with scholarly critics of the liberal democratic peace.

This book will be of great interest to students of international relations, foreign policy, political philosophy and security studies.

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Introduction

Liberal peace is definitely part of the rhetoric of foreign policy. Indeed, we have often been told that promoting freedom produces peace. At the US Republican Convention in 2004, President George W. Bush told "young men and women" in the Middle East and ". . . reformers and political prisoners and exiles" everywhere ". . . that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever. . . . As freedom advances, heart by heart, and nation by nation, America will be more secure and the world more peaceful." He was not the first Republican to make these grandiloquent claims. In a speech before the British parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. He then (perhaps ironically) announced a "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development." And not just Republicans. President Clinton made "Democratic Enlargement" the doctrinal centerpiece of his administration's foreign policy in the 1990s. And, of course, these ideas were the hallmark of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy and of the foreign policies of many other liberals.

The debate between liberals and their critics, skeptical of the effects of liberal principles and institutions (often called Realists), has been played out again and again. In Europe it shaped the exchanges between British prime ministers Gladstone and Disraeli in the nineteenth century. In the US, it goes back to the first US presidential administration. During the Washington Administration, Alexander Hamilton at the Treasury and James Madison, a leader of the Congress and adviser to Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, disagreed in pretty much the same ways as Realists and liberals do today.[1] Hamilton won the first debate mostly because there were no credible liberal republics around. The US embodied at best the hope of becoming one (half slave, it was not the reality). The world is different today.

Liberalism is not just part of the rhetoric of foreign relations; it also has a real effect on them. Some political scientists, including many of the Realist critics noted above, argue that states are all pretty much the same. They pursue interests, such as security, oil and military bases, and seek hegemony and settle for the balance of power against power. Democratic and Liberal ideologies are banners waved in front of these interests, not their true sources. But, in my view, these scholars are too skeptical.

Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful – among themselves. But they are also prone to make war – against nonliberal states. Modern liberalism carries with it two legacies, peace and war. They affect liberal states, not separately, but simultaneously.

The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among fellow liberal states. During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife. But after the Reform Act 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes despite, for example, British grievances against the Northern Civil War blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And despite generations of Anglo-American tension, despite the rise of the US to world power based on its population and industrial might, Britain leaned toward the US, rather than balanced against it, and the US reciprocated; thus liberal Britain, France and the US fought World War I together against illiberal Germany.

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which the eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," began to be established among liberal societies. More than 70 liberal states currently make up the union. Today, most liberal states are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent.

Of course, the outbreak of war, in any given year, between any two given states, is a low probability event. But the occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred years seems therefore to have significance. Western Europe was once the most war prone region; with the spread of liberal republics it has become a zone of peace.

The toughest empirical critics of the proposition find that the democratic peace is statistically significant over the past couple of centuries. The disagreement is over how to explain it. Significantly, similar claims cannot be made for feudal, monarchical, communist, authoritarian or totalitarian forms of rule; nor for pluralistic, or merely similar societies. The balance of power shifts, great powers rise and fall, and yet this liberal peace holds.

The liberal or democratic peace was not just an artifact of Cold War bipolarity. Bipolarity correlated with peace in the liberal democratic West, not in the Warsaw Pact where the USSR invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and not in the nonliberal Third World where both the US and the USSR intervened repeatedly to prop up Cold War allies or undermine the allies of rivals. The World War II alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany collapsed as soon as Nazi Germany did. The liberal alliance in NATO survived the Cold War despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.

When states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states sometimes align with authoritarian, or even totalitarian,

states to balance even more threatening authoritarian states. Thus, in World War I the liberal allies joined with Czarist Russia and in World War II with Stalinist Russia. Nonetheless, the liberals tend to wind up all on the same side, despite the complexity of the paths that take them there.

Here, the predictions of liberal pacifists are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a political foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers (NATO, the alliances with Japan, Australia and New Zealand). This foundation appears to be impervious to the economic competition and personal quarrels that regularly take place with liberal allies. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states. And, as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.

These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is perfect or inevitable, nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace. But they do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace – but only among themselves.

For liberalism also carries with it a second legacy – international "imprudence." Peaceful restraint only seems to work in the liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states.

Many of these wars have been defensive, and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with liberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, of interest, and of pure fear of what other states might do, all lead toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties – from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis and Stalin's communists.

But we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do. Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico between 1846 and 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is only the latest instance of this.

The essays in this book, collected since I first published "Liberal legacies" in two parts in 1983, explore both these legacies. But before I outline the contents of this volume and explain why I chose them, let me remind readers what I mean by liberal states and how liberalism and its major modern alternative, realism, do and do not differ from each other.

Liberalism

By "liberalism" or "liberal states" I do not mean necessarily left-leaning, or more egalitarian politics, as "liberalism" often did and does in the political rhetoric of the US and many other states, including the UK (before the rise of Labour's social democracy). By liberal, I mean states founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation. This is a wide range that includes European social democracy, US domestic liberalism and US domestic conservatism. In the nineteenth century states were at best thinly liberal: the US was half slave, and the poor and women were excluded from the franchise everywhere. In the twentieth century liberal democracy deepened (as the franchise expanded) and widened (from three questionable liberal republics in 1800 to more than 70 today).

That said, there is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by the traits just listed that most liberal states share, although none has them all. Political theorists, however, identify liberalism with an essential principle, the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, not as objects or means only. A commitment to this principle (when put into practice) has generated rights and institutions.

A threefold set of rights forms the foundation of this ideal version of liberalism. Liberalism calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called negative freedom, which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the "positive freedoms." Such social rights as equality of opportunity in education and such economic rights as healthcare and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community.

This ideal liberalism is thus marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights, such as freedom of religion and speech. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved. Most pertinently for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives over foreign policy held, for example, by monarchs or military bureaucracies. Third, the economy rests on recognition of the right to private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition

(for example, by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it does not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

These principles and institutions have shaped two "high roads" to liberal governance. In order to protect the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, laissez-faire liberalism has leaned toward a highly constrained role for the state and a much wider role for private property and the market. In order to promote the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, welfare liberalism has expanded the role of the state and constricted the role of the market.[2] Both nevertheless accept the four institutional requirements and contrast markedly with the colonies, monarchical regimes, military dictatorships, and Communist Party dictatorships with which they have shared the political governance of the modern world.

Paralleling each of the high roads are "low roads" that, while achieving certain liberal values, fail to reconcile freedom, equality, and order. An overwhelming terror of anarchy and a speculation on preserving property can drive laissez-faire liberals to support a law-and-order authoritarian rule that sacrifices democracy. Authoritarianism to preserve order is the Realist argument of Hobbes's Leviathan, and it finds an echo in Locke's liberal concept of "tacit consent." It also shapes the argument of right-wing Liberals who seek to draw a distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" dictatorships. The justification sometimes advanced by liberals for the former is that they can be temporary and can educate the population into an acceptance of property, individual rights, and, eventually, representative government. Other liberals focus solely on freedom of property and market relations and portray the state as a simple rational agent of property rights or as a firm ready for entrepreneurial capture, as does Schumpeter. Lastly, some liberals on the left make revolutionary dictatorship a vehicle for democratic education.[3]

There are at least three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three groups of theorists: John Locke, the great founder of modern liberal individualism, who together with the later utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, provided the liberal foundations of international law; Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter and other commercialists, explicators of the liberal pacifism invoked by the politicians; and Immanuel Kant, a liberal republican who calls for a demanding internationalism that institutes peace among fellow liberal republics. In *Ways of War and Peace* I paid attention to all three. In this collection, I focus on Kantian liberal internationalism and the wider attributes of actual quasi-liberal polities in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Liberalism and realism in international theory

For international relations theory, the political theorist's high and low views of liberalism have ambiguous implications. Defined by the centrality of individual rights, private property, and representative government, it is a domestic theory. Realism, on the other hand, is an international theory, defined by the centrality of

the state of war. There appears to be no simple theoretical comparison of the two. Realist theory would be falsely portrayed, indeed caricatured, if it were "domesticized" by being limited to states with authoritarian or totalitarian domestic politics or even purely unitary states. Correspondingly, liberal theory would be caricatured if it were "internationalized" by being limited to assertions about the natural harmony of world politics. Some Realists are totalitarian; Hobbes justified authoritarian states. Some are democratic communitarians, such as Rousseau. Machiavelli was a republican Realist. Some liberals, such as Bentham or Cobden or Schumpeter, saw deep tendencies toward homogeneously pacific world politics. Others, such as John Stuart Mill, justified imperialism under some circumstances and intervention under others. No simplification well represents the actual philosophical and historical richness of their worldviews.

The core of realism (to simplify) portrays world politics as follows: a state of war among all states and societies, which is a condition not in which war is constant but in which war is regarded as a continuous possibility, a threatening prospect, in which each state has to regard every other state as presenting the possibility of this threat.[4] This is because:

1   Relations among states are anarchic, in that they lack a global state. Trade, culture, even institutions and international law could still exist under anarchy, but none can alter its anarchic and warlike character.
2   States are independent units that could be treated as strategic actors. The variations in state structure range from the abstractly unitary sovereign rationality of Hobbes to the ideally unitary moral rationality of the General Will and the sociologically diverse non-ideal states of Rousseau, to the rational princes and imperial republics of Machiavelli, to the diverse states of Thucydidean Greece. Despite the diversity, some group or unit have enough political power to constitute a state, capable of competition in the international arena.
3   Some of these states seek to expand; others, merely to survive. No one is prepared to engage in long-term accommodation or cooperation, because even though one state may be ideally focused on non-aggressive security, it needs to assume that there are at least some states that are aggressive and, therefore, a normative policy has to assume a dangerous state of war, in which rational states pursue their diverse goals.

Each was in a state of war that we call a security dilemma, where attempts to enhance security make others less secure. The net result is that many key international goods have only relative value. They are relative because, as Hobbes opined, "clubs are trumps."[5] At the extreme every good thus has to be measured first by the extent to which it contributes to security in a world where only self-help secures one's existence. Some relations are mutually assured deterrence standoffs, in which both have an absolute, interdependent and positive interest in survival. Within an alliance positive absolute values can be appreciated, but only because they contribute to the relative superiority of the alliance over a rival alliance. And alliances are easy to break. The liberals are different.

World politics, rather than being a relatively homogeneous state of war, is at the minimum a heterogeneous state of peace and war and might become a state of global peace, in which the expectation of war disappears. If two or more liberal societies coexist in the international system, then rather than have a security rationale governing all interaction – as it must for rational states in a state of war – other criteria of policy come into play. Liberal societies compete to become rich, glorious, healthy, and cultured, all without expecting to have to resolve their competition through war. Formal and informal institutions, such as international organization and law, then take on a greater role in competition with the warriors and diplomats who dominate the Realist stage.[6] This is because:

1   Although states live under international anarchy, meaning the absence of a global government, they do not experience a general state of war.
2   States are inherently different "units," differentiated by how they relate to individual human rights. So liberals distinguish liberal from non-liberal societies, republican from autocratic or totalitarian states, capitalist from communist, fascist, and corporatist economies. Differences in international behavior then reflect these differences.
3   The aims of the state go beyond security, as do the aims of the individual, because security is not always at stake. They include the protection and promotion of individual rights, and they reflect the interests of the representative government that controls the state.

Thus for liberals, states behave differently and are not homogenized by the international system by being either competed out of existence or socialized into structural strategies. Some liberals argue that liberal states are inherently respectful of international law. Others argue that liberal states are inherently peaceful, while authoritarians are inherently aggressive. Still others argue that liberals are peaceful, but can only afford to be so toward one another.

Liberal states exist under anarchy (there is no world government), but their anarchy is different. Rather than being overwhelmingly a relative contest, a zero-sum game, their contest is a positive- or negative-sum game. They can win or lose together. A failure to inform may undermine coordination when liberals are seeking compatible goals. In more competitive situations, a failure to trust may undermine cooperation when each would prefer at least one alternative to a failure to cooperate. This is because their insecurities can be solved by stable accommodation. They can come to appreciate that the existence of other liberal states constitutes no threat and instead constitutes an opportunity for mutually beneficial trade and (when needed) alliance against non-liberal states.

Liberals differ from Realists in many ways, but one way they don't, despite popular attributions to the contrary, is Liberal "idealism" versus Realist "realism." Liberals are as realistic as Realists, though their interests differ, and Realists as idealistic as liberals, though their ideals differ. Liberals do incorporate ideals of individual, or human, rights, but Realists are idealists, too. They frequently think they can find an essential ideal "national interest" that integrates the many

interests nations have and stands apart from whatever the legitimate state says it is at any given time. Both Liberals and Realists can appreciate the values of peace. Realists such as Rousseau and even Hobbes made peace the first duty of the state, as did Kant and other liberals. And liberals can justify the use of force when needed to preserve the security of the state or, sometimes, to rescue other people from massacre. Like Realists, liberals incorporate material interests into their theories, the interests of citizens should shape foreign policy and do so legitimately when coalitions that represent them win electoral power.

Liberals are thus both similar to and different from the Realists. But they also differ from one another, and they do so in systematic ways. Each of the liberal theorists, like the Realists, must make some assumptions about international structure, domestic society, and human nature. Liberals pay more attention to domestic structures and diverse human interests than do Realists. They all think that the international system has less than an overriding influence and so distinguish themselves from almost all Realists. Still, compared with one another, we can identify varieties. The Image I institutionalists (Locke and Bentham) focus on individual-level (Image I[7]) determinants, the commercialists (Smith and Schumpeter) on societal-level (Image II), and the internationalists (Kant) on interstate (Image III) determinants of the state of war. Their conceptions of what describes the state of war also differ. For none of the liberals does the state of nature (without government) produce the state of war; for each the state of war must be made known by aggressive acts or declared intentions to aggress. For all the liberals – unlike the Realists – there exists the more or less firm possibility of a state of peace.

For Locke and Bentham, the state of peace is easily corrupted by the inconveniences of prejudiced and partial judgment, misinformation, and uncertainty; and the state of war and state of peace begin to merge. Individual citizens and statespersons whose perceptions and interest can corrupt peace can, if they are dedicated to the rule of law, defend the rights of life, liberty, and property and achieve a measure of international justice. They are, however, often likely to fail and may only succeed in preserving the security of their state.

For Smith and Schumpeter the state of war can be tamed by the development of commercial society or capitalist democracy, which rationalize and align individual interests with social interests through markets. The state of war is a product of autocratic imperialism and export monopolism, social formations that are atavistic after the process of free market capitalism has begun to take root. Indeed, it is the development of the market economy that in the long run will ensure that the warlike forces of traditional autocracies will evolve into extinction.

For the Kantian Internationalists on which I focus in this collection, the state of war is a potent structural force that can be overcome only by a process of constitutional evolution of world politics in which emerging republican governments establish among themselves a state of peace, a pacific union. By instituting reliable international law, collective security, and transnational "hospitality," republics create a new politics of peace whose expansion offers the prospect of an eventual perpetual and universal peace.

Liberalism, especially Kantian Liberalism, thus lays a special claim to what world politics is and can be: a state of peace. It also claims a special right in what shapes the politics of liberal states – liberty and democracy. But how special is the liberal peace? Can it be equally well explained by Realist concerns, such as the balance of power? And how can we reconcile Machiavelli's love of liberty and Thucydides's and Rousseau's commitments to democracy with their Realist "state of war" conclusions? And what bearing does liberal internationalism have on international justice and whether states should ever militarily intervene to protect individual rights or rescue beleaguered populations? These and related questions I address in the essays that follow and I return to them in the new essay with which I conclude the volume.

The essays in this volume

In the first two essays, "Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs, Parts I and II," (Chapters 1 and 2), I first examined the special significance of liberalism for international relations. The inspiration for the essays was an invitation from the students of The Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton (where I was then teaching) to speculate on what liberalism meant for foreign policy, after the shellacking liberals received in the 1980 US elections. (I was the stand-in for Congressman Stephen Solarz of Brooklyn, who had to cancel at short notice.) Preparing my talk, searching for inspiration on liberalism and foreign affairs, I remembered that my political theory tutor, Professor Judith Shklar, had once remarked, after I dismissed Kant as a mere utopian idealist, that I should read exactly what he said, not what others said about him, the next time. She was a wonderful teacher, brilliant and caring, and she never minced words.

In the two essays I outline two legacies of liberalism, both inspired by Immanuel Kant's striking essay of 1795, "Perpetual peace."[8] The first legacy is peace among fellow liberal republics and the second is a continuing state of war between republics and non-republics. The first is not well-explained by alternative theories, such as the balance of power; it appears to be special to liberalism. The second, the state of war, Kant expected, as did Hobbes, since these states lacked either a globally enforced or a self-enforced peace. But Kant condemns the unnecessary imperial aggression that commercial states often inflict without justification on nonliberal states and societies. The real hope is thus peaceful transformation, achieved by commerce and transnational contacts, to a world where all states are liberal, and where global peace will then have been achieved.

"Liberalism and world politics" (Chapter 3) tackles the same question and again interprets Kant's "Perpetual peace," but this time to highlight differences between liberal imperialism (Machiavelli, as I then saw him), liberal pacifism (Schumpeter and commercial liberals), and Kant's liberal internationalism with its two legacies. Published in 1986 in the *American Political Science Review*, it became the most cited international relations essay in the 100 years of the journal and the sixteenth most cited article overall.[9]

"Politics and grand strategy" (Chapter 4) was commissioned by two inspiring colleagues, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein. It attempts to orient liberal

theory in the panoply of international theory, starting with simple, rational, egoistic unitary actors under anarchy – what political scientists call structural realism. Step by step, I indicate how each specification and complication of the rational unitary actor model adds depth and explanatory value, as do liberal institutions, with Kant, and then economic and social forces, with Marx, and leadership, with Machiavelli.

"The voice of the people" (Chapter 5) was part of an endeavor to assess the implications of the post-Cold War world. The volume was organized by the courageous and indefatigable Geir Lundestad, now the director of the Nobel Institute, and includes essays by many leading scholars in international history and international relations. My essay was an effort to sort out the competing claims to the meaning of the voice of the people. It explores the logic underlying the arguments of four theorists who gave weight to popular government – Thucydides, Rousseau, Kant and Schumpeter. It asks how could Thucydides see popular forces as producing imperialism; Rousseau, isolationism; Kant, liberal internationalism; and Schumpeter, pacifism. I argue that the differences are explicable and coherent.

"One world; many peoples," (Chapter 6) reviews John Rawls' last major work, his profound *Law of Peoples*, for the American Political Science Association's review journal, *Perspectives on Politics*. John Rawls was an inspiration to me (as to so many others) and a friend who joined a weekly lunch in Harvard's Leverett House with Judith Shklar that I had organized to connect Harvard undergraduates with eminent scholars. I grew to know him best when we spent a long evening in the cellar café of the Nassau Inn discussing potential actual "Kazanistans" – the hypothetical "decent hierarchical" regimes that are so important in his model of liberal toleration. The essay contrasts liberal cosmopolitans, liberal internationalists and Rawls' own "many peoples" view on international justice. I now think that Rawls' views are actually closer to Kant's than to any others (as you will see in the concluding essay to this volume). But Rawls didn't do exegesis.

"An international liberal community" (Chapter 7) grew out of an earlier foray into policy advising. This version, commissioned by my former teacher and eminent Kennedy School dean Graham Allison and incisive foreign policy expert Gregory Treverton, focuses on the strategic value of the inter-liberal democratic community and how it can be protected, preserved and enlarged. Some members of the Bill Clinton campaign foreign policy team appreciated the essay, but, as often in campaign politics, one never knows whether an influential connection was made. (I later contributed in very minor ways to the Kerry and Obama campaign's foreign policy advisory efforts.)

"A more perfect union?" (Chapter 8) addresses whether liberals can go beyond a separate peace to a more integrated global democracy. Globalization is making the arms-length internationalism of classical liberalism ever more ethically and practically problematic. Yet, the essay concludes, we are not yet sufficiently integrated to sustain global democratization. A period of tension seems bound to follow, I argue, but it can be mitigated by efforts to enhance international accountability.

"A few words on Mill, Walzer and nonintervention" (Chapter 9) is part of a tribute to a former teacher and friend, Michael Walzer, and a rumination on when

force should and should not be used to promote national security and human security across borders. It engages with both J. S. Mill's classic 1859 essay on intervention and Michael Walzer's powerful modern statement, in *Just and Unjust Wars*, on the rules of war. It interrogates Mill by examining the examples he invokes and it builds on Walzer by examining loose ends he left. In the end, I argue for much less intervention than Mill's liberalism allowed and, perhaps, a little more than Walzer's communitarianism envisages.

"After the freedom agenda" (Chapter 10) tries to come to terms both with the alleged authoritarian resurgence (the collapse of new democracies and the rise of China) and with the Bush legacy. I argue that the authoritarian resurgence is exaggerated; new democracies have often collapsed and important new ones are emerging. President Bush adopted liberal rhetoric to wave before his campaign of democracy promotion designed to "transform" by force the Middle East, starting with Iraq. Borrowing from Mill, I respond that forcible democratization is generally both wrong and counterproductive. Encouraging grass roots determinations of democracy – what each people means by it and are prepared to sacrifice for it – is on the other hand fully warranted. I highlight the value of multilateral approaches while declaring an interest, as the current chair of the advisory board of the United Nations Democracy Fund.

The concluding essay engages with two sets of scholarly critics. I address those who have argued that Kant's perpetual peace is not a separate peace, but instead a peace homogeneously available to all. And I address those who regard the liberal democratic peace as either insignificant from an empirical point of view or illogical from an historical or policy view. At the same time, I note where my views have changed on a few issues, in part stimulated by the ever valuable criticism and suggestion of colleagues.

Notes

1 Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
2 The sources of classic laissez-faire liberalism can be found in Bentham, Cobden, *Federalist Papers*, Kant, Spencer, Hayek, Friedman, and Robert Nozick's, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Expositions of welfare liberalism are

in the work of the later Mill, T. H. Greene, the Fabians and John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Amy Gutmann, *Liberal Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) discusses variants of liberal thought.

3 See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979), pp. 34–45, and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Complementarily, when social inequalities are judged to be extreme, the welfare liberal can argue that establishing (or reestablishing) the foundations of liberal society requires a nonliberal method of reform, a second "low road" of redistributing authoritarianism. Aristide Zolberg reports a "Liberal left" sensibility among US scholars of African politics that was sympathetic to progressive autocracies; see *One Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. vii. An example is the confused reaction in Europe and the United States to the decision by the Algerian government to abort an election that would have turned the state over to anti-liberal Islamic fundamentalists and the subsequent warming of European Community relations with the Moroccan monarchy (*Economist* (January 9, 1993), pp. 37–8). A recent example (2011) is the desperate effort by the US and the EU to influence the democratic revolution in Egypt, to keep it peaceful and friendly to US and European interests, while respecting the legitimacy of the popular rebellion.

4 Joseph Nye's "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40(2): 235–51, has helped me frame this comparison. And for various interpretations of Realism, see John Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983), Robert Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

5 Thomas Hobbes, *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England*, Cropsey, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 140.

6 Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, Chapter 1, identifies the centrality of diplomats and warriors for international politics, as a central feature of Realism. Transnational complexity, though under the label of "Complex Realism," is well described by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane in *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989). For an enlightening overview of the liberal tradition, see Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Temple Smith, 1978). And for an analytic survey of current political science approaches to liberal international theory, see Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, "Liberal International Theory," in Charles Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 107–50, and Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," *International Organization* 5, vol. 51, 1997: 513–53.

7 "Images" in the sense of Kenneth Waltz's well-known categories from *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

8 See Eric Easley, *The War over Perpetual Peace: An Exploration of the History of a Foundational International Relations Text* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) for a valuable survey of the debates over Kant's text.

9 See Lee Sigelman, "*The American Political Science Review* citation classics," *American Pol. Sci. Rev.* 100(4), Nov. 2006, pp. 667–?.

1   Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs, part 1*

I

What difference do liberal principles and institutions make to the conduct of the foreign affairs of liberal states? A thicket of conflicting judgments suggests that the legacies of liberalism have not been clearly appreciated. For many citizens of liberal states, liberal principles and institutions have so fully absorbed domestic politics that their influence on foreign affairs tends to be either overlooked altogether or, when perceived, exaggerated. Liberalism becomes either unself-consciously patriotic or inherently "peaceloving." For many scholars and diplomats, the relations among independent states appear to differ so significantly from domestic politics that influences of liberal principles and domestic liberal institutions are denied or denigrated. They judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics.[1]

Although liberalism is misinterpreted from both these points of view, a crucial aspect of the liberal legacy is captured by each. Liberalism is a distinct ideology and set of institutions that has shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez faire. It defines much of the content of the liberal patriot's nationalism. Liberalism does appear to disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Thus its foreign relations cannot be adequately explained (or prescribed) by a sole reliance on the balance of power. But liberalism is not inherently "peace-loving"; nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent. Furthermore, liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions that a world peace may well require in the nuclear age. Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces the possibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest. It has strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a separate peace among liberal societies.

Putting together these apparently contradictory (but, in fact, compatible) pieces of the liberal legacy begins with a discussion of the range of liberal principle and practice. This article highlights the differences between liberal practice toward

other liberal societies and liberal practice toward nonliberal societies. It argues that liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in the first and has contributed to exceptional confusion in the second. Appreciating these liberal legacies calls for another look at one of the greatest of liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.

II

Liberalism has been identified with an essential principle – the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. This principle has generated rights and institutions.

A commitment to a threefold set of rights forms the foundation of liberalism. Liberalism calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called "negative freedom," which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the "positive freedoms." Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community.

These three sets of rights, taken together, seem to meet the challenge that Kant identified:

> To organize a group of rational beings who demand general laws for their survival, but of whom each inclines toward exempting himself, and to establish their constitution in such a way that, in spite of the fact their private attitudes are opposed, these private attitudes mutually impede each other in such a manner that [their] public behavior is the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes.[2]

But the dilemma within liberalism is how to reconcile the three sets of liberal rights. The right to private property, for example, can conflict with equality of opportunity and both rights can be violated by democratic legislation. During the 180 years since Kant wrote, the liberal tradition has evolved two high roads to individual freedom and social order; one is laissez-faire or "conservative" liberalism and the other is social welfare, or social democratic, or "liberal" liberalism. Both reconcile these conflicting rights (though in differing ways) by successfully organizing free individuals into a political order.

The political order of laissez-faire and social welfare liberals is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical

equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved.[3] Most pertinently for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor to the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military castes over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition (for example, by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

In order to protect the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, laissez-faire liberalism has leaned toward a highly constrained role for the state and a much wider role for private property and the market. In order to promote the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, welfare liberalism has expanded the role of the state and constricted the role of the market.[4] Both, nevertheless, accept these four institutional requirements and contrast markedly with the colonies, monarchical regimes, military dictatorships, and communist party dictatorships with which they have shared the political governance of the modern world.

The domestic successes of liberalism have never been more apparent. Never have so many people been included in, and accepted the domestic hegemony of, the liberal order; never have so many of the world's leading states been liberal,

Table 1.1 Liberal regimes and the pacific union (by date "liberal")

Period	Liberal regimes and the pacific union (by date "liberal")[a]	Total number
18th century	Swiss Cantons[b] French Republic 1790–1795 United States[b] 1776–	3
1800–1850	Swiss Confederation, United States France 1830–1849 Belgium 1830– Great Britain 1832– Netherlands 1848– Piedmont 1848– Denmark 1849–	8
1850–1900	Switzerland, United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands Piedmont –1861, Italy 1861– Denmark –1866 Sweden 1864–	13

Table 1.1 Continued

Period	Liberal regimes and the pacific union (by date "liberal")[a]	Total number
	Greece 1864–	
	Canada 1867–	
	France 1871–	
	Argentina 1880–	
	Chile 1891–	
1900–1945	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada	29
	Greece –1911, 1928–1936	
	Italy –1922	
	Belgium –1940	
	Netherlands –1940	
	Argentina –1943	
	France –1940	
	Chile –1924, 1932	
	Australia 1901–	
	Norway 1905–1940	
	New Zealand 1907–	
	Colombia 1910–1949	
	Denmark 1914–1940	
	Poland 1917–1935	
	Latvia 1922–1934	
	Germany 1918–1932	
	Austria 1918–1934	
	Estonia 1919–1934	
	Finland 1919–	
	Uruguay 1919–	
	Costa Rica 1919–	
	Czechoslovakia 1920–1939	
	Ireland 1920–	
	Mexico 1928–	
	Lebanon 1944–	
1945[c]–	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Mexico	49
	Uruguay –1973	
	Chile –1973	
	Lebanon –1975	
	Costa Rica –1948, 1953–	
	Iceland 1944–	
	France 1945–	
	Denmark 1945–	
	Norway 1945–	
	Austria 1945–	
	Brazil 1945–1954, 1955–1964	
	Belgium 1946–	
	Luxemburg 1946–	
	Netherlands 1946–	
	Italy 1946–	
	Philippines 1946–1972	
	India 1947–1975, 1977–	

Sri Lanka 1948–1961, 1963–1977, 1978–
Ecuador 1948–1963, 1979–
Israel 1949–
West Germany 1949–
Peru 1950–1962, 1963–1968, 1980–
El Salvador 1950–1961
Turkey 1950–1960, 1966–1971
Japan 1951–
Bolivia 1956–1969
Colombia 1958–
Venezuela 1959–
Nigeria 1961–1964, 1979–
Jamaica 1962–
Trinidad 1962–
Senegal 1963–
Malaysia 1963–
South Korea 1963–1972
Botswana 1966–
Singapore 1965–
Greece 1975–
Portugal 1976–
Spain 1978–
Dominican Republic 1978–

Sources: Arthur Banks and W. Overstreet, eds., *The Political Handbook of the World*, 1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *A Year Book of the Commonwealth 1980* (London: HMSO, 1980); *Europa Yearbook, 1981* (London: Europa, 1981); W. L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968); Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981); and *Freedom at Issue*, no. 54 (Jan.–Feb. 1980).

Notes
a. I have drawn up this approximate list of "liberal regimes" according to the four institutions described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or monarchical), representative, government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively, either potentially or actually, elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (that is, 30 percent) or open to "achievement" by inhabitants (for example, to poll-tax payers or householders) of the national or metropolitan territory. Female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded; and representative government is internally sovereign (for example, including and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years).
b. There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient "republics," since none appear to fit Kant's criteria. See Stephen Holmes, "Aristippus in and out of Athens," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 1 (March 1979).
c. Selected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million.

whether as republics or as constitutional monarchies. Indeed, the success of liberalism as an answer to the problem of masterless men in modern society is reflected in the growth in the number of liberal regimes from the three that existed when Kant wrote to the more than forty that exist today. But we should not be complacent about the domestic affairs of liberal states. Significant practical problems

endure: among them are enhancing citizen participation in large democracies, distributing "positional goods" (for example, prestigious jobs), controlling bureaucracy, reducing unemployment, paying for a growing demand for social services, reducing inflation, and achieving large-scale restructuring of industries in response to growing foreign competition.[5] Nonetheless, these domestic problems have been widely explored though they are by no means solved. Liberalism's foreign record is more obscure and warrants more consideration.

III

In foreign affairs liberalism has shown, as it has in the domestic realm, serious weaknesses. But unlike liberalism's domestic realm, its foreign affairs have experienced startling but less than fully appreciated successes. Together they shape an unrecognized dilemma, for both these successes and weaknesses in large part spring from the same cause: the international implications of liberal principles and institutions.

The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory.[6] When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect.

These conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkably effective kind. *Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.*[7] No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states. Indeed, threats of war also have been regarded as illegitimate. A liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has expanded despite numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategic interest.

During the nineteenth century, the United States and Britain negotiated the northern frontier of the United States. During the American Civil War, the commercial linkages between the Lancashire cotton economy and the American South and the sentimental links between the British aristocracy and the Southern plantocracy (together with numerous disputes over the rights of British shipping against the Northern blockade) brought Great Britain and the Northern states to the brink of war, but they never passed over that brink. Despite an intense Anglo-French colonial rivalry, crises such as Fashoda in 1898 were resolved without going to war. Despite their colonial rivalries, liberal France and Britain formed an entente before World War I against illiberal Germany (whose foreign relations were controlled by the Kaiser and the Army). During 1914–15 Italy, the liberal

Table 1.2 International wars listed chronologically*

British-Maharattan (1817–1818)	Mahdist (1882–1885)
Greek (1821–1828)	Sino-French (1884–1885)
Franco-Spanish (1823)	Central American (1885)
First Anglo-Burmese (1823–1826)	Serbo-Bulgarian (1885)
Javanese (1825–1830)	Sino-Japanese (1894–1895)
Russo-Persian (1826–1828)	Franco-Madagascan (1894–1895)
Russo-Turkish (1828–1829)	Cuban (1895–1898)
First Polish (1831)	Italo-Ethiopian (1895–1896)
First Syrian (1831–1832)	First Philippine (1896–1898)
Texan (1835–1836)	Greco-Turkish (1897)
First British-Afghan (1838–1842)	Spanish-American (1898)
Second Syrian (1839–1840)	Second Philippine (1899–1902)
Franco-Algerian (1839–1847)	Boer (1899–1902)
Peruvian-Bolivian (1841)	Boxer Rebellion (1900)
First British-Sikh (1845–1846)	Ilinden (1903)
Mexican-American (1846–1848)	Russo-Japanese (1904–1905)
Austro-Sardinian (1848–1849)	Central American (1906)
First Schleswig-Holstein (1848–1849)	Central American (1907)
Hungarian (1848–1849)	Spanish-Moroccan (1909–1910)
Second British-Sikh (1848–1849)	Italo-Turkish (1911–1912)
Roman Republic (1849)	First Balkan (1912–1913)
La Plata (1851–1852)	Second Balkan (1913)
First Turco-Montenegran (1852–1853)	World War I (1914–1918)
Crimean (1853–1856)	Russian Nationalities (1917–1921)
Anglo-Persian (1856–1857)	Russo-Polish (1919–1920)
Sepoy (1857–1859)	Hungarian-Allies (1919)
Second Turco-Montenegran (1858–1859)	Greco-Turkish (1919–1922)
Italian Unification (1859)	Riffian (1921–1926)
Spanish-Moroccan (1859–1860)	Druze (1925–1927)
Italo-Roman (1860)	Sino-Soviet (1929)
Italo-Sicilian (1860–1861)	Manchurian (1931–1933)
Franco-Mexican (1862–1867)	Chaco (1932–1935)
Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863)	Italo-Ethiopian (1935–1936)
Second Polish (1863–1864)	Sino-Japanese (1937–1941)
Spanish-Santo Dominican (1863–1865)	Changkufeng (1938)
Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864)	Nomohan (1939)
Lopez (1864–1870)	World War II (1939–1945)
Spanish-Chilean (1865–1866)	Russo-Finnish (1939–1940)
Seven Weeks (1866)	Franco-Thai (1940–1941)
Ten Years (1868–1878)	Indonesian (1945–1946)
Franco-Prussian (1870–1871)	Indochinese (1945–1954)
Dutch-Achinese (1873–1878)	Madagascan (1947–1948)
Balkan (1875–1877)	First Kashmir (1947–1949)
Russo-Turkish (1877–1878)	Palestine (1948–1949)
Bosnian (1878)	Hyderabad (1948)
Second British-Afghan (1878–1880)	Korean (1950–1953)
Pacific (1879–1880)	Algerian (1954–1962)
British-Zulu (1879)	Russo-Hungarian (1956)
Franco-Indochinese (1882–1884)	Sinai (1956)

(*Continued overleaf*)

Table 1.2 Continued

Tibetan (1956–1959)	Turco-Cypriot (1974)
Sino-Indian (1962)	Ethiopian-Eritrean (1974–)
Vietnamese (1965–1975)	Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975–)
Second Kashmir (1965)	Timor (1975–)
Six Day (1967)	Saharan (1975–)
Israeli-Egyptian (1969–1970)	Ogaden (1976–)
Football (1969)	Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978–1979)
Bangladesh (1971)	Sino-Vietnamese (1979)
Philippine-MNLF (1972–)	Russo-Afghan (1979–)
Yom Kippur (1973)	Irani-Iraqi (1980–)

* The table is reprinted by permission from Melvin Small and J. David Singer from *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 79–80. This is a partial list of international wars fought between 1816 and 1980. In Appendices A and B of *Resort to Arms*, Small and Singer identify a total of 575 wars in this period; but approximately 159 of them appear to be largely domestic, or civil wars.

  This definition of war excludes covert interventions, some of which have been directed by liberal regimes against other liberal regimes. One example is the United States' effort to destabilize the Chilean election and Allende's government. Nonetheless, it is significant (as will be apparent below) that such interventions are not pursued publicly as acknowledged policy. The covert destabilization campaign against Chile is recounted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–73*, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

  The argument of this article (and this list) also excludes civil wars. Civil wars differ from international wars not in the ferocity of combat but in the issues that engender them. Two nations that could abide one another as independent neighbors separated by a border might well be the fiercest of enemies if forced to live together in one state, jointly deciding how to raise and spend taxes, choose leaders, and legislate fundamental questions of value. Notwithstanding these differences, no civil wars that I recall upset the argument of liberal pacification.

member of the Triple Alliance with illiberal Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under the Triple Alliance to either support its allies or remain neutral. Instead, Italy, a liberal regime, joined the alliance with France and Britain that would prevent it from having to fight other liberal states, and declared war on Austria and Germany, its former allies. And despite generations of Anglo-American tension and British restrictions on American trade, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917. Nowhere was this special peace among liberal states more clearly proclaimed than in President Woodrow Wilson's "War Message" of 2 April 1917: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."[8]

  Statistically, war between any two states (in any single year or other short period of time) is a low probability event. War between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, may be somewhat more probable. The apparent absence of war among the more clearly liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred years thus has some significance. Politically more significant, perhaps, is that, when states are forced to decide, by the pressure of an impinging

world war, on which side of a world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies. And historically, we should recall that medieval and early modern Europe were the warring cockpits of states, wherein France and England and the Low Countries engaged in near constant strife. Then in the late eighteenth century there began to emerge liberal regimes. At first hesitant and confused, and later clear and confident as liberal regimes gained deeper domestic foundations and longer international experience, a pacific union of these liberal states became established.

The Realist model of international relations, which provides a plausible explanation of the general insecurity of states, offers little guidance in explaining the pacification of the liberal world. Realism, in its classical formulation, holds that the state is and should be formally sovereign, effectively unbounded by individual rights nationally and thus capable of determining its own scope of authority. (This determination can be made democratically, oligarchically, or autocratically.) Internationally, the sovereign state exists in an anarchical society in which it is radically independent; neither bounded nor protected by international "law" or treaties or duties, and hence, insecure. Hobbes, one of the seventeenth century founders of the Realist approach drew the international implications of Realism when he argued that the existence of international anarchy, the very independence of states, best accounts for the competition, the fear, and the temptation toward preventive war that characterize international relations. Politics among nations is not a continuous combat, but it is in this view a "state of war . . . a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known."[9]

In international relations theory, three "games" explain the fear that Hobbes saw as a root of conflict in the state of war. First, even when states share an interest in a common good that could be attained by cooperation, the absence of a source of global law and order means that no one state can count upon the cooperative behavior of the others. Each state therefore has a rational incentive to defect from the cooperative enterprise even if only to pursue a good whose value is less than the share that would have been obtained from the successful accomplishment of the cooperative enterprise (this is Rousseau's "stag dilemma"). Second, even though each state knows that security is relative to the armaments level of potential adversaries and even though each state seeks to minimize its arms expenditure, it also knows that, having no global guarantee of security, being caught unarmed by a surprise attack is worse than bearing the costs of armament. Each therefore arms; all are worse off (this is the "security dilemma," a variant of the "prisoner's dilemma"). Third, heavily armed states rely upon their prestige, their credibility, to deter states from testing the true quality of their arms in battle, and credibility is measured by a record of successes. Once a posture of confrontation is assumed, backing down, although rational for both together, is not rational (first best) for either individually if there is some chance that the other will back down first (the game of "chicken").[10]

Specific wars therefore arise from fear as a state seeking to avoid a surprise attack decides to attack first; from competitive emulation as states lacking an

imposed international hierarchy of prestige struggle to establish their place; and from straightforward conflicts of interest that escalate into war because there is no global sovereign to prevent states from adopting that ultimate form of conflict resolution. Herein lie Thucydides's trinity of "security, honor, and self-interest" and Hobbes's "diffidence," "glory," and "competition" that drive states to conflict in the international state of war.[11]

Finding that all states, including liberal states, do engage in war, the Realist concludes that the effects of differing domestic regimes (whether liberal or not) are overridden by the international anarchy under which all states live.[12] Thus Hobbes does not bother to distinguish between "some council or one man" when he discusses the sovereign. Differing domestic regimes do affect the quantity of resources available to the state as Rousseau (an eighteenth-century Realist) shows in his discussion of Poland, and Morgenthau (a twentieth-century Realist) demonstrates in his discussion of morale.[13] But the ends that shape the international state of war are decreed for the Realist by the anarchy of the international order and the fundamental quest for power that directs the policy of all States, irrespective of differences in their domestic regimes. As Rousseau argued, international peace therefore depends on the abolition of international relations either by the achievement of a world state or by a radical isolationism (Corsica). Realists judge neither to be possible.

First, at the level of the strategic decisionmaker, Realists argue that a liberal peace could be merely the outcome of prudent diplomacy. Some, including Hobbes, have argued that sovereigns have a natural duty not to act against "the reasons of peace."[14] Individuals established (that is, should establish) a sovereign to escape from the brutalities of the state of nature, the war of all against all, that follows from competition for scarce goods, scrambles for prestige, and fear of another's attack when there is no sovereign to provide for lawful acquisition or regularized social conduct or personal security. "Dominions were constituted for peace's sake, and peace was sought for safety's sake"; the natural duty of the sovereign is therefore the safety of the people. Yet prudent policy cannot be an enforceable right of citizens because Hobbesian sovereigns, who remain in the state of nature with respect to their subjects and other sovereigns, cannot themselves be subjects.

Nevertheless, the interstate condition is not necessarily the original brutality only now transposed to the frontiers. The sovereign is personally more secure than any individual in the original state of nature and soldiers too are by nature timorous. Unlike individuals, states are not equal; some live more expansively by predominance, others must live only by sufferance. Yet a policy of safety is not a guarantee of peace. The international condition for Hobbes remains a state of war. Safety enjoins a prudent policy of forewarning (spying) and of forearming oneself to increase security against other sovereigns who, lacking any assurance that you are not taking these measures, also take them. Safety also requires (morally) taking actions "whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they [the sovereign] suspect, whether by slight or force."[15] If preventive wars are prudent, the Realists' prudence obviously cannot account for

more than a century and a half of peace among independent liberal states, many of which have crowded one another in the center of Europe.

Recent additions to game theory specify some of the circumstances under which prudence could lead to peace. Experience; geography; expectations of cooperation and belief patterns; and the differing payoffs to cooperation (peace) or conflict associated with various types of military technology all appear to influence the calculus.[16] But when it comes to acquiring the techniques of peaceable interaction, nations appear to be slow, or at least erratic, learners. The balance of power (more below) is regarded as a primary lesson in the Realist primer, but centuries of experience did not prevent either France (Louis XIV, Napoleon I) or Germany (Wilhelm II, Hitler) from attempting to conquer Europe, twice each. Yet some, very new, black African states appear to have achieved a twenty-year-old system of impressively effective standards of mutual toleration. These standards are not completely effective (as in Tanzania's invasion of Uganda); but they have confounded expectations of a scramble to redivide Africa.[17] Geography – "insular security" and "continental insecurity" – may affect foreign policy attitudes; but it does not appear to determine behavior, as the bellicose records of England and Japan suggest. Beliefs, expectations, and attitudes of leaders and masses should influence strategic behavior. A survey of attitudinal predispositions of the American public indicate that a peaceable inclination would be enhanced by having at the strategic helm a forty-five-year-old, black, female, pediatrician of Protestant or Jewish faith, resident in Bethesda, Maryland.[18] Nevertheless, it would be difficult to determine if liberal leaders have had more peaceable attitudes than leaders who lead nonliberal states. But even if one did make that discovery, he also would have to account for why these peaceable attitudes only appear to be effective in relations with other liberals (since wars with nonliberals have not been uniformly defensive).

More substantial contributions have been made in the logic of game theory decision under differing military technologies. These technologies can alter the payoffs of the "security dilemma": making the costs of noncooperation high, reducing the costs of being unprepared or surprised, reducing the benefits of surprise attack, or increasing the gains from cooperation. In particular, Jervis recently has examined the differing effects of situations in which the offense or the defense has the advantage and in which offensive weapons are or are not distinguishable from defensive weapons. When the offense has the advantage and weapons are indistinguishable, the level of insecurity is high, incentives for preemptive attack correspondingly are strong. When offensive weapons do not have an advantage and offensive weapons are distinguishable the incentives for preemptive attack are low, as are the incentives for arms races. Capable of signalling with clarity a nonaggressive intent and of guaranteeing that other states pose no immediate strategic threat, statesmen should be able to adopt peaceable policies and negotiate disputes. But, this cannot be the explanation for the liberal peace. Military technologies changed from offensive to defensive and from distinguishable to nondistinguishable, yet the pacific union persisted and persisted only among liberal states. Moreover, even the "clearest" technical messages appear

subject to garbling. The pre-1914 period, which objectively represented a triumph of the distinguishable defense (machine guns, barbed wire, trench warfare) over the offensive, subjectively, as Jervis notes, was a period which appeared to military leaders to place exceptional premiums on the offensive and thus on preemptive war.[19]

Second, at the level of social determinants, some might argue that relations among any group of states with similar social structures or with compatible values would be peaceful.[20] But again, the evidence for feudal societies, communist societies, fascist societies, or socialist societies does not support this conclusion. Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility. There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers (nor have they lasted long enough) to test fairly their pacific compatibility; but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, capitalist, military dictatorships fought each other in the 1930s. Communist powers have engaged in wars more recently in East Asia. And we have not had enough socialist societies to consider the relevance of socialist pacification. The more abstract category of pluralism does not suffice. Certainly Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with liberal states in 1914; Japan as well in 1941. But they were not liberal.

And third, at the level of interstate relations, neither specific regional attributes nor historic alliances or friendships can account for the wide reach of the liberal peace. The peace extends as far as, and no further than, the relations among liberal states, not including nonliberal states in an otherwise liberal region (such as the north Atlantic in the 1930s) nor excluding liberal states in a nonliberal region (such as Central America or Africa).

At this level, Raymond Aron has identified three types of interstate peace: empire, hegemony, and equilibrium.[21] An empire generally succeeds in creating an internal peace, but this is not an explanation of peace among independent liberal states. Hegemony can create peace by over-awing potential rivals. Although far from perfect and certainly precarious, United States hegemony, as Aron notes, might account for the interstate peace in South America in the postwar period during the height of the Cold War conflict. However, the liberal peace cannot be attributed merely to effective international policing by a predominant hegemon – Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the postwar period. Even though a hegemon might well have an interest in enforcing a peace for the sake of commerce or investments or as a means of enhancing its prestige or security; hegemons such as seventeenth-century France were not peace-enforcing police, and the liberal peace persisted in the interwar period when international society lacked a predominant hegemonic power. Moreover, this explanation overestimates hegemonic control in both periods. Neither England nor the United States was able to prevent direct challenges to its interests (colonial competition in the nineteenth century, Middle East diplomacy and conflicts over trading with the enemy in the postwar period). Where then was the capacity to prevent all armed conflicts between liberal regimes, many of which were remote and others strategically or economically insignificant? Liberal hegemony and leadership are important (see Section V below), but they are not sufficient to explain a liberal peace.

Peace through equilibrium (the multipolar classical balance of power or the bipolar "Cold War") also draws upon prudential sources of peace. An awareness of the likelihood that aggressive attempts at hegemony will generate international opposition should, it is argued, deter these aggressive wars. But bipolar stability discourages polar or superpower wars, not proxy or small power wars. And multipolar balancing of power also encourages warfare to seize, for example, territory for strategic depth against a rival expanding its power from internal growth.[22] Neither readily accounts for general peace or for the liberal peace.

Finally, some Realists might suggest that the liberal peace simply reflects the absence of deep conflicts of interest among liberal states. Wars occur outside the liberal zone because conflicts of interest are deeper there. But this argument does nothing more than raise the question of why liberal states have fewer or less fundamental conflicts of interest with other liberal states than liberal states have with nonliberal, or nonliberal states have with other nonliberals. We must therefore examine the workings of liberalism among its own kind – a special pacification of the "state of war" resting on liberalism and nothing either more specific or more general.

IV

Most liberal theorists have offered inadequate guidance in understanding the exceptional nature of liberal pacification. Some have argued that democratic states would be inherently peaceful simply and solely because in these states citizens rule the polity and bear the costs of wars. Unlike monarchs, citizens are not able to indulge their aggressive passions and have the consequences suffered by someone else. Other liberals have argued that laissez-faire capitalism contains an inherent tendency toward rationalism, and that, since war is irrational, liberal capitalisms will be pacifistic. Others still, such as Montesquieu, claim that "commerce is the cure for the most destructive prejudices," and "Peace is the natural effect of trade."[23] While these developments can help account for the liberal peace, they do not explain the fact that liberal states are peaceful only in relations with other liberal states. France and England fought expansionist, colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century (in the 1830s and 1840s against Algeria and China); the United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1848 and intervened again in 1914 under President Wilson. Liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as any other form of government or society in their relations with nonliberal states.

Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance. "Perpetual Peace," written in 1795, predicts the ever-widening pacification of the liberal pacific union, explains that pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that Perpetual Peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

The First Definitive Article holds that the civil constitution of the state must be republican. By republican, Kant means a political society that has solved the

problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A basically private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical freedom – the legal equality of citizens as subjects – on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally including himself. And tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he does not also administer.[24]

Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the "pacific union" described in the Second Definitive Article of the Eternal Peace. The pacific union is limited to "a treaty of the nations among themselves" which "maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands." The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until "very late and after many unsuccessful attempts." Then right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and good will will have taught all the nations the lessons of peace. Not until then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. But in the meantime, the "pacific union" of liberal republics "*steadily expands* [my emphasis]" bringing within it more and more republics (despite republican collapses, backsliding, and war disasters) and creating an ever-expanding separate peace.[25] The pacific union is neither a single peace treaty ending one war nor a world state or state of nations. The first is insufficient; the second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. Kant develops no organizational embodiment of this treaty, and presumably he does not find institutionalization necessary. He appears to have in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the Third Definitive Article.[26]

The Third Definitive Article of the Eternal Peace establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law "shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." In this he calls for the recognition of the "right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives upon the soil of another [country]," which "does not extend further than to the conditions which enable them [the foreigners] to attempt the developing of intercourse [commerce] with the old inhabitants." Hospitality does not require extending either the right to citizenship to foreigners or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas, without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).[27]

Kant then explains each of the three definitive articles for a liberal peace. In doing so he develops both an account of why liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. His central claim is that a natural evolution will produce "a harmony from the very disharmony of men against their will."[28]

The first source derives from a political evolution, from a *constitutional law*. Nature (providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.) "Asocial sociability" draws men together to fulfill needs for security and material welfare as it drives them into conflicts over the distribution and control of social products. This violent natural evolution tends toward the liberal peace because "asocial sociability" inevitably leads toward republican governments and republican governments are a source of the liberal peace.

Republican representation and separation of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is "organized well" to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by authority derived from representation, by general laws, and by nondespotic administration). States which are not organized in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus cede rights of representation to their subjects in order to strengthen their political support or to obtain tax revenue. This argument provides a plausible, logical connection between conflict, internal and external, and republicanism; and it highlights interesting associations between the rising incidence of international war and the increasing number of republics.

Nevertheless, constant preparation for war can enhance the role of military institutions in a society to the point that they become the society's rulers. Civil conflict can lead to praetorian coups. Conversely, an environment of security can provide a political climate for weakening the state by constitutional restraints.[29] Significantly, the most war-affected states have not been liberal republics.[30] More importantly, the argument is so indistinct as to serve only as a very general hypothesis that mobilizing self-interested individuals into the political life of states in an insecure world will eventually engender pressures for republican participation. Kant needs no more than this to suggest that republicanism and a liberal peace are possible (and thus a moral obligation). If it is possible, then sometime over the course of history it may be inevitable. But attempting to make its date of achievement predictable – projecting a steady trend – he suggests, may be asking too much. He anticipates backsliding and destructive wars, though these will serve to educate the nations to the importance of peace.[31]

Kant shows how republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations. He argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and once the habit of respect for individual rights is engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this:

> If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and,

to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it.[32]

One could add to Kant's list another source of pacification specific to liberal constitutions. The regular rotation of office in liberal democratic polities is a nontrivial device that helps ensure that personal animosities among heads of government provide no lasting, escalating source of tension.

These domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce Kant's "caution" in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. To see how this removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source.

Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, *international law* adds a second source – a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states – an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism." Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states "as culture progresses and men gradually come closer together toward a greater agreement on principles for peace and understanding."[33] As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends. In short, domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial.[34]

Lastly, *cosmopolitan law*, adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later

to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war.

Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. Furthermore, the interdependence of commerce and the connections of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational, bureaucratic, and domestic organizations create interests in favour of accommodation and have ensured by their variety that no single conflict sours an entire relationship.[35]

No one of these constitutional, international or cosmopolitan sources is alone sufficient, but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace. Liberal states have not escaped from the Realists' "security dilemma," the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. But the effects of international anarchy have been tamed in the relations among states of a similarly liberal character. Alliances of purely mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken, economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have proven fragile, but the political bond of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.

V

Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states. It has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. It failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims

(fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination. Far-sighted and constitutive measures have only been provided by the liberal international order when one liberal state stood preeminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did the United States following World War II, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as the British Loan, the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, the IMF, and the liberalization of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international liberal order.[36]

Thus, the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the liberal world. This danger is not that today's liberal states will permit their economic competition to spiral into war, but that the societies of the liberal world will no longer be able to provide the mutual assistance they might require to sustain liberal domestic orders in the face of mounting economic crises.

These dangers come from two directions: military and economic. Their combination is particularly threatening. One is the continuing asymmetry of defense, with the United States (in relation to its GNP) bearing an undue portion of the common burden. Yet independent and more substantial European and Japanese defense establishments pose problems for liberal cooperation. Military dependence on the United States has been one of the additional bonds helpful in transforming a liberal peace into a liberal alliance. Removing it, without creating a multilaterally directed and funded organization among the liberal industrial democracies, threatens to loosen an important bond. Economic instabilities could make this absence of a multilateral security bond particularly dangerous by escalating differences into hostility. If domestic economic collapses on the pattern of the global propagation of depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the domestic political foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if international economic rivalry were to continue to increase, then consequent attempts to weaken economic interdependence (establishing closed trade and currency blocs) would break an important source of liberal accommodation.[37] These dangers would become more significant if independent and substantial military forces were established. If liberal assumptions of the need to cooperate and to accommodate disappear, countries might fall prey to a corrosive rivalry that destroys the pacific union.

Yet liberals may have escaped from the single, greatest, traditional danger of international change – the transition between hegemonic leaders. When one great power begins to lose its preeminence and to slip into mere equality, a warlike resolution of the international pecking order becomes exceptionally likely. New power challenges old prestige, excessive commitments face new demands; so Sparta felt compelled to attack Athens, France warred with Spain, England and Holland fought with France (and with each other), and Germany and England struggled for the mastery of Europe in World War I. But here liberals may again be an exception, for despite the fact that the United States constituted Britain's greatest challenger along all the dimensions most central to the British maritime hegemony, Britain and the United States accommodated their differences.[38] After the defeat of Germany, Britain eventually, though not without regret, accepted its replacement by the United States as the commercial and maritime hegemon of the

liberal world. The promise of a peaceable transition thus may be one of the factors helping to moderate economic and political rivalries among Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Consequently, the quarrels with liberal allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan Administrations should not be attributed solely to the personal weaknesses of the two presidents or their secretaries of state. Neither should they be attributed to simple failures of administrative coordination or to the idiosyncracies of American allies. These are the normal workings of a liberal alliance of independent republics. There is no indication that they involve a dissolution of the pacific union; but there is every indication that, following the decline in American preponderance, liberal states will be able to do little to reestablish the union should the international economic interdependence that binds them dissolve and should the domestic, liberal foundations of its central members collapse. But should these republican foundations and commercial sources of interdependence remain firm, then the promise of liberal legacies among liberal regimes is a continuing peace, even when the leadership of the liberal world changes hands.

When in *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*, Julian (F. Scott Fitzgerald) tells his friend (Hemingway), "The very rich are different from you and me," his friend replies, "Yes, they have more money." But the liberals are fundamentally different. It is not just, as the Realists might argue, that they have more or less resources, better or worse morale. Their constitutional structure makes them – realistically – different. They have established peace among themselves. But the very features which make their relations to fellow liberals differ from the state of war that all other states inhabit also make their relations with nonliberals differ from the prudent, strategic calculation that Realists hope will inform the foreign policies of states in an insecure world. These failings are the subject of the second part of this article.

Notes

* This is the first half of a two-part article. The article has benefited from the extensive criticisms of William Ascher, Richard Betts, William Bundy, Joseph Carens, Felix Gilbert, Amy Gutmann, Don Herzog, Stanley Hoffman, Marion Levy, Judith Shaklar, Mark Uhlig, and the Editors of *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. I have also tried to take into account suggestions from Fouad Ajami, Steven David, Tom Farer, Robert Gilpin, Ernest van den Haag, Germaine Hoston, Robert Jervis, Donald Kagan, Robert Keohane, John Rawls, Nicholas Rizopoulos, Robert W. Tucker, Richard Ullman, and the members of a Special Seminar at the Lehrman Institute, February 22, 1983. The essay cannot be interpreted as a consensus of their views.

1 The liberal-patriotic view was reiterated by President Reagan in a speech before the British Parliament on 8 June 1982. There he proclaimed "a global campaign for democratic development." This "crusade for freedom" will be the latest campaign in a tradition that, he claimed, began with the Magna Carta and stretched in this century through two world wars and a Cold War. He added that liberal foreign policies have shown "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" and that this crusade will strengthen the prospects for a world at peace (*New York Times*, 9 June 1982). The skeptical scholars and diplomats represent the predominant Realist interpretation of international relations. See ns. 4 and 12 for references.

2 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" (1795) in *The Philosophy of Kant*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 453.

3 The actual rights of citizenship have often been limited by slavery or male suffrage, but liberal regimes harbored no principle of opposition to the extension of juridical equality; in fact, as pressure was brought to bear they progressively extended the suffrage to the entire population. By this distinction, nineteenth-century United States was liberal; twentieth-century South Africa is not. See Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

4 The sources of classic, laissez-faire liberalism can be found in Locke, the *Federalist Papers*, Kant, and Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Expositions of welfare liberalism are in the work of the Fabians and John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Amy Gutmann, *Liberal Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), discusses variants of liberal thought.

   Uncomfortably paralleling each of the high roads are "low roads" that, while achieving certain liberal values, fail to reconcile freedom and order. An overwhelming terror of anarchy and a speculation on preserving property can drive laissez-faire liberals to support a law-and-order authoritarian rule that sacrifices democracy. Authoritarianism to preserve order is the argument of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. It also shapes the argument of right wing liberals who seek to draw a distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" dictatorships. The justification sometimes advanced by liberals for the former is that they can be temporary and educate the population into an acceptance of property, individual rights, and, eventually, representative government. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45. Complementarily, when social inequalities are judged to be extreme, the welfare liberal can argue that establishing (or reestablishing) the foundations of liberal society requires a nonliberal method of reform, a second low road of redistributing authoritarianism. Aristide Zolberg reports a "liberal left" sensibility among U.S. scholars of African politics that justified reforming dictatorship. (See *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969], p. viii.) And the argument of "reforming autocracy" can be found in J. S. Mill's defense of colonialism in India.

5 Fred Hirsch, *The Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

6 Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) offers a clear and insightful discussion of liberal ideas on intervention and nonintervention.

7 There appear to be some exceptions to the tendency for liberal states not to engage in a war with each other. Peru and Ecuador, for example, entered into conflict. But for each, the war came within one to three years after the establishment of a liberal regime, that is, before the pacifying effects of liberalism could become deeply ingrained. The Palestinians and the Israelis clashed frequently along the Lebanese border, which Lebanon could not hold secure from either belligerent. But at the beginning of the 1967 War, Lebanon seems to have sent a flight of its own jets into Israel. The jets were repulsed. Alone among Israel's Arab neighbors, Lebanon engaged in no further hostilities with Israel. Israel's recent attack on the territory of Lebanon was an attack on a country that had already been occupied by Syria (and the P.L.O.). Whether Israel actually will withdraw (if Syria withdraws) and restore an independent Lebanon is yet to be determined.

8 Imperial Germany is a difficult case. The Reichstag was not only elected by universal male suffrage but, by and large, the state ruled under the law, respecting the civic equality and rights of its citizens. Moreover, Chancellor Bismarck began the creation of a social welfare society that served as an inspiration for similar reforms in liberal regimes. However, the constitutional relations between the imperial executive and the

representative legislature were sufficiently complex that various practices, rather than constitutional theory, determined the actual relation between the government and the citizenry. The emperor appointed and could dismiss the chancellor. Although the chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag, a defeat in the Reichstag did not remove him nor did the government absolutely depend on the Reichstag for budgetary authority. In practice, Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues. But the emperor's direct authority over the army, the army's effective independence from the minimal authority of the War Ministry, and the emperor's active role in foreign affairs (including the influential separate channel to the emperor through the military attachés) together with the tenuous constitutional relationship between the chancellor and the Reichstag made imperial Germany a state divorced from the control of its citizenry in foreign affairs.

   This authoritarian element not only influenced German foreign policymaking, but also shaped the international political environment (a lack of trust) the Reich faced and the domestic political environment that defined the government's options and capabilities (the weakness of liberal opinion as against the exceptional influence of junker militaristic nationalism). Thus direct influence on policy was but one result of the authoritarian element. Nonetheless, significant and strife-generating episodes can be directly attributed to this element. They include Tirpitz's approach to Wilhelm II to obtain the latter's sanction for a veto of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's proposals for a naval agreement with Britain (1909). Added to this was Wilhelm's personal assurances of full support to the Austrians early in the Sarajevo Crisis and his, together with Moltke's, erratic pressure on the Chancellor throughout July and August of 1914, which helped destroy whatever coherence German diplomacy might otherwise have had, and which led one Austrian official to ask, "Who rules in Berlin? Moltke or Bethmann?" (Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1964], pp. xxviii and chap. 6). For an excellent account of Bethmann's aims and the constraints he encountered, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History* 2 (1969).

   The liberal sources of Italy's decision are pointed out in R. Vivarelli's review of Hugo Butler's *Gaetano Salvemini und die Italienische Politik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* in the *Journal of Modern History* 52, no. 3 (September 1980): 541.

   The quotation from President Wilson is from Woodrow Wilson, *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), p. 378.

 9 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Penguin, 1980), I, chap. 13, 62; p. 186.
10 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 1 (January 1978).
11 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars*, trans. Rex Warner (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1954) I:76; and Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, chap. 13, 61, p. 185. The coincidence of views is not accidental; Hobbes translated Thucydides. And Hobbes's portrait of the state of nature appears to be drawn from Thucydides's account of the revolution in Corcyra.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 1959), pp. 120–23; and see his *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The classic sources of this form of Realism are Hobbes and, more particularly, Rousseau's "Essay on St. Pierre's Peace Project" and his "State of War" in *A Lasting Peace* (London: Constable, 1917), E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Year's Crisis: 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1951), and the works of Hans Morgenthau.
13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, trans. Willmoore Kendall (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); and Hans Morgenthay, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 132–35.

14 Hobbes, "De Cive," *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes* (London: J. Bohn, 1841), 2: 166–67.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 171.

16 Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," pp. 172–86.

17 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why West Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (October 1982).

18 Interpreted from Michael Haas, *International Conflict* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 80–81, 457–58.

19 Jevis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," pp. 186–210, 212. Jervis examines incentives for cooperation, not the existence or sources of peace.

20 There is a rich contemporary literature devoted to explaining international cooperation and integration. Karl Deutsch's *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) develops the idea of a "pluralistic security community" that bears a resemblance to the "pacific union," but Deutsch limits it geographically and finds compatibility of values, mutual responsiveness, and predictability of behavior among decision-makers as its essential foundations. These are important but their particular content, liberalism, appears to be more telling. Joseph Nye in *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971) steps away from the geographic limits Deutsch sets and focuses on levels of development; but his analysis is directed toward explaining integration – a more intensive form of cooperation than the pacific union.

21 Raymond Aron. *Peace and War* (New York: Praeger, 1968) pp. 151–54. Progress and peace through the rise and decline of empires and hegemonies has been a classic theme. Lucretius suggested that they may be part of a more general law of nature: "Augescunt aliae gentes, aliae minuntur/Inque brevi spatio mutantur saecula animantum,/Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt." [Some peoples wax and others wane/And in a short space the order of living things is changed/And like runners hand on the torch of life.] *De Rer. Nat.* ii, 77–79.

22 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 8; and Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 3.

One of the most thorough collective investigations of the personal, societal, and international systemic sources of war has been the Correlates of War Project. See especially Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982) for a more comprehensive list and statistical analysis of wars. J. David Singer ("Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline," *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 1 [1981]) drew the following conclusions: "The exigencies of survival in an international system of such inadequate organization and with so pervasively dysfunctional a culture require relatively uniform response (p. 11) . . . domestic factors are negligible;" war "cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena" (p. 1).

Michael Haas, *International Conflict*, discovers that, at the systemic level, "collective security, stratification, and hegemonization systems are likely to avoid a high frequency in violent outputs" (p. 453); but "no single [causal] model was entirely or even largely satisfactory" (p. 452). At the social level, war correlates with variables such as: "bloc prominence, military mobilizations, public perceptions of hostility toward peoples of other countries, a high proportion of gross national product devoted to military expenditures . . ." (p. 461). These variables appear to describe rather than explain war. A cluster analysis he performs associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with the existence of peaceful countries (pp. 464–65). But these factors do not correlate with pacification during the period 1816–1965 according to M. Small and J. D. Singer, "The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 50, no. 4 (Summer 1976).

Their conclusions follow, I think, from their homogenization of war and from their attempt to explain all wars, in which a myriad of states have engaged. I attempt to

explain an interstate peace, which only liberal regimes, a particular type of state and society, have succeeded in establishing.

23 The incompatibility of democracy and war is forcefully asserted by Paine in *The Rights of Man*. The connection between liberal capitalism, democracy, and peace is argued by, among others, Joseph Schumpeter in *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridian, 1955); and Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws* I, bk. 20, chap. 1. This literature is surveyed and analyzed by Albert Hirschman, "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 20 (December 1982).

24 Two classic sources that examine Kant's international theory from a Realist perspective are Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace" in the *State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965) and Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June 1962). I have benefited from their analysis and from those of Karl Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chap. 4; W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chap. 1; and particularly Patrick Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983). But some of the conclusions of this article differ markedly from theirs.

Kant's republican constitution is described in Kant, "Perpetual Peace," *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 437 and analyzed by Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, chap. 5.

25 Kant, "Universal History," *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 123. The pacific union follows a process of "federalization" such that it "can be realized by a gradual extension to all states, leading to eternal peace." This interpretation contrasts with those cited in n. 24. I think Kant meant that the peace would be established among liberal regimes and would expand as new liberal regimes appeared. By a process of gradual extension the peace would become global and then perpetual; the occasion for wars with nonliberals would disappear as nonliberal regimes disappeared.

26 Kant's "Pacific Union," the *foedus pacificum*, is thus neither a *pactum pacis* (a single peace treaty) nor a *civitas gentium* (a world state). He appears to have anticipated something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United Nations. One could argue that these two institutions in practice worked for liberal states and only for liberal states. But no specifically liberal "pacific union" was institutionalized. Instead liberal states have behaved for the past 180 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of Perpetual Peace had been signed. This follows Riley's views of the legal, not the organizational, character of the *foedus pacificum*.

27 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 444–47.

28 Kant, the fourth principle of "The Idea for a Universal History" in *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 120. Interestingly, Kant's three sources of peace (republicanism, respect, and commerce) parallel quite closely Aristotle's three sources of friendship (goodness, pleasure or appreciation, and utility). See *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 8, chap. 3, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1955).

29 The "Prussian Model" suggests the connection between insecurity, war, and authoritarianism. See *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*, ed. Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), "Introduction," for an argument linking security and liberalism.

30 Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 176–79.

31 Kant, "The Idea for a Universal History," p. 124.

32 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in *The Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), pp. 790–92.

Gallie in *Philosophers of Peace and War* criticizes Kant for neglecting economic, religious, nationalistic drives toward war and for failing to appreciate that "regimes" make war in order to enhance their domestic political support. But Kant holds that these drives should be subordinated to justice in a liberal society (he specifically criticizes

colonial wars stimulated by rapaciousness). He also argues that *republics* derive their legitimacy from their accordance with law and representation, thereby freeing them from crises of domestic political support. Kant thus acknowledges both Gallie's sets of motives for war but argues that they would not apply within the pacific union.

33 Kant, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 454. These factors also have a bearing on Karl Deutsch's "compatibility of values" and "predictability of behavior" (see n. 20).

34 A highly stylized version of this effect can be found in the Realist's "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. There a failure of mutual trust and the incentives to enhance one's own position produce a noncooperative solution that makes both parties worse off. Contrarily, cooperation, a commitment to avoid exploiting the other party, produces joint gains. The significance of the game in this context is the character of its participants. The "prisoners" are presumed to be felonious, unrelated apart from their partnership in crime, and lacking in mutual trust – competitive nation states in an anarchic world. A similar game between fraternal or sororal twins – Kant's republics – would be likely to lead to different results. See Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (April 1968), for an exposition of the role of presumptions; and "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978), for the factors Realists see as mitigating the security dilemma caused by anarchy.

   Also, expectations (including theory and history) can influence behavior, making liberal states expect (and fulfill) pacific policies toward each other. These effects are explored at a theoretical level in R. Dacey, "Some Implications of 'Theory Absorption' for Economic Theory and the Economics of Information" in *Philosophical Dimensions of Economics*, ed. J. Pitt (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1980).

35 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), chaps. 1–2, and Samuel Huntington and Z. Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963, 1964), chap. 9. And see Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) for a detailed case study of interliberal politics.

36 Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, "Politicization in the World Economy" in Hirsch, Doyle and Edward Morse, *Alternatives to Monetary Disorder* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/McGraw-Hill, 1977).

37 Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future," *International Organization* 29, no. 1 (Winter 1975).

38 George Liska identifies this peaceful, hegemonic transition as exceptional in *Quest for Equilibrium: America and the Balance of Power on Land and Sea* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), chap. 4, p. 75. Wilson's speeches, including his "War Message," suggest the importance of ideological factors in explaining this transition: "Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the *existence* [emphasis supplied] of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people." This quotation is from Woodrow Wilson, *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), p. 378. Ross Gregory in *The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1971) offers an interpretation along these lines, combining commercial, financial, strategic, and ideological factors in his account of the policy which brought the United States onto a collision course with Germany.

2 Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs, part 2*

Even though liberalism has achieved striking success in creating a zone of peace and, with leadership, a zone of cooperation among states similarly liberal in character, liberalism has been equally striking as a failure in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world. In these foreign relations, liberalism leads to three confusing failings: the first two are what Hume called "imprudent vehemence" and, conversely, a "careless and supine complaisance"[1] the third is the political uncertainty that is introduced by the moral ambiguity of the liberal principles which govern the international distribution of property.

Imprudent vehemence is the most familiar failing. In relations with powerful states of a nonliberal character, liberal policy has been characterized by repeated failures of diplomacy. It has often raised conflicts of interest into crusades; it has delayed in taking full advantage of rivalries within nonliberal alliances; it has failed to negotiate stable mutual accommodations of interest. In relations with weak states of a nonliberal character, liberal policy has succumbed to imperial interventions that it has been unable to sustain or to profit from. Its interventions, designed to create liberal societies by promoting the economic development and political stability of nonliberal societies, have frequently failed to achieve their objects. Confusion, drift, costly crusades, spasmodic imperialism are the contrasting record of liberal foreign policy *outside* the liberal world. A failure to negotiate with the powerful and a failure to create stable clients among the weak are its legacies.[2] Why?

These failures mainly flow from two sources. First, outside the pacific union, liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the international state of war Hobbes and the Realists describe. Conflict and wars are a natural outcome of struggles for resources, prestige, and security among independent states; confusion is an unsurprising accompaniment in a state of war without reliable law or organization.

Second, these failures are also the natural complement of liberalism's success as an intellectual guide to foreign policy among liberal states. *The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non liberal societies.*

If the legitimacy of state action rests on the fact that it respects and effectively represents morally autonomous individuals, then states that coerce their citizens or foreign residents lack moral legitimacy. Even Kant regarded the attitude of "primitive peoples" attached to a lawless liberty as "raw, uncivilized, and an animalic degradation of humanity."[3] When states reject the cosmopolitan law of access (a rejection that authoritarian or communist states, whether weak or powerful, can often find advantageous and, indeed, necessary for their security), Kant declares that they violate natural law:

> The inhospitable ways of coastal regions, such as the Barbary Coast, where they rob ships in the adjoining seas or make stranded seamen into slaves, is contrary to natural law, as are the similarly inhospitable ways of the deserts and their Bedouins, who look upon the approach of a foreigner as giving them a right to plunder him.[4]

Nevertheless, Kant rejects conquest or imperial intervention as an equal wrong. The practice of liberal states, which in many cases only applies liberal principles in part, has not been so forbearing.

According to liberal practice, some nonliberal states, such as the United States' communist rivals, do not acquire the right to be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of other states. Instead conflicts of interest become interpreted as steps in a campaign of aggression against the liberal state. Of course, powerful authoritarian or totalitarian states, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, sometimes wage direct or indirect campaigns of aggression against liberal regimes. And totalitarian diplomacy is clouded by the pervasive secrecy these societies establish. But part of the atmosphere of suspicion can be attributed to the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people. Referring to fascist states, Cordell Hull concluded, "their very nature requires them to be aggressive."[5] Efforts by nonliberal states at accommodation thus become snares to trap the unwary. When the Soviets refuse to negotiate, they are plotting a world takeover. When they seek to negotiate, they are plotting even more insidiously. This extreme lack of public respect or trust is one of the major features that distinguishes relations between liberal and nonliberal societies from relations among liberal societies.

At the same time, lack of public trust constrains social and economic exchanges. Commercial interdependence can produce conflict as well as welfare when a society becomes dependent on foreign actions it cannot control. Among liberal societies the extent and variety of commercial exchanges guarantee that a single conflict of interest will not shape an entire relationship. But between liberal and nonliberal societies, these exchanges, because they are limited for security considerations, do not provide a counterweight to interstate political tension nor do they offer the variety that offsets the chance that a single conflict of interest will define an entire relationship.

Furthermore, the institutional heritage of liberal regimes – representation and division of powers – opens avenues for special interests to shape policy in ways

contrary to prudent diplomacy. As George Kennan has noted, this form of government "goes far to rule out the privacy, the flexibility, and the promptness and incisiveness of decision and action, which have marked the great imperial powers of the past and which are generally necessary to the conduct of an effective world policy by the rulers of a great state."[6] And these features may be compounded by the incentives for exaggerated claims that competitive electoral politics tends to encourage. The loss of these attributes is not harmful to interliberal relations (in fact, their absence is more likely to be beneficial), but the ills of ready access to foreign policy created by representation and the division of power multiply when a lack of trust is combined with the limited economic and social connection of extra-liberal relations. Together they promote an atmosphere of tension and a lobby for discord that can play havoc with both strategic choice and moral intent.

These three traits affect liberal relations both with powerful nonliberal states and with weak nonliberal societies, though in differing ways.

In relations with *powerful* nonliberal states the consequences of these three features have been missed opportunities to pursue the negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual strategic interest and the failure to construct wider schemes of accommodation that are needed to supplement arms control. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, this is the charge that Lord Sanderson levelled against Sir Eyre Crowe in Sanderson's response to Crowe's famous memorandum on the state of British relations with Germany.[7] Sanderson pointed out that Crowe interpreted German demands to participate in the settlement of international disputes and to have a "place in the sun" (colonies), of a size not too dissimilar to that enjoyed by the other great powers, as evidence of a fundamental aggressiveness driving toward world domination. Crowe may well have perceived an essential feature of Wilhelmine Germany, and Sanderson's attempt to place Germany in the context of other rising powers (bumptious but not aggressively pursuing world domination) may have been naive. But the interesting thing to note is less the conclusions reached than Crowe's chain of argument and evidence. He rejects continued accommodation (appeasement) with Germany not because he shows that Germany was more bumptious than France and not because he shows that Germany had greater potential as a world hegemon than the United States, which he does not even consider in this connection. Instead he is (legitimately) perplexed by the real uncertainty of German foreign policy and by its "erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit" which accords with the well-known personal characteristics of "the present Ruler of Germany."

Similar evidence of fundamental suspicion appears to characterize U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. In a fascinating memorandum to President Wilson written in 1919, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's advisers), recommended that the President speak out against the danger of "world domination" the "Bolsheviki" – a "tyranny that is the negation of democracy" – posed to free peoples. Rejecting military intervention as excessively costly and likely to "make us a party in reestablishing the reactionary classes in their economic domination over the lower classes," he proposed a "relief program" designed to undercut

some of the popular appeal the Bolsheviks were garnering both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Although acknowledging that the evidence was not yet clear, he concluded: "If the militant features of Bolshevism were drawn in colors with their true parallel with Prussianism as an attempt at world domination that we do not stand for, it would check the fears that today haunt all men's minds." (The actual U.S. intervention in the Soviet Union was limited to supporting anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak soldiers in Siberia and to protecting military supplies in Murmansk from German seizure.)[8]

In the postwar period, and particularly following the Korean War, U.S. diplomacy equated the "international Communist movement" (all communist states and parties) with "Communist imperialism" and with a domestic tyranny in the U.S.S.R. that required a Cold War contest and international subversion as means of legitimizing its own police state. John Foster Dulles most clearly expressed this conviction, together with his own commitment to a strategy of "liberation," when he declared: ". . . we shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others."[9]

Liberalism has also encouraged a tendency to misread communist threats in the Third World. Since communism is seen as inherently aggressive, Soviet military aid "destabilizes" parts of Africa in Angola and the Horn; the West protects allies. Thus the People's Republic of China was a "Soviet Manchukuo" while Diem was the "Winston Churchill of Asia." Both the actual (and unstable) dependence of these regimes on their respective superpowers and anticolonialism, the dominant force of the region, were discounted.

Most significantly, opportunities for splitting the Communist bloc along cleavages of strategic national interest were delayed. Burdened with the war in Vietnam, the United States took ten years to appreciate and exploit the strategic opportunity of the Sino-Soviet split. Even the signal strategic, "offensive" success of the early Cold War, the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, did not receive the wholehearted welcome that a strategic assessment of its importance would have warranted.[10] Both relationships, with Yugoslavia and China, become subject to alternating, largely ideologically derived, moods: visions of exceptionalism (they were "less ruthless," more organic to the indigenous, traditional culture) sparred with bouts of liberal soul-searching ("we cannot associate ourselves with a totalitarian state"). And these unresolved tensions continue to affect the strategic relationship with both communist independents.

A purely Realist focus on the balance of power would lead one to expect the hostility between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that emerged preeminent after the defeats of Nazi Germany and Japan. Furthermore, a bipolar rivalry raises perceptions of zero-sum conflict (what one gains the other must lose) and consequently a tendency toward overreaction. And liberalism is just one of many ideologies prone to ideological crusades and domestic "witch hunts."[11] But, Realists have no reason to anticipate the hesitation of the United States in exploiting divisions in the Communist bloc and in forming strategic relationships with the U.S.S.R.'s communist rivals. U.S. Cold War policy cannot be

explained without reference to U.S. liberalism. Liberalism creates both the hostility to communism, not just to Soviet power, and the crusading ideological bent of policy. Liberals do not merely distrust what they do; we dislike what they are – public violators of human rights. And to this view, laissez faire liberals contribute antisocialism and social democratic liberals add a campaign for democracy.

One would think this confused record of policy would have produced a disaster in the East-West balance of forces. Squandered opportunities to negotiate East-West balances of interest and erratic policy should have alienated the United States' allies and dissipated its strategic resources. But other factors mitigated liberal confusion and crusades. Communist nuclear weapons and state power dictated prudence, and mutual survival has called for detente. The liberal alliance was deeply rooted in the pacific union and almost impervious to occasional crises over alliance policy toward the Soviet Union. And the productivity of market economies provided resources that could be mobilized to sustain the strategic position of the liberal West despite a confusion of aims and strategy.

Dilemmas and disasters are also associated with liberal foreign policy toward *weak*, nonliberal states; no greater spirit of accommodation or tolerance for non-interventionist sovereignties informs liberal policy toward the many weak, nonliberal states in the Third World. Indeed, liberalism's record in the Third World is in many respects worse than in East-West relations, for here power is added to confusion. This problem affects both conservative liberals and welfare liberals, but the two can be distinguished by differing styles of intervention.[12]

Both liberal strains appear congenitally confused in analyzing and in prescribing for situations of intervention. The liberal dictum in favor of nonintervention does not hold. Respecting a nonliberal state's state rights to noninterference requires ignoring the violations of rights they inflict on their own populations. Addressing the rights of individuals in the Third World requires ignoring the rights of states to be free of foreign intervention. Bouts of one attitude replace bouts of the other; but since the legitimacy of the nonliberal state is discounted, the dominant tendency leads towards interventionism.

A liberal imperialism that promotes liberalism neither abroad nor at home was one result of this dilemma. Protecting "native rights" from "native" oppressors, and protecting universal rights of property and settlement from local transgressions, introduced especially liberal motives for imperial rule. Kant's right of universal hospitality justifies nothing more than the right to visit and exchange. Other liberals have been prepared to justify much more. Some argue that there is a universal right of settlement under which those who cannot earn a living in their own countries have a right to force others – particularly nomads and tribal hunters – to cede parts of their territory for more intensive settlement. J.S. Mill justifies even more coercive treatment of what he calls the "barbarous nations." They do not have the rights of civilized nations, "except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one." He justifies this imperial education for "barbarous" nations, while requiring nonintervention among "civilized" nations, because the former are not capable of reciprocating in the practice of liberal rights, and reciprocity is the foundation of liberal morality.[13]

Ending the slave trade destabilized nineteenth-century West African oligarchies, yet encouraging "legitimate trade" required protecting the property of European merchants; declaring the illegitimacy of suttee or of domestic slavery also attacked local cultural traditions that had sustained the stability of indigenous political authority. Europeans settling in sparsely populated areas destroyed the livelihood of tribes that relied on hunting. The tribes, quite defensively, retaliated in force; the settlers called for imperial protection.[14] The protection of cosmopolitan liberal rights thus bred a demand for imperial rule that violated the equality of American Indians, Africans, and Asians. In practice, once the exigencies of ruling an empire came into play, liberal imperialism resulted in the oppression of "native" liberals seeking self-determination in order to maintain imperial security: to avoid local chaos and the intervention of another imperial power attempting to take advantage of local disaffection.

Thus nineteenth-century liberals, such as Gladstone, pondered whether Egypt's protonationalist Arabi rebellion (1881–82) was truly liberal nationalist (they discovered it was not) before intervening to protect strategic lifelines to India, commerce, and investment.[15] Britain's Liberal Party faced similar dilemmas in managing Ireland; they erratically oscillated between coercion and reform. These foreign disasters contributed to the downfall of the Liberal Party as Parliament in 1886 chose to be ruled by a more aristocratic and stable Conservative Party. The Conservatives did pursue a steadier course of consistent coercion in Ireland and Egypt, yet in their effort to maintain a paramountcy in southern Africa they too were swept away in a campaign to protect the civic and property rights of British settlers (*uitlanders*) in the Boer's theocratic republics. These dilemmas of liberal imperialism are also reflected in U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean where, for example, following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Article III of the Platt Amendment gave the United States the "right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . ."[16]

The record of liberalism in the nonliberal world is not solely a catalogue of disasters. The North American West and the settlement colonies – Australia and New Zealand – represent a successful transplant of liberal institutions, albeit in a temperate, underpopulated, and then depopulated environment and at the cost of Indian and aborigine rights. Similarly, the twentieth-century expansion of liberalism into less powerful nonliberal areas has also had some striking successes. The forcible liberalization of Germany and Japan following World War II and the long covert financing of liberal parties in Italy are the more significant instances of successful transplant. Covert financing of liberalism in Chile and occasional diplomatic démarches to nudge aside military threats to noncommunist democratic parties (as in Peru in 1962, South Korea in 1963, and the Dominican Republic in 1962[17] and again in 1978) illustrate policies which, though less successful, were directed toward liberal goals. These particular postwar liberal successes also are the product of special circumstances: the existence of a potential liberal majority, temporarily suppressed, which could be reestablished by outside aid or unusually weak oligarchic, military, or communist opponents.[18]

Elsewhere in the postwar period, when the United States sought to protect liberals in the Third World from the "communist threat," the consequences of liberal foreign policy on the nonliberal society often became far removed from the promotion of individual rights. Intervening against "armed minorities" and "enemies of free enterprise" meant intervening for other armed minorities, some sustaining and sustained by oligarchies, others resting on little more than U.S. foreign aid and troops. Indigenous liberals simply had too narrow a base of domestic support.

To the conservative liberals, the alternatives are starkly cast: Third World authoritarians with allegiance to the liberal, capitalist West or "Communists" subject to the totalitarian East (or leftist nationalists who even if elected are but a slippery stepping stone to totalitarianism).[19] Conservative liberals are prepared to support the allied authoritarians. The communists attack property in addition to liberty, thereby provoking conservative liberals to covert or overt intervention, or "dollar-diplomacy" imperialism. The interventions against Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, and against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to fall into this pattern.[20]

To the social welfare liberals, the choice is never so clear. Aware of the need to intervene to democratize the distribution of social power and resources, they tend to have more sympathy for social reform. This can produce on the part of "radical" welfare liberals a more tolerant policy toward the attempts by reforming autocracies to redress inegalitarian distributions of property in the Third World. This more complicated welfare-liberal assessment can itself be a recipe for more extensive intervention. The large number of conservative oligarchs or military bureaucracies with whom the conservative liberal is well at home are not so congenial to the social welfare liberal; yet the communists are still seen as enemies of liberty. They justify more extensive intervention first to discover, then to sustain, Third World social democracy in a political environment that is either barely participatory or highly polarized. Thus Arthur Schlesinger recalls President Kennedy musing shortly after the assassination of Trujillo (former dictator of the Dominican Republic), "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime [by his followers] or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can't really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third." Another instance of this approach was President Carter's support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which was explained by one U.S. official in the following analogy: "There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits."[21]

Thus liberal policy toward the Third World state often fails to promote individual rights. Its consequences on liberalism at home may also be harmful. As Hobson pointed out in his study of imperialism, imperial security and imperial wars may enhance in the short run the position of nonliberal domestic forces, such as the military, and introduce in the longer run issues into the political debate, such as security, that raise the role of nonliberal coalitions of conservative oligarchy or technocracy.[22]

One might account for many of these liberal interventions in the Third World by geopolitical competition, the Realists' calculus of the balance of power, or by the desire to promote the national economic interests of the United States. The attempt to avoid Third World countries coming under the hegemony of the USSR or to preserve essential sources of raw materials are alternative interpretations of much of the policy attributed to liberalism which on their face are plausible. Yet these interventions are publicly justified in the first instance as attempts to preserve a "way of life": to defend freedom and private enterprise. The threat has been defined as "Communism," not just "Sovietism" or "economic nationalism." Expectations of being punished electorally, should they abandon groups they had billed as democratic allies contributed to the reluctance of U.S. politicians to withdraw from Vietnam. The consistent policy of seeking a legitimating election, however unpromising the circumstances for it (as in Vietnam), reflects the same liberal source.[23] Moreover, few communist or socialist Third World states actually do seek to cordon off their markets or raw materials from the liberal world economy. And the radical movements, first and foremost anticolonialist, against which the United States has intervened, have not been simple proxies for the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, by geopolitical considerations alone, the large interventions may have been counterproductive. The interventions have confirmed or enhanced the coherence of the Soviet bloc as the Chinese Civil War (U.S. logistical support for the KMT) and the drive to the Yalu of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Angolan War served to increase the dependence of the PRC, Vietnam, and Angola on the USSR. In each of these interventions, U.S. geopolitical interests might have been served best by supporting the communist side and encouraging its separation from the Soviet bloc. But because the United States failed to distinguish communism from Soviet power, this separation was impossible. Had the Soviet Union been a capitalist authoritarian superpower, geopolitical logic also would have led the United States to intervene against the expansion of its bloc.[24] But the United States intervenes against the expansion of communism regardless of geopolitical considerations just as it (along with Britain) did against Soviet communism following World War I.[25]

Is the United States anticommunist because communism is the ideology adopted by the Soviet Union; or are liberals anti-Soviet because the Soviet Union is the headquarters of communism? In encouraging intervention, the imprudent vehemences of geopolitics and the liberalisms cannot be clearly separated in a bipolar contest between a communist and a liberal superpower. Nonetheless, liberalism does appear to exacerbate intervention against weak nonliberals and hostility against powerful nonliberal societies.

VII

A second manifestation of international liberalism outside the pacific union lies in a reaction to the excesses of interventionism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal – "a careless and supine complaisance" – affects policy toward strategically and

economically important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical failing of the liberal great power, so complaisance characterizes declined or not quite risen liberal states.[26] Representative legislatures may become reluctant to fund the military establishment needed to play a geopolitical role. Rational incentives for "free riding" on the extended defense commitments of the leader of the liberal alliance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the nineteenth century, the United States informally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs. Today, the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic analysts, fail to bear their "fair" share of alliance burdens.

A different form of complaisance is charged by Realists who perceive ideologically based policies as self-indulgent. Oligarchic or authoritarian allies in the Third World do not find consistent support in a liberal policy that stresses human rights. They claim that the security needs of these states are neglected, that they fail to obtain military aid or more direct support when they need it (the Shah's Iran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and South Africa). Equally disturbing from a Realist point of view, communist regimes are shunned even when a detente with them could further United States strategic interests (Cuba, Angola). Welfare liberals particularly shun the first group, while laissez faire liberals balk at close dealings with the second. In both cases the Realists note that our economic interests or strategic interests are slighted.[27]

VIII

Lastly, both variants of liberalism raise dilemmas in North–South economic relations and particularly in the international distribution of property or income. Not expecting to have to resolve whether freedom of enterprise should extend to doing business with the followers of Marx and Lenin, conservative, laissez faire liberals have become incensed over the attractiveness to American and European corporations of profits made in the communist world. And the commitment of liberals – both social welfare and laissez faire liberals – to the efficiency and the political advantages of international free trade is severely tested by the inflow of low-cost imports from newly industrializing countries of the Third World. These imports threaten domestic industries, which tend to be politically active and affiliated with the extremes of conservative or welfare liberalism. Some of these have strongly resisted domestic, union organization (for reasons of cost) and thus strongly support domestic laissez faire, conservative liberalism (among these, most prominent are some textile firms). The welfare liberals face similar political dilemmas in their association with well-organized labor in related industries (for example, the garment industry) or in industries just recently threatened by imports (for example, steel or autos).[28]

In addition, the welfare liberal faces international moral and domestic political dilemmas. If the disadvantaged are rightly the objects of social welfare, redistribution should be directed toward the vast preponderance of the world's poor who are in the Third and Fourth Worlds. Three arguments reveal facets of the moral and political problems welfare liberals face.

First, there is the obligation of humanitarian aid. Peter Singer has argued that the humanitarian obligation an individual has to rescue a drowning child from a shallow pool of water (when such a rescue would not require a sacrifice of something of comparable moral importance, for example, one's own life) should be extended to international aid to famine victims and the global poor.[29] Recently, Brian Barry has provided a strong defense against skepticism concerning this obligation.[30] But he concludes that, while it is hard to doubt that .25 percent of national income (the U.S. figure for foreign aid) is too low, there does not seem to be a clear limit on how much aid of the enormous amount needed is obligatory. One should add that since this aid is required by needy individuals (mostly) in the Third and Fourth Worlds and not clearly owed to their states, the logistics of distributing humanitarian aid will prove difficult. And since this aid is due from individuals in the wealthy North, a limitless personal obligation to the world's poor threatens a form of tyrannical morality. Nor is the burden easily shifted to liberal governments in the North. Political obstacles to taxing rich liberal societies for humanitarian aid are evident. The income of the American poor places them among the world's more advantaged few. But the demand for redistributing income from the United States to the world's poor meets two domestic barriers: the United States poor *within* the United States are clearly disadvantaged, and our democratic politics places the needs of disadvantaged voting citizens above those of more disadvantaged but foreign people.

The second and third problems arise with respect to claims to international redistribution based on obligations of justice. Both establishing a just global society and justly distributing resources in an unjust international society raise apparently insuperable barriers.

In cases of extreme inequality and political recalcitrance within a country, the welfare liberals find justifiable a developmental, redistributing dictatorship to equalize opportunity as a necessary foundation for a just liberal society.[31] The liberal justification for such a dictatorial redistribution on a national scale is that without it authentically democratic liberal politics and social economy are rendered ineffective. The enormous social inequalities of the international order might – however implausibly – suggest the same prescription should apply to the international order. But extended to global scale, this prescription runs up against a fundamental liberal constraint. It is not clear that an effective global, liberal polity can be formed. Kant regarded global sovereignty, whether liberal in aim or not, as equivalent to global tyranny due to the remoteness of the representation it would entail. If the maximum effective size of a legislature is about 500, a global constituency would have to be of the order of 8 million persons. Confederal solutions that mix direct and indirect elections further attenuate the political life of the citizen or they create the grounds for serious conflict between the local government and the remote confederation. In short, the redistribution that can be justified on liberal grounds does not stretch beyond liberal government. Since modern states may already be too large for effectively liberal politics, global government cannot be a liberal aim. Yet without the prospect of moral autonomy through representative government this form of international redistribution is not justified on liberal grounds.

The dilemma of justly redistributing income in an international society of independent states is addressed by Brian Barry. After rejecting "just requitals" (just prices) for past exploitation as being inadequate justice for poor societies lacking any resources whatsoever and after rejecting justice as "fair play" (reciprocal obligations) for being ill-suited to the minimally integrated international economy, he settles on justice as equal rights.[32] He follows Hart's argument that special rights (to property) presuppose general rights (to property) and that natural resources (or inherited endowments) cannot be justly acquired without consent. Without consent, all have an equal right to global resources. The contemporary rich countries, therefore, owe a share of their income or resources to poor countries. Moreover, they owe this share without the requirement that it be directed to the poorest in the poor countries, because the rich have no right to impose conditions on income or property to which all have an equal right. If rich countries can dispose of global income autonomously, poor countries should have the same right.[33]

There are two objections that I think should be made against accepting Barry's principle of indiscriminate interstate justice. First, if justice is determined by the equal rights of individuals to global resources or inheritances, then rich *countries* only acquire income justly when they acquire it justly from individuals (for example, by consent). Only just countries have rights over the autonomous disposition of national income. An unjust rich state has no right to dispose or hold income. A just rich country, conversely, has the right to dispose autonomously of national income, provided that national income represents its just share of global income. Any surplus is owed to *individuals* who are poor or to just poor states that have acquired a right to dispose of income or resources by the consent of their citizens. Neither unjust poor states nor unjust rich states should (by the argument of equal rights of individuals) have rights over global income. If there were justice among "thieves," it might call for distribution without condition from unjust rich states to unjust poor states. But there is no reason why that scheme should apply to the surplus of just rich states beyond that which they distribute to just poor states. Some form of trust for the global poor (for present lack of such an institution, perhaps the World Bank or UNICEF) seems a better recipient than an unjust poor state. An obligation of equal justice that requires, say, Norway or Sweden to tax its citizens to provide direct transfers to a Somoza or a Duvalier in preference to funding the IDA of the World Bank or UNICEF is morally bizarre.[34]

The second objection reflects the residual insecurity of the contemporary order. As long as there is no guarantee of security, indiscriminate obligations of justice to redistribute income and resources (including redistribution to potential security threats) cannot be justified. Obliging Israel to tax itself for Syria, or Japan for China, or even the United States for Cuba threatens the rights of individuals within these states to promote their territorial integrity and political independence.

These two objections to the application of just redistribution should not apply within the pacific union. States within the liberal union do rest on consent and do not constitute threats to one another. Between the union's rich and poor members, obligations of justice to distribute global resources and income supplement

humanitarian obligations applicable globally to aid the poor. (Of course, obstacles are daunting. Among them are how to raise international revenue in a just fashion; how to distribute this revenue in an efficient manner; and how to persuade democratic citizens to support a lengthy program when some mismanagement is likely and when strategic ties to authoritarian allies make competitive demands on the revenues they have become accustomed to raise for foreign purposes. These obstacles may even make a public recognition of the obligation unlikely, but that does not mean it should not be recognized.)

To counterbalance these costly dilemmas in relations between liberal and nonliberal states, liberalism has had two attractive programs. One is a human rights policy that counters the record of colonial oppression and addresses the ills of current domestic oppression in the Second and Third Worlds. The other is a policy of free trade and investment. But neither has had the impact it might have. The attraction of human rights has been tarnished by liberal practice in supporting dictatorships; complementarily, human rights holds little attraction to dictatorial governments in the Third World. The market has been tarnished by unequal bargaining, and now that the bargaining has become more equal, by a mounting "new protectionism."

Liberal principles and economic institutions retain their attractive potential even though they alone cannot satisfy Third World needs such as creating national unity or reducing social inequalities. Releasing this potential from the burden of liberal practice is a feat the liberal world has yet to accomplish.

Thus liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in relations among liberal states as well as exceptional failures in relations between liberal and nonliberal states. Both tendencies are fundamentally rooted in the operation of liberalism within and across national borders. Both are liberalism's legacy in foreign affairs.

IX

No country lives strictly according to its political ideology and few liberal states are as hegemonically liberal as the United States.[35] Even in the United States, certain interests and domestic actors derive their sense of legitimacy from sources other than liberalism. The state's national security bureaucracy reflects an approach to politics among nations that focuses on other states, particularly threatening states. Its policies correspondingly tend to fall into the Realist, national interest frame of reference. Certain of the West European states and Japan have more syncretic and organic sources of a "real" national interest. But in the United States, and in other liberal states to a lesser degree, public policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles. Policies not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term public support. I have argued that these principles are a firm anchor of the most successful zone of international peace yet established; but also a source of conflicted and confused foreign policy toward the nonliberal world. Improving policy toward the nonliberal world by introducing steady and long-run calculations of strategic and economic interest is likely to require political institutions that are inconsistent with both a liberal

policy and a liberal alliance: for example, an autonomous executive branch or a predominance of presidential and military actors in foreign policy so as to obtain flexible and rapid responses to changes in the strategic and economic environment. In peacetime, such "emergency" measures are unacceptable in a liberal democracy. Moreover, they would break the chain of stable expectations and the mesh of private and public channels of information and material lobbying that sustain the pacific union. In short, completely resolving liberal dilemmas may not be possible without threatening liberal success.

Therefore, the goal of concerned liberals must be to reduce the harmful impact of the dilemmas without undermining the successes. There is no simple formula for an effective liberal foreign policy. Its methods must be geared toward specific issues and countries. But liberal legacies do suggest guidelines for liberal policy making that contrast quite strikingly with the Realists' advocacy of maximizing the national interest.

First, if "publicity" makes radically inconsistent policy impossible in a liberal republic, then policy toward the liberal and the nonliberal world should be guided by general liberal principles. Liberal policies thus must attempt to promote liberal principles abroad: to secure basic human needs, civil rights, and democracy, and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market economy. Important among these principles, Kant argued, are some of the "preliminary articles" from his treaty of perpetual peace: extending nonintervention by force in internal affairs of other states to nonliberal governments and maintaining a scrupulous respect for the laws of war.[36] These, as J. S. Mill argued, imply a right to support states threatened by external aggression and to intervene against foreign intervention in civil wars.[37] Furthermore, powerful and weak, hostile and friendly nonliberal states must be treated according to the *same* standards. There are no special geopolitical clients, no geopolitical enemies other than those judged to be such by liberal principles. This policy is as radical in conception as it sounds. It requires abandoning the national interest and the balance of power as guidelines to policy. The interests of the United States must be consistent with its principles. We must have no liberal enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.

Second, given contemporary conditions of economic interdependence, this policy could employ economic warfare to lead a liberal crusade against communism and against Third World authoritarians of the left or the right. It could also lead to a withdrawal into isolationism and a defense of only one principle: the right of the United States to territorial integrity and political independence. Both of these policies are consistent with liberal principles, but neither promotes security in a nuclear age nor enhances the prospects for meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed. To avoid the extremist possibilities of its abstract universalism, U.S. liberal policy must be further constrained by a geopolitical budget. Here the Realists' calculus of security provides a benchmark of survival and prudence from which a liberal policy that recognizes national security as a liberal right can navigate. This benchmark consists of prudent policies toward the most significant, indeed the only, strategic threat the United States faces – the USSR. Once the Realists set a prudent policy toward the USSR, the liberals can then take over

again, defining more supportive and interdependent policies toward those coun-
tries more liberal than the USSR, and more constraining and more containing
policies toward countries less liberal than the USSR.[38]

And third, specific features of liberal policy will be influenced by whether
voting citizens choose to be governed by a laissez faire or by a social democratic
administration. But both of these liberalisms should take into account more
general guidelines to a prudent, liberal foreign policy – such as those that follow.

In relations with the USSR, a prudent set of policies calls for a frank acceptance
of our political incapacity to sustain a successful reforming crusade. Instead mutu-
ally beneficial arrangements should be accepted to the extent they do not violate
liberal principles or favor long-run Soviet interests over the long-run interests of
the United States and the liberal world. Arms control would be central to this as
would the expansion of civilian trade. We would encounter difficulties when our
liberal allies can gain economic benefits from trade deals (for example, the sale of
computer technology) that might in the long run favor the USSR. These situations
may be exceptionally difficult to resolve diplomatically since assessments of stra-
tegic advantage tend to be uncertain and since the particular nature of the benefits
(say, sales of grain as opposed to sales of computers) can influence the assessment
of the strategic risks entailed. Liberals will also need to ensure that ties of depen-
dence on the USSR (such as the gas pipeline) are not a major constraint on liberal
foreign policy by providing alternative sources (for example, uranium) for allies
or by equalizing the import costs of energy and by assuring alternative sources in
an emergency. Given the Soviet Union's capacity to respond to bottlenecks
imposed by the West, there will be few occasions (fortunately for the coherence
of the liberal alliance) when it can be clearly shown that an embargo would unam-
biguously hamper the Soviet Union and help the liberal alliance.[39]

In relations with the People's Republic of China, similar liberal principles
permit trade that includes arms sales to a state no more restrictive of its subjects'
liberty but much less restrictive of the liberty of foreign peoples than is the USSR.
But strategic temptations toward a further alliance should be curbed. Such an alli-
ance would backfire, perhaps disastrously, when liberal publics confront policy-
makers with the Chinese shadows of antiliberal rule.

Arms control, trade, and accommodation toward nonliberal Third World
nations must first be measured against a prudent policy toward the Soviet Union
and then should reflect the relative degrees of liberal principle that their domestic
and foreign policies incorporate. Although our policy should be directed by liberal
principles, it should free itself from the pretension that by acts of will and material
benevolence we can replicate ourselves in the Third World. The liberal alliance
should be prepared to have diplomatic and commercial relations as it does with
the USSR with every state that is no more repressive of liberal rights than is the
USSR. For example, North Korea and Mozambique might receive PRC level rela-
tions; Vietnam, with its foreign incursions, and Angola, with its internal ethnic
conflict, Soviet-level relations. Being one of the few states that deny the legal
equality of its subjects, South Africa should be treated as Amin's Uganda and Pol
Pot's Khmer Republic should have been, in a more containing fashion than is the

USSR. No arms should be traded, investment should be restricted with a view to its impact on human rights, and trade should be limited to humanitarian items that do not contribute to the longevity of *apartheid*.

Elsewhere, the liberal world should be prepared to engage in regular trade and investment with all Third World states no more restrictive of liberty than is the PRC, and this could include the sale of arms not sensitive to the actual defense of the liberal world in regard to the USSR. Furthermore, the liberal world should take additional measures of aid to favor Third World states attempting to address the basic needs of their own populations and seeking to preserve and expand the roles of the market and democratic participation. Much of the potential success of this policy rests on an ability to preserve a liberal market for Third World growth; for the market is the most substantial source of Third World accommodation with a liberal world whose past record includes imperial oppression. To this should be added mutually beneficial measures designed to improve Third World economic performance. Export earnings insurance, export diversification assistance, and technical aid are among some of these. (And social democrats will need to take steps that begin to address the humanitarian obligations of international aid and the limited obligations of international justice rich countries have to poor individuals and to [just] poor countries.)

Liberals should persevere in attempts to keep the world economy free from destabilizing, protectionist intrusions. Although intense economic interdependence generates conflicts, it also helps to sustain the material well-being underpinning liberal societies and to promise avenues of development to Third World states with markets that are currently limited by low income. Discovering ways to manage interdependence when rapid economic development has led to industrial crowding (at the same time as it retains massive numbers of the world's population in poverty) will call for difficult economic adjustments at home and institutional innovations in the world economy. These innovations may even require more rather than less explicit regulation of the domestic economy and more rather than less planned dis-integration of the international economy. Under these circumstances, liberals will need to ensure that those suffering losses, such as from market disruption or restriction, do not suffer a permanent loss of income or exclusion from world markets. Furthermore, to prevent these emergency measures from escalating into a spiral of isolationism, liberal states should undertake these innovations only by international negotiation and only when the resulting agreements are subject to a regular review by all the parties.[40]

Above all, liberal policy should strive to preserve the pacific union of similarly liberal societies. It is not only currently of immense strategic value (being the political foundation of both NATO and the Japanese alliance); it is also the single best hope for the evolution of a peaceful world. Liberals should be prepared, therefore, to defend and formally ally with authentically liberal, democratic states that are subject to threats or actual instances of external attack or internal subversion.

Strategic and economic Realists are likely to judge this liberal foreign policy to be either too much of a commitment or too little. The Realists may argue that through a careful reading of the past we can interpret in a clear fashion a ranked

array of present strategic and economic interests. Strategically beneficial allies, whatever their domestic system, should be supported. The purposes of our power must be to maximize our present power. Global ecologists and some on the left claim an ability to foresee future disasters that we should be preparing for now by radical institutional reforms.

But liberals have always doubted our ability to interpret the past or predict the future accurately and without bias. Liberalism has been an optimistic ideology of a peculiarly skeptical kind. Liberals assume individuals to be both self-interested and rationally capable of accommodating their conflicting interests. They have held that principles such as rule under law, majority rule, and the protection of private property that follow from mutual accommodation among rational, self-interested people are the best guide to present policy. These principles preclude taking advantage of every opportunity of the present. They also discount what might turn out to have been farsighted reform. The implicit hope of liberals is that the principles of the present will engender accommodating behavior that avoids the conflicts of the past and reduces the threats of the future. The gamble has not always paid off in the past (as in accepting a Sudeten separatism). It certainly is not guaranteed to work in the future (for example, in controlling nuclear proliferation or pollution). But liberalism cannot *politically* sustain nonliberal policies. Liberal policies rest upon a different premise. They are policies that can be accepted by a liberal world in good faith and sustained by the electorates of liberal democracies.

In responding to the demands of their electorates, liberal states must also ascribe responsibility for their policies to their citizenry. The major costs of a liberal foreign policy are borne at home. Not merely are its military costs at the taxpayers' expense, but a liberal foreign policy requires adjustment to a less controlled international political environment – a rejection of the status quo. The home front becomes the front line of liberal strategy. Tolerating more foreign change requires a greater acceptance of domestic change. Not maintaining an imperial presence in the Persian Gulf calls for a reduction of energy dependence. Accepting the economic growth of the Third World may require trade and industrial adjustment. The choice is one between preserving liberalism's material legacy of the current world order at the cost of liberal principles or of finding ways of adjusting to a changing world order that protect liberal principles.

First addition

Kant argued that the natural evolution of world politics and economics would drive mankind inexorably toward peace by means of a widening of the pacific union of liberal republican states. In 1795 this was a startling prediction. In 1981, almost two hundred years later, we can see that he appears to have been correct. The pacific union of liberal states has progressively widened. Liberal states have yet to become involved in a war with one another. International peace is not a utopian ideal to be reached, if at all, in the far future; it is a condition that liberal states have already experienced in their relations with each other. Should this history sustain a hope for global peace?

Kant did not assume that pacification would be a steady progress; he anticipated many setbacks. Periods of history since 1795, among them the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars, have fully justified his pessimism. The future may have more fundamental setbacks in store.

First, human beings have been driven into forming liberal republics by the pressures of internal and external war. Discord has thus created the essential institutions on which liberal pacification rests. But the Kantian logic of war may find itself supplanted by a nuclear logic of destruction. However persuasive a moral foundation for peace a global wasteland might make, it would make a poor material foundation for its survivors. Indeed, the erratic and lengthy process of educative wars that Kant anticipated appears impossible under nuclear conditions. Long before the nations completed their process of graduation into republicanism, a nuclear wasteland might well have reduced them to barbarism. Yet nuclear logic also calls forth a sense of caution (the balance of terror) that could accelerate the process of graduation into peace even before republics established a homogeneous governance of the world.[41]

Second, Kant assumed that republics formed an endpoint of political evolution: "the highest task nature has set mankind." The increasing number, the longevity, the spread of republics to all continents and to all cultures that are free from foreign domination lend credence to his judgment. Nonetheless, a great and long depression or a runaway inflation could create the conditions that lead to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Having access to the new technology of surveillance to root out domestic dissidents, such regimes might prove difficult for their populations to dislodge. And nuclear deterrence might provide them with external security.[42]

Third, Kant relied upon international commerce to create ties of mutual advantage that would help make republics pacific. But past technological progress that lowered the costs of transport and that developed rapidly and unevenly – together encouraging international trade – could change direction. Instead, a trade-saving path of technical progress such as emerged in the Roman Empire could reemerge. If the technological progress of transportation develops less quickly than the spread of manufacturing technology, if current trends toward resource-saving technology continue, if economic development tends to equalize capital–labor ratios, or if states choose economic stability over growth and prefer domestic manufacturing, agriculture and services to trade, then world trade could decline even as global economic development continued. The educative force of international exchange would thereby decline.[43]

But, if we assume that these setbacks do not emerge and that, as Kant argued, a steady worldwide pressure for a liberal peace continues, can the past record of liberalism's expansion lead us to any sense of when it might ultimately triumph?

Second addition

Extrapolating nature's secret design

Kant's argument implies two dynamic paths toward peace: one transnational, the other international. The first operates through the ties of trade, cultural exchange,

Table 2.1 The pacific union

	1800	1800–1850	1850–1900	1900–1945	1945–(1980)
Number of liberal regimes	3	8	13	29	49
Transnational track		+5	+5	+16	+20
International track		>2x	<2x	>2x	<2x

and political understanding that together both commit existing republics to peace and, by inference, give rise to individualistic demands in nonrepublics whose resolution requires the establishment of republican government. The second operates through the pressure of insecurity and of actual war that together engender republican governments – the domestic constitutional foundations of peace. While the second appears fundamental, the first is not merely dependent. The transnational track conveys the impression of a global society expanding from one country to the next, encompassing an ever larger zone of peace, and yet working on each society in an independent even though connected and similar fashion. The international track – war – is basically a set of epidemics become, in the larger perspective, endemic to the international state of war. It operates conjointly, on one because it is operating on another. It is inherently relational and interdependent.

In all likelihood, the past rate of progress in the expansion of the pacific union has been a complex and inseparable combination of the effects of both tracks. But if we imagine that progress had been achieved solely by one track or the other, we can deduce the outer limits of the underlying logics of the transnational and international progresses toward peace.

The second row represents the transnational track of an underlying arithmetic widening of the zone of peace accomplished by linking republics together and creating pressures, incentives, and ideals leading more nations to become republican. An expanding rate of absolute progress reveals itself as the base develops each century – in the nineteenth adding 5 per 50 years, in the twentieth more than tripling to approximately 18 (i.e., 16:20/2) per 50 years. Thus if the rate triples again in the twenty-first century to approximately 50 liberal states per 50 years and if the state order remains fixed at roughly 150 states, the pacific union will not become global until, at the earliest, the year 2101. The third row, a geometric progression that corresponds to the interdependent logic of war, may be the better indicator of Kantian progress. There republics more than double in number during warlike periods such as 1800 to 1850 or 1900 to 1950, less than double in more pacific times (1850–1900 or perhaps 1945–2000, when there have so far been many wars, but no "great" or world wars involving many states akin to the Napoleonic War or World Wars I and II). Thus if we assume continuing preparation for war and petty wars – akin to the period 1850 to 1900 – and a similar ratio of expansion (13/8) then global peace should be anticipated, at the earliest, in 2113.[44]

Of course, this pacific calculus further assumes that, as Kant required in his "Second Supplement," a "Secret Article" be included in the treaty for a Perpetual Peace: "The maxims of the philosophers concerning the conditions of the possibility of public peace shall be consulted by the states which are ready to go to war." To this proviso, we need add that the greater complexity of international relations today calls for economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists as well as natural scientists to add their advice to that of the philosophers. This increase in the costs of consultation would, however, be fully justified if even a small war or two were thereby indefinitely delayed, wars being so much more destructive than they were in Kant's day.

Notes

1 David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power" in *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* (1741–1742) (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 346–47. With "imprudent vehemence," Hume referred to the English reluctance to negotiate an early peace with France and the total scale of the effort devoted to prosecuting that war, which together were responsible for over half the length of the fighting and an enormous war debt. With "complaisance," he referred to political exhaustion and isolationism. Hume, of course, was not describing fully liberal republics as defined here; but the characteristics he describes, do seem to reflect some of the liberal republican features of the English eighteenth century constitution (the influence of both popular opinion and a representative [even if severely limited] legislature). He contrasts these effects to the "prudent politics" that should govern the balance of power and to the special but different failings characteristic of "enormous monarchies," which are prone to strategic overextension, bureaucratic, and ministerial decay in court intrigue, praetorian rebellion (pp. 347–48). These failings are different from those of more, even if not fully, republican regimes. Indeed just as the eighteenth century English failings illuminate aspects of contemporary liberal diplomacy, the failings of his universal monarchy seem to be reflected in some aspects of the contemporary authoritarian and totalitarian predicament.

2 A careful statistical analysis that has just appeared, R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (March 1983), empirically demonstrates that "libertarian" states engaged neither in war nor in other forms of conflict with each other in the period 1946–1980. (But his definition of libertarian appears to be more restrictive than my definition of liberal states.) He also finds that between 1946 and 1980 libertarian states were less likely to engage in any form of conflict than were states of any other domestic political regime. The extensive history of liberal imperialism and the liberal role in conflicts and wars between liberal and nonliberal states for the longer period from the 1790s that I survey lead me to conclusions which differ from his second point. Both George Kennan's *American Diplomacy* (New York: Mentor, 1951) and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), esp. p. 147, are cogent criticisms of the impact of American liberalism. Different but related analyses of the impact of liberal principles and institutions on U.S. foreign policy are made by Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), esp. pp. 114–43.

3 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Friedrich, ed. p. 442.

4 Ibid., p. 446.

5 Cordell Hull, Radio Address, 9 April 1944, excerpted in Norman Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1977), p. 172.

6 George F. Kennan, *A Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977), p. 4.

7 Memoranda by Mr. Eyre Crowe, 1 January 1907, and by Lord Sanderson, 25 February 1907, in G. P. Gooch *et al.*, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, 3 (London: HMSO, 1928), pp. 397–431.

8 Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, 28 March 1919, excerpted in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, II, ed. Thomas Paterson (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978), p. 95.
   Fear of Bolshevism may have been one of the factors precluding a liberal alliance with the Soviet Union in 1938 against Nazi aggression. But the connection liberals draw between domestic tyranny and foreign aggression may also operate in reverse. When the Nazi threat to the survival of liberal states did require a liberal alliance with the Soviet Union, Stalin became for a short period the liberal press's "Uncle Joe."

9 U.S. Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Nomination of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Designate*, 15 January 1953, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), pp. 5–6.

10 Thirty-three divisions, the withdrawal of the Soviet bloc from the Mediterranean, political disarray in the Communist movement: these advantages called out for a quick and friendly response. An effective U.S. ambassador in place to present Tito's position to Washington, the public character of the expulsion from the Cominform (June 1948), and a presidential administration in the full flush of creative statesmanship (and an electoral victory) also contributed to Truman's decision to rescue Yugoslavia from the Soviet embargo by providing trade and loans (1949).
   Nonetheless (according to Yugoslav sources), this crisis was also judged to be an appropriate moment to put pressure on Yugoslavia to resolve the questions of Trieste and Carinthia, to cut its support for the guerrillas in Greece, *and* to repay prewar (pre-revolutionary) Yugoslav debts compensating the property owners of nationalized mines and land. Nor did Yugoslavia's strategic significance exempt it from inclusion among the countries condemned as "Captive Nations" (1959) or secure most-favored-nation trade status in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Ideological anticommunism and the porousness of the American political system to lobbies combined (according to Kennan, ambassador to Yugoslavia at that time) to add these inconvenient burdens to a crucial strategic relationship. (John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road* [New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper and Row, 1967], pp. 18–27; Suctozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, in Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost* [New York: Viking, 1970], p. 268; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950–1963* [Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972], chap. 12.)

11 Like the *original* crusades (an earlier instance of transcendental foreign policy), the first were expeditions that created strategic littorals (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland in 1918 to 1920 for Antioch and Jerusalem): the second and third (1947 to 1949 for the crusades of the monarchs) new logistical reinforcements, or anticommunism in Europe; the fourth (the crossing of the 38th Parallel for Constantinople) was a strategic diversion. A McCarthyite (Albigensian) crusade at home followed. The fifth and sixth crusades extended the range of the conflict to the Third World (for Damietta); and later crusades were excuses for reequipping armies.

12 See Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), for an interesting analysis of the impact of liberal ideology on American foreign aid policy, esp. chaps. 3 and pp. 313–23.

13 See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt II, chap. 30, and Pt 1, chap. 15. This right is discussed in Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 46. Mill's remarks on colonialism are in "A Few Words on Nonintervention," pp. 377–79, and in "Civilization" he distinguishes "civilized" nations from "barbarous" nations, not on

racial or biological grounds but on the basis of what our contemporary scholars now call socioeconomic modernization or development. Mill declared, "Their minds are not capable of so great an effort [as reciprocity], nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives." Both essays are in J. S. Mill, *Essays on Literature and Society*, ed. with an introduction by J. B. Schneewind (New York: Collier, 1965). Perhaps the most interesting memorial to liberal imperialism is the inscription, written by Macaulay, on the base of Lord William Bentinck's statue in Calcutta: "He abolished cruel rites; he effaced humiliating distinctions; he gave liberty to the expression of public opinion; his constant study was to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the natives committed to his charge" (cf. Mill). It is excerpted in Earl Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1910), p. 67.

14 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1945), p. 351. De Tocqueville describes how European settlement destroys the game; the absence of game reduces the Indians to starvation. Both then exercise their rights to self-defense. But the colonists are able to call in the power of the imperial government. Palmerston once declared that he would never employ force to promote purely private interests – commercial or settlement. He also declared that he would faithfully protect the lives and liberty of English subjects. In circumstances such as those de Tocqueville described, Palmerston's distinctions were meaningless. See Kenneth Bourne, *Palmerston: The Early Years* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 624–26. Other colonial settlements and their dependence on imperial expansion are examined in Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of Imperialism," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longmans, 1972).

15 Gladstone had proclaimed his support for the equal rights of all nations in his Midlothian Speeches. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt served as a secret agent in Egypt keeping Gladstone informed of the political character of Arabi's movement. The liberal dilemma – were they intervening against genuine nationalism or a military adventurer (Arabi)? – was best expressed in Joseph Chamberlain's memorandum to the Cabinet, 21 June 1882, excerpted in J. L. Garvin and J. Amery, *Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1935) 1, p. 448. And see Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), chaps. 2–3; Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century: 1815–1914* (London: Batsford, 1976), chap. 8; and Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

16 On Ireland and its relation to British parties, Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Parnell and His Party, 1880–1890* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); on South Africa, G.H.L. LeMay, *British Supremacy in South Africa 1899–1907* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). A good representative of liberal attitudes on force and intervention is the following comment by Vice Admiral Humphrey Smith:

"I don't think we thought much about war with a big W. We looked on the Navy more as a World Police Force than as a war-like institution. We considered that our job was to safeguard law and order throughout the world – safeguard civilization, put out fires on shore, and act as guide, philosopher, and friend to the merchant ships of all nations." Vice Admiral Humphrey Smith, *A Yellow Admiral Remembers* (London, 1932), p. 54 in Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence: 1870–1914* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 47.

The Platt Amendment is excerpted in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas Paterson (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978) i, 328.

17 During the Alliance for Progress era in Latin America, the Kennedy Administration supported Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic in 1962. See also William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 1 (October 1975).

18 See Samuel Huntington, "Human Rights and American Power," *Commentary*, September 1981, and George Quester, "Consensus Lost," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall

1980), for argument and examples of the successful export of liberal institutions in the postwar period.

19 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45. In 1851 the liberal French historian Guizot made a similar argument in a letter to Gladstone urging that Gladstone appreciate that the despotic government of Naples was the best guarantor of liberal law and order then available. Reform, in Guizot's view, meant the unleashing of revolutionary violence. (Philip Magnus, *Gladstone* [New York: Dutton, 1964], p. 100.)

20 Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: Meridian, 1968), chap. 10; and on Nicaragua, see *The New York Times*, 11 March 1982, for a description of the training, direction, and funding ($20 million) of anti-Sandinista guerrillas by the United States.

21 Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769, and quoted in Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: Meridian, 1968), p. 158. And for the U.S. official's comment on the Salvadoran land reform, see L. Simon and J. Stephen, *El Salvador Land Reform 1980–1981* (Boston, MA: Oxfam-America, 1981), p. 38. See Zolberg, n. 4, above.

22 John Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 145–47.

23 Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1979). Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1972), chap. 11, portrays the elections of 1967 in this way. Allan Goodman, *Politics in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), disagrees, but does find that the elections of 1971 fit this description.

24 Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

25 Although geopolitical anti-Sovietism and the effects of the two liberalisms complemented each other throughout the postwar period and together usually led to intervention; less frequently, geopolitics and liberalism worked together to restrain intervention. Once recognized, the defection of *established* Communist regimes such as Yugoslavia and China was welcomed, though neither defection was fully exploited. Both the geopolitical interest and the prospects of increased trade or development were served by Yugoslav and Chinese separation from the Soviet bloc. In other instances this particular complementary restraint may have had less welcome effects. The most serious harm to American national economic interests inflicted in the postwar period was the OPEC embargo and price revolution of 1973–74. Geopolitical factors dictated no intervention because the Iranian "regional policeman" needed funds to purchase its arms. Conservative liberals rightly perceived no substantial attack on U.S. oil corporations. Welfare liberals had come to believe in improving the terms of trade for Third World exports, and oil appeared a good place to begin. None of these sources of restraint appear in quite the same light in 1982.

26 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), discusses the sources of change in the foreign policies of rising and declining hegemonies.

27 Kirkpatrick points out our neglect of the needs of the authoritarians, see n. 4. Theodore Lowi argues that Democratic and Republican policies toward the acquisition of bases in Spain reflected this dichotomy; "Bases in Spain" in *American Civil-Military Decisions*, ed. Harold Stein (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 699. In other cases where both the geopolitical and the domestic orientation of a potential neutral might be influenced by U.S. aid, liberal institutions (representative legislatures) impose delay or public constraints and conditions on diplomacy that allow the Soviet Union to steal a march. Warren Christopher has suggested that this occurred in U.S. relations with Nicaragua in 1979. Warren Christopher, "Ceasefire Between the Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 998.

28 On economic policy, and pressure groups, see J. J. Pincus, "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," *Journal of Political Economy* 83, August 1975, and L. Salamon and J. Siegfried, "Economic Power and Political Influence," *American Political Science Review* 71, September 1977.

29 Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 229–43.

30 Brian Barry, "Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective" in *Ethics, Economics, and the Law; Nomos XXIV*, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), chap. 11.

31 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 352–53.

32 Barry, "Humanity and Justice," p. 234. For an exposition of the implications of a Rawlsian argument ("fair play") concerning international justice, see Charles Beitz, *op. cit.*, Part III. And for a criticism of the extension of Rawls's arguments to international justice, see Christopher Brewin, "Justice in International Relations," in *The Reason of States*, ed. Michael Donelan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 151–52.

33 Ibid., p. 248.

34 None of the points raised in the first objection to Barry's argument of international distribution devalue the right of nationality or justify liberal imperialism. Both nationality and property are national-state rights derived from the equal rights of individuals, but they are different. Nationality can only be enjoyed collectively, property can retain an individual form of appropriation. No international scheme of provision a global affiliation can substitute for nationality when the nation is the accepted center of loyalty; international provision of income to individuals can substitute for or bypass a corrupt state.

35 Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1953). The United States is one of the few liberal states both of whose leading political fractions (parties) are liberal. Others have shared or competitive fractions: aristocratic or statist-bureaucratic fractions contesting more centrally liberal fractions.

36 See Kant's "Preliminary Articles," pp. 431–36; and for a contemporary application of liberal views that shares a number of positions with the policies suggested here, see Richard Ullman, "The Foreign World and Ourselves: Washington, Wilson, and the Democrats Dilemma," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1975/76, and Stanley Hoffmann; *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), chaps. 2–4. Michael Walzer in *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), has reformulated and revised the major liberal propositions concerning the justice of wars and justice in wars.

37 Interestingly, even a liberal imperialist of a Millian persuasion would now accept that the right to nonintervention should extend to the contemporary Third World. Since the criteria set forth in "Civilization" (commercialization, security) are now met by all nations, Mill would find that we no longer have "barbarous nations" requiring imperial rule.

38 These points benefited from comments by Fouad Ajami, Thomas Farer, and Richard Ullman. For a recent example of a prudential argument for detente, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Detente Without Illusions," *New York Times*, 7 March 1983. And for a coherent exposition of a liberal foreign policy which has helped inform my views on this entire question, Marshall Cohen, "Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy," which will appear in *Liberalism Reconsidered*, ed. by D. MacLean and C. Mills (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983).

39 *The Economist Study* of Soviet technology, June 1981, and an extensive literature on the use of economic sanctions, including F. Holtzman and R. Portes, "Limits of Pressure," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978.

40 These and similar policies can be found in Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, and in C. Fred Bergsten *et al.*, "The Reform of International Institutions," and Richard N. Cooper *et al.*, "Towards a Renovated International System" (Triangle Papers 11 and

14), both in *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports: 9–14* (New York: New York University Press, 1978).

41 For a thorough survey of these issues see Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

42 Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 229. Senate Judiciary Committee, *Committee Print: Surveillance Technology* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976).

43 In this connection, an interesting hypothesis that either a frontier, a rapidly growing industrial sector, or an improved educational system are the only hopes for preserving an essential foundation for modern democracies has been advanced by Marion Levy, "A Revision of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft Categories and Some Aspects of the Interdependencies of Minority and Host Systems," in *Internal War*, ed. Harry Eckstein (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), p. 261.

44 In the last sentence of "Perpetual Peace," Kant expressed a hope for a similar rate of expansion of the pacific union. "It is to be hoped that the periods in which equal progress is achieved will become shorter and shorter." Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Friedrich, p. 476.

3   Liberalism and world politics

Promoting freedom will produce peace, we have often been told. In a speech before the British Parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. He then announced a "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development" (Reagan, June 9, 1982).

In making these claims the president joined a long list of liberal theorists (and propagandists) and echoed an old argument: the aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war. Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war this argument asserts. When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace. Thus the very existence of liberal states, such as the U.S., Japan, and our European allies, makes for peace.

Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the liberal claim President Reagan reiterated for us. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a brilliant explicator of the liberal pacifism the president invoked; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant.

Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other liberal republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful, yet they are also prone to make war, as the U.S. and our "freedom fighters" are now doing, not so covertly, against Nicaragua. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's liberal internationalism are not arbitrary but rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.

Liberal pacifism

There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call *liberal* resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain

characteristics – for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity – that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all. Joseph Schumpeter clearly fits within this family when he considers the international effects of capitalism and democracy.

Schumpeter's "Sociology of Imperialisms," published in 1919, made a coherent and sustained argument concerning the pacifying (in the sense of nonaggressive) effects of liberal institutions and principles (Schumpeter, 1955; see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155–59). Unlike some of the earlier liberal theorists who focused on a single feature such as trade (Montesquieu, 1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. 1) or failed to examine critically the arguments they were advancing, Schumpeter saw the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism, and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms.

He defines *imperialism* as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 6). Excluding imperialisms that were mere "catchwords" and those that were "object-ful" (e.g., defensive imperialism), he traces the roots of objectless imperialism to three sources, each an atavism. Modern imperialism, according to Schumpeter, resulted from the combined impact of a "war machine," warlike instincts, and export monopolism.

Once necessary, the war machine later developed a life of its own and took control of a state's foreign policy: "Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus, Schumpeter tells us that the army of ancient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt, took over the state and pursued militaristic imperialism. Like the later armies of the courts of absolutist Europe, it fought wars for the sake of glory and booty, for the sake of warriors and monarchs – wars *gratia* warriors.

A warlike disposition, elsewhere called "instinctual elements of bloody primitivism," is the natural ideology of a war machine. It also exists independently; the Persians, says Schumpeter (1955, pp. 25–32), were a warrior nation from the outset.

Under modern capitalism, export monopolists, the third source of modern imperialism, push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed markets. The absolute monarchies were the last clear-cut imperialisms. Nineteenth-century imperialisms merely represent the vestiges of the imperialisms created by Louis XIV and Catherine the Great. Thus, the export monopolists are an atavism of the absolute monarchies, for they depend completely on the tariffs imposed by the monarchs and their militaristic successors for revenue (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 82–83). Without tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated by foreign competition.

Modern (nineteenth century) imperialism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war machine, militaristic attitudes left over from the days of monarchical wars, and export monopolism, which is nothing more than the economic residue of monarchical finance. In the modern era, imperialists gratify their private interests. From the national perspective, their imperialistic wars are objectless.

Schumpeter's theme now emerges. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace. Indeed, they are antithetical to imperialism. For Schumpeter, the further development of capitalism and democracy means that imperialism will inevitably

disappear. He maintains that capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its populace is "democratized, individualized, rationalized" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 68). The people's energies are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market train people in "economic rationalism"; the instability of industrial life necessitates calculation. Capitalism also "individualizes"; "subjective opportunities" replace the "immutable factors" of traditional, hierarchical society. Rational individuals demand democratic governance.

Democratic capitalism leads to peace. As evidence, Schumpeter claims that throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to "war, expansion, cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties; and that the industrial worker of capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist." In addition, he points out that the capitalist world has developed means of preventing war, such as the Hague Court and that the least feudal, most capitalist society – the United States – has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies (Schumpeter, 1955, pp. 95–96). An example of the lack of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., Schumpeter thought, was our leaving over half of Mexico unconquered in the war of 1846–48.

Schumpeter's explanation for liberal pacifism is quite simple: Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. When free trade prevails, "no class" gains from forcible expansion because

> foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were in its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the "civilized" nations undertakes the task of colonization.
>
> (Schumpeter, 1955, pp. 75–76)

Schumpeter's arguments are difficult to evaluate. In partial tests of quasi-Schumpeterian propositions, Michael Haas (1974, pp. 464–65) discovered a cluster that associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with peaceful conditions. However, M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have discovered that there is no clearly negative correlation between democracy and war in the period 1816–1965 – the period that would be central to Schumpeter's argument (see also Wilkenfeld, 1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841).

Later in his career, in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Schumpeter, (1950, pp. 127–28) acknowledged that "almost purely bourgeois commonwealths were often aggressive when it seemed to pay – like the Athenian or the Venetian commonwealths." Yet he stuck to his pacifistic guns, restating the view that capitalist democracy "steadily tells . . . against the use of military force and for peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war which, under modern circumstances, is not in general very likely" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 128).[1] A recent study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "libertarianism" and international violence is the closest test Schumpeterian

pacifism has received. "Free" states (those enjoying political and economic freedom) were shown to have considerably less conflict at or above the level of economic sanctions than "nonfree" states. The free states, the partly free states (including the democratic socialist countries such as Sweden), and the nonfree states accounted for 24%, 26%, and 61%, respectively, of the international violence during the period examined.

These effects are impressive but not conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis. The data are limited, in this test, to the period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for example, the Russo-Afghan War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China's invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S., quasi-covert intervention in Angola (1975) and our not so covert war against Nicaragua (1981–). More importantly, it excludes the Cold War period, with its numerous interventions, and the long history of colonial wars (the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, the Mexican Intervention, etc.) that marked the history of liberal, including democratic capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984).

The discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter's pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his "materialistic monism" leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. Neither glory, nor prestige, nor ideological justification, nor the pure power of ruling shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals leave little room for positive-sum gains, such as the comparative advantages of trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized." Citizens – capitalists and workers, rural and urban – seek material welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume that ruling makes no difference. He also presumes that no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one's political power, despite deterimental effects on mass welfare. Third, like domestic politics, world politics are homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized" nations govern "culturally backward" *regions*. These assumptions are not shared by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism.

Liberal imperialism

Machiavelli argues, not only that republics are not pacifistic, but that they are the best form of state for imperial expansion. Establishing a republic fit for imperial expansion is, moreover, the best way to guarantee the survival of a state.

Machiavelli's republic is a classical mixed republic. It is not a democracy – which he thought would quickly degenerate into a tyranny – but is characterized by social equality, popular liberty, and political participation (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung, 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock, 1975, pp. 198–99; Skinner, 1981, chap. 3). The consuls serve as "kings," the

senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the people in the assembly as the source of strength.

Liberty results from "disunion" – the competition and necessity for compromise required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes (the last representing the common people). Liberty also results from the popular veto. The powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, because they seek to dominate. The mass demands not to be dominated, and their veto thus preserves the liberties of the state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. 122). However, since the people and the rulers have different social characters, the people need to be "managed" by the few to avoid having their recklessness overturn or their fecklessness undermine the ability of the state to expand (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. 249–50). Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the people supplies.

Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because these are, in fact, their own (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287–90). If you seek the honor of having your state expand, Machiavelli advises, you should organize it as a free and popular republic like Rome, rather than as an aristocratic republic like Sparta or Venice. Expansion thus calls for a free republic.

"Necessity" – political survival – calls for expansion. If a stable aristocratic republic is forced by foreign conflict "to extend her territory, in such a case we shall see her foundations give way and herself quickly brought to ruin"; if, on the other hand, domestic security prevails, "the continued tranquility would enervate her, or provoke internal disensions, which together, or either of them seperately, will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. 129). Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Rome, rather than that of Sparta or Venice, as our model.

Hence, this belief leads to liberal imperialism. We are lovers of glory, Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand.

There is considerable historical evidence for liberal imperialism. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and Thucydides' Athens both were imperial republics in the Machiavellian sense (Thucydides, 1954, bk. 6). The historical record of numerous U.S. interventions in the postwar period supports Machiavelli's argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3–4; Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is, calls some of his insights into question. To the extent that the modern populace actually controls (and thus unbalances) the mixed republic, its diffidence may outweigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness.

We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism – pacifism and imperialism – indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics. Before we accept either conclusion, however, we must consider a third apparent regularity of modern world politics.

Liberal internationalism

Modern liberalism carries with it two legacies. They do not affect liberal states separately, according to whether they are pacifistic or imperialistic, but simultaneously.

The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among liberal states.[2] During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife; however, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes. They negotiated despite, for example, British grievances during the Civil War against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under that treaty to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France, which prevented it from having to fight other liberal states and then declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917 before entering World War I on their side.

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," has begun to be established among liberal societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent, as Appendix 1 indicates.

Here the predictions of liberal pacifists (and President Reagan) are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance. This foundation appears to be impervious to the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.

Of course, the probability of the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is low. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent

absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule (Doyle, 1983a, p. 222), nor for pluralistic or merely similar societies. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberals all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace.[3] They do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace – but only among themselves.

Liberalism also carries with it a second legacy: international "imprudence" (Hume, 1963, pp. 346–47). Peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states. (For a list of international wars since 1816 see pp. 19–20 above.)

Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with the liberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's communists.

Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do.[4] Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b).

Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. While they can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151–54; Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance – liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects – indeed is premised upon – flexible arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that include preventive war. Hegemonies wax and wane, but the liberal peace holds. Marxist "ultra-imperialists" expect a form of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialistic toward fellow liberal capitalists.

Kant's theory of liberal internationalism helps us understand these two legacies. The importance of Immanuel Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated (Armstrong, 1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. 1; Galston, 1975; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley, 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, 1965; Waltz, 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has an important analytical theory of international politics. *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93–130), helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Kant tries to teach us methodologically that we can study neither the systemic relations of states nor the varieties of state behavior in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the ever-widening pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains this pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

The First Definitive Article requires the civil constitution of the state to be republican. By *republican* Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical freedom – the legal equality of citizens as subjects – on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally, including himself or herself. Tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he or she does not also administer (Kant, *PP*, pp. 99–102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).[5]

Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union (*foedus pacificum*), described in Kant's Second Definitive Article. The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state. The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until "a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts" (Kant, *UH*, p. 47). At that time, all nations will have learned the lessons of peace through right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and good will. Only then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. In the meantime, the "pacific federation" of liberal republics – "an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war" – brings within it more and more republics – despite republican collapses, backsliding, and disastrous wars – creating an ever-expanding separate peace (Kant, *PP*, p. 105).[6] Kant emphasizes that:

> it can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation

can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.

(Kant, *PP*, p. 104)

The pacific union is not a single peace treaty ending one war, a world state, nor a state of nations. Kant finds the first insufficient. The second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. National sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations; a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests (Kant, *UH*, p. 50). Although Kant obliquely refers to various classical interstate confederations and modern diplomatic congresses, he develops no systematic organizational embodiment of this treaty and presumably does not find institutionalization necessary (Riley, 1983, chap. 5; Schwarz, 1962, p. 77). He appears to have in mind a mutual non-aggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the Third Definitive Article.[7]

The Third Definitive Article establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law "shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." In this Kant calls for the recognition of the "right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory." This "does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them [foreigners] to attempt to enter into relations [commerce] with the native inhabitants" (Kant, *PP*, p. 106). Hospitality does not require extending to foreigners either the right to citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).

Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epistemology, a condition for ethical action, and, most importantly, an explanation of how the "mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord" (Kant, *PP*, p. 108; *UH*, pp. 44–45). Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human understanding (Kant, *UH*, pp. 51–53). Perpetual peace, however, is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First Addition" to *Perpetual Peace* ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, failing that, from a hidden plan.[8] Peace is an ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end (Kant, *UH,* p. 50; Murphy, 1970, chap. 3). In order for this duty to be practical, Kant needs, of course, to show that peace is in fact possible. The widespread

sentiment of approbation that he saw aroused by the early success of the French revolutionaries showed him that we can indeed be moved by ethical sentiments with a cosmopolitan reach (Kant, *CF*, pp. 181–82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153–54). This does not mean, however, that perpetual peace is certain ("prophesiable"). Even the scientifically regular course of the planets could be changed by a wayward comet striking them out of orbit. Human freedom requires that we allow for much greater reversals in the course of history. We must, in fact, anticipate the possibility of backsliding and destructive wars – though these will serve to educate nations to the importance of peace (Kant, *UH*, pp. 47–48).

In the end, however, our guarantee of perpetual peace does not rest on ethical conduct. As Kant emphasizes:

> we now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does nature do in relation to the end which man's own reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his *moral purpose?* And how does nature guarantee that what man *ought* to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, without prejudice to the free agency of man? . . . This does not mean that nature imposes on us a *duty* to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not: *facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt.*
>
> (*PP*, p. 112)

The guarantee thus rests, Kant argues, not on the probable behavior of moral angels, but on that of "devils, so long as they possess understanding" (*PP*, p. 112). In explaining the sources of each of the three definitive articles of the perpetual peace, Kant then tells us how we (as free and intelligent devils) could be motivated by fear, force, and calculated advantage to undertake a course of action whose outcome we could reasonably anticipate to be perpetual peace. Yet while it is possible to conceive of the Kantian road to peace in these terms, Kant himself recognizes and argues that social evolution also makes the conditions of moral behavior less onerous and hence more likely (*CF*, pp. 187–89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106–13). In tracing the effects of both political and moral development, he builds an account of why liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. He also explains how these republics would engage in wars with nonrepublics and therefore suffer the "sad experience" of wars that an ethical policy might have avoided.

The first source of the three definitive articles derives from a political evolution – from a constitutional law. Nature (providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.) "Asocial sociability" draws men together to fulfill needs for security and material welfare as it drives them into conflicts over the distribution and control of social products (Kant, *UH*, p. 44–45; *PP*, pp. 110–11). This violent natural evolution tends towards the liberal peace because "asocial sociability"

inevitably leads towards republican governments, and republican governments are a source of the liberal peace.

Republican representation and separation of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is "organized well" to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by authority derived from representation, by general laws, and by nondespotic administration) (Kant, *PP*, pp. 112–13). States that are not organized in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus encourage commerce and private property in order to increase national wealth. They cede rights of representation to their subjects in order to strengthen their political support or to obtain willing grants of tax revenue (Hassner, 1972, pp. 583–86).

Kant shows how republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations. He argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and the habit of respect for individual rights engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this:

> If, as is inevitability the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debts which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars. But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any significant reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready for such pruposes) to justify the war for the sake of propriety.
>
> (Kant, *PP*, p. 100)

Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution – Kant's "hesitation" – in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies. Kant's position is ambiguous. He regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them (Kant, *PP*, p. 106). At the same time, Kant argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states (*PP*, p. 102). Thus to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of

wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source.

Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source for the definitive articles: a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states – an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism." Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states: "as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace" (Kant, *PP*, p. 114). As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establishing and preserving the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends. Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics also to be consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate; each, however, may also be self-confirming.

Lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Because keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is the international market's removal of difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere

of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes, and states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The inter-dependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation (Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963, chap. 9; Keohane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt, 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1–2). Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations between liberal and nonliberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies, and this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together (and only together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace. Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken; economic ties between liberal and non-liberal states have proven fragile; but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.

In their relations with nonliberal states, however, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.

Conclusion

Kant's liberal internationalism, Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and Schumpeter's liberal pacifism rest on fundamentally different views of the nature of the human being, the state, and international relations.[9] Schumpeter's humans are rationalized, individualized, and democratized. They are also homogenized, pursuing material interests "monistically." Because their material interests lie in peaceful trade, they and the democratic state that these fellow citizens control are pacifistic. Machiavelli's citizens are splendidly diverse in their goals but fundamentally unequal in them as well, seeking to rule or fearing being dominated. Extending the rule of the dominant elite or avoiding the political collapse of their state, each calls for imperial expansion.

Kant's citizens, too, are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means. The Kantian state thus is governed publicly according to law, as a republic. Kant's is

the state that solves the problem of governing individualized equals, whether they are the "rational devils" he says we often find ourselves to be or the ethical agents we can and should become. Republics tell us that:

> in order to organize a group of rational beings who together require universal laws for their survival, but of whom each separate individual is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the constitution must be so designed so that, although the citizens are opposed to one another in their private attitudes, these opposing views may inhibit one another in such a way that the public conduct of the citizens will be the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes.
>
> (Kant, *PP*, p. 113)

Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's republics are capable of achieving peace among themselves because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics. These international rights of republics derive from the representation of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals. Unlike Schumpeter's capitalist democracies. Kant's republics – including our own – remain in a state of war with nonrepublics. Liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from nonrepublics that are not constrained by representation. Even though wars often cost more than the economic return they generate, liberal republics also are prepared to protect and promote – sometimes forcibly – democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights to noninterference. These wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; they also can generate enormous suffering.

Preserving the legacy of the liberal peace without succumbing to the legacy of liberal imprudence is both a moral and a strategic challenge. The bipolar stability of the international system, and the near certainty of mutual devastation resulting from a nuclear war between the superpowers, have created a "crystal ball effect" that has helped to constrain the tendency toward miscalculation present at the outbreak of so many wars in the past (Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Huntington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear peace" appears to be limited to the superpowers. It has not curbed military interventions in the Third World. Moreover, it is subject to a desperate technological race designed to overcome its constraints and to crises that have pushed even the superpowers to the brink of war. We must still reckon with the war fevers and moods of appeasement that have almost alternately swept liberal democracies.

Yet restraining liberal imprudence, whether aggressive or passive, may not be possible without threatening liberal pacification. Improving the strategic acumen of our foreign policy calls for introducing steadier strategic calculations of the national interest in the long run and more flexible responses to changes in the international political environment. Constraining the indiscriminate meddling of our foreign interventions calls for a deeper appreciation of the "particularism of history, culture, and membership" (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the improvement

in strategy and the constraint on intervention seem, in turn, to require an executive freed from the restraints of a representative legislature in the management of foreign policy and a political culture indifferent to the universal rights of individuals. These conditions, in their turn, could break the chain of constitutional guarantees, the respect for representative government, and the web of transnational contact that have sustained the pacific union of liberal states.

Perpetual peace, Kant says, is the end point of the hard journey his republics will take. The promise of perpetual peace, the violent lessons of war, and the experience of a partial peace are proof of the need for and the possibility of world peace. They are also the grounds for moral citizens and statesmen to assume the duty of striving for peace.

Appendix 1

Table 3.1 Liberal regimes and the pacific union, 1700–1982

18th Century	1900–1945	1945–[b]
Swiss Cantons[a]	Switzerland	Switzerland
French Republic, 1790–1795	United States	United States
United States,[a] 1776–	Great Britain	Great Britain
Total = 3	Sweden	Sweden
	Canada	Canada
1800–1850	Greece, –1911; 1928–1936	Australia
Swiss Confederation	Italy, –1922	New Zealand
United States	Belgium, –1940	Finland
France, 1830–1849	Netherlands, –1940	Ireland
Belgium, 1830–	Argentina, –1943	Mexico
Great Britain, 1832–	France, –1940	Uruguay, –1973
Netherlands, 1848–	Chile, –1924; 1932–	Chile, –1973
Piedmont, 1848–	Australia, 1901	Lebanon, –1975
Denmark, 1849–	Norway, 1905–1940	Costa Rica, –1948; 1953–
Total = 8	New Zealand, 1907–	Iceland, 1944–
	Colombia, 1910–1949	France, 1945–
1850–1900	Denmark, 1914–1940	Denmark, 1945
Switzerland	Poland, 1917–1935	Norway, 1945
United States	Latvia, 1922–1934	Austria, 1945–
Belgium	Germany, 1918–1932	Brazil, 1945–1954; 1955–1964
Great Britain	Austria, 1918–1934	
Netherlands	Estonia, 1919–1934	Belgium, 1946–
Piedmont, –1861	Finland, 1919–	Luxemburg, 1946–
Italy, 1861–	Uruguay, 1919–	Netherlands, 1946–
Denmark, –1866	Costa Rica, 1919–	Italy, 1946–
Sweden, 1864–	Czechoslovakia, 1920–1939	Philippines, 1946–1972
Greece, 1864–	Ireland, 1920–	India, 1947–1975; 1977–
Canada, 1867–	Mexico, 1928–	Sri Lanka, 1948–1961; 1963–1971; 1978–
France, 1871–	Lebanon, 1944–	
Argentina, 1880–	Total = 29	Ecuador, 1948–1963; 1979–
Chile, 1891–		Israel, 1949–
Total = 13		

(*Continued overleaf*)

Table 3.1 Continued

1945–(cont.)	1945–(cont.)	1945–(cont.)
West Germany, 1949–	Bolivia, 1956–1969; 1982–	Malaysia, 1963–
Greece, 1950–1967; 1975–	Colombia, 1958–	Botswana, 1966–
	Venezuela, 1959–	Singapore, 1965–
Peru, 1950–1962; 1963–1968; 1980–	Nigeria, 1961–1964; 1979–1984	Portugal, 1976–
		Spain, 1978–
El Salvador, 1950–1961	Jamaica, 1962–	Dominican Republic, 1978–
Turkey, 1950–1960; 1966–1971	Trinidad and Tobago, 1962–	Honduras, 1981–
		Papua New Guinea, 1982–
Japan, 1951–	Senegal, 1963–	Total = 50

Note: I have drawn up this approximate list of "liberal regimes" according to the four institutions Kant described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intra-party) elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (i.e., 30%) or, as Kant (*MM*, p. 139) would have had it, open by "achievement" to inhabitants of the national or metropolitan territory (e.g., to poll-tax payers or house-holders). This list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies (Powell, 1982, p. 5). Other conditions taken into account here are that female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement and that representative government is internally sovereign (e.g., including, and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years). Sources for these data are Banks and Overstreet (1983), Gastil (1985), *The Europa Yearbook, 1985* (1985), Langer (1968), U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1980), and U.S. Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics," since none appears to fit Kant's commitment to liberal individualism (Holmes, 1979).

a There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout.

b Selected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states categorized as "free" by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounced capitalist orientation.

Notes

1 He notes that testing this proposition is likely to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward the military, the spirit and manner by which bourgeois societies wage war, and the readiness with which they submit to military rule during a prolonged war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 129).

2 Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90–92) seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implications of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp. 55–58) performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J. Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the postwar period that drew on an unpublished study (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his *Understanding Conflict and War* (1979, p. 386). I use the term *liberal* in a wider, Kantian sense in my discussion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I survey the period from 1790 to the present and find no war among liberal states.

3 Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972, p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other, and this is a strong assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion of the issue of statistical significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis.

4 There are serious studies showing that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes (Payne, n.d.), but this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or of the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in particular, represent a minority in the current international system; they are strategically encircled, and due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing defenses against both external and internal enemies. Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures. According to Walter Clemens (1982, pp. 117–18), the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often during the period 1946–1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946–1979. Relatedly, Posen and VanEvera (1980, p. 105; 1983, pp. 86–89) found that the United States devoted one quarter and the Soviet Union one tenth of their defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character).

5 All citations from Kant are from *Kant's Political Writings* (Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet translation edited by Hans Reiss. The works discussed and the abbreviations by which they are identified in the text are as follows:

PP   *Perpetual Peace* (1795)
UH   *The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784)
CF   *The Contest of Faculties* (1798)
MM   *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797).

6 I think Kant meant that the peace would be established among liberal regimes and would expand by ordinary political and legal means as new liberal regimes appeared. By a process of gradual extension the peace would become global and then perpetual; the occasion for wars with nonliberals would disappear as nonliberal regimes disappeared.

7 Kant's *foedus pacificum* is thus neither a *pactum pacis* (a single peace treaty) nor a *civitas gentium* (a world state). He appears to have anticipated something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United Nations. One could argue that in practice, these two institutions worked for liberal states and only for liberal states, but no specifically liberal "pacific union" was institutionalized. Instead, liberal states have behaved for the past 180 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of perpetual peace had been signed.

8 In the *Metaphysics of Morals* (the *Rechtslehre*) Kant seems to write as if perpetual peace is only an epistemological device and, while an ethical duty, is empirically merely a

"pious hope" (*MM*, pp. 164–75) – though even here he finds that the pacific union is not "impracticable" (*MM*, p. 171). In the *Universal History* (*UH*), Kant writes as if the brute force of physical nature drives men toward inevitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 ff.) argues that from a post-critical (post-*Critique of Judgment*) perspective, *Perpetual Peace* reconciles the two views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "*a priori* of the *a posteriori*" – a critical perspective that then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic patterns in history. Law and the "political technology" of republican constitutionalism are separate from ethical development, but both interdependently lead to perpetual peace – the first through force, fear, and self-interest; the second through progressive enlightenment – and both together lead to perpetual peace through the widening of the circumstances in which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and smaller burdens.

9 For a comparative discussion of the political foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp. 232–38).

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4 Politics and grand strategy

Contemporary discussions of grand strategy in the United States tend to be dominated by issues of global political economy. Despite Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that strategy should be considered an instrument in the pursuit of a "political object"[1] and despite Michael Howard's classic discussion of the "forgotten dimensions" of strategy, our objects appear to be overwhelmingly economic, and the significances of differing political values and political institutions remain forgotten.[2]

The major reason for this neglect of the politics of grand strategy seems to be quite straightforward. Politics is simply being crowded out by the current exciting and controversial literature on the economics of grand strategy.[3] In the light of this literature, politics seems derivative of the deeper widely perceived facts of United States economic decline and East Asian ascent.[4] The current focus on the economic base makes politics – considered as the explicit contest over who decides and for what purposes – seem somehow superstructural and superficial, a spurious correlate of these deeper forces.

In addition to this possible lack of demand or appreciation, a specifically political interpretation of grand strategy suffers in the United States from systematic shortages of supply. The natural producer and consumer of grand strategy – the military – finds itself constrained by laws and professional conventions to stay out of politics. Strategy in this view is planned to promote the "national interest," and the national interest is whatever the politicians say it is.[5] But politicians, to take a step further, particularly those in presidential democracies such as ours, do not quite fill in the gap and define the "national interest" in any way that has operational significance. Coalition parties tend to preclude coherent and critical discussions of strategy. (In 1986 the Democratic party dropped a discussion of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua from its midterm report on foreign policy because it was too controversial.) Short horizons have equivalent effects on the party in power; lacking a bipartisan consensus, administrations can rarely plan for what they can be sure to be able to implement. Instead, we find familiar searches for the roots of "national malaise," "standing tall," "that vision thing," and the "end of history."[6] We seem to be groping for something to replace the simplicities of Cold War containment. Having become used to a consensus when political antitotalitarianism, economic antisocialism, and strategic balances of power all pointed in the

same anti-Soviet direction, we seem to have become unaccustomed to international political choice.

By default, the task falls to intellectuals – including international political scientists and international historians. Here another consideration operates. A professional reluctance to politicize the discipline joins a scientific urge toward parsimonious theory. In addition, both of these operate within a context of a postwar tradition of realist skepticism directed against the overtly political philosophies of prewar idealists and pacifists. Together they have established a powerful paradigm of structuralism or neorealism that systematically depoliticizes, "structures," the subject of international politics at the same time as it conditions professional and bureaucratic discussion toward a structural grand strategy, the balance of power.

For the number and power of states to determine the characteristics of the international system and thereby prejudice us toward the adoption of a balance of power strategy, we need to accept the following basic assumptions of structural realism.[7]

As do all international theories, neorealism assumes that the international system is "anarchic" in the sense that it lacks a world government, a monopoly of legitimate violence. It also assumes that its units, the actors in world politics, want to survive. But neorealism in some versions adds three ancillary assumptions:

1   that the units of analysis are "like" units and nations or "states . . . are the key units of action" – states are hierarchical institutions that possess a monopoly of legitimate violence;
2   "that they seek power, either as an end or as a means to other ends," that is, there is a hierarchy of ends with security predominating and power being the primary, or essential, independent means to security under a condition of international anarchy;
3   that the units "behave in ways that are, by and large rational," meaning that they process a unitary, egoistic, welfare function and adopt policies designed to maximize outcomes given that welfare function.

From these assumptions neorealists infer that the international condition is a "state of war" – a tract of time wherein the possibility of war is assumed by all. From that inference neorealists then conclude that states should balance power against power rather than bandwagon toward the more powerful, simply because states that fail to do so are competed out of existence, and that other statesmen therefore are socialized into the superiority of balancing strategy.[8]

The robust version of neorealism regards the general assumption – international anarchy – and an instinct for survival as sufficient to generate the "state of war" and a balancing strategy. The latter three assumptions are ancillary and are held to be either unnecessary or derivative of international anarchy (by competitive selection and socialization). A contingent, less powerful version of structural realism regards all four assumptions as necessary to generate a state of war and (thus) a balancing strategy.[9]

Despite the scientific success of structuralism, however, we as social scientists observe a large residual of unexplained international behavior. And structural realism's political success in dominating the debate also leaves itself unexplained and its own implicit politics unexplored. Indeed, the manifest success of structuralism has left us bereft of the political insights focused on competing political values and differing institutions. We may be, to borrow the paleontological metaphor, in danger of evolutionary deadend. The lack of an adequate sense of alternative conceptions of grand strategy can stifle our imaginations and preclude effective policy solutions to dramatically changing circumstances.[10]

In an effort to broaden our intellectual and policy repertoire, I will draw on competing political philosophies of international relations, reintroducing differing political values and varying institutions into the formulation of the foundations of grand strategy. What might follow from employing those philosophies as guidelines in how to relax the ancillary assumptions of neorealism? What would strategic reasoning look like if we relaxed those ancillary assumptions – broke up the unitary state, changed the logic of calculation, and diversified our goals beyond national security? How "robust" is neorealism – does repoliticization make a difference? By doing this, we can achieve an indirect understanding of the constraining role that real world differences in units and preferences impose on the ideal structuralist model of the balance of power.

The state as a work of art

Let us begin with two simple cases. First, what if we were to relax national-state action but keep security interest-driven goals and rational decision making? Second, what if we were to keep state action and rational decision making but relax the primacy of security? In both cases, we retain unitary rational calculation. The focus thus falls on the unitary calculator – the statesman as individual, maximizing personal interests that may or may not correspond with those of the state and that may or may not place security goals first.

Machiavelli's philosophy of individualist realism offers us a set of relevant expectations with which to illuminate these situations. Machiavelli's realism rests fundamentally – that is, causally and directly – on his view of the individual. He draws his examples of successful and unsuccessful personal politics from the princes of contemporary Europe and the imperial republic, of classical Rome. He validates these lessons by providing two sorts of evidence. For supporting or contradicting examples he offers contemporary European experience, the successes and failures of, among others, Ferdinand of Spain, Cesare Borgia, and Louis XII. For integrated, or definitive and digested, exemplary experience he offers the glorious experience of Rome, whose successful use as interpreted by Polybius or Livy validates any procedure.[11]

Individuals need to maximize their own interests, beginning with security, because the "state of war" is pervasive. It makes itself felt not only between states but also within them. Hereditary princes, like the duke of Ferrara, could rely on custom to secure the love of their subjects. That love posed formidable hurdles to

the ambitions of conquerors, who found these principalities not only difficult to conquer but even more difficult to hold against all those who preferred a return of the ancient ruling family.[12] Conservative aristocratic republics like Venice and Sparta tried to limit their insecurity by limiting their ambitions. By choosing isolation and autonomy, Sparta kept its citizens poor and powerless. Spartan kings ruled over citizens whose modest but adequate standard of living stimulated few appetites, either material or political, domestic or foreign.[13]

But neither hereditary princes nor conservative republics fully escape insecurity because they cannot completely escape new princes and expansionist republics. New princes both cause and respond to the threat of violence that surrounds them. Both new principalities and "mixed" principalities (an old prince attempting to hold a new conquest) create enemies of all those displaced in the conquest and yet gain little security from the support of their followers, whom they could not fully reward without further alienating the conquered population.[14]

So why would a prince enter this violent contest? Are princes simply seekers after "power for its own sake"? Machiavelli says princes seek war and military conquest despite all the dangers for two reasons: first, in order to demonstrate and obtain the rewards of imperial greatness that fortune bestows on *virtù* (courageous ambition), and second, in order to protect the state from predation.[15]

Through lionlike military leadership the Prince can turn uncertainty into confidence, despair into courage. For populations having little in common except their subjection to him, the prince can offer a promise of success through strategic brilliance.[16]

Through foxlike diplomacy the Prince can economize on the use of violence. Neither neutrality nor, unless necessary, (what we now call) collaboration or "bandwagoning," subordinating oneself or aligning with stronger foreign princes, will do.[17] Active "balancing" is both more prestigious and more secure, because aligning can make the difference needed for victory or because failing to align with the weaker can leave you victim to the designs of the winner, without the support of the weaker. And better than either is the imperial acquisition of new provinces.

Let us examine the circumstances of collaboration and imperialism, two alternatives to the balance of power. Machiavelli gives us many important reflections on the requisites of successful imperialism. He offers many examples of mistaken policies, but he does not pursue just what necessities or failures of *virtù* would compel collaboration or bandwagoning.[18] But in the modern literature on the history of empires, there is a classic example of rational security-oriented calculation that places the personal interests of the ruler above the national interests of the state.

Khedive Tewfik, nominal ruler of the Egypt from 1879 to 1892, felt compelled to make just such a choice in 1882 when he collaborated with the British expeditionary force against a nationalist movement that had taken control of the Egyptian state. After many years of increasing debt and financial corruption, widespread disaffection of the agricultural classes, increasing foreign control through a committee of foreign bondholders represented by British and French financial

advisers – and a consequent upsurge of nationalist sentiment – Colonel Ahmed Arabi of the Egyptian army led a rebellion against khedivial corruption. During the crisis years of 1881–82, the khedive flirted with an alignment toward the nationalists but in the end chose the British as a more reliable foundation for his throne.

Tewfik clearly lacked *virtù*. His father, the previous khedive, described Tewfik thus, "Ni tête, ni coeur, ni courage."[19] But the equally significant source of his collaboration and that of scores of other Egyptian notables (some of whom at first opposed the British) was the lack of a defined alternative. "Egypt" was politically a fief of the Mamluks, now contested by native Egyptians; commercially and financially, an economic colony of European capitalism; legally and formally, still a province of the Ottoman Empire; internationally, a quasi-independent state founded by Muhammad Ali, two generations before Tewfik; and actually, any and all of the above.[20] The "Egyptian" nation-state was still up for definition, awaiting political creation. But Tewfik was not the ruler to create it. In order to best preserve himself as Colonel Arabi's rebellion spun out of control in the summer of 1882, he placed himself under the protection of the British landing force and returned – in their "knapsacks" – a puppet restored to his capital. Rather than "Egypt" balancing against the British threat to its independence, Tewfik collaborated with the British in order to maintain his personal security.

Machiavelli saw that the vigorous contest of world politics rested on either (or both) virtuous leaders or well-organized states. On the one hand, the unfortunate Tewfik was thus doubly disadvantaged. Ferdinand of Aragon, on the other hand, was doubly advantaged.

Prince of Aragon, husband of Isabella of Castile, hence king of united Spain, conqueror of Naples and Navarre and North Africa, sovereign of the Americas, Ferdinand was the one contemporaneous Christian prince who could measure his *virtù* head to toe against the great founders of antiquity whom Machiavelli so admired – Moses, Cyrus, and Romulus. And unlike the poor Khedive Tewfik, Ferdinand captured the Machiavellian "stato," having both "dominio," an effectively controlled territory, and "imperio," a right of command.[21]

Nonetheless, our understanding of Ferdinand also requires us to relax the assumptions of structural realism. He was a rational calculator without compare and the founder of the Spanish state, but his ambitions went much beyond a primacy of security.

Ferdinand of Spain's conquests, beginning with Granada, made him "the first king among the Christians."[22] Ferdinand succeeded both in enlarging his kingdom at the expense of foreign rivals and, more important, in securing himself at home. He kept the barons of Castile (his domestic rivals) occupied in foreign wars. He employed the riches of the people and the church to create his own army. He acquired great fame and wealth in an act of "pious cruelty" (whose victims were the hapless Marranos).[23]

Although born in 1452 as the son of the king, John II of Aragon, Ferdinand learned that to become great one had to think like a new prince, which he proceeded to do. He helped his father destroy his older brother (from a first marriage), the

Prince of Viana, who led the nationalist faction in Aragon. With the help of the bribes funded by the great Jewish financiers of Castile and Aragon, he succeeded in winning the hand in marriage of Isabella of Castile.[24] After trying a coup against his wife, he learned to appreciate her talents and ruled with her, suppressing the ancient independence of the noble magnates of Castile and Aragon, strengthening the bureaucratic discipline of the state, and then setting about great conquests.[25]

His success first appeared internationally in the reconquest of Muslim Spain, Granada, in 1492. By "keeping the minds of the barons of Castile occupied," the war against Granada put them under his power.[26] This increase in his power allowed him to turn against former allies and to reward new ones, so he expelled the Jews and Moors in order to reward his new allies: the missionary orders, the soldiers, and the great nobles. (But he appears to have known that this was an economically foolish policy – that it would destroy finance and agriculture – because he refused to expel the Moors from his own personal kingdom of Aragon.) He then turned his new domestic authority to more foreign conquest and went after Naples (a traditional arena of Aragonese expansion), began a half-hearted conquest of North Africa, and at Isabella's urging, financed exploration of the Americas. His success domestically in refounding the state was evidenced by his being able to raise public revenues from less than 900,000 reals in 1474 to 26,000,000 in 1504.[27]

Ferdinand created an effective diplomatic service, but repeatedly abused its members by requiring them to tell the most apparent lies, which successfully clouded his intentions, as Machiavelli noted.[28] He also created a great army under the leadership of Gonsalvo de Cordova, composed of a modern infantry of forces – halberd, sword, and harquebus.

His end honored him little. After a life spent struggling to create a great and independent Spain dominating the entire western Mediterranean, Ferdinand was forced to recognize as his sole heirs his daughter, Juana the Mad, and her hostile husband, the Habsburg archduke Philip.[29]

For Ferdinand, the balance of power was not an end or a policy, but a tactic of "divide and rule" in an imperial strategy of conquest. His *virtù* was reflected in a willingness to take risks much beyond those someone attempting to maximize personal or national security would have been willing to assume. The state was an entity as yet uninstitutionalized and unpurposed. It was in Jacob Burckhardt's phrase a "work of art" yet to be fashioned, whether well or ill, by "artists" such as Ferdinand and Tewfik.[30] In one case, domestic constraints forced Tewfik to invite the British in. In the other, domestic impulses led Ferdinand to seek a larger role than Spanish resources could fully sustain.

The pacific union

The third example is somewhat more complicated and yet is more familiar. Liberal internationalists who have wanted to claim that "free states" are different from other states relax two of the structuralist realist assumptions at the same time.

Liberals retain the assumption of the state as the essential, stable, and institutionalized unit of decision. But they relax the assumption that states are single rational egoistic calculators in favor of a view that sees states as complex representative institutions – liberal republics. At the same time, they relax the assumption that states are motivated by security defined in terms of power, material interests, and prestige in favor of the assumption that liberal republics are motivated by the value of individual freedom.

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy of liberal internationalism these two innovations work together and have significant effects on world politics. In *Perpetual Peace*,[31] Kant shows how liberal republics lead to a dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations – a "pacific union" among similarly liberal states – and a "state of war" between liberals and nonliberals.

First, republican governments, he argues, tame the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies and ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Wars then appear as direct charges on the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution, Kant's "hesitation," in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, protect private property, or support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies.[32]

Second, in order to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source – a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states – an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soulless despotism." Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states "as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace."[33] As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles that they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors that they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but are (potentially) mutually beneficial.

At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may also be self-fulfilling.

Democratic liberals do not need to assume either that public opinion rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is liberal. It can assume that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially nonliberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that antiliberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public.

Finally, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests on the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation. Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations between liberal and nonliberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies. And this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient. Kantian theory is neither solely institutional nor solely ideological, nor is it solely economic. But together (and only together) the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.[34] But in their relations with nonliberal states, liberal states

have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole.[35] Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and the shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.

By opening up the assumptions of neorealism, Kantian liberal internationalism can let us see how responsible statesmen might reject the neorealist's endorsement of the balance of power both as a general ideal and as a determinant of international politics. On the one hand, balancing denigrates the pacific union and thus should be eschewed by liberals in their relations with each other. On the other hand, liberal suspicion of nonliberals may preclude the balancing that might be the most desirable strategy to pursue in war-prone relations. In either event, domestic liberalism alters the canvas painted by realist theory.

The great betrayal

Finally, in the most complex case, we can relax all three assumptions and consider a subnational, nonunitary decision undertaken with the purpose of promoting values other than those of national security. Marxist theory can give us entrance into this form of strategic reasoning. The famous (notorious to some) decision made by the socialist parties of Europe in August 1914 to either support or not support their governments' declaration of war presents us with a classic case.

The decisions by many of these socialist parties to support their governments and to fight for their sovereign states has generally been interpreted, as it was first denounced by V. I. Lenin, as the "direct betrayal" of international working-class solidarity.[36] In what has become the conventional account, socialists supposedly chose state and nation over class when they chose war over peace.[37]

This view, however, is much too simple. It does not fit the record of the actual choices made by the socialist parties. More important, it fails to appreciate the special kind of strategic choice the socialists faced.

1   The decision was not a national decision or state decision; nowhere were socialist parties in power.
2   None of the parties was an egoistic, rational-unitary actor. They saw themselves to be acting collectively for the international working class, while in fact many were split by competing factions.
3   The values they sought to promote were not national security, wealth, and prestige – nor peace for its own sake – but a more complicated calculation of what was required to achieve international progress toward world socialism.

Marx and Engels's legacy of revolutionary theory included a core of ideas on national development, imperialism, and internationalism that most socialists knew well and that, despite the many other differences and disputes, was sufficiently broad to contain their differences. It also characterized the publicly expressed views of the dominant factions of the socialist parties of prewar Europe.

Marxist development theory stressed that bourgeois national democracy was one of the culminating stages in a struggle for progressive development. For Marxists, progress had a scientific meaning. It meant advancement in social liberation from feudalism, through autocratic mercantilistic capitalism, to democratic national capitalism spreading across the globe, to, eventually and inevitably, democratic socialism. Marxist international theory held that imperialism could be a progressive (while violent) stage of development for precapitalist societies, even though its effects on industrial societies could be politically reactionary. It also argued that bourgeois class factions were dangerously prone to war, though the more advanced capitalist democracies contained tendencies that counteracted militarism and gave a promise of some efficacy to socialists seeking to oppose war. Only socialism promised both the liberation of the proletariat and peace.

The proper internationalist policy for socialist leaders required a dualistic judgement. It had to attempt to maximize the prospects of progressive development globally, especially socialist revolution in Europe, at the same time as it maximized the prospects of revolution in each country considered separately. The two imperatives could come into conflict when the promotion of, for example, the national independence of colonial territories weakened the more progressive capitalist states in relation to the more reactionary states.

Internationalist policy also had to take into account the precapitalist conditions of much of Africa and Asia and the specific capitalist conditions of contemporary Europe. After 1870 all the major powers were operating within a capitalist mode of production (Russia recently), but only France, England, and the United States had fully sovereign bourgeois democracies. Germany, though better endowed with a socialist movement than any of the other capitalist democracies, suffered from the autocratic vestiges of Prussian Junkerism.[38] Russia remained the most oppressive and took particularly vigorous steps to suppress its nascent socialist movement following the abortive democratic revolution of 1905.[39]

By August 4, 1914, Marxism had become a political movement and a set of socialist doctrines with a bewildering variety of positions. No national movement lacked factions. Each faction claimed to have discovered the true meaning of Marxist doctrine for its time. Some argued that the growth in the influence of trade unions and socialist parties demonstrated the efficacy of electoral social democracy (for example, Eduard Bernstein in Germany); others that the capitalists had so protected themselves with the military and bureaucratic apparatus of a coercive state that only violent revolutionary warfare would achieve socialism (Lenin in Russia). Some believed that the development of finance capital constituted a new stage of aggressive, monopolistic, imperialistic capitalism (Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin); others that finance capital constituted a force for ultraimperialistic international cooperation (Karl Kautsky). These differences in strategy were compounded by dozens of other differences in tactics (reformist, catastrophist, etc.).[40]

But the socialist leaders of Europe did share an intellectual heritage of Marxist theory that transcended those factional squabbles. They also shared a membership in the Second International.[41] Neither heritage, however, served to suppress

controversy. Indeed both, separately, encouraged it. The intellectual heritage of Marx and Engels on war and peace contained many areas of ambiguity, as the critics have noted so pointedly. And the competition to lead the socialist international movement encouraged fierce debate.[42]

The "Marxist" interpretation of the socialists which follows thus cannot refute those "realists" who note the pressures of nationalism (because those pressures indeed existed) nor can it altogether replace those historians who stress the divergences among parties and the roots of those divergences in the particular political interests of each faction (because those divisions existed). But looking back on the socialists today, we can see that together their doctrinal commitments and party interests can offer a credible alternative account and, indeed, a slightly superior account for the stance each socialist party adopted in the crisis of August 1914.

The socialists of Europe, not surprisingly, were divided concerning a proper colonial policy. The Stuttgart Conference of the Second International (1907) condemned imperialism in general, as had earlier conferences, stressing its war-provoking effects.[43] But in the imperial countries ruling over precapitalist societies of Asia and Africa, the socialists' views were divided. Bernard Shaw and other Fabians went so far as to endorse support for the Boer War, since the majority of South Africans would experience more progress under British rule, which was civilized, than under Paul Kruger's obscurantist racial oppression.[44] In less conflicted cases, the European socialists ringingly and consistently opposed the imperialist policies of bourgeois governments, including their own, in the Fashoda (1898), Moroccan (1905 and 1911), and Balkan crises.[45]

Equally unsurprisingly, the socialists were united in the condemnation of war and in their determination to do all they could either to prevent its outbreak or to end it on just terms as soon as possible – though specific measures against militarism "naturally differ in different countries" (the "Stuttgart Resolution").[46] But none of these resolutions "repealed" the rights of democratic nations to resist aggression or the more general duty to resist imperialism and promote the progress of international socialism.

Given these strictures concerning imperialism and militarism, where should Marxists in the various socialist parties of Europe have stood on the issues of the international crisis of August 1914?

No true Marxist would have judged an imperialist war against Serbia to have been a step toward socialist progress; the cost in lives, the stirring up of militarism, and the fact that Serbia was engaged in its own bourgeois nationalist development were fully sufficient to discredit any potential defense along progressivist lines.

Significantly, no defense of imperialism in the Balkans was made by any of the socialist parties within the allied aggressor states or by the socialist party of the rival imperialist state. The Austrian socialists, although deploring the terroristic assassination of the archduke, condemned Austrian imperialism just before their party publications were censored by the Austrian state.[47] The German Social Democratic party (SPD) staged demonstrations against Austrian imperialism.[48]

The Social Democratic paper *Vorwärts* editorialized (July 25, 1914), "Not a single drop of the blood of a single German soldier must be sacrificed for the benefit of the war-hungry Austrian despots or for imperialist commercial interests," and it exhorted, "Long live international solidarity." The Russian Socialist party similarly denounced the tsarist policy of intervention and imperialistic interference in the Balkans in a letter to the Austrian socialists written as early as 1913.[49]

Marxists should have found the rapid escalation to world war to have been an issue that provoked more divisive stands (internationally and in some cases internally) than had the question of imperialism. Marx's opposition to militarism, his recognition of the progressive role played by the national independence of bourgeois democracy, and his commitment to encouraging overall international progress could come into conflict. The competing variables can be arrayed on the following four dimensional policy matrix: (1) the stronger the socialist party and (2) the more advanced the bourgeoisie (e.g., industrial development and democratic state), (3) the clearer it was that the nation was attacked as opposed to attacking; and (4) the more repressive the most immediate opponent of the nation seemed, the stronger would be the case (Marx and Engels would have argued) that the socialist party should support the war as a war of national defense and/or international progress. And, in the converse, the stronger would be the case that the socialist party should reject the war as an instance of pure imperialism or reactionary militarism.

Again, these implications seem to have been by and large fulfilled. Table 4.1 illustrates the strength of socialism. Table 4.2 presents the decision matrix socialist parties confronted in July and August 1914.

In Serbia, the war's first victim, the two socialists in the parliament of 166 deputies maintained solidarity with fellow socialists at home and abroad.[50] To all of the other deputies, the decision to support the war was a clear case of Serbian

Table 4.1 Socialism in 1914

	Members	*Votes*	*socMPs*	*MPs*
Serbia		25,000	2	166
Belgium		600,000	39	185
France	90,700	1,397,337	102	595
Britain	1,559,082	370,802	42	670
Italy			77	508
Austria	145,500	1,041,000	82	516
Germany	1,085,905	4,250,329	110	397
Russia		800,000	14	442

Sources: Julius Braunthal, *History of the International, Volume 2: 1914–1943* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 351; *Yearbook of the International Socialist Labour Movement*, ed. Julius Braunthal (London: Lincolns Praeger International Yearbook Publishing Co., 1956); *The Socialist Yearbook 1913*, ed. J. Bruce Glasier (Manchester: National Labour Press, 1913); and *Statesman's Yearbook* (London: Macmillan, 1915).

The number of party members, votes in the general election, socialist members of parliament, and total number of members of parliament are as of the last election before August 1914.

Table 4.2 The socialist decision matrix (summary of factors that in Marxist theory should have influenced the socialist decisions of August 1914)

	Soc	*Cap*	*Def/Agg*	*Threat*	*Net*
Serbia	0	0	−1	−1	−2
Belgium	1	2	2	1	6
France	2	2	1	1	6
Britain	1	2	0	1	4
Italy	1	1	0	0	2
Austria	2	1	−1	1	3
Germany[a]	2	1	0/ −2	1/ −1	4/0
Russia	1	0	0	−2	−1

Note: This table is illustrative only; none of the difficult judgments facing the socialists of 1914 lent themselves to reliable quantification.

　　"Soc" (socialism) indicates the relative strength of the local socialist parties on a scale of 0–2; "Cap" indicates the degree of bourgeois capitalist democratic development on a scale of 0–2; "Def/Agg" indicates the extent to which the country was clearly attacked (2), to mixed (0), to clearly aggressive (−2); "Threat" indicates whether defeat would be by a less (2) to more (−2) progressive power. The "Net" increases with the increased set of reasons, from a Marxist point of view, for the socialist parties to support the decisions of their governments to go to war in August 1914. All parties with scores of 3 or above voted for war; at 2, the Italians abstained; all those at or below 0 opposed the war.
[a] Comparison of Germany's 1914 situation to situations of 1915–1916 and later.

national self-defense: Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. But to the socialist deputies, the representatives of a weak socialist party, the Serbian working class, like the Bulgarians and the Albanians, were the victims of the oppressive Serbian state – a semicolonial regime, dependent on the tsar and on Parisian finance – that had actively tolerated terroristic organizations aimed at Austria. The Austrian socialists had denounced the attack on Serbia. The Serbian socialists responded: "There must be no war between the peoples of Austria-Hungary and the Serbian people." The vote for war was 164 in favor; 2 against.[51]

　　Belgium was Serbia's Marxist mirror image. In Belgium, also obviously attacked, the socialists also entered the war united. An electoral democracy, with 39 socialist deputies in a chamber of representatives of 185, neutral Belgium was invaded by Germany. The socialists stopped their antiwar demonstrations on August 3 and declared that "in defending the neutrality and even the existence of our country against militarist barbarism we shall be conscious of serving the cause of democracy and of political liberty in Europe."[52]

　　The French socialists also entered the war united. Enjoying a representation of 102 in an elected chamber of 595 deputies, they originally staged large demonstrations against French participation in the Balkan crisis and in support of French mediation efforts which they had been assured were underway.[53] They did an about-face after Germany invaded France, calling forth socialist patriots to remember their "historic role" in 1793 and 1870 in the new struggle against German "militaristic imperialism" and for democratic "civilization."[54]

　　The British socialists entered the war more divided.[55] Only 7 members of the 39-member Labour party were Marxist socialists. Still, all of the socialists and

members of the Labour party opposed involvement in the Balkans. National defense was not an immediate issue and the rival imperialist powers, whether Austrian or Russian, in their view, deserved no help from British socialists.[56] But the invasion of Belgium split the Independent Labour party socialists and changed the Labour party majority positions toward active or passive support for the war. The wanton aggression against Belgium offered them proof that the war had now become a war against antidemocratic, military autocracy, which was what they thought threatened Europe if Prussia were to conquer the Western democracies.[57]

In Italy the 77 socialists (of the 508 members of the Lower House) maintained neutrality. Emerging from a bruising general strike against the government, the Italian socialists were understandably disaffected from official policy as well as critical of imperialism in the Balkans by their country's ally (Austria). They condemned Austrian and German aggression and rejected any participation in the war on the side of Austria. When the bourgeoisie also turned against Austria and Germany, the socialists, in conflict with their own government and not yet called on to defend the nation from foreign attack, also rejected participation against Austria. When Austria later invaded Italy, the socialists expressed their hostility to an Austrian victory,[58] adopting the policy of "neither support nor sabotage."

In Austria, the socialists held 82 out of 516 seats in the lower chamber; in Germany, 110 out of 397 seats.[59] The Austrian party initially opposed the imperialist war in the Balkans. But the specter of defeat at the hands of what they saw as a (more) reactionary Russia loomed and changed their stand. In Hungary, the socialists, though facing severe repression by the state, also supported the war against "Russia . . . the land of slavery."[60]

A great deal rested on the crucial decision of the German Social Democratic party. Despite the many successes of the SPD and the power of labor in Germany, their influence on public policy was limited. The kaiser and the military establishment were quite free from parliamentary control (as is suggested by the kaiser's plans to have the socialists arrested in the event they opposed the war). But as elsewhere, so in Germany, the powerful Social Democratic party succumbed on August 4 to the fear of a Russian victory that would result from a victory by the Entente Powers,[61] and they thereby included bourgeois France and England with the threat from reactionary Russia. Writing two months later, Emil Vandevelde (Belgian president of the International) grasped the dilemma German Marxists faced: "Had they voted against the war credits they would have given up their country to invasion by the Cossacks. Yet in voting for the credits they provided the Kaiser with weapons for use against Republican France and against the whole of West European democracy. Between these two evils they chose that which they judged to be the lesser."[62]

Demonstrating the authenticity of their dilemma, the socialists later changed their view. As information on the aggressive and annexationist cast of the German war aims became clearer in 1915 and 1916, the SPD slowly began to split. With each new Reichstag vote, new members, first including Karl Liebknecht and eventually Eduard Bernstein, joined the opposition to a war that now seemed to be

directed less at the Russian menace than at the democratic bourgeois societies (with their socialist parties) of Western Europe.[63]

In Russia, object of the central European panic, the socialists held 14 seats and the Labor party held 10 seats out of 442 in the Duma. The socialists and other working-class organizations had been subjected to severe police repression before and after the 1905 revolution. Both the Labor party and the Social Democratic party (Menshevik and Bolshevik) denounced the war on August 8 and declared their "solidarity with the European proletariat." They both walked out of the Duma. Alexander Kerensky of the Labor party, following the outbreak of actual hostilities and feeling the pressure of patriotic demonstrations in the streets, called on its members to "protect your country to the end against aggression."[64] Before the effective disintegration of their faction some of the Mensheviks expressed support for national defense. But the leading factions of the Social Democrats at home – Social Revolutionaries, Left-Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks – and some of the leaders abroad (Julius Martov and Leon Trotsky) continued to agitate, the domestic leaders were arrested, and the party then urged the soldiers to "struggle for peace."[65] This was magnified by a lonely voice from abroad when Lenin urged proletarian soldiers, Russian as well, to rebel against their capitalist-bourgeois oppression.

Many of the socialist parties were divided over the true significance of Marxism and Marxist strategy for their country. And they, like many of the leaders of other parties at the beginning and during the course of World War I were undoubtedly guilty of national chauvinism, opportunism, and other errors. They were too weak to overwhelm the forces of right-wing militarism. Yet they might have been strong enough to cast doubt on the resolve of France and Britain to stand up to the plans of the German expansionists, influential enough in Germany to cast doubt on the threat its arms race posed to the other European powers, and fierce enough everywhere in attacks on their own national government's militarism to provide grist for the propaganda of foreign militarists.[66]

If, however, we think the "betrayal" of August 4, 1914, is a refutation of the Marxist approach to international strategy, we are too hasty. Marxism did not preclude the defense of the nation. Nor did it require opposing every policy adopted by a bourgeois government. But Marxist internationalism was not identical with nationalism. Nowhere in power, unable to prevent the war, the Marxists followed their governments when their governments adopted policies with which Marxists should not have disagreed. When the two conflicted, the Marxists acted as Marxists.

For the Belgian, French, and British socialists in bourgeois democracies, the crisis seemed clear. A German-Austrian victory meant the loss of national freedom and domination by more reactionary militaristic strains of Junkeristic capitalism. But for the German and Austrian and Hungarian socialists, defeat by Russia also meant a loss of national freedom and domination by even more reactionary tsarist oppression. All voted for war.

But Marxist strategy was not thereby identical to neorealist strategy; nor did nationalism thereby overwhelm Marxism. The two merely corresponded. When

the two differed, the Marxists followed Marxist strategy. In 1913 and 1914, Russian, Austrian, German, and Hungarian socialists each condemned their state's imperialism in the Balkans. In 1914 Serbian and Russian socialists voted against the war. For these socialists subject to reactionary and aggressive states, a national defeat might mean socialist liberation. And, finally, when the German SPD began to realize in 1915 that a Russian victory was not likely and that their own government had misled them and had not acted defensively in 1914, it began to turn against the war, voting in increasing numbers with each new vote against the war policies and war budget of the German state. Here, socialism explains the socialists better than does neorealism.

Relaxing neorealism

Relaxing neorealism has a clear cost in reduced parsimony, or increased complexity, as these four stories illustrate. Rather than one general theory, we realize that we need to acquire competing general theories; rather than a robust, parsimonious structuralism, we realize that structural realism's validity may be extremely contingent on the relevance of all four of its basic assumptions. But a more complicated set of political determinants of grand strategy also adds value that can more than balance the increased scientific cost.

First, at a minimum, it provides a context for the neorealist's endorsement of the balance of power. An appreciation of the existence of roads that are not taken highlights the significance of the assumptions of state action, unitary rational decision, security- and power-driven preferences with which the realists begin. It identifies for us the nature of the choices we make or preclude when we adopt a balance of power strategy.

Second, a more complicated model of international politics helps us to understand the values many actors express and the perceptions they hold concerning how policy is made. We gain a descriptively richer sense of the practice of international politics.

Third, and much more significant, the complicated model helps us to account for actual variance in the ways states actually behave. Once we introduce the constraints of more complicated images of political preferences and units on the ideal-rational structuralist model, we can begin to model more closely the world we actually observe. We need the complexity to account for how the Tewfiks, Ferdinands, Liberals, and Marxists actually play the game of international strategy.

Fourth, and most important, if we need a more complex international politics to understand the actual complexity of world politics, we will need a politically sophisticated grand strategy to succeed in world politics. If we assume that a Tewfik wanted to balance, those who understood that he needed to collaborate would lose the opportunities available to them; if we assume a Ferdinand would be satisfied by a balance of power, those who sought to preserve their independence from his imperial grasp would be misled; if we assume that fellow liberals should be contained by a balance of power, resources better devoted to domestic welfare or international adjustment could be wasted; and if we assume that Marxist

revolutionaries were ordinary nationalists, opportunities for cooperation could be missed or their solidarity could be underestimated. A richer model of the range of grand strategy opens choices for those wanting to enhance liberal peace or promote socialist development. It demonstrates the potential of an entrepreneurial strategy of state formation and the dangers of factionalism and collaboration.

Acknowledging the diversity of political choice, we should adopt a mandate to translate: we should examine differing conceptions of who the actors are, what values they hold, and by what means they make decisions. We can improve strategy by being aware of the difference the differences can make.

Notes

1 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. 1 (1832; rpt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 1:11.
2 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in his *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). Howard's four dimensions of strategy are the operational, the logistical, the social, and the technological. Much of the current grand strategy concentrates on the logistical; in this essay I examine the relations between the social and the operational dimensions. See also the valuable discussion in Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).
3 See works by Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, David Calleo; and critics Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, Aaron Friedberg, and Charles Kupchan. See valuable survey in Samuel Huntington, "The U.S. – Decline or Renewal," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Spring 1988): 76–96.
4 See *New York Times*, March 4, 1990, "Week in Review" survey of statistics and attitudes to U.S. economic decline.
5 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 84–85; Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 3.
6 The referents are, of course, Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush, and State Department official Francis Fukuyama.
7 Here I slightly revise the definition of Robert Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 7.
8 Kenneth Waltz, "Political Structures," in *Neorealism*, ed. Keohane, chap. 5.
9 For an attempt at a defense of a contingent, structural realism (one requiring all four assumptions), see the author's "Hobbes and the Balance of Power," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1989, and "Politics and Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 22–47.
10 John Ruggie and Robert Cox offer valuable criticisms along these lines of the historical narrowness and sociological thinness of the structuralist model. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," and Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," both in Keohane, *Neorealism*. And for extensive

historical criticism of the balance of power model see R. Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, B. Healy, and A. Stein, *Power, Balance of Power, and Status in Nineteenth Century International Relations* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), and the articles by Paul Schroeder and Peter Gellman in *Review of International Studies* 15 (April 1989): 135–54, 155–82. For a defense of an interpretation of balancing that focuses on perceptions, see William Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987): 353–81.

11 Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), chap. 2.

12 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513), trans. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 6–7.

13 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (1513), trans. Luigi Ricci and E. R. Vincent (New York: Modern Library, 1950), pp. 122, 126.

14 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 8.

15 "It is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed," so matter of factly notes Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 14. And see Sebastian de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chap. 7.

16 Shakespeare captured this *virtù* well in *Henry V:* when the frightened English, Welsh, Scots, and Irish gather around Henry at Agincourt on the morning of St. Crispin's Day, young Henry inspires them with the sense of their glory and gives them confidence by the confidence in victory he displays.

17 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, pp. 89–90; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 126.

18 For example, necessity and a lack of good fortune – illness and a failure to anticipate the resentment that Julius II would bear him – caused the downfall of Cesare Borgia, who otherwise was a most virtuous prince (*The Prince*, chap. 7). For a discussion of the literature on "collaboration" see Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); for "bandwagoning" toward "threats" (not necessarily power) see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and for a recent discussion of balancing that reconciles balancing with bandwagoning by independent (nonimperialized) states see Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 233–56.

19 A. M. Broadley, *How We Defended Arabi and His Friends* (London, 1884), p. 16.

20 Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), chap. 1.

21 de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, p. 158.

22 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chap. 21. Although Machiavelli criticized Ferdinand in his letters for "cunning and good luck, rather than superior wisdom" (from Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Letters of Machiavelli*, trans. Allan Gilbert [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961], p. 111), he praised Ferdinand at considerable length in chapter 21 of *The Prince*.

23 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 88.

24 John Elliott, *Imperial Spain* (New York: Mentor, 1963), p. 21.

25 W. H. Prescott in his classic history of Spain described Ferdinand's virtues: "impartial justice in the administration of the laws; his watchful solicitude to shield the weak from the oppression of the strong; his wise economy, which achieved great results without burdening his people with oppressive taxes; his sobriety and moderation; the decorum, and respect for religion, which he maintained among his subjects; the industry he promoted by wholesome laws and his own example; his consummate sagacity, which crowned all his enterprises with brilliant success, and made him the oracle of the princes of his age." W. H. Prescott, *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella* (1837; rpt. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1904), vol. 4, p. 255. But Prescott also noted his propensity toward "vicious gallantries" that disturbed both Isabella and the stability of the kingdom. Ibid., p. 251.

26 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 88.

27 Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, p. 90.
28 Machiavelli, *The Letters*, pp. 115–16. He made them famous for perfidy.
29 Machiavelli, *The Letters*, p. 133.
30 Jacob Burckhardt noted: "The feeling of the Ferrarese toward the ruling house was a strange compound of silent dread, of the truly Italian sense of well-calculated interest, and of the loyalty of the modern subject: personal admiration was transferred into a new sentiment of duty." Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1878), trans. S. G. Middlemore (London: Phaidon Press, 1965), p. 32.
31 Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in *Kant's Political Writings*, trans. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 93–130.
32 Kant regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them (ibid., p. 106). At the same time, he argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states (ibid., p. 102).
33 Ibid., p. 114.
34 The evidence for the existence and significance of a pacific union is discussed in Chapter 1. Clarence Streit seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the fifteen leading democracies of the 1930s; Streit, *Union Now, a Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic* (New York: Harper, 1938), pp. 88, 90–92. Dean Babst performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace"; see Babst, "A Force for Peace" *Industrial Research* 14 (April 1972): 55–58. And Rudolph Rummel did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of laissez-faire) focusing on the postwar period; Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (March 1983): 27–71. I use liberal in a wider (Kantian) sense in my discussion of this issue in "Kant, Liberal Legacies . . .," pt. I. In that essay, I survey the period from 1790 to the present and find no war among liberal states. Babst did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1 percent (p. 56). But this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other; and this is a strong assumption. Rummel has a further discussion of significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis.
35 For evidence, see Chapter 2. Although there are serious studies that show that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes (see Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Ziegler, "Socialism and Militarism," *PS: Political Science and Politics* [December 1989]: 800–813), this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or – with even greater enthusiasm – as the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Stanislav Andreski, for example, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures; Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," in *Journal of Strategic Studies: Special Issue on Strategy and the Social Sciences*, ed. Amos Perlmutter and John Gooch, 3 (December 1980): 3–10. And according to Walter C. Clemens, Jr., the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946–76 as the Soviet Union did in 1946–79; Clemens, *National Security and U.S.-Soviet Relations* (Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1982), pp. 117–18.

   Relatedly, Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera found that the United States devoted one-quarter and the Soviet Union devoted one-tenth of their respective defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character); see Posen and Van Evera, "Overarming and Underwhelming," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980): 105; and Posen and Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration – Departure from Containment," *International Security* 8 (Summer 1983): 86–89.

36 Lenin declared: "The conduct of the leaders of the German Social Democratic Party of the Second International [1889–1914] who have voted the war budget and who repeat the bourgeois chauvinistic phrases of the Prussian Junkers and of the bourgeoisie is a direct betrayal of Socialism." This was the second of the *Seven These against War*, which Lenin announced in Bern to the handful of his Bolshevik fellow exiles on September 6 or 7, 1914 (the these are quoted in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* [New York: Dell, 1964], pp. 635–36). Note the birth and *death* dates for the Second International. See Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 5, and R. Craig Nation, *War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989) for thorough accounts of Lenin's relations with the Second International just prior to and during World War I.

37 Leszek Kolakowski, for example, sees the socialist as having been overwhelmed by national patriotism and as having revealed that "the international solidarity of the proletariat – its ideological foundation – was an empty phrase." Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism, Volume 2: The Golden Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 29. And Julius Braunthal says: "In the spirit of Marxism it (the International) had proclaimed itself the irreconcilable opponent of the bourgeois-capitalist state. . . . But on 4 August almost all Socialist parties in the belligerent countries pledged themselves to the defense of the very bourgeois-capitalist states whose destruction had hitherto been their aim." Braunthal, *History of the International, Volume 2: 1914–1943* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 1. Although Kenneth Waltz in his chapter on the socialists and World War I carefully notes that his summary compresses many interesting points of Marx's ambiguous statements on world politics, he supports this synopsis while identifying the valuable distinction between socialist policy toward the war and socialist responsibility for the war (Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1954], pp. 125–26, 129).

38 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 562. Prewar socialists were well aware of constitutional differences among bourgeois regimes. Although the German socialist party was Europe's largest, the Reich government was not fully responsible to the Reichstag. Civil liberties were also somewhat tenuous. The 1907 Stuttgart Conference was held in Stuttgart rather than in Berlin in order to avoid provoking the kaiser. Despite this, one of the deputies, a Mr. Quelch from Britain, was summarily expelled from Germany merely for describing the Hague Conference of the Great Powers then meeting as a "'thieves' supper.'"

39 J. P. Nettl, *The Soviet Achievement* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), pp. 29–31.

40 Particularly useful secondary works drawing connections between Marxist theory and Marx's internationalism are Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917–1928)* (Geneva: E. Droz, 1957); Solomon F. Bloom, *The World of Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941); G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Alan Gilbert, "Marx on Internationalism and War," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7 (Summer 1978): 346–69. For a fuller discussion and bibliography of Marxist theory of internationalism see my "Politics and Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 22–47.

41 Merle Fainsod, *International Socialism and the World War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 8–15; G. D. H. Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought, Volume II: Marxism and Anarchism, 1850–1890* (London: Macmillan, 1954); George Lichtheim, *Marxism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pt. 5, chaps. 5–7; Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (1939; rpt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); and Michael Lowy, "Marxists and the National Question," *New Left*

Review 96 (March–April 1976): 81–100, are particularly good surveys of the variety of rival doctrinal factions that had emerged within Marxism in Western Europe and Russia before 1914. Fainsod divides up the prewar socialists into three factions (Right, Center, Left), reflecting philosophical disputes on the meaning of historical materialism and tactical differences on many issues, including policies in response to the outbreak of a war (see pp. 15–17). German Marxism, however, according to Lichtheim (pp. 323–324), remained the most influential doctrine up to the outbreak of the war. More important, in distinction from Fainsod, I suggest that their philosophical differences could be contained by the common core of Marxist thought and that this common core provides a sufficient explanation of the differing policies the socialist parties adopted. Kolakowski (pp. 4–5) describes the common core of Marxism during its "Golden Age." This common core gave rise to so strong an allegiance that even after the factional splits in the German SPD became acute, late in the war, Rosa Luxemburg refused to lead her Spartacists out of the party even though she had come to think of the official Social Democratic organization as "a stinking corpse" (noted in Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 30 [New York: International Publishers, 1971], p. 345).

42 An extensive account of these competitions and the resulting spheres of ideological influence can be found in Borkenau, *World Communism*, chap. 40.

43 James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), pp. 196–98.

44 Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895–1914* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960).

45 Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy: 1905–1917* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), pp. 69, 201; and William Walling, *The Socialists and the Great War* (New York: Holt and Company, 1915), pp. 99–113.

46 Quoted in Joll, *Second International*, p. 197.

47 Walling, *Socialists*, pp. 146–47.

48 Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, p. 286.

49 Walling, *Socialists*, p. 111.

50 The parliamentary statistics for Serbia and the other states noted below are taken from the *Statesman's Yearbook 1915*.

51 Braunthal, *History of the International*, p. 34.

52 Walling, *Socialists*, pp. 181–82; Braunthal, *History of the International*, p. 25.

53 In addition to the 102 organized socialists, the elections of May 1914 returned 30 independent socialists.

54 Walling, *Socialists*, pp. 177–79.

55 Douglas J. Newton, *British Labour, European Socialism, and the Struggle for Peace, 1889–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 343–51, sympathetically assesses the errors made and the difficulties faced by the British socialists in 1914. He found a lack of rapport between the British trades union leadership and the more doctrinaire of both the British and the continental socialists. Moreover, the secrecy of prewar diplomacy and the speed of the crisis of August 1914 made effective opposition extremely unlikely.

56 Fainsod, *International Socialism*, p. 32.

57 Walling, *Socialists*, pp. 164–65; Braunthal, *History of the International*, pp. 27–29.

58 Walling, *Socialists*, pp. 198–99.

59 The 82 socialists in Austria include German Social Democrats, Polish Social Democrats, and Bohemian Social Democrats. Austria and Hungary, although represented in separate parliaments, maintained unified foreign affairs and defense under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

60 Walling, *Socialists*, p. 149.

61 Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 277.

62 Quoted in Braunthal, *History of the International*, p. 15. Vandevelde, however, did not see that the same Marxist logic justified Russian Marxists in opposing the war, rather than supporting Russia in order to aid the Western democracies as Vandevelde wished. And, indeed, some part of the support for this position may have stemmed from internationalist, as opposed to purely nationalist, sources, in that a defeat of Russia by Germany could have resulted in the defeat of Russia's western allies – the progressive societies of France and England. At least, this seems to have been G. V. Plekhanov's convoluted reasoning prior to the war. The Menshevik leader Iu Larin countered that Russian Social Democrats must struggle against "that other, and not less dangerous, enemy of the working class which is Russian absolutism" (letters quoted in Braunthal, *History of the International*, p. 26).

63 Gay, *Dilemma of Democratic Socialism*, pp. 284–88.

64 Walling, *Socialists*, p. 192.

65 Braunthal, *History of the International*, p. 32. But some of the arrested Left-Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders, under examination at their trial, later declared that they did not support Lenin's injunction to work for national defeat. See also Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1950), p. 67.

66 R. J. Crampton, "August Bebel and the British Foreign Office," *History* 58 (June 1973): 218–32.

5   The voice of the people

Political theorists on the international implications of democracy[1]

There appears to be a growing impression that step by step with the increase in domestic civil rights and popular self-government, the prospects for international peace improve. The spread of popular government and the growth of civil society in Eastern Europe and (with fits and starts) the former Soviet Union seem to many thus not only to herald but also to cause the radical reduction of international tensions in Europe and the wider world.

In the popular press, the notion seemed so widespread that *The Economist* (ever a dasher of cold water on popular optimisms) felt that the spirit of the day called for a rebuttal.[2] Prominent political leaders have clearly contributed to this perception. For example, in a speech before the British parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. (He then announced a "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development".)[3] President Bush, similarly, on 1 October 1990, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, declared: "Calls for democracy and human rights are being reborn everywhere. And these calls are an expression of support for the values enshrined in the Charter. They encourage our hopes for a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world."[4] In his 1991 UN Address ("Pax Universalis", 23 September 1991) he stated equally unequivocally: "As democracy flourishes, so does the opportunity for a third historical breakthrough: international cooperation."[5]

The Cold War is over. President Yeltsin has explicitly declared that he (also the Russians?) no longer regards the United States as an enemy and no longer targets missiles in our direction.[6] President Bush celebrated victory – by "the Grace of God" – in the 1992 State of the Union Address in the name of the "G.I. Joes and Janes" and even more nameless US taxpayers to whom he wished to credit the demise of communism, which "died this year".[7] President Clinton embraced the Russian leader at the recent Vancouver Summit in the Spring of 1993 and, together with the other members of the G-7, reaffirmed a commitment to the financial backing of Russian democracy while, more generally, defining the United States's strategy as one of enlarging the community of democratic nations.

These pronouncements of our time also find roots in classical democratic theory. The American revolutionary, Thomas Paine, in 1791 proclaimed:

"Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty is restored to its natural and original place, the nation. . . . Were this the case throughout Europe, the cause of war would be taken away."[8] Democratic pacifism, according to Paine and other and later democrats, rests on the view that the aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war. Democratic states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war. When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace. Thus the very existence of free-market democracies, such as the USA, Japan, and our European allies and now possibly Hungary, Czech republic, Poland, and, perhaps, a democratic Russia makes for peace. Some contemporary scholarship provides evidence to support these claims in which free and democratic, "libertarian" states are seen to be inherently peaceful.[9]

Nonetheless, there are good reasons for us to be skeptical of this association between peace, tolerance, restraint, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. Both in classical theory and in historical practice four major associations have been claimed for popular government, and only one of them promises the modern assured association of peace and democracy that the politicians and much of the public seem to expect.

The first claim, ranked by longevity, is that of democratic *imperialism*, that democracies are an effective, perhaps even the best means to launch imperial aggression. This is the view of Thucydides, which influenced classical political thought up to and including Machiavelli.

The second is that democracy should be associated with effective defence in all directions, a policy of *isolationism* within a pervasive and generalized state of war. Democratic government requires of its international relations independence, above all else. This is Rousseau's vision.

The third asserts that democracies are shaped by *internationalism* – peaceful, but as Paine too may be implying, not necessarily in the relations with non-democracies.[10] This is also Immanuel Kant's vision.

And only the fourth, the most modern, makes the optimistic claim – *pacifism* – that is now so popular.

I would like to explore the arguments underlying these radically different visions of the effects of popular government and try to sort out the reasons for their differences. I do so partly in the hope that in understanding these different visions of popular government and its effects, we will have the analytic tools that will help us better anticipate what sort of world we seem to be moving towards.

Democratic imperialism

Thucydides's view of the effects of democracy on relations between states (*poleis*) serves as a valuable counterpoint to the modern impression. Rather than peace, rather than restraint, power and imperial growth, excess and factionalism were the

traits that he saw associated with democracy. This association leaves us with two puzzles. The larger one is of course why do we see democracy as peace-loving when he saw it as empire-making, and this I postpone to the conclusion. The smaller puzzle, Thucydides's own dilemma, is how an institution so useful in making an empire could be so prone to destroying it.

Democracy meant that power was in the hands not of the minority but of the "whole people". Citizens enjoyed equality before the law, a political career open to talents, and a special freedom and tolerance in private matters.[11] In actual practice, of course, Athens was a society that rested on commerce and small agriculture but that also exploited slave labor in silver mines at Laurium and in domestic service. For the 40,000–50,000 male citizens, democratic self-rule was real; the assembly and its democratically elected Council of 500 being the dominant voice in the legislative affairs of the state, just as the ten democratically elected *strategoi* were in military and executive affairs.

For Thucydides, states are driven by "honor, security and self-interest" (I:76). States cannot escape from constant danger because "when tremendous dangers are involved no one can be blamed for looking to his own interest" (I:76). Since weakness always means subjection, only independent strength guarantees independent security; so states must look to their own relative power.

For Thucydides and other Athenians, the most straightforward connection between democracy and power relies on the importance of naval power. When naval power relies upon oared galleys, a navy of free rowers is inherently superior to a navy of slave rowers, since in the heat of battle the former can be called upon to defend their ship. And, as Pseudo-Xenophon noted: ". . . the poorer classes and the demos rightly possess more authority than the well-born and the rich because it is the demos that rows the ships and keeps the city powerful."[12]

A second democratic source of power is simply the resources released when the citizens have a stake in the survival and success of the state. Rather than spending resources in coercing the citizenry, the state can draw upon citizens' resources for what are regarded as public purposes (Thucydides I:17). A free society, furthermore, is a society in which deliberation in public can guide and, through the exercise of reason, improve public policy.

Third, and in addition to providing the institutional framework that allows Athens to draw upon the resources of the mass of its citizens, democratic institutions also provide a large part of its motive force, both material and ideal. As Pericles so eloquently explained in his "Funeral Oration" for the Athenian war-dead, a democratic polity is the necessary expression of a free society, and only in a free society are the creative energies of the populace allowed full play to develop. A free society allows an "adventurous spirit" to rule, producing a willingness to take risks, to increase production, and to trade far and wide. By the 440's, moreover, paid jury duty provided valuable sources of additional income to approximately half of the citizenry.[13] Colonial settlement on the confiscated lands of recalcitrant "allies" offered a livelihood to smaller numbers. Of the 1,000 talents of annual state revenue in 431, 600 were derived from imperial taxation, fees, and tariffs.[14] Equally important (according to Pericles) is the authority public

magistrates derive from the Athenian respect for law (II:37). Moreover, the freedom of Athens produces a willingness to take risks, a confidence in an ability to overcome dangers; and these contributed to the Athenian patriotism that underlay the empire (II:39–40).

And fourth, together those domestic traits make Athens an attractive center for all the Ionian peoples and offer the material basis that permits Athens to "make friends by doing good to others" (I:40). They sought access to the economy Athens controlled. The masses sought association with the Athenian demos; indeed they could be counted on as allies in many cases against their own oligarchic rulers. Athenian liberality, together with manifest productivity of its economy and cultural vitality of its society, also produces the international "popularity" that made association with the Athenian polis, even in its imperial form, attractive to the masses throughout much of the Greek world.[15] (The demos of Mytilene, for example, resisted the efforts of the oligarchic faction to liberate Mytilene from the Athenian empire; so that when the oligarchy mistakenly armed them, they surrendered the city to Athens, III:27.)

Democracy, however, is also a source of eventual weakness, over-extension, and self-destruction. Indeed, it is here, in Thucydides's history of the Peloponnesian War, in which democracy first acquired its reputation for such disastrous factionalism that, more than two thousand years later, the American authors of the *Federalist Papers* still felt it necessary to try to rebut the charge.[16] Athenian democracy fractured under stress. The great plague of 430 undermined trust (those first to help others became the most likely to be infected, II:51). Afterwards the patriotic respect for the laws and for caution, courage, and brilliance that had led the citizens to follow the wise strategy of attrition prescribed by Pericles (who embodied all three virtues) broke down into passion, suspicion, and self-interest. The citizens let themselves be led by lesser men who had one but not the rest of his virtues – they followed the merely cautious (Nicias), or merely courageous (Cleon), or merely brilliant (Alcibiades).[17] Each of these leaders and the policies of appeasement, brutality, and adventurousness they advocated became the public policy of a majority of the democratic citizenry. Nowhere better than in the debate over whether to send an expedition to conquer hitherto neutral Sicily do the effects of factionalism emerge. Thucydides sums up the debate and fateful decision in this way:

> There was a passion for the enterprise which affected everyone alike. The older men thought they would either conquer the places against which they were sailing or, in any case, with such a large force, could come to no harm; the young had a longing for the sights and experiences of distant places, and were confident that they would return safely; the general masses and the average soldier himself saw the prospect of getting pay for the time being and of adding to the empire so as to secure permanent paid employment in the future. The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the majority was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet
>
> (VI:24).

Athenian democracy, rather than inhibiting, thus contributed to war. In a world that required that states look to their relative power in order to maintain security, democracy was valued because it enhanced state power and, in particular, helped establish imperial power. But more than simply adding to resources and influence, it also, as a tragic by-product, shaped and reshaped public goals and visions. Both directly and indirectly democracy engendered supplementary reasons for expansion – to maintain employment, to enhance glory, to stir up adventures, to expand commerce, to educate other peoples in democratic civilization. These new goals – each chosen by a temporary majority – led to unnecessary wars which then undermined the security of the state. That was and is the democratic tragedy of which Thucydides warned us.

Democratic isolationism

Everywhere he turned, Rousseau saw oppression and corruption. Nonetheless, he thinks human beings are by nature good and that they can find a just freedom in (and only in) a social contract governed by self-determining free citizens. But even those just societies were surrounded by an exceptionally dangerous state of war, some of whose danger was produced by just those optimistic features of trust and solidarity carried on to the battlefield.[18]

Like Thucydides and Machiavelli (and indeed all realists), Rousseau finds the international condition among states to be a state of war. It is characterized by "social misery".[19] In the natural condition of mankind before the institution of states, there are many quarrels and fights, but war is a social creation of states, an act expressing an intention to destroy or weaken an enemy state and the "state of war" is characterized by the continuing intention of policide, temporarily lacking the act.

The state of war, moreover, is inherently unjust. Justice calls for a union of force and law, with force controlled by law. In most (corrupt) states men suffer the worst of both worlds because we suffer the evils of two conditions: "so long as the prince is regarded as absolutely uncontrolled, it is force alone which speaks to the subject under the name of law and to the foreigner under the name of reason of state: so taking from the latter the power and from the former the very will, to offer resistance. . . . force reigns under the empty name of justice."[20] But even if we had a just state internally, international politics would remain the mere exercise of force without the control of law, for international law is a mere "illusion" – for want of any global sanction to make it an effective replacement for the exercise of force.

Describing the condition of all states in an anarchic international system, Rousseau appears to be a strikingly structural interpreter of world politics.[21] But Rousseau differs from structuralists in his route to these conclusions, and, in the end, he leaves a more varied set of possibilities open to the political struggle of rulers and also of citizens. He seeks to go beyond the condition of a corrupt Europe and examines ideal democracy together with two partly-imagined, partly-real partial escapes – an isolated "Corsica" and a defensively constituted "Poland". But no escape from war is reliable, not even democracy.

Rousseau develops the foundations of international politics in a grand deriva-
tion from the state of nature. Rather than the tamer of natural man, Rousseau
portrays the typical state as his ultimate oppressor. In the original state of nature,
stripped of all the attributes of civilization, man is a gentle animal, according to
Rousseau. He is naturally equal and his social relations are completely casual and
neither cooperative nor warlike. "I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak,
and slaking his thirst at the first brook; finding his bed at the foot of the tree which
afforded him a repast; and with that all his wants supplied."[22] Lacking in language
he has few thoughts. Reason guides his pursuit of simple wants. He experiences
few fears, which include fear of pain and cold, but not of death. He readily
expresses his natural compassion for the sufferings of others.

Soon, scarcity arises as the numbers of men increase. This leads to a second state
of nature, which is both progressive and regressive. It is progressive because increased
interdependence leads to stable relationships, the first "expansion of the human
heart". Families are organized and love comes to characterize human relations within
them. Language evolves and reason develops as careful calculation rewards its prac-
titioners with increased material benefits. Here we develop what we think of as
specifically human consciousness beyond that which we share with the animals.

At the same time, scarcity is the origin of property, possession, rivalry, pride,
hatred, and jealousies. Individualism and familism replace natural happiness.
Cooperation becomes inherently problematic. We become "stag hunters", who
lacking in trust and motivated by self-interest, abandon the common prey for the
individual target of the hare.[23] Pride becomes the source of contentious compari-
sons. Metallurgy and agriculture create extensive mastery of nature, more inten-
sive social dependence, and fiercer competition.

The more skilful at these more productive technologies became the rich, the
less skilful became the poor. Inequality breeds more inequality. Deceit and preten-
sion come to characterize human relationships. The poor then react and try to steal
from the rich; the rich to oppress and protect themselves from the poor.

Then the rich decide to form a "social contract". In order to protect their prop-
erty, they trick the poor into accepting a legal equality of rights in property that in
effect secures their unequal superiority in possessions and influence. Armed with
the power of the state, the rich and the domestically powerful pursue their partic-
ular interests at home and abroad. They create more violence and mayhem among
states in pursuit of their wealth and prestige than had ever characterized the
state of nature. Conflict now occurs between organized armies and not individual
quarrelers.[24]

The typical foreign relations of Europe are the foreign relations of these corrupt
states, as described by the Abbé de St. Pierre (whose peace plan Rousseau exam-
ines). The balance of power can mitigate international tyranny, but it does so
through the threat of war. Therefore, says St. Pierre, sovereigns need to combine
their separate and fundamental interests in security and subordinate their private
interests to an organized league of collective security.

In his critique of St. Pierre's *Peace Project*, Rousseau shows how peace is
impossible for them. This is because (1) monarchs prefer their apparent interest

(prestige and relative superiority) to their real interests in security. And, even if the monarchs were sensible, (2) their ministers of state are the very individuals who gain from the existence of wars. They are hardly likely to abolish the wars which are their greatest source of profit and influence (p. 101). And (3), even if both monarchs and ministers become committed to rational, national cooperation, how would one ensure that all states came to the same realization at once, except through force. And Rousseau concludes by asking: Should peace then be more desired or feared?[25]

Having dismissed international organization as a route to peace, Rousseau considers the route to peace through domestic political revolution – through democracy. He does so in three ways.

First, Rousseau imagines the hypothetical creation of a just Social Contract that would liberate citizens from their subjection and inequality. Sometime early in its history, before corruption had become deeply ingrained in the character and the institutions of a people, a great moral Legislator might be inspired to break their chains and set them on the path to self-government.

Each citizen would be asked to pledge all, not to a corrupt monarch or his ministers, but to each other. Sovereignty would be made secure at home, since no one could justly challenge the authority of the laws and the citizens would escape from the strife of the state of nature. Each citizen would also become both equal to all others and free. Inalienable, indivisible, infallible as an expression of the true interests of the people as a whole, and therefore all encompassing, the people assembled would decide laws applying to all on an equal basis, absolutely, and thus constitute the General Will. The General Will would thus be inherently general (meaning national, or coextensive with the polity) and rational – it was the people rightly understanding their long-term general interests.[26]

Unlike the corrupted monarchies St. Pierre tried to save, the Social Contract would pursue no whims or private interests that would lead the state into possibly frequent battles. Wars would only be fought for national purposes that expressed the long-term rational interests of the people. Wars would only be fought if necessary; but, if fought, they would be unrestrained in their degree of violence except by the natural sympathies that were part of the natural human condition. Soldiers would volunteer for any war the Social Contract required and fight until the death. And wars would only be fought among states – among the soldiers who fight for states, not against non-combatants.

But would wars be necessary in a state of war inhabited by just, rational Social Contracts directed only by the General Will? Would the compassion of the original state of nature translate into a pacific General Will or would the spirit of jealousies (the family rivalries) of the late state of nature translate into a jealously patriotic General Will?

Quite probably, the latter, Rousseau seems to say. For Rousseau notes that even if the ministers St. Pierre describes were not privately interested in war, the very independence of states precludes a stable solution to international cooperation. Disappointment breeds rivalry, and particular national advantages, even considered from the purest standpoint of rational long-run national interest, can clash.

When the expected costs of war now are exceeded by the expected costs of the insecurity or material loss that would follow from not having a particular strategic pass or river under national control or from not having control of a particular natural resource, then there is nothing in the General Will that would preclude a war.[27]

Although we cannot imagine national reform achieving global peace, Rousseau suggests it might allow particular states to mitigate or even escape, at least for a while, the general state of war.

Second, Rousseau thus explores a model for an isolationist peace. Corsica is his model of the small, undeveloped society (an eighteenth-century version of the exemplary role played by Tanzania, Albania, or Burma in our times?). The Genoese blockaded the island, devastated the coasts, slaughtered the native nobility. This tragedy represents a fortunate opportunity for authentic reform. From devastation, a wise Corsican leadership can establish a society and republic of free farmers and small manufacturers, restricting trade with the outside world to the barest essentials. As a new "Sparta," it could cultivate its virtue with its small farms tilled by robust soldiers.[28] Here, while rural simplicity persists, "Everyone will make a living, and no one will grow rich."[29] Enjoying isolation and guaranteed by the unity a similarity of social circumstances brings, Corsica would present little temptation to and great resistance against any great power seeking a colonial conquest.[30] The Corsicans would gain security in their time, until the increase in population creates a need for extensive manufactures and commerce, and with them an end to virtue, simplicity, and the self-dependence that might have for a time made Corsica strong and safe in the surrounding state of war.

Third, Rousseau examines the establishment of non-provocative defence. Not all eighteenth-century states were of Corsican dimensions or potential democratic virtue. For the larger, more developed (more corrupted) states, Rousseau offers the example of Poland (an eighteenth-century Egypt, Brazil or India, perhaps). Introducing rustic equality and democratic virtue (not to speak of island isolation) is out of the question in a traditional society dominated by aristocratic landowners, afflicted with the odd domestic disability of the anarchic Polish diet and its *liberum veto*, and surrounded by imperialistic great powers.

Instead, Rousseau recommends a step by step progressive reform creating as a surrogate for Corsica's island isolation, a non-provocative defence of Polish independence. By cultivating education, cultural festivals, and a political system rewarding patriotic participation in public life, the Polish nationalists can make Poland indigestible for any foreign conqueror.[31] Combining patriotism, confederalism, central sovereignty, and a militia army, Rousseau hopes that Poland's enemies will find her neither an offensive threat nor an easy prey to invasion. Beyond that, and especially during the vulnerable period when it begins to undertake the reforms it needs, Poland can rely on the balance of power, the natural support of Turkey, which is Russia's and Austria's rival to the south.

Reforms alter the state of war – mitigate its particular effects for particular states. The rational prudence of the democratic General Will removes that aspect

of conflict and war caused by monarchical and ministerial caprice. Isolation contains interdependence. Non-provocative defences assuage conflicts caused by fear of pre-emptive attack and deter attacks prompted by the likely success of easy conquest.

Each democratic reform reduces the danger. None of them removes states from the state of war.

Liberal internationalism

Liberal democratic internationalists who have wanted to claim that "free states" are different from other states relax two of the assumptions Rousseau makes. Liberals retain the assumption of the state as the essential, stable and institutionalized unit of decision. But they relax the assumption that states are single rational egoistic calculators in favor of a view that sees states as complex representative institutions – liberal republics or constitutional democracies. At the same time, they relax the assumption that states are motivated by security defined in terms of power, material interests, and prestige in favor of the assumption that constitutional democracies are motivated as well by the value of cosmopolitan individual freedom.

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy of liberal internationalism these two innovations work together and have significant effects on world politics. In *Perpetual Peace*,[32] Kant shows how liberal republics lead to a dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations – a "pacific union" among similarly liberal states – and a "state of war" between liberals and non-liberals.

First, republican governments, he argues, tame the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies and ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Wars then appear as the direct charges on the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. They did not for Thucydides or Rousseau. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution, Kant's "hesitation," in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, protect private property, or support liberal allies against non-liberal enemies.[33]

Second, in order to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and non-liberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source – a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states – an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism". Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states "as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace" (*PP*, p. 114). As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an

understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, liberal states assume that non-liberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because non-liberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may also be self-fulfilling.

Democratic liberals do not need to assume either that public opinion rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is liberal. It can assume that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially non-liberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that anti-liberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public.

Lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarchy; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarchy. Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create cross-cutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational

and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation. Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations between liberal and non-liberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies. And this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

No single constitutional, international or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient. Kantian theory is neither solely institutional nor solely ideological, nor solely economic. But together (and only together) the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.[34] But in their relations with non-liberal states, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole.[35] Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies.

Democratic pacifism

The modern thesis that democracies are inherently peaceful has received an eloquent and scholarly restatement in the engagingly provocative *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* by John Mueller.[36] Mueller marshals extensive evidence to demonstrate that major war has gradually moved "toward terminal disrepute because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility" (Mueller, 1989, p. 4). Both the psychic and physical costs of war have made it obsolete. Like duelling and slavery, it has become socially and morally repulsive. Like pyramid building, it has become too costly. It no longer seems worth it.

Schumpeter's "Sociology of Imperialisms", offers considerable evidence to support this view while it develops a comprehensive analysis of the sources that underlie the forces of democratic pacifism. Published in 1919 as a refutation of Lenin's *Imperialism*, Schumpeter's essay made a coherent and sustained argument concerning the pacifying (in the sense of non-aggressive) effects of liberal institutions and principles.[37] Unlike some of the earlier liberal theorists, who focused on a single feature, such as trade,[38] or failed to examine critically the arguments they were advancing, Schumpeter saw the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms.

Schumpeter defined "imperialism" as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (p. 6). Excluding imperialisms that were mere "catchwords" and object-ful imperialisms (e.g. defensive), he traced the roots of objectless imperialism to three sources, each an atavism. Modern imperialism resulted from the combined impact of a "war machine", warlike instincts, and export monopolism.

Once necessary, the war machine later developed a life of its own and took control of a state's foreign policy. "Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required" (p. 25). And so, Schumpeter tells us, the army of ancient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt, took over the state and pursued militaristic imperialism. Like the later armies of the courts of absolutist Europe, it fought wars for the sake of glory and booty, for the sake of warriors and monarchs – wars *gratia* warriors.

A warlike disposition, elsewhere called "instinctual elements of bloody primitivism", is the natural ideology of a war machine. It also exists independently; the Persians, he says, were a warrior nation from the outset (pp. 25–32).

Under modern capitalism, export monopolists, the third source of modern imperialism, push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed markets. But the absolute monarchies were the last clear-cut imperialisms. Nineteenth century imperialisms merely represent the vestiges of the imperialisms created by Louis XIV and Catherine the Great. Thus the export monopolists are an atavism of the absolute monarchies, for they depend completely on the tariffs imposed by the monarchs and their militaristic successors for revenue (pp. 82–83). Without tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated by foreign competition.

Modern (nineteenth-century) imperialism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war machine, militaristic attitudes left over from the days of monarchical wars, and export monopolism, which is nothing more than the economic residue of monarchical finance. In the modern era, imperialists gratify their private interests. From the national perspective, their imperialistic wars are objectless.

Schumpeter's theme now emerges. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace. Indeed, they are antithetical to imperialism. And the further (to Schumpeter) development of capitalism and democracy means that imperialism will inevitably disappear.

Capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its populace is "democratized, individualized, rationalized" (p. 68). The people's (daily) energies are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market train people in "economic rationalism"; the instability of industrial life necessitates calculation. Capitalism also "individualizes"; "subjective opportunities" replace the "immutable factors" of traditional, hierarchical society. Rational individuals demand democratic governance.

And democratic capitalism leads to peace. As evidence, Schumpeter claims that (1) throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to "war, expansion, cabinet diplomacy"; (2) contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties; and (3) the industrial worker of capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist". In addition, (4) the capitalist world has developed the means of preventing war, such as the Hague Court; and (5) the least feudal, most capitalist society – the United States – has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies (pp. 95–96). (The US left over half of Mexico unconquered in the war of 1846–48.)

His explanation for liberal pacifism was quite simple. Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. When free trade prevails, "no

class" gains from forcible expansion: "foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were in its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization, it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the 'civilized' nations undertakes the task of colonization" (pp. 75–76).

Later in his career, in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Schumpeter developed a much more sophisticated model of capitalist political economy and he acknowledged that "almost purely bourgeois commonwealths were often aggressive when it seemed to pay – like the Athenian or the Venetian commonwealths."[39] But he stuck to his (pacifistic) guns, restating the modern view that capitalist democracy "steadily tells . . . against the use of military force and for peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war which, under modern circumstances, is not in general very likely" (p.128).[40]

Comparisons

Thucydides, Rousseau, Kant, and Schumpeter are each advocates (and theorists) of popular, or democratic, or representative republican government. Yet they expect democratic foreign relations to be (variously) imperialist, isolationist, internationalist, and pacific. How can we explain their differences and understand the multiple legacies of democratic foreign affairs?

The pattern of expected foreign relations of democratic states that they offer us can be seen in the following table:

Table 5.1 Foreign relations of democratic states

	Peace	*War*	*Imperialism*
with/			
Democracies	S,K	R,T	T
Non-Democracies	S	R,T,K	T,K

(Where S=Schumpeter; K=Kant; T=Thucydides; and R=Rousseau)

Thucydides's democratic imperialism, Rousseau's democratic isolationism, Kant's liberal internationalism, and Schumpeter's liberal pacifism rest on fundamentally different views on the nature of man, the state, and international relations.

Let us examine the theorists pairwise.

Schumpeter and Kant

Schumpeter's man is rationalized, individualized, and democratized. He is also homogenized, pursuing material interests "monistically". Since his material interests lie in peaceful trade, he and the democratic state that he and his fellow citizens control are pacifistic. Schumpeter's "materialistic monism" leaves little

room for non-economic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. His states, moreover, are the same. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized". Citizens, capitalists and workers, rural and urban, seek material welfare. Schumpeter presumes that no one seems to want to rule. He also presumes that no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one's political power, despite detrimental effects on mass welfare. Just as ideal domestic politics are homogenized, so world politics, too, is homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized nations" govern "culturally backward regions."

Unlike Schumpeter's capitalist democracies, Kant's constitutional democracies – including our own – remain in a state of war with non-republics. Liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from non-republics that are not constrained by representation. Liberal politicians often fail in their categorical moral duties and stir up foreign quarrels with non-liberal states as a way of enhancing their own domestic power. And even though wars often cost more than the economic return they generate, liberal republics also are prepared to protect and promote – sometimes forcibly – democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against non-republics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights to non-interference. These wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; they also can generate enormous suffering.

Thucydides and Rousseau

Thucydides's citizens (unlike Schumpeter's) are splendidly diverse in their goals, both at home and abroad. Their characters are shaped in varying proportions by courage, ambition, fear, profit, caution, glory, and patriotism. Although they are equal before the law and all citizens have a right to vote, their circumstances greatly differ, divided as they are among rich and poor, urban and rural. Internationally, their states are driven by fear, honor, and self-advantage. States too are radically unequal in size, resources, and power. Such a people and such a state find imperialism useful, feasible, and valued. In a dangerous world, empire adds to the security, profit, and glory of the powerful majority, even if not of all the citizens. The demos makes naval power effective and cheap.

Rousseau's citizens of the Social Contract, too, are equal, rational, and free. But, going beyond legal equality, social and economic equality distinguish them from Thucydides's Athenians. Particular "wills" such as the ones that drove the Athenians to Sicily would yield to the General Will – the rational, national, general interest – which Thucydides (Pericles) had defined as precluding further imperial expansion. The exploitation of non-citizens in the empire (the source of so much national revenue) also would be unacceptable in a Rousseauian republic that demanded that all men be free, ruling and being ruled on an equal basis. This

obviously precludes slavery. It also requires that every other form of political rule that did not give an equal voice to all affected had to be excluded from a free democracy, which is why Rousseau's democracy had to be small. Nor, lastly, would Rousseau allow the extensive commerce that made empire both valued and feasible. The Rousseauian democracy was free, independent, and isolationist.

Rousseau and Kant

Kant's citizens, like Rousseau's, are free, politically equal, and rational. The Kantian state thus is governed publicly according to law, as a republic. Kant's constitutional democracy thus also (logically) solves the problem of governing equals. But his citizens are different in two respects. They retain their individuality, whether they are the "rational devils" he says that we egoists often find ourselves to be or the ethical agents, treating other individuals as ends rather than as means, that we can and should become. And they retain their diversity in economic and social circumstance.

Like Rousseau's direct democracy, Kant's constitutional democracy exercises democratic caution in the interest of the majority. But unlike Rousseau's General Will, Kant's republics are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals. The Rousseauian citizen cedes all rights to his fellow citizens, retaining only the right to equal consideration. In order to be completely self-determining, Rousseau requires that there be no limit but equality on the sovereignty and authority of the General Will. The resulting communitarianism is intense – every aspect of culture, morality, and social life is subject to the creation and the re-creation of the national citizenry. The tendency to enhance domestic consciousness through external hostility and what Rousseau calls *amour propre* would be correspondingly high. Just as individuality disappears into collective consciousness, so too does an appreciation for the international rights of foreign republics.[41] These international rights of republics derive from our ability to reconstruct in our imagination the act of representation of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals. Kant appears to think that the General Will, which Rousseau thinks can be realized only within the community, can be intuited by each individual as the Categorical Imperative. Rousseau's democracy – for the sake of intensifying national identity – limits our identification to fellow citizens.

This imaginative act of Kantian cosmopolitan identification benefits from the institutional process of republican government. Constitutionally divided powers among the executive, legislature, and the judiciary require public deliberation and thereby mitigate the effect of particular passions or hasty judgment. Rousseau's direct democracy appears to slight the value of republican delay.

Moreover, for the sake of equality and autonomy, Rousseau's democracy precludes the private ties of commerce and social interaction across borders that lead to both domestic diversity and transnational solidarity. These material ties sustain the transnational, or cosmopolitan, identity of individuals with each other that serves as the foundation of international respect, which in turn is the source of the spirit of international law that requires tolerance and peace among fellow

constitutional democracies (while exacerbating conflict between constitutional democracies and all other states).

Rousseau shares with Kant democratic rationality. Rousseau, however, excludes both the moral individualism and the social pluralism that provide the foundations for Kant's "international" and "cosmopolitan" laws, and thereby precludes the liberal peace.

Comparing Thucydides and Rousseau, on the one hand, Kant and Schumpeter, on the other, we can say that whatever the differences in their special views of man and the nature of domestic politics, the first two agree that the polis or state either does or should command all force and command all loyalty. Differences among actual states and personal values are then contained by their similar degree of national authority. There is thus no room for the individualism and domestic diversity that Kant finds is at the root of the transnational loyalties and transnational interests that make a democratic peace. Nor is there room for the simple transnational materialism Schumpeter sees as governing the interests of pacific democratic majorities. The democracies of Thucydides and Rousseau remain in a state of war.

Present implications

To the extent that these theoretical distinctions tap the actual range of diversity in the development of contemporary democracies, they offer us some useful warnings about the international implications of the current trend toward democratization.[42]

Although majority rule may be a necessary condition of a state of peace, it is not a sufficient condition. Rousseau's portrait of the search for autarchy and national identity presupposes a continuing state of war with all outside polities; it undermines democratic peace. Thucydides's picture of democratic imperialism illustrates the impact of unrestrained passions and material interests.

In order to establish peace among themselves, democracies can follow Kant's route, defining individual rights in such a way that the cosmopolitan rights of all mankind are entailed in the moral foundations of the rights of domestic citizens. And then they must allow the material ties of transnational society to flourish among themselves. Or, attempting to guarantee an indiscriminate global peace, they can follow Schumpeter's prescription, relying upon the supposedly pacifying culture of capitalism and the material interests of free trade underlying it.

What are the implications for world politics today of these moral and political choices? Real states are always more complicated than theoretical models. But unlike even just thirty years ago, today we see few, if any, states aspiring to revolutionary Rousseauian democracy (Iran might come closest). We find many more in the Balkans and around the Black Sea and elsewhere that Thucydides would easily recognize, practising imperialism subject to supposedly democratic plebiscite in pursuit of limitless security, nationalist honor and crude self-interest.

The dominant forms of contemporary democracy, fortunately, appear to be liberal and capitalist, Kantian and Schumpeterian. They share pluralist and republican polities; capitalist and market economies; materialist and rationalist cultures,

with a commitment to human rights. The long record of liberal internationalism – both liberal solidarity with fellow liberals and liberal imperialism toward non-liberals – decides in favor of the Kantian roots of rights married to markets. On the other hand, recent mood swings toward complacency, "donor fatigue" and over-burdened United Nations peace-keeping – as the scramble for profit displaces Cold War internationalism – may highlight and draw upon the material sources of Schumpeterian pacifist isolationism.

In either case, liberal democracy accounts for, and claims credit for, extraordinary international feats. To a record of two centuries of peace among liberal democracies, it adds an extraordinary geo-strategic triumph: the solidarity of the Free World during the Cold War, America's long undefended democratic borders with Canada and Mexico, the reconciliation of the democratic states of Europe in the post-war period, and the successful assimilation of the defeated Axis powers, Germany and Japan and Italy, into the liberal order of the "Free World". And just as Britain peacefully ceded international hegemony to the United States in the middle twentieth century, liberal internationalism promises a peaceful transition if the United States' decline leads to another liberal transition – to a united Europe or possibly Japan.

Yet the history of liberal internationalism and the political foundations of the liberal peace give us three warnings about – or typical failures of – liberal internationalism.

The first is complaisance – let us call it the "1921–1931 Problem". Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states.

It has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide adequate international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. It failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims (fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination.

Far-sighted and constitutive measures have only been provided by the liberal international order when one liberal state stood pre-eminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did the United States following World War II, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as the British Loan, the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, the IMF, and the liberalization of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international liberal order.[43]

Thus, the decline of US hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the liberal world. The danger is not that today's liberal states will permit their economic competition to spiral into war nor that a world economic crisis is now likely, but that the societies of the liberal world will no longer be able to provide the mutual assistance they might require to sustain liberal domestic orders if they were to be faced with mounting economic crises.

The most pressing danger of complaisance today is how to support Russia and its democratic neighbors in the Commonwealth of Independent States – what is left of a shaky union of quasi-independent and hopefully still democratizing republics in the middle of Eurasia.

Isolationists decry both the involvement and the cost. But neither liberal principles nor liberal interests allow the luxury of non-involvement. Even in the isolationist aftermath of World War I, providing humanitarian aid to the Russians, financial support for Germany, and policing the Caribbean seemed to be an automatic part of the liberal project.

Even if liberal principles did not call for universalism, liberal interests now do. Trade and investments reach across the world. The oil on which the US and its closest economic partners in Europe and Japan rely still depends on Middle East supplies, as the crisis in the Gulf reminded us. The cost, moreover, of the forty-five year Cold War has to be calculated in trillions.[44] The possible failure of democratization in Russia would place thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of the "fascist situation" of which Ambassador Robert Strauss warned.[45] A renewed Cold War, next with Russian Fascism, has to be the largest, even if far from the most likely, threat to the security liberal democracies now enjoy.

The second danger lies in imprudent crusading – the problem of liberal imperialism to which liberal powers, including the United States, have repeatedly succumbed. Here liberals need to avoid the tendency to engage in crusades that are costly and counter-productive – both morally and materially. Neither villages nor countries can be destroyed in order to be saved. Nor should we assume that every realization of fundamental human rights requires the duplication of "Kansas City".

The third danger is vehement paranoia – what might be called the "1901–1911 Problem", the escalation of hostilities that preceded World War I. In relations with powerful non-liberal states, liberal states have often missed opportunities to pursue the negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual strategic interest and failed to construct wider schemes of accommodation that are needed to supplement arms control. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, this is the charge that Lord Sanderson leveled against Sir Eyre Crowe in Sanderson's response to Crowe's famous memorandum on the state of British relations with Germany.[46] Sanderson pointed out that Crowe interpreted German demands to participate in the settlement of international disputes and to have a "place in the sun" (colonies), of a size not too dissimilar to that enjoyed by the other great powers, as evidence of a fundamental aggressiveness driving toward world domination. Crowe may well have perceived an essential feature of Wilhelmine Germany, and Sanderson's attempt to place Germany in the context of other rising powers (bumptious but not aggressively pursuing world domination) may have been naive. But the interesting thing to note is less the conclusions reached than Crowe's chain of argument and evidence. He rejects continued accommodation (appeasement) with Germany not because he shows that Germany was more bumptious than France and not because he shows that Germany had greater potential as a world hegemon than the United States (which he does not even consider in this connection). Instead he is (legitimately) perplexed by the

real uncertainty of German foreign policy and by its "erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit" which accords with the well-known personal characteristics of "the present Ruler of Germany".

In this context, contemporary Japan is another Germany. Germany was a *Rechtstaat* at home, capitalist, and semi-individualist in culture. Its foreign policy, however, had not been placed under the control of representative government. So, too, Japan is less than a complete liberal republic. It is democratic, but, until the 1993 victory of Prime Minister Hosokawa's movement, hegemonically under the sway of the Liberal Democratic Party. It is capitalist – though very well organized from the top both privately and publicly. It is egalitarian – but not individualist in culture (though here we can also note signs of change with the new spirit of fledgling Japanese consumerism). If we add a history of US racism toward the Japanese and Japanese racist chauvinism toward foreigners, we have a dangerous combination.

In short, there is plenty of room for the sort of spiralling misperception and rivalry that characterized the pre-war Anglo–German antagonism. We will need institutions and multifaceted contacts to offset the economic tensions that are likely to be an increasingly important part of the relationship.

The liberal world has entered a nearly unprecedented condition of security and it appears to be significantly linked to the surge of democracy world-wide. But that good fortune is neither guaranteed to persist nor will it necessarily involve peace.

Even if the Iraq War is unlikely to be repeated soon, "Grenada" and "Panama" are likely to arise frequently in the new world order we are entering. If we want to avoid them becoming revivals of destructive imperialism, we will need to have the institutions of multilateral security, whether in the UN or regional organizations, ready to provide guidance and multilateral restraint.

Moreover, it is very much in our hands whether the 1990s do in fact become another "1930s", brief moments before the collapse of collective security into complaisance (as occurred in the Manchurian Incident of 1931) and then war. Another Cold War with a Russia after a next, perhaps successful, authoritarian coup could reenact the European crisis of liberal democracy that began with the Reichstag Fire of 1933.

Or instead, will the 1990s become a pre-World-War-I style rivalry spiralling into extensive hostility. Will the US–Japanese relationship follow on the model of the pre-World-War-I antagonism between Germany and Britain?

Either alone or both together could radically alter our pacific prospects and make whatever investments in institution-building and development aid we now consider expensive seem cheap in retrospect.

Notes

2 See *The Economist*, 1 September 1990.

3 President Ronald Reagan, "Address to Parliament", *The New York Times*, 9 June 1982.

4 He earlier announced as a "plain truth: the day of the dictator is over. The people's right to democracy must not be denied." See *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1989.

5 President Bush's first two examples were individual enterprise and international trade; he then justified the large cuts in US tactical nuclear forces by the decline in hostility that stemmed from the survival of democratic forces in the USSR after the 1991 coup.

6 Like so many of Mr. Yeltsin's good intentions, practice falls short. Russian rocket forces still have US targets coded into their missiles. See "60 Minutes", Sunday, 31 October 1993. One can assume that US targeting has exhibited an equal bureaucratic inertia.

7 See *The New York Times*, 29 January 1992.

8 Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, in Eric Foner, ed., *Complete Writings*, I, (New York: The Citadel press 1945) p. 342.

9 See Schumpeter, Rummel (note 34), and Mueller (note 36).

10 Paine's own remark as well as his militant role in the American and French revolutions leaves us with an interesting ambiguity. Monarchs engage in war amongst themselves, Paine notes; but is war between monarchs and democracies the product of the monarchs attacking the democracies or the democratic nations attacking the "miserable and inimical" monarchs?

11 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner, introduction by M.I. Finley (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1972) Book I: Paragraph 37 (i.e., in following citations, 1:37).

12 Pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of Athens* 1:2.

13 N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd ed. 1986) p. 301.

14 *Ibid.*, Hammond, p. 347.

15 But for a thorough treatment see the debate on this issue between Ste Croix and Bradeen in *Historia*, in 1954 and 1960. For current scholarship on the international implications of Thucydides's history see Richard Ned Lebow and Barry Strauss, eds., *Hegemonic Rivalry* (Oxford: Westview 1991).

16 In "Federalist No. 10."

17 John Finley's *Thucydides* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942) suggests this interpretation.

18 He is a realist who sees equally important causes of the state of war in the structure of the system, the nature of mankind, and the varying domestic structure of states. In Kenneth Waltz's terms, Images One, Two, and Three are operating together and with equal significance (see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press 1954)). For this point and many others, see Stanley Hoffmann's classic essay on Rousseau in *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

19 J.J. Rousseau, "Fragment on War," *A Lasting Peace* (London: Constable, 1917), p. 128.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 127 in the "Fragment on War."

21 See for example, Harry Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge, 1963) chap. 3. For this author's discussion of the varieties of realism see "Thucydidean Realism". *Review of International Studies* (1990).

22 J.J. Rousseau, "Second Discourse", in *The Social Contract and the Discourses* (New York: Dutton 1950), p. 200.

23 *Ibid.*, "Second Discourse", p. 238.

24 *Ibid.*, "Second Discourse", p. 252.

25 See "St Pierre's Project" and Rousseau's "Judgment of St. Pierre's Project" in *A Lasting Peace*, above (note 19).

26 *Ibid.*, "Social Contract", pp. 28–29.

27 Rousseau, if this is correct, would not agree with A.J.P. Taylor's statement, "That if every state followed its own interest, all would be peaceful and secure" (Taylor, *Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. xx).

28 Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985), pp. 28–29.

29 J.J. Rousseau, "Corsica," in Frederick Watkins ed., *Political Writings*, (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1986), p. 308.

30 *Ibid.* Valuable contextual remarks on Rousseau can be found in Torbjorn Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992) chap. 5, and Grace Roosevelt, *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

31 J.J. Rousseau, "Poland", in Watkins (1986), pp. 169–181, 183. (See note 21.)

32 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" (1795), in Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 93–130.

33 Kant regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them (*Perpetual Peace*, in 1970, p.106). At the same time, he argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states (*PP*, p. 102).

34 The evidence for the existence and significance of a pacific union is discussed in Doyle ("Kant, Liberal Legacies and International Affairs", Part 1, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12, 1983a, pp. 205–235). For a careful statistical treatment see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, and Wealth: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?", *International Interactions* 17, 1992, pp. 245–267. Clarence Streit (*Union Now*, New York: Harpers, 1938, pp. 88, 90–92) seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the fifteen leading democracies of the 1930s. D.V. Babst ("A Force for Peace", *Industrial Research*, 14, April 1972, pp. 55–58) performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace". And R. J. Rummel did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of *laissez-faire*) focusing on the postwar period ("Libertarianism and International Violence", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27, 1983, pp. 27–71). I use liberal in a wider (Kantian) sense in my discussion of this issue (1983a). In that essay, I survey the period from 1790 to the present, and find no war among liberal states. Babst did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the posibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1% (p. 56). But this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other; and this is a strong assumption. Rummel has a further discussion of significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis. Recent work has extended these arguments into considerations of strategies of international reform (e.g. James Lee Ray, *Democracies and International Conflict*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), patterns of evolution in the international system by George Modelski (and see Charles Kegley, "The Long Postwar Peace During the Cold War", *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, 1992, pp. 1–18), and implications for the categorization of contemporary international theory (Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", *World Politics* 1988).

35 For evidence, please see Doyle ("Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", Part 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, Fall 1983, pp. 323–53). Although there are serious studies that show that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes, this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or – with even greater enthusiasm – the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Stanislav Andreski ("On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 3, 1980, pp. 3–10), for example, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures. And according to Walter Clemens ("The Super-powers and the Third World", in Charles Kegley and Patrick McGowan, eds., *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR*, 1982, pp. 117–118) the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946–1976

as the Soviet Union did in 1946–1979. Relatedly, Posen and VanEvera found ("Overarming and Underwhelming", *Foreign Policy* 40, 1980, p. 105) that the United States devoted one quarter and the Soviet Union one tenth of their defence budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character).

36 *Retreat from Doomsday* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). This is also the view of Rummel (1983) discussed above and for a discussion of other aspects of "commercial liberalism" see Robert Keohane *After Hegemony*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 22–24.

37 Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: World, 1955).

38 Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, I, Bk 20, chap. 1.

39 Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1950), pp. 127–128.

40 He notes that testing this proposition is likely to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical analysis". But the bourgeois attitude toward the military, the spirit and manner by which bourgeois societies wage war, and the readiness with which they submit to military rule during a prolonged war are "conclusive in themselves" (1950, p. 129).

41 Drawing on historical evidence of the early twentieth century Stephen VanEvera ("Primed for Peace", *International Security*, 15, 3 Winter 1990–91) reaches a similar conclusion about the dangers of militaristic nationalism. The comparison detailed here, however, suggests an even wider indictment of the danger of nationalism among democracies.

42 A lively and informative debate, much of it published in *International Security*, has considered the relevance of Realist and Democratic Liberal categories as metaphors with which to interpret the recent revolutionary changes in the international politics of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. See, in particular, John Mearsheimer's criticism of liberalism ("Back to the Future", *International Security*, 15, 1, Summer 1990); Jack Snyder's discussion of policy paths ("Avoiding Anarchy in the New Europe", *International Security*, 14, 4, Spring 1990); and Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry's survey of external influences on Soviet behavior (*Review of International Studies*, 1991).

43 Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books 1975); and Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, "Politicization in the World Economy" in Hirsch, Doyle and Edward Morse, *Alternatives to Monetary Disorder* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/McGraw Hill, 1977).

44 Greg Treverton in *Rethinking America's Security* estimates $11 trillion.

45 See *The New York Times*, 20 November 1991.

46 Memoranda by Mr. Eyre Crowe, 1 January 1907, and by Lord Sanderson, 25 February 1907, in G.P. Gooch *et al*., eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, 3 (London: HMSO, 1928), pp. 397–431.

6 One world, many peoples

International justice in John Rawls's
The Law of Peoples

> Were all humanity a single nation state, the present North/South divide would
> make it an unviable, semi-feudal entity, split by internal conflicts. Its small part
> [one fifth] is advanced, prosperous, powerful; its much bigger part [the other four
> fifths] is underdeveloped, poor, powerless. A nation so divided within itself would
> be recognized as inherently unstable. A world so divided should likewise be recog-
> nized as inherently unstable. And the position is worsening, not improving.
>
> South Commission, *The Challenge to the South*, p. 2[1]

We live in "one world." The globe is an ecological whole, sufficiently connected
that it is now possible to envision climate changes and catastrophes that affect the
entire planet.[2] The world's economy is increasingly becoming interconnected.
Human beings recognize a common humanity, including a body of human rights.
But we are not the "single nation state" hypothesized by the South Commission.
We are divided into many peoples, governed by the slightly more than the 191
states recognized by the United Nations as members. But the existence of many
peoples does not answer the normative questions implicit in the South
Commission's warning. Should we be trying to govern the one world as if we were
one people – and take on the task of building a single stable world order, bridging
the divides between the much better-off top fifth and much less well-off bottom
four-fifths? Or, should the one world be governed as if it were two sets of peoples,
one set free and the other not? Or, should a third order shape the world, one that
encompasses many peoples who develop the rules, agreements and accommoda-
tions that are needed to keep those peoples at peace where possible and promote
mutually advantageous cooperation, while taking those measures that address the
emergencies and extremes to which all decent states would concur?

I propose both to give an account of why it is that John Rawls, the most promi-
nent political philosopher of egalitarian justice in our time, came to the last
conclusion – many peoples – and why it is that his conclusion seems justifiable.
His criteria and categories, presented as hypothetical by him, do have real world
referents, but their practical reach is quite limited. His conclusions are reasonable
from two points of view: his work is both principled and practical, even though it
is not complete – principled because it corresponds with the priority Rawls places

on liberty, and practical because existing states, if motivated by liberty, can actually abide by these principles. But it is not complete; some of his general principles might lead to less international toleration and greater redistribution than the argument in *The Law of Peoples* suggests.

That Rawls's argument has proven controversial is evidenced in the contrary conclusions reached by numerous of Rawls's closest interlocutors. Some "cosmopolitan" critics, such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, and many more see themselves as applying the core ideas of Rawls's domestic conceptions of justice to the wider world. Others, such as Peter Singer, adopt different but equally cosmopolitan foundations.[3] Other "neo-Kantian" liberals, including myself, have employed liberal conceptions to justify a view of international distributive justice that distinguishes relations among liberal states, where standards of distributive justice can apply, from relations between liberals and nonliberals, where distributive justice does not.[4]

"Justice as fairness"

In his magisterial *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls explained how separate individuals could converge on agreed standards for what is fair for the overall distribution of rights and valued primary goods.

How do we decide what is a fair set of standards? Rawls said that we should contemplate a hypothetical contract.[5] That is, what should be agreed to by free individuals under conditions of impartiality, the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance"? If individuals had to agree to govern their lives and prospects, not knowing each other's identities – class, talents, race, religion, tastes – and yet knew that they would have to live together, be dependent on each other for protection, economic production, and the products of social cooperation, what principles of justice would they choose to regulate the basic features of public life?

Rawls says we should choose two sets of basic principles, the first being Maximum Equal Liberty and second, Equal Opportunity and the "Difference Principle." Liberty is prior. Even from a self-interested point of view, we have a stake in equal liberty for all. If, after the veil of ignorance was lifted, it turned out that we were part of a minority, we wouldn't want to be oppressed by tyranny, even by democratic majority tyranny. So we would insist on civil liberties, such as constitutional protections of free speech, religion, and assembly. For matters not protected by basic liberties we would want democratic government so that our voices would be equal. Second, we would require Equal Opportunity and the Difference Principle. That is, we would want income distributed so that (a) it was open to fair competition (no discrimination) and (b) we would all receive equal income, unless differences in income helped the people at the bottom of the social ladder improve their condition. That is, we would reward the long hard work of surgeons with an income high enough to attract enough skilled practitioners away from sunbathing because, unlike sunbathing, surgery helps those needing medical care. We all would want the "difference principle" because we, too, might turn out to be among the poorest, least able, severely ill or handicapped, after the lifting of the veil.

These highly egalitarian principles, Rawls said, apply only to domestic society. In an incomplete argument in the *Theory of Justice*, Rawls said that international relations should be governed by traditional international law (the legalist paradigm, no aggression, etc.) and just redistribution should be in the domain of domestic determination.[6]

One world, "one people": global justice as fairness

Despite Rawls's brief rejection of international extension in *A Theory of Justice* that his principles warrant global application, many argue for just such an extension of his domestic theory.[7] The inherent universality of principles of equal consideration, maximum equal liberty, and respect for the values embodied in human rights might suggest that these principles deserved global extension. Like the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of citizenship and its basic privileges and immunities to all persons under its jurisdiction, born or naturalized in the United States, as well as the guarantee of equal protection of the laws (Fourteenth Amendment),[8] so, one might assume, the equal liberties embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would apply to all persons globally and be enforced. So, too, one could imagine that republican (representative) government (Art IV:4), which the Constitution guarantees to every U.S. state, should be guaranteed – that is, extended – to every nation state.

Similar extensions could govern distributive principles. Indeed, Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and others have reasonably objected that Rawls assumes unwarrantedly that societies are self-sufficient in international relations. Instead, they argue, societies are interdependent. So like interdependent individuals, nations who trade, invest, borrow and yet are unequal must redistribute goods fairly. Moreover, they must consider that – like the endowments or talents of the hypothetical domestic original condition – national natural resources are arbitrary from a moral point of view.[9] The U.S. has done nothing to deserve ownership of the fertile Great Plains, Mesabi iron ore, and West Virginia coal fields, while the Sahelians deserve only the encroaching desert sands.

By analogy the world, too, needs a hypothetical social contract in order to redistribute justly the products of social interdependence. We then should distribute goods behind a veil of ignorance as if we also did not know of which *country* we would find ourselves a citizen. The implications are unclear. How much would the wealthy have to tax themselves to implement a global difference principle in which all incomes were distributed in such a fashion that inequalities were permitted only to the extent that they served the needs of the *world's* least advantaged? However indistinct in its details it might appear, such a calculus would seem to give rise to a large duty to redistribute income to the poor across the globe. It would also involve ignoring, for distributive purposes, a world of many peoples and treating the world, for economic purposes, as if it were one people.

Peter Singer in a classic article draws on different foundational assumptions, adding a utilitarian argument that we should base our distribution of goods on values that are common to all mankind, i.e., saving lives, avoiding harm. Liberal

and cosmopolitan in its assumptions, it treats all humanity as ends, irrespective of state borders or class division.[10]

Singer, in the midst of a Bengal famine, writing in 1971 focused on the most desperate problem of international distributive justice – the plight of the starving. Of course many other disasters have come since and there are more than enough crises to spark our continuing concern. He says that charity is not a sign of generosity, but an imperative duty of justice. And this point he makes in an unforgettable analogy.

Imagine walking by a shallow pool of water and seeing a two-year-old child drowning in it. What should you do? Obviously, you should walk in and save the child. And so, just that simply, you should aid people starving in the world.[11]

But many would object:

a.   Starving people are foreigners, or are on the other side of the world.
b.   Other people don't provide aid; why should I?
c.   I can't end the starvation unless all the rich also aid.
d.   Aid is costly; I don't have enough to spare and still meet my other needs.
e.   It's government's – my country's – responsibility, not my personal responsibility.

Singer takes up each of the objections in turn.

a.   Foreigners. Would it make a difference if it's not your child in the pool? Or if it takes place not in your hometown? Obviously not.
b.   Other people don't aid the starving, so why should I? Would it make a difference if three other people were standing around doing nothing?
c.   Too many people are starving; I can't save them all? What if there are ten children drowning, and you cannot save them all. Shouldn't you save as many as you can?
d.   Too costly to aid the starving? What if you are wearing your best dress or suit, should you still jump in? Of course.
e.   It is a government responsibility? Yes, but if lifeguards aren't present should you shrug your shoulders?

A stronger objection is "What if it is truly costly?" Suppose the children are swept away in a deep, raging river and rescue is a risk to your own life. Then, Singer at last acknowledges, it seems different. There is no moral obligation; instead, rescue becomes an act for heroes.

But how much risk, or cost, is less than life-threatening? Singer argues that for a pure utilitarian, it is up to the point that your own life is also at risk. This means that one should, if necessary, reduce your real income to the poverty or starvation level. Mother Theresa, thus, was doing the right thing, but are any of the rest of us? Singer then provides a more accommodating version of his ethic. He suggests that at least we should reduce our income significantly in order to offer assistance – that is, by 40 percent, 30 percent, or 20 percent. Or, at the very least,

we should do something – agitate, petition, or try to persuade the government to supplement our efforts to aid the world's desperate.

Powerful as this ethic is, it leaves many questions even for the well intentioned. Does it apply to lesser inequality, or does it only hold in an emergency?[12] To state the charge provocatively: do we have a moral obligation to act in order to prevent children from perhaps becoming overweight when their parents allow them to consume starchy, fatty foods? Moreover, in the less-than-clear emergencies, do not other principles begin to have relevant weight? For example, what if achieving justice requires radical social change and local elites oppose this? Is military intervention justified? What if foreign food assistance disrupts the livelihood of local farmers? Is the scale of taxation just? Is there an appropriate international institution to distribute the aid in a way that discourages paternalism, ensures that no one state acquires unmerited international influence, and avoids coercion in the raising of aid and also exploitation of the generous? These problems are the typical concerns that arise in moral political practice; they acquire additional weight as one moves away from emergency, life-and-death situations to those of "merely" chronic deprivation.

One world, two sets of peoples: neo-Kantian liberalism

One alternative to "one world" global justice – whether Beitz's global fairness or Singer's utilitarian principles of global distribution – posits two zones of world politics, one at peace and the other not. It limits distributional claims founded on liberal principles to the first zone, where claims can be justified when liberty is accorded priority.[13]

International rights, it is argued, must be founded on moral freedom and individual self-determination. This foundation sustains a "democratic peace" among liberal republics. Although states throughout history have gone to war with each other to advance both their rational national and non-rational governmental interests, liberal democratic peoples have, by and large, respected each other's sovereignty and security. This is the argument of the liberal, Neo-Kantian "democratic peace" thesis, which holds that democratic peoples do not war against each other (though they sometimes do war against non-democratic peoples). The three reasons are that first, liberal peoples are responsible to the majority of electors, who, unlike monarchs and dictators, cannot regularly displace the costs of going to war on others. If, second, those electors respect liberal principles, they will respect the rights of peoples similarly free to express their rights, and negotiate rather than fight over differences of interest. And third, respect for rights of property and the benefits of commercial exchange will reinforce these moral commitments.[14] These Kantians do not assume that international politics is harmonious or lacking in coordination and cooperation problems. They do hold that avoiding war between liberal republics is possible because (through the three reasons just enumerated) it is self-enforcing – effective without the global sovereign that Hobbesian realists have argued is a necessary precondition to peace.

The neo-Kantians argue that one should not separate the economic from the political features of a just social order. Nonetheless, freedom is prior to wealth,

just as Rawls's Maximum Equal Liberty is prior to the Difference Principle. Only if the first can be secured, should one proceed to the second.

We should recall that there are domestic exceptions to the priority principle. Rawls and others have argued that freedom and democratic self-determination can be compromised for material well-being, if the community finds itself in a state of desperation. Then the natural principle of justice should operate, determining that the basic minimum subsistence of all is the first duty of public justice.[15] In cases of extreme poverty, inequality, and political anarchy within a country, liberals can find justifiable a developmental, redistributing dictatorship to equalize opportunity as a necessary foundation for an eventually just, liberal society.[16]

The enormous social inequalities between the richest one-fifth and the other four-fifths of the world that characterize the present international order might – however implausibly – suggest that the same redistributive prescription of natural justice should apply internationally.

Extended to the global scale, however, this prescription runs up against fundamental liberal constraints. The first objection is that it is not clear that an effective global, liberal polity can be formed. Differing from the Utilitarians and (apparently) other advocates of One World justice, no neo-Kantian liberal would want to join a "Scheme of Global Social Cooperation" unless it included a complete global social contract.[17] This would need to cover a polity establishing order and maximum equal liberty. But under the present regime of global intentions characterized by national independence and cultural diversity, this may not be possible.

Part of the problem is institutional design. Immanuel Kant, for example, regarded global sovereignty, whether liberal in aim or not, as equivalent to global tyranny due to the remoteness of the representation it would entail.[18] But the more fundamental problem is the absence of a genuine sense of global community, the sense that we are in a common social project. For a Kantian liberal, lacking such a project, there is no duty to ensure a global difference principle without a global polity guaranteeing maximum equal liberty.

For some liberals, therefore, the redistribution that can be justified on liberal-contractarian grounds does not stretch beyond liberal government. Modern states may already be too large for effective liberal politics; it is even harder to argue that global government can be a liberal aim. Global reformers need to be able to guarantee that a scheme of global natural justice to assist the poor will end in effective, global equal liberty. Without the prospect of moral autonomy through representative government, this form of international redistribution is not justified on liberal grounds.

A second objection reflects the residual insecurity of the contemporary order. As long as there is no guarantee of international security, indiscriminate obligations to redistribute substantial amounts of income and resources (including redistribution to potential security threats) cannot be justified.[19] Obliging Japan to tax itself for China or Israel for Syria, or even the United States for Cuba indirectly threatens the rights of individuals within these states to promote their territorial integrity and political independence. And a third objection is raised by the domestic tyranny that characterizes some of the states of the poorer countries. No

distribution that serves to fund tyrannies, such as Joseph-Desiré Mobutu's long exploitation of Zaire, and thus indirectly supports the oppression of peoples, could be justified. Although nongovernmental organizations can partially bypass those tyrannies, the tyrannies do limit how much can be justly transferred.

And, lastly, additional concerns arise at the individual level. The priority of freedom reflects the assumption that it is freedom that makes life subjectively valuable. Thus obligations incurred in the name of freedom to distribute to the destitute at home or abroad have to have a cut off that allows individuals to pursue a self-determining life. Such cutoffs could apply domestically in liberal societies. They apply a fortiori given the much greater global inequalities. They should not be forced to be "moral saints" or be subject to "moral tyranny."[20]

It should be stressed that these objections to the application of just redistribution should not apply to cases of assistance to the destitute, particularly when they are reachable by neutral nonpolitical agencies, such as developmental nongovernmental organizations. Nor do those three objections apply with equal force to social justice within the zone of the pacific union of liberal states. Liberal states have not formed an international commonwealth or a comprehensive scheme of social cooperation, but they do share a common project of respect for individual rights and they respect each other's sovereignty; and so the second, the security, objection to redistribution has no force.[21]

As importantly, as Peter Singer has pointed out, these objections do not take into account the fact that thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of individuals in the contemporary world would be happy to emigrate to the existing "many peoples" of the developed world on *existing*, liberal terms of citizenship, fully accepting all the local, liberal norms and laws that currently hold sway. Moreover, as Singer notes, the existing international economic order could be radically improved in ways that meet many of the basic needs of the poor with even a minimal sacrifice (1 percent of income) of the wealthy – if most of the wealthy were persuaded to make this small sacrifice. Even though neither of these two measures is likely to establish a globally just economic order, each separately and both together could certainly advance the basic needs of the poor and be steps toward greater justice.[22]

One world, many peoples: Rawls's *The Law of Peoples*

Even though advocates of global justice draw inspiration from Rawls's "justice as fairness" and even though Rawls himself draws on Kantian ideas, Rawls himself draws very different conclusions from both the advocates of global justice and the Neo-Kantian advocacy of discriminate international justice. He shares with the Neo-Kantians the view that the world is not an incipient single global scheme of cooperation. He shares with the advocates of global justice a reluctance to draw lines of discrimination between liberals and non-liberals.

Instead, Rawls starts at a different place – not with the global original position of all individuals but with the principles relevant to the relations among existing societies for the "international political world as we see it."[23] He wants to see

whether we can justify after due reflection ("reflective equilibrium") the conventional principles of peace and toleration embodied in ordinary international law. Thus, rather than drawing the principles from a social contract, he tests the principles to see if they can respond to core concerns for human rights and stability – a "realistic utopia."[24]

Rawls claims that eight principles – those characterizing the core ideas underlying conventional international law – would be chosen:[25]

1   Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
2   Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3   Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4   Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5   Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
6   Peoples are to honor human rights.
7   Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8   Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.

These, together with provisions for free trade and international organizations to supplement cooperation, would be selected in a second, world-level contract among "Free and Equal Peoples."

Are these principles a realistic code of behavior for peoples? Rawls says they are. Rejecting realpolitik assumptions associated with the balance of power against power, he ascribes to the "democratic peace" the mutual security and toleration that provides a realistic political foundation for the eight principles of the Law of Peoples, among fellow liberal peoples. The more problematic issues are the duties liberal peoples have to those other peoples less advantaged (redistributive duties to the global poor) and the relations they have with non-liberal peoples (how wide is the scope of toleration?). Here Rawls rejects the arguments of both One World global redistribution and Neo-Kantian liberalism, but not altogether persuasively.

Just distribution among many peoples

Will peoples want also to adopt a "difference principle" to distribute income justly across borders? Controversially, separating his argument from the One World advocates of global justice, he says they wouldn't. This is because peoples will want to preserve their independence and self-determination.

Relieving the suffering of the poor so that they can experience health, well being and be self-determining, self-respecting effective members of their society applies everywhere. But the usual domestic arguments that favor more egalitarian distributions do not apply in an international society of peoples.

Rawls is aware that societies are interdependent in that they provide assistance to societies in need and trade with each other and invest in each other's

economies.[26] But, like the Neo-Kantians, he does not find a commitment to a global social scheme of cooperation among the world's peoples. Instead, peoples have committed themselves to their own cooperative schemes. This is significant because peoples know that they may not all agree on distributive principles.[27] Observing existing Free Peoples, Rawls notes that one sees that there are various kinds of liberal arrangements, ranging from social democratic to laissez faire societies. Many can be reasonable, given national circumstances, not just the most egalitarian.

Since they are not part of the same scheme of cooperation, the standards of effective participation will differ between societies. So, too, do the standards of what it takes to lead a life in dignity and have a reasonable chance of competing on the basis of equality of opportunity for societal and political positions.[28] As partial evidence of this, we can see that existing democracies survive amidst considerable poverty. India at $1720 and Senegal at $1600 are among the poorest, ranked 106 and 111 of 143 countries by gross domestic product per capita, yet both are recognized democracies.[29]

The justice of the international distribution of resources is also not crucial, according to Rawls, because states do not need equal resources in order to establish "decent" (to be defined below), self-determining domestic institutions. Indeed, imposing the same distribution restricts the freedom of choice of poorer societies.[30] For example, some individuals in these societies will suffer because their preference for low population growth, high savings, and material prosperity will not be realized in the society in which they find themselves born. This is a morally arbitrary result. But so would be another society's imposing its preferences on the society with high population growth, low saving, and limited material growth.

Imposed redistribution also limits the legitimate freedom of wealthier societies, who have a right to choose higher over lower savings rates or lower over higher rates of population growth (both for the sake, for example, of greater future income). Redistributing income each generation would vitiate their choices, violating their rights to self-determination.[31]

Beyond liberal, to well-ordered peoples

Which peoples can participate in the society of peoples, sharing the eight principles of international order? Which peoples would be likely to choose such a set of principles and have their choices be mutually and reliably respected? Some Neo-Kantians, as noted above, would limit the set of such peoples, which Rawls calls "well-ordered", to other liberal peoples, excluding all those that do not meet the test of representative democracy, protecting legally established individual rights. In contradistinction, Rawls argues that the set of well-ordered peoples should include not merely liberal peoples but also other well-ordered peoples that he calls "decent societies," which include "decent hierarchical societies."[32] These decent hierarchical peoples are to enjoy all the rights of other well-ordered societies, even including the right to respect embodied in not being enticed or or pressured into adopting liberal domestic principles.[33]

Why would such decent hierarchical peoples respect the eight principles? In part, Rawls says that they would because being non-aggressive and respecting basic human rights are part of what it means to be a decent people. Beyond that, he adds further definition of what a decent hierarchical people is: they are not likely to have cause to be aggressive. Decent peoples respect human rights to life (including basic rights: no torture, no starvation, etc.) but also freedom of thought and religion. They have a consultation hierarchy such that rulers consult interest groups, composed and represented by their own members (e.g., women by women, etc.). They recognize a right of dissent and governments duly reply, though not necessarily comply.[34] Unfortunately, we have no assurance that semi-authoritarian governments actually do abide by the eight principles, even with regard to their relations with liberal peoples – think of Wilhemine Germany in 1914 or late Czarist Russia and the aggressive policies they pursued in the outbreak of World War One.

Why would, why should, liberal peoples respect the decent hierarchical peoples? Why, the liberal might ask, respect them if they do not treat their own people with equal respect? Partly, of course, Rawls answers that they respect many human rights, do consult, etc. – they embody key liberal principles. Under what circumstances could one justify aggressive pressure when they so closely track liberal values? The answer is sure to be just about never. But Rawls asks more: that liberal peoples freely tolerate these societies and eschew even criticizing them, even though they do not accord equal rights to their members or treat their members equally from even a political point of view.

Can Rawls appeal to the stability of the democratic peace thesis to support respect for decent hierarchicals, as he did for tolerance and peace among liberal peoples? It doesn't appear so. Liberals respect other liberal governments because those governments represent individuals who deserve respect. But that very logic of representative respect that generates tolerance for fellow liberal peoples generates suspicion of governments that systematically remove themselves from democratic accountability to the majority. If those governments will not trust their own publics, why should *we* trust them? The record of war and Cold War between liberals and non-liberals lends support to this, ranging from the record of tension and war on the one hand between liberal France and Britain, and semi-autocratic Germany on the other, before World War I, to the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after World War II. Lest we assume that this is solely a product of autocratic aggression, recall the long record of liberal imperialism in Africa, America, and Asia against societies that offered insufficient protection for trade and private property.[35]

Rawls suggests that it was insufficiencies in the equal protection of rights or inadequacies in the social protections that ensured fair equality of opportunity (such as unemployment or health insurance) that made liberal polities subject to manipulative elites and therefore aggressive against non-liberal polities. But the evidence for this is indeterminate. Semi-socialist Sweden and Denmark are less militarily interventionist than (more) laissez faire U.S., but in modern times the UK, France, and Italy (all with better social insurance than the U.S.) are no less interventionist.

As further evidence of a prospect for international toleration of hierarchicals,[36] Rawls notes that in the ordinary domestic life of liberal societies, liberals do respect hierarchical institutions, such as the Catholic Church or the authority of almost all universities, which are not ruled democratically by all stakeholders, but oligarchically by presidents, trustees and faculty. But neither the Catholic Church nor a university is a fully comprehensive institution; nor are they sovereign institutions. In liberal societies most of their members have ties, livelihoods and affiliations outside those institutions and their members can leave them and join other more congenial institutions elsewhere, voluntarily. No such freedom of choice holds internationally. Individuals can leave sovereign states, but their freedom is practically constrained because they have no correlative right to enter other sovereign states.

Lastly, do they exist? Are there actually existing "decent hierarchical societies"? Rawls implies as much and, with obvious reference to the hierarchical rule and established religion that are associated with many Islamic societies, calls them "Kazanistans."[37] However, just as there are few, if any, perfectly liberal democracies, so there are few, if any, perfectly decent hierarchical societies. If we take his criteria seriously but not absolutely, one can, however, identify a handful of such states (see Table 6.1). Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and maybe also Bhutan are among them. The best case can be made for Oman, with its consultative council (the Shura) and a record of domestic toleration. Qatar and Bhutan also appear to be close to meeting the Rawlsian criteria for decent hierarchies. Kuwait and Bahrain are moving beyond hierarchy to democratic governance (but with significant restrictions on who can vote). The others do not clearly meet Rawls' criteria.

Although legislative institutions are weak, these states, including especially the Gulf states, benefit from small size. One recent article makes this point well:

> The small size of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE offsets these weak [quasi-legislative] institutions. To varying degrees, all the Gulf ruling families and elites provide some access to their citizens by holding regular, but informal, meetings where citizens can air complaints, petition for redress of grievances, or otherwise try to influence decision-making. As one Bahraini interlocutor noted, "I don't worry too much about whether I have a vote or not – after all, I can talk to someone who talks to the ruling family simply by picking up the phone."[38]

One can wonder whether this is an elite privilege or whether everyone enjoys the same two degrees of separation from the sovereign. But another scholar makes a similar argument in regard to Oman. The Sultan of Oman makes an annual tour of the country to hear complaints and petitions from his people. At other times of the year, "if a matter is urgent, a person can wait outside the palace and stop the sultan's car."[39]

Do relations between liberal states and decent hierarchicals demonstrate respect and evidence stability? We lack systematic tests of this issue, and impressionistic

Table 6.1 Candidates for decent hierarchical societies

Candidate Countries	Basic presupposition: Consultation hierarchy? Rulers obligated to reply, and do reply to properly put demands?[1]	Criterion (1): Non-aggressive foreign policy?[2]	Criterion (2a): Human rights secured?[3] 1. Right to subsistence, security 2. No slavery; serfdom, forced occupation 3. "Sufficient measure of liberty of conscience" 4. Property 5. Similar cases treated similarly	Criterion (2b):[4] Everyone a responsible part of the cooperative effort?	Criterion (2c):[5] Sincere belief held by judges and ministers?	Possible further criterion.[6] Historically oppressed groups represented mostly by members of their own group?
Oman Yes	The sultan is absolute ruler, but there is a "Consultative Council" popularly elected. Freedom House says little about what the Consultative Council does. But "citizens may petition the gov't indirectly through their local governors to redress grievances or may appeal directly to the sultan during his annual three-week tour of the country."[7]	OK	"All are allowed to worship freely." "Although traditional social pressures keep many woman from working or taking part in public life, some have come to occupy important positions in commerce, industry, and other sectors. Women hold around 30% of civil service positions and enjoy equal educational opportunities. Female genital mutilation is practiced in some rural areas." "Laws prohibit criticism of the sultan and provide for censorship of all domestic and imported publications, though journalists normally practice self-censorship."	–	–	–
Kuwait Yes, and evolving toward democracy	"Suffrage is restricted to males who are 21 yrs of age or older, do not serve in the armed forces, and were not naturalized within the last 20 years – 14.8% of the population." But "in practice . . . unlicensed associations are free to organize informally. Informal social gatherings, called diwaniyas, provide a forum for political discussion."	OK	"Islam is the state religion. Both Sunnis and Shias worship freely, though the latter complain of insufficient government funding for mosques and religious training. The Christian community of around 150K is allowed to practice without interference. Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, and Buddhists can worship privately, but may not construct buildings for public worship." "Freedom of expression is restricted." "Freedom of assembly and association is limited."	–	"Trials are open and relatively fair, and defendants have the right to appeal verdicts and to be represented by legal counsel, which the courts provide in criminal cases. Suspects may be detained for four days before being brought before an investigating official; arbitrary arrests and detentions are rare. Prison conditions, according to the U.S. State Department, 'Meet or exceed' international standards."	No.

Bahrain Yes, verging toward democracy	Since 2002, elected Chamber of Deputies, though districted in fashion to give advantages to Sunnis (Department of State 2003). Before 2003, a Shura appointed by the King.	OK, but U.S. Mid-East base	—	—	—
Qatar Partial	There is a Shura appointed by the Emir even though it is supposed to be a "partially elected consultative council."	OK	"Freedom of expression is limited . . . Al-Jazeera, which has gained international attention for airing the views of political dissidents from around the Arab world, virtually ignores domestic Qatari politics." "Public demonstrations are generally prohibited." "The country's small Shiite Muslim minority is allowed to practice openly, but not to organize traditional ceremonies and rituals, such as self-flagellation. While public worship by non-Muslims remains officially prohibited, they are allowed to conduct services privately. In 2000, the government authorized the first-ever construction of three churches. . . . Non-Muslims cannot bring suit in Sharia courts, which handle most civil claims."	Per capita income is $18,789.	—
Bhutan Partial	Hereditary king has instituted a National Assembly, chosen by a consensus of family heads at village level open meetings, with considerable influence from the Government.	OK	Problematic (see Department of State, Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Bhutan)	—	85% of the population in subsistence farming, many unmet basic needs.

Table 6.1 Continued

Candidate Countries	Basic presupposition: Consultation hierarchy? Rulers obligated to reply, and do reply, to properly put demands?[1]	Criterion (1): Non-aggressive foreign policy?[2]	Criterion (2a): Human rights secured?[3] 1. Right to subsistence, security 2. No slavery, serfdom, forced occupation 3. "Sufficient measure of liberty of conscience", 4. Property 5. Similar cases treated similarly	Criterion (2b):[4] Everyone a responsible part of the cooperative effort?	Criterion (2c):[5] Sincere belief held by judges and ministers?	Possible further criterion.[6] Historically oppressed groups represented mostly by members of their own group?
United Arab Emirates Partial to No	"The seven dynastic rulers of the emirates collectively constitute the Federal Supreme Council which selects the president and vice president every five years and ratifies federal legislation." Not open to wider non-official participation. "The 40-member Federal National Council, composed of delegates appointed by the seven rulers, serves as an advisory body."	OK	"Non-Muslims, mostly foreign nationals, may practice freely but may not proselytize or distribute religious literature. Although Christian churches and schools are widespread, there are no Buddhist temples and only one Hindu temple in the UAE." "Women are well represented in education, government and the professions, but face discrimination in job benefits and promotion." "Journalists and academics exercise self-censorship regarding governmental policy, national security, and religion."	—	—	—
Jordan Problematic	Elected parliament, but Palestinian refugees "now comprise a majority of the population."	OK	"The government . . . suppressing criticism of Jordanian relations with Israel and banning all demonstrations." "Government monitoring of telephone conversations and Internet communication is routine." "Christians and Jews are officially recognized . . . and allowed to worship freely. Baha'is and Druze are allowed to practice their faiths, but are not officially recognized." "Jordans of Palestinian descent face discrimination in employment by the government and the military and in admission to universities."	—	—	"Although women constitute only 14% of the workforce, the government has made efforts to increase the no. of women in the civil service. In December, the government announced plans to guarantee women a quota of seats in parliament."

Nepal No	Beginning in 1990, a democratically elected assembly. But a violent Maoist insurgency, the massacre of the royal family in 2001 created a crisis. The King dismissed Parliament in 2002 and decided to rule alone with appointed cabinet.	—	Basic security and human needs threatened by the Maoist insurgency	—		—
Saudia Arabia No	?	"Freedom of religion in Saudi Arabia is virtually nonexistent for those who do not adhere to the Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam." "Women in Saudi Arabia are second-class citizens."	—	Torture of prisoners regularly happens.	—

1 Rawls, *Law of Peoples* (1999), 72. This section has benefited from the research assistance of Ihsan Dogramaci.
2 Ibid, 64.
3 Ibid., 65.
4 Ibid., 65–66.
5 Ibid., 66–67.
6 Ibid., 75.
7 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from Freedom House, *Freedom House Country Reports: 2003*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countries.html.

evidence is contradictory. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, after 9/11 the, "Gulf States, despite public sentiment that sympathizes with some aspects of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. views, have been [unusually?] supportive of the U.S. military effort against the Taliban and A1 Qaeda."[40] Nonetheless, both the U.S. and the U.K. are spearheading a drive to democratize, modernize and liberalize the region. Whatever the merits of this new "Middle East Initiative," it is not a hallmark of the non-critical respect that Rawls postulates.[41]

In short, evidence for a stable scheme of respect between liberal peoples and decent hierarchicals – a scheme that would significantly expand the society of well-ordered peoples – is weak. Decent hierarchicals do not appear to include the major non-liberal powers of the current world order, such as China, which does not regularly tolerate free speech, assembly, dissent or religion. Nor would they likely include other non-liberal states, such as Myanmar or Cuba, that are current objects of contention with the liberal world.[42] Decent hierarchicals do exist, but they are few in number. They are small and lack population, and there does not seem to have emerged any special sense of solidarity or respect between them and liberal peoples that would separate the decent hierarchicals from the relations that would characterize the foreign policies that shape international politics between liberals and non-liberals in general.

Outlaw states and burdened societies

Outside the society of well-ordered states, Rawls postulates that there lie outlaw states and burdened societies. Outlaw states are states that do not respect the eight principles and do regularly violate human rights. As such, they do not merit respectful toleration by liberal peoples and, under extreme circumstances, may be justifiably intervened against in order to prevent or stop genocide or other extreme abuses of human rights.[43] While well-ordered peoples will want to take prudent measures of defense against such outlaw societies, this does not mean that well-ordered peoples may treat them as objects for acquisition or exploitation. "Reasonable", not merely rational, standards that include measures to eventually bring outlaw societies within the society of well-ordered peoples should govern policy. These standards can include criticism of the human rights violations of these outlaw regimes and other forms of more material pressure, including denial of membership in international institutions and "the firm denial of economic and other assistance."[44] Wars fought between well-ordered and outlaw states must, unlike so many wars in the past, be fought according to the standard laws of wars, providing due protection for noncombatants.

Burdened societies raise very different issues. They are not expansive or aggressive, but they lack the institutions and political culture, the material resources, and the physical and human capital needed to be well ordered. Well-ordered peoples have a duty of assistance to help burdened societies become well-ordered. This does not mean wealthy or equal. Rawls has previously argued that wealth (beyond a low minimum) is not required to become well ordered. Nor are extensive resources needed (so that they need not be distributed according to cosmopolitan,

one world, standards of fair use). Culture and institutions, Rawls argues, are much more important in determining a well-ordered society than are natural resources. (Here he follows Amartya Sen's arguments about the importance of human rights as a means of securing the welfare of the least advantaged.) Advice, much more than money, may be useful to assist societies to appreciate the importance of protecting the interests of the least advantaged, for example, women (p. 110).[45] In short, the aim is to assist all societies in becoming self-determining well-ordered (at least decent) participants in the society of peoples – nothing beyond this, Rawls argues, is needed or justified.

Despite his arguments against cosmopolitan duties of international economic distribution, it would be wrong to see his work as a brief for global capitalism, or present political and economic inequalities. The duties of assistance that he posits would be radical in their present implications. Preventing starvation and ending gross abuses of human rights presupposes that the wealthy and powerful states will fulfill large commitments to humanitarian assistance and international intervention. Assisting burdened peoples and those subject to outlaw states is for Rawls a true obligation. If it is limited by assistance until "decency" is achieved, that does not mean that achieving a decent society is any less ambitious a target in the current world where, for example, 250 million mostly rural sub-Saharan Africans live on less than a dollar a day, subject to climate and other agricultural vagaries that make famine an ever-present threat and their daily living precarious in the extreme.[46]

Conclusion

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* is a profound work that completes his great works on the theory of (domestic) justice. It challenges One World cosmopolitans by questioning whether the distributive utopia they envision can be regarded as realistic, given the world we know today and the peoples that inhabit it. It challenges the Neo-Kantians who posit a world of many peoples divided between liberal and non-liberal zones by arguing that their moral vision does not adequately take into account the respectability of some peoples who embody principles of human rights and respect for international law, even though they lack democratic institutions.

The Law of Peoples' limitations correspond to these differences. It misses one of the great attractions of the cosmopolitan morality. In a world that is becoming increasingly globalized, *The Law of Peoples* may be signaling a tolerance for such large differences in material welfare that the solidarity we will need to meet global challenges will never be cultivated.[47] It misses the realism of the Neo-Kantians. We do not yet have good evidence that liberal peoples will genuinely respect decent hierarchies, rather than either neglecting their existence or seeking to transform, modernize and democratize them. Rawls is walking a narrow ledge, one that is at the same time politically utopian and ethically traditional. But he has delivered, profoundly, on what he promised: a reflection, balancing the principles that liberal societies say they would want to live by with the actual world of many peoples that we currently inhabit.

Notes

1 The recent report of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization comes to a similar judgment, calling the current inequalities "ethically unacceptable and politically unsustainable" (2004, p. 3).
2 For example, as developed by Singer 2002, chapter one.
3 The literature reviewing *Theory of Justice* (*TJ*) and *The Law of Peoples* (*LP*) is vast and impressive. In addition, to the specific citations below I have found helpful, Amdur 1977, Barry 1982, Blake 2001, Buchanan 2000a, Caney 2002, Freeman 2005, Gudridge 2001, Miller 1998, Moellendorf 1996, Tan 2001, and Tucker 1975.
4 Doyle 1983b.
5 *TJ*.
6 *TJ*.
7 For an insightful review of this literature see Moellendorf 1996.
8 These privileges are not completely equal across all categories; the presidency, for example, is limited to citizens born in the United States.
9 Beitz 1975, Pogge 1994.
10 Singer 1972.
11 Singer also grounds his argument in a utilitarian critique of Northern government expenditures in 1971, the crucial famine year. What is the implication, he asks, given that Australia spent more money on the Sydney Opera House than on famine relief or Britain more on development of the Concorde.
12 While Singer formulates his ethic only in terms of emergencies and not in terms of lesser inequalities, the two are quite closely related in practice and Singer broadens the analysis to poverty in *One World* (2002). Perhaps the simplest way to see this is to consider that even given a severe drought in the United States – there is little (if any) chance of Americans experiencing famine conditions. Utilitarians should have no problem imploring us to care about the 90% of the 40,000 deaths per day due to non-emergency chronic hunger conditions.
13 This is an argument I made in Doyle 1983b and elaborated in Doyle 1997, chapter 11.
14 See Doyle 1983a and for extensive discussion, including a variety of proponents and critics, Brown *et al.* 1996.
15 Isaiah Berlin, for example, suggests the prior importance of at least a minimum level of subsistence before personal and political liberty can be enjoyed (Berlin 1969, "Introduction").
16 *TJ*, 252–53.
17 Rawls's position is, however, complex, testing as much as anything on his view that peoples from different cultures do not possess the (non-political) cultural common ground to "construct" a just cosmopolitan order. Here a dissenting line of liberal thought (one distinct from both utilitarianism and global common law) is worth mentioning: Explicitly motivated by questions of development in the Global South, Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Seyla Benhabib have recently attempted to construct a universalistic philosophy of "human capabilities" that stakes out what might be called the middle ground between Rawls and the ā priori cosmopolitanism of Pogge, Singer and Beitz (Benhabib 1995). Another route to justice not explored here is piecemeal justice, issue by issue. In this model, as suggested to me by Charles Beitz, the fair play principles appropriate to a just trade regime or just regime of environmental cooperation would be established and global justice would only be examined as a residual guarantee. Undoubtedly, a just trade regime would go a long way towards

reducing global inequalities. Agricultural and other commodity subsidies in the indus-
trial North violate just principles of fair play free trade and greatly discriminate against
the less developed world of the global South. The owner of the average cow in Europe
or Japan receives a subsidy ten times the income per capita of the lowest fifth of the
world's human population. Cotton and other commodities in the U.S. receive equally
egregious subsidies. Removing those subsidies, permitting developing world exporters
greater access to the markets of the developed North, would thus be a large step toward
global justice and equality. But the removal of those subsidies would not address the
inequalities that characterize the poorest parts of the world that lack the productive
facilities and access to markets that would encourage them to grow their way out of
poverty. These poorest areas need assistance to develop the physical and social infra-
structure that would permit them to take advantage of global trade (assuming that it was
organized on fair basis) and this assistance would seem to need to be motivated by
more global considerations of justice such as those that the cosmopolitans raise.

18 If the maximum effective size of a deliberative legislature is the conventional 500 or so,
a global constituency would have to be of the order of 8 million persons. The other
alternative to direct representation – confederal solutions that mix direct and indirect
elections – also attenuate the political life of the citizen or create grounds for serious
conflict between the local government and the remote confederation. But the range of
effective institutions governing a viable community has varied over time, as Beitz
notes, raising the issue of whether current institutional capacities should constrain
duties. See Beitz 2000, 683.

19 This prohibition need not include small payments into multilateral institutions that
(albeit via a middleman) already result in some minor such redistributions – for
example, some of Israel's contributions to UN institutions actually end up funding
projects that benefit its enemies. The question of "where to draw the line" as it relates
to the still simmering debate over a more significant multilateral tax in exchange for the
privilege of UN membership is an interesting one indeed.

20 See the argument of Susan Wolf 1982.

21 Kant's argument for the mutual security that should be established among fellow
liberal republican states is in "Perpetual Peace" (Kant 1970).

22 Singer 2002, 169–70 and 193–95, but as Carens 1989 notes completely open immigra-
tion might limit the ability of the citizens of wealthier societies to choose the kinds of
health and social policies that they would prefer. Generous social benefits might be
swamped by uncontrolled immigration. For a valuable criticism of Rawls's neglect of
migration and the import of that neglect for his overall argument see Benhabib 2004.

23 *LP*, 83.

24 *LP*, 1999, 86.

25 *LP*, 37.

26 Rawls discusses international distributive justice and his rejection of One World
standards, in *LP*, 113–20.

27 *LP*, 55.

28 *LP*, 114–15.

29 Gross domestic product per capita as ranked by the *CIA World Fact Book* (1999) and
democracies/"free countries" as determined by Freedom House's *Freedom in World*
(2004).

30 Macedo 2004 effectively develops and elaborates on the importance of this point. For
other arguments supporting views related to Rawls's on the importance of autonomy
and the political foundation of justice, see Blake 2001 and Nagel 2005.

31 Beitz 2000, 692, replies to Rawls that *not* redistributing international income makes
later generations in the poorer country bear the burdens of choices that their ancestors
made. This difference is not readily resolved on the basis of claims to
self-determination.

32 There are other forms of decent people, but Rawls does not focus on them.

33 *LP*, 61.
34 *LP*, 75.
35 See Doyle 1983b.
36 *LP*, 69.
37 *LP*, 69. Rawls notes that decent hierarchical societies are effectively ideal types or hypotheticals. There may not be any given society that exactly embodies all his criteria: "I do not argue against this contention, and indeed it may be true" (75n.).
38 Byman and Green 1999, 10.
39 Riphenburg 1998, 69.
40 Katzman 2003, 1.
41 See the speech by UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw, "Partnership for Reform in the Arab World" at the Civility [sic] Programme on Middle East Reform (March 1, 2004) in http::/www.caabu.org/press/documents/straw-eu-fpc.html. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice described the communiqué on the Middle East Initiative as "a very strong affirmation of the need for reform and change in the Middle East, for the need for modernization in the Middle East because, in fact, you cannot have the kind of economic renaissance that needs to take place in the Middle East without doing something to enhance the creativity of (their) people." (Cox News Service, June 8, 2004, 12:00 a.m.).
42 Rawls discusses none of these states. Whether they would fit as outlaw states depends for him on either or both their human rights records and tendencies toward aggression.
43 *LP*, 81. Benevolent dictatorships, a fifth category of state, do not merit the respect accorded to decent hierarchical societies (because they do not embody consultation hierarchies, etc.) but since they do not violate basic rights and are not aggressive, they too have a right of self-defense and should not be aggressed against (*LP*, 92).
44 *LP*, 93.
45 *LP*, 110.
46 For a discussion of realistic remedial measures, see the UN Millenium Project 2005.
47 For a careful survey of the (inadequate) state of the literature on global inequality and its significance (see Galbraith 2002). It is significant that the UN's Millennium Development Goal on extreme poverty reduction (reducing by half the proportion of people living on less than a $1 a day by 2015) is being met. At the same time, it is worth noting that almost all progress is attributable to growth in China and India. Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe are all in retrograde motion and Latin America is stagnant.

7 An international liberal community

Americans have always wanted to stand for something in the world. As liberals, we have wanted to stand for freedom, when we could. In recent times, both Republicans and Democrats have joined in this cause. In 1982 President Ronald Reagan announced a "crusade for freedom" and "a campaign for democratic development." In the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice President George Bush endorsed the "Reagan Doctrine." Governor Michael Dukakis repeated President John F. Kennedy's pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, [and] oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty." Since then, President Bush has ordered an invasion of Panama and announced as a "plain truth: the day of the dictator is over. The people's right to democracy must not be denied."[1] He then justified the invasion as a way to protect U.S. citizens, arrest Manuel Noriega, and bestow democratic freedom to the people of Panama.

Realist skeptics, however, have denounced the pursuit of liberal ideas in foreign affairs as a dangerous illusion that threatens our security. Instead, they say we should focus on employing our national resources to promote our power in a world where nothing but self-help and the balancing of power against power will assure our security.[2] Radical skeptics, on the other hand, have portrayed liberal foreign affairs as little more than a cloak for imperialism.[3] Both sets of critics have identified actual dangers in liberal foreign policy.

What the skeptics miss, however, is the successful establishment of a liberal community of nations, and in missing the liberal community, they miss what appears to be the single best hope for the growth of a stable, just, and secure international order.

In this chapter, I want to examine the legacies of liberalism on foreign affairs and explore their foundations in the liberal community of democratic republican states. After tracing the mixed record of liberal influences on U.S. foreign policy, I will suggest ways in which the United States and its allies in the liberal community can preserve, manage, defend, expand, and (where needed) rescue the community from the threats it now faces.

A liberal community of peace

For almost two centuries liberal countries have tended and, now, liberal democratic countries do tend, to maintain peaceful relations with each other. This is the community's first legacy. Other democracies are our natural allies. We tend to respect and accommodate democratic countries. We negotiate rather than escalate disputes.

During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife. But after the Reform Bill of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British Parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes despite, for example, severe British grievances against the Northern blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I, and in 1914–15, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its treaty obligations under the Triple Alliance to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France that had the effect of preventing it from having to fight other liberal states, and declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917, before entering World War I on their side.

Liberal states thus appear to exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a political foundation that defines common strategic interests for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers – NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), our Japanese alliance, ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty Alliance). This foundation resists the corrosive effects of the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states and, as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave and short of a single world empire.

Of course, the outbreak of war, in any given year, between any two given states, is a low-probability event. But the occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, Fascist, Communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule; nor for pluralistic, or merely similar societies. More significant, perhaps, is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the complexity of the paths that take them there.

A liberal community of peace has become established among liberal states. (More than forty liberal states currently compose their informal union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent.) The firm maintenance of their separate peace since the eighteenth century offers the promise of a continuing peace, and a continuation of the unsteady but overall increase in the number of liberal states since that time announces the possibility of an eventual world peace (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 The liberal community (by date "liberal")[a]

Period		Total number
18th century	Swiss Cantons[b] French Republic 1790–1795 United States[b] 1776–	3
1800–1850	Swiss Confederation, United States France 1830–1849 Belgium 1830– Great Britain 1932– Netherlands 1848– Piedmont 1848– Denmark 1849–	8
1850–1900	Switzerland, United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands Piedmont –1861, Italy 1861– Denmark –1866 Sweden 1864– Greece 1864– Canada 1867–[c] France 1871– Argentina 1880– Chile 1891–	13
1900–1945	Switzerland, United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada Greece –1911,	29
1928–1936	Italy –1922 Belgium –1940 Netherlands –1940 Argentina –1943 France –1940 Chile –1924, 1932 Australia 1901 Norway 1905–1940 New Zealand 1907– Colombia 1910–1949 Denmark 1914–1940 Poland 1917–1935 Latvia 1922–1934 Germany 1918–1932 Austria 1918–1934	

Table 7.1 Continued

Period		Total number
	Estonia 1919–1934	
	Finland 1919–	
	Uruguay 1919–	
	Costa Rica 1919–	
	Czechoslovakia 1920–1939	
	Ireland 1920–	
	Mexico 1928–	
	Lebanon 1944–	
1945[d]–	Switzerland, the United States,	
	Great Britain, Sweden,	
	Canada, Australia, New Zealand,	
	Finland, Ireland, Mexico	
	Uruguay –1973, 1985–	
	Chile –1973	
	Lebanon –1975	
	Costa Rica –1948, 1953–	
	Iceland 1944–	
	France 1945–	
	Denmark 1945–	
	Norway 1945–	
	Austria 1945–	
	Brazil 1945–1954, 1955–1964, 1985–	
	Belgium 1946–	
	Luxemburg 1946–	
	Netherlands 1946–	
	Italy 1946–	
	Philippines 1946–1972; 1987–	
	India 1947–1975, 1977–	
	Sri Lanka 1948–1961, 1963–1971, 1978–1983	
	Ecuador 1948–1963, 1979–	
	Israel 1949–	
	West Germany 1949–	
	Greece 1950–1967, 1975–	
	Peru 1950–1962, 1963–1968, 1980–	
	El Salvador 1950–1961	
	Turkey 1950–1960, 1966–1971, 1984–	
	Japan 1951–	
	Bolivia 1956–1969, 1982–	
	Colombia 1958–	54
	Venezuela 1959–	
	Nigeria 1961–1964, 1979–1984	
	Jamaica 1962–	
	Trinidad and Tobago 1962–	
	Senegal 1963–	
	Malaysia 1963–	
	Botswana 1966–	

Singapore 1965–
Portugal 1976–
Spain 1978–
Dominican Republic 1978–
Honduras 1981–
Papua New Guinea 1982–
Argentina 1983–
South Korea 1988–
Taiwan 1988–

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a I have drawn up this approximate list of "liberal regimes" (through 1982) according to the four "Kantian" institutions described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intraparty) elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (that is, 30 percent) or, as Kant would have had it, open to "achievement" by inhabitants (for example, to poll tax payers or householders) of the national or metropolitan territory. (This list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies. Female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement; and representative government is internally sovereign (for example, including and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years). (Banks and Overstreet [1983]; U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office [1980]; *The Europa Yearbook, 1985;* Langer [1968]; U.S. Department of State [1981]; Gastil [1985]; Freedom House [1991].
b There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient "republics," since none appear to fit Kant's criteria (Holmes [1979]).
c Canada, as a commonwealth within the British empire, did not have formal control of its foreign policy during this period.
d Selected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than 1 million. These include all states categorized as "Free" by Freedom House and those "Partly Free" (45 or more free) states with a more pronounced capitalist orientation.

Although this banner has recently been waved before President Reagan's Republican "crusade for freedom," under President Woodrow Wilson's effort to make the world "safe for democracy" it formed the core vision of the foreign policy of the Democratic party. Wilson's war message of April 2, 1917 expressed this liberal commitment well: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed people of the world such concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."

These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant, nor that liberalism is the peace's sole valid explanation.[4] But they do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace – but only among themselves.

Liberal imprudence

Liberalism, as the critics note, also carries with it other legacies. Peaceful restraint only seems to work in the liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states.

Many of these wars have been defensive, and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with liberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, of interest, and of pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's Fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's Communists.

But we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do.[5] Although most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1846–48, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states.

We need therefore to remind ourselves that a "freer world" does not automatically mean "a more peaceful world." Trying to make the world safe for democracy does not necessarily make democracies safe for the world.

On the one hand, democracies are prone to being tempted into aggressive crusades to expand overseas the "free world" of mutual security, civil liberties, private property, and democratic rule, and this has led in the past to enormous suffering and only infrequently to successful transplants of democratic rule to previously non-democratic countries. Furthermore, we distrust nondemocratic countries, sometimes excessively. We regard their domestic oppression as an inherent sign of aggressive intent and downplay the role of error. In the KAL (Korean Airlines) 007 disaster, according to journalist Seymour Hersh, our government pronounced horrible error as evil intent, and we were all too ready to accept that verdict.

On the other hand, democratic majorities sometimes succumb to bouts of isolationism and appeasement, tempting aggressive states to employ strategies of piecemeal conquest (salami tactics). Self-indulgent majorities thus undermine what can be vital collective security interests.

Foundations

Neither realist nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. They can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability.[6] But neither the logic of the balance of power nor of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance – liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects, indeed is premised upon, flexible arrangements of geostrategic rivalry

that regard foreign capabilities (whether democratically governed or not) as inherently threatening. Realist balancing theory therefore expects rational states to balance against proximate power. It also includes preventive war. But liberal neighbors, such as the United States and Canada, have maintained a long undefended border for over a century. Hegemonic states can police the lesser powers but, as hegemonies wax and wane, the liberal peace still holds. Marxist "ultraimperialists" (Kautsky-ists) expect a form of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists do expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialistic toward fellow advanced capitalists, whether liberal or not.

Perpetual Peace, an essay by the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, helps us understand the effects of democratic republicanism on foreign affairs. In that essay, Kant shows how liberal republics lead to dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations – a "pacific union" among similarly liberal states – and a "state of war" between liberals and nonliberals.

First, Kant argues, republican governments tame the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies by making government decisions subject to the control of majority representation. They also ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Wars then appear as the direct charges on the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution, Kant's "hesitation," in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, protect private property, or support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies.[7]

Second, in order to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law, according to Kant, adds a second source – a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states – an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soulless despotism." Yet at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states: "as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace." As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play, and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace.

Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples are essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. Wilhelm II of Imperial Germany may or may not have been aggressive (he was certainly idiosyncratic); liberal democracies such as England, France, and the United States, however, assumed that whatever was driving German policy, reliable democratic, constitutional government was not restraining it. They regarded Germany and its actions with severe suspicion – to which the Reich reacted with corresponding distrust. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate. Each, however, may also be self-fulfilling.

Democratic liberals do not need to assume either that public opinion directly rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite is liberal. They can also assume a third possibility: that the elite typically manages public affairs but that potentially nonliberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that antiliberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public.

Lastly, "cosmopolitan law" adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these inevitably contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials also help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours

an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation. Conversely, a sense of suspicion, like that characterizing relations between liberal and nonliberal governments, makes transnational contacts appear subversive. Liberal and nonliberal states then mutually restrict the range of contacts between societies, and this can further increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient. Kantian theory is neither solely institutional nor solely ideological, nor solely economic. But together (and only together) the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them, plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.[8] But in their relations with nonliberal states, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole.[9] Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.

A need for new thinking

In our recent past we have often failed to appreciate the significance of the liberal community. So, like the Russians, we stand in need of "new thinking." Our record fits the liberal community, but our debates have failed to understand it. Our failure to understand the opportunities of the liberal community may indeed be an important source of our frequent experience of the imprudent appeasement and crusading imperialism of which conservative and radical skeptics have warned us.

Before our rise to world power in the 1890s, American principles seemed to take a back seat to a series of pressing necessities. Securing our effective independence from England called for a strategy of limited involvement (enunciated in Washington's Farewell Address).[10] Acquiring a secure hold on the preponderance of North America stimulated a doctrine of spheres of influence (the Monroe Doctrine) and a policy of frontier colonialism (Manifest Destiny). Avoiding, succumbing to, then repairing the ravages of civil war reinforced the drive for continental hegemony and isolation from foreign entanglements. None of these dominant strategies was uncontested. Few of our foreign policy debates have been as spirited as the disputes over how best to achieve those goals of national security and economic development, as we can see in the domestic fights over the Jay Treaty (1794), the Tariff (1828), or the Mexican War (1848).

But the principle of freedom followed behind our national strategy. The United States was too weak to export freedom either through force or foreign aid as democratic internationalists such as Thomas Paine had urged and as France and later Britain did. Americans settled upon an international identity as a secularized republican version of the Puritan "City upon a Hill."[11] America would be a model for democratic republicanism, a laboratory of democratic experiment, and a refuge for oppressed liberals from around the world. The American democrats chose

"democracy in one country." Defending our existence preempted exporting our essence.

The recent post-1945 Cold War period is no better guide to our challenges. Our commitment to freedom was not subordinated to our security or our prosperity; it was, as we then saw it, indistinguishable from them. In 1947 President Truman declared that nearly every nation had to chose between two alternative ways of life: democratic freedom or autocratic oppression. He defined our purposes by announcing that "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Following the defeat of the Axis powers, the Communist Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to democratic freedom on a worldwide basis. But in those years national security and economic prosperity pointed in very much the same direction. George Kennan's geopolitical analysis of the five centers of potential global industrial power suggested that as long as the United States prevented any rival from acquiring control over Eurasia, the U.S. would remain secure. Containing the USSR, preventing it from dominating Western Europe and Japan, effectively satisfied this geostrategic imperative.[12] Equally, preserving our prosperity seemed to mean avoiding the spiraling escalation of tariff and invest-ment restrictions, competitive monetary depreciation, and financial expropriation that had accompanied the worldwide economic crisis of the Great Depression. Protectionism, of course, was widespread as the industrial and agrarian economies attempted to readjust to peacetime conditions, but the most serious threat of total restrictions again came from the spread of communism. Having rejected isola-tionism, we were spared other hard choices. Our principles, our national security, our economic interests all pointed the same way, toward containment of the Communist bloc.

Our last age of intellectually difficult strategic choice was thus the age of our rise to world power, between 1890 and 1940. But it too serves as a poor model for today. Even if we could allow for the significant differences in political and economic environment, the choices made then represent not a positive but a nega-tive model, what we must try to avoid rather than to repeat. We first chose liberal imperialism toward our weaker neighbors in Latin America and the Pacific. Then we chose isolationism in the face of growing demand for our participation in the international organization of international security.

In 1899 President McKinley grandiloquently proclaimed that "our priceless principles undergo no change under the tropical sun. They go with the flag." But from our perspective today, the racism and arrogance that also shaped those policies render them unacceptable, even if the imperial variety of international paternalism were affordable.

The isolationist response to dealings with other powerful states created equally costly results. The United States Senate rejected our participation in the League of Nations, leaving a fatal gap in its membership. As importantly, our reluctance to play a direct and active role in European security complicated the management of the European debt problem (despite the active role played by New York bankers) and in the 1930s raised anew the problem of who or what would contain a reviving

Germany. Today, even more clearly, the integration of the world trading system, United States and Third World international debts and deficits, the resource dependence of the major industrial nations of Europe and Japan make an isolationist strategy reckless in the extreme.

We need to go beyond those two historic alternatives in United States national strategy – moralistic isolationism and liberal imperialism.[13] We lack the simple constraints of pre-1898 weakness and post-1945 Cold War. Today our economic interests are ambiguous. Can we best revive our sagging productivity through nationalism or multilateralism?[14] President Mikhail Gorbachev's steps toward detente and democratic reform are depriving the original Cold War of its purpose.[15] Looming shifts in the balance of resources and productivity suggest to some an increase in Japanese, Chinese, and (if united) European power. But do we really want to regard them as potential enemies and therefore to play multipolar balancing against them?

Securing and expanding the liberal community

An important alternative to the balancing of enemies is thus the cultivation of friends. If the actual history of the liberal community is reliable, a better strategy for our foreign relations lies in the development of the liberal community.

If a concern for protecting and expanding the range of international freedom is to shape our strategic aims, then policy toward the liberal and the nonliberal world should be guided by general liberal principles. At the minimum, this means rejecting the realist balance of power as a general strategy by trusting the liberal community and therefore refusing to balance against the capabilities of fellow democratic liberals. At its fullest, this also means going beyond the standard provisions of international law. Membership in the liberal community implies accepting a positive duty to defend other members of the liberal community, to discriminate in certain instances in their favor, and to override in some (hopefully rare) circumstances the domestic sovereignty of states in order to rescue fellow human beings from intolerable oppression: Authentically liberal policies should, furthermore, attempt to secure personal and civil rights, to foster democratic government, and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market economy as well as to meet those basic human needs that make the exercise of human rights possible.

In order to avoid the extremist possibilities of its abstract universalism, however, U.S. liberal policy should be constrained by a geopolitical budget. Strategy involves matching what we are prepared to spend to what we want to achieve. It identifies our aims, resources, threats, and allies. While liberal democracy thus can identify our natural allies abroad, we must let our actual enemies identify themselves.

One reason for this is that we cannot embark upon the "crusades" for democracy that have been so frequent within the liberal tradition. In a world armed with nuclear weapons, crusading is suicidal. In a world where changes in regional balances of power could be extremely destabilizing for ourselves and our allies, indiscriminate provocations of hostility (such as against the People's Republic of China) could create increased insecurity (for Japan and ourselves). In a world of

global interdependence, common problems require multilateral solutions. We simply do not have the excess strength that would free us from a need to economize on dangers or to squander opportunities for negotiated solutions.

A second reason why we should let our enemies identify themselves is that our liberal values require that we should reject an indiscriminate "crusade for democracy." If we seek to promote democracy because it reflects the rights of all to be treated with equal respect, irrespective of race, religion, class, or nationality, then equal respect must guide both our aims and our means. A strategy of geopolitical superiority and liberal imperialism, for example, would both require increased arms expenditures and international subversion and have little or (more likely) a retrogressive effect on human rights in the countries that are our targets.

Instead, our strategy should lean toward the defensive. It should strive to protect the liberal community, foster the conditions that might allow the liberal community to grow, and save the use of force for clear emergencies that severely threaten the survival of the community or core liberal values.

Preserving the community

Above all, liberal policy should strive to preserve the pacific union of similarly liberal societies. It is not only currently of immense strategic value (being the political foundation of both NATO and the Japanese alliance); it is also the single best hope for the evolution of a peaceful world. Liberals should be prepared, therefore, to defend and formally ally with authentically liberal, democratic states that are subject to threats or actual instances of external attack or internal subversion. We must continue to have no liberal enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.

We have underestimated the importance of the democratic alliance. Our alliances in NATO, with Japan, ANZUS, and our alignments with other democratic states are not only crucial to our present security, they are our best hopes for long-term peace and the realization of our ideals. We should not treat them as once useful but now purposeless Cold War strategic alignments against the power of the USSR.

They deserve our careful investment. Spending $200 million to improve the prospects of President Corazon Aquino's efforts to achieve a transition to stable democracy in the Philippines cannot be considered too large an investment. Placing a special priority on helping the Argentineans and Mexicans manage their international debts is a valuable form of discrimination, if we take into account that financial decompression in those countries might undermine their democratic governance. With the help of West European and Japanese allies, a similar political investment in the economic transition of the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe merits equivalent attention.

Managing the community

Much of our success in alliance management has to be achieved on a multilateral basis. The current need to redefine NATO and the increasing importance of the

U.S. relationship with Japan offer us an opportunity to broaden the organization of liberal security. Joining all the democratic states together in a single democratic security organization would secure an important forum for the definition and coordination of common interests that stretch beyond the regional concerns of Europe and the Far East. As the Cold War fades, pressures toward regionalism are likely to become increasingly strong. In order to avoid the desperate responses that might follow regional reactions to regional crises such as those of the 1920s and 1930s, a wider alliance of liberal democracies seems necessary. It could reduce pressures on Japan and Germany to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, mitigate the strategic vulnerabilities of isolated liberal states such as Israel, and allow for the complementary pooling of strategic resources (combining, for example, Japanese and German financial clout with American nuclear deterrence and American, British, and French expeditionary thrust).

Much of the success of multilateral management will rest, however, on shoring up economic supports. Reducing the U.S. budget and trade deficits will especially require multilateral solutions. Unilateral solutions (exchange rate depreciation, increased taxation) are necessary but not sufficient, and some (protectionism) are neither. Avoiding a costly economic recession calls for trade liberalization and the expansion of demand abroad to match the contraction of governmental and private spending in the United States. But we will also need to create a diplomatic atmosphere conducive to multilateral problem solving. A national strategy that conveys a commitment to collective responsibility in United States diplomacy will go far in this direction.

Discovering ways to manage global interdependence will call for difficult economic adjustments at home and institutional innovations in the world economy. Under these circumstances, liberals will need to ensure that those suffering losses, such as from market disruption or restriction, do not suffer a permanent loss of income or exclusion from world markets. Furthermore, to prevent these emergency measures from escalating into a spiral of isolationism, liberal states should undertake these innovations only by international negotiation and only when the resulting agreements are subject to a regular review by all the parties.[16]

Protecting the community

The liberal community needs to be protected. Two models could fit liberal national strategy designed to protect against the international power of nonliberal states.[17]

If faced with severe threats from the nonliberal world, the liberal community might simply balance the power of nonliberal states by playing divide and rule within the nonliberal camp, triangulating, for example, between Russia and China as the United States did during the 1970s.

If, on the other hand, the liberal community becomes increasingly predominant (or collectively unipolar) as it now appears to be becoming, the liberal community could adopt a more ambitious grand strategy. Arms exports, trade, and aid could reflect the relative degrees of liberal principle that nonliberal domestic and foreign policies incorporate. Liberal foreign policy could be designed to create a ladder of

rewards and punishments – a set of balanced incentives, rewarding liberalization and punishing oppression, rewarding accommodation and punishing aggression. This strategy would both satisfy liberal demands for publicity – consistent public legitimation – and create incentives for the progressive liberalization of nonliberal states.

Expanding the community

There are few direct measures that the liberal world can take to foster the stability, development, and spread of liberal democratic regimes. Many direct efforts, including military intervention and overt or covert funding for democratic movements in other countries, discredit those movements as the foreign interference backfires through the force of local nationalism. (The democratic movement in Panama denounced U.S. political aid before the invasion and today suffers at home and abroad from its overt dependence on the United States.)

Much of the potential success of a policy designed to foster democracy rests therefore on an ability to shape an economic and political environment that indirectly supports democratic governance and creates pressures for the democratic reform of authoritarian rule.

Politically, there are few measures more valuable than an active human rights diplomacy, which enjoys global legitimacy and (if successful) can assure a political environment that tolerates the sort of dissent that can nourish an indigenous democratic movement. There is reason to pay special attention to those countries entering what Samuel Huntington has called the socioeconomic "transition zone" – countries having the economic development that has typically been associated with democracy.[18] For them, more direct support in the form of electoral infrastructure (from voting machines to battalions of international observers) can provide the essential margin persuading contentious domestic groups to accept the fairness of the crucial first election.

Economically, judging from the historical evidence of the 1920s and 1930s, democratic regimes seem to be more vulnerable to economic depression than authoritarian regimes. (This is why economic aid should be targeted at the margin toward fledgling democracies.) But in periods of stable economic growth, democratic regimes seem to accommodate those social groups that are newly mobilized by economic growth better over the long run than do authoritarian regimes. Democracies expand participation better. They also allow for the expression of nonmaterial goals more easily, it seems, than do the more functionally legitimated authoritarian regimes. Economic growth thus may be the liberals' best long-run strategy.

Following World War II, the allied occupation and remaking of Germany and Japan and the Marshall Plan's successful coordination and funding of the revival of Europe's prewar industrial economies and democratic regimes offer a model of how much can be achieved with an extraordinary commitment of resources and the most favorable possible environment. Practically, today, short of those very special circumstances, there are few direct means to stimulate economic growth

and democratic development from abroad. But liberals should persevere in attempts to keep the world economy free from destabilizing protectionist intrusions. Although intense economic interdependence generates conflicts, it also helps to sustain the material well-being underpinning liberal societies and to promise avenues of development to Third World states with markets that are currently limited by low income.[19] To this should be added mutually beneficial measures designed to improve Third World economic performance. Export earnings insurance, international debt management assistance, export diversification assistance, and technical aid are some of these. In the case of the truly desperate poor, the condition of some of the populations of Africa, more direct measures of international aid and relief from famine are required, both as a matter of political prudence and of moral duty.

Rescuing the community

Liberal principles can also help us think about whether liberal states should attempt to rescue individuals oppressed by their own governments. Should a respect for the rights of individuals elicit our help or even military rescue? Historically, liberals have been divided on these issues,[20] and the U.S. public today has no clear answer to these questions. It supported the "rescue" of Grenada and the purge in Panama, but as many rejected "another Vietnam" in Nicaragua.[21]

Traditionally, and in accord with current international law, states have the right to defend themselves, come to the aid of other states aggressed against, and, where necessary, take forcible measures to protect their citizens from wrongful injury and release them from wrongful imprisonment.[22] But modern international law condemns sanctions designed to redress the domestic oppression of states. The United Nations Charter is ambiguous on this issue, since it finds human rights to be international concerns and permits the Security Council to intervene to prevent "threats" to "international peace and security." Given the ambiguity of the charter and the political stalemate of the Security Council, difficult moral considerations thus must become a decisive factor in considering policy toward domestic oppression in foreign countries.[23]

Nonintervention also has important moral foundations. It helps encourage order – stable expectations – in a confusing world without international government. It rests on a respect for the rights of individuals to establish their own way of life free from foreign interference.

The basic moral presumption of liberal thought is that states should not be subject to foreign intervention, by military or other means. Lacking a global scheme of order or global definition of community, foreign states have no standing to question the legitimacy of other states other than in the name and "voice" of the individuals who inhabit those other states. States therefore should be taken as representing the moral rights of individuals unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Although liberals and democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring "civilization," metropolitan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign peoples expressing no demand for them,

these interventions find no justification in a conception of equal respect for individuals. This is simply because it is to their sense of their own self-respect and not our sense of what they should respect that we must accord equal consideration.

What it means to respect their own sense of self-determination is not always self-evident. Ascertaining what it might mean can best be considered as an attempt at both subjective and objective interpretation.

One criterion is subjective. We should credit the voice of their majority. Obviously, this means not intervening against states with apparent majority support. In authoritarian states, however, determining what are the wishes of the majority is particularly difficult. Some states will have divided political communities with a considerable but less than a majority of the population supporting the government, a large minority opposing, and many indifferent. Some will be able to suppress dissent completely. Others will not. Widespread armed resistance sustained by local resources and massive street demonstrations against the state (and not just against specific policies) therefore can provide evidence of a people standing against their own government. Still, one will want to find clear evidence that the dissenters actually want a foreign intervention to solve their oppression.

The other criterion is objective. No group of individuals, even if apparently silent, can be expected to consent to having their basic rights to life, food, shelter, and freedom from torture systematically violated. These sorts of rights clearly crosscut wide cultural differences.

Whenever either or both of these violations take place, one has (1) a prima facie consideration favoring foreign intervention.[24] But even rescuing majorities suffering severe oppression or individuals suffering massive and systematic violations of human rights is not sufficient grounds to justify military intervention. We must also have (2) some reasonable expectation that the intervention will actually end the oppression. We need to expect that it will end the massacre or address starvation (as did India's intervention in East Pakistan and Tanzania's in Uganda). Or, if prodemocratic, it should have a reasonable chance of establishing authentic self-determination, rather than (as J. S. Mill warned) merely introducing new rulers who, dependent on outside support, soon begin to replicate the oppressive behavior of the previous rulers. (The U.S. invasion of Grenada and the covert push in the Philippines seem to qualify; the jury is still out on Haiti and Panama.)

Moreover, (3) the intervention must be a proportional response to the suffering now endured and likely to be endured without an intervention. Countries cannot, any more than villages, be destroyed in order to be saved. We must consider whether means other than military intervention could achieve the liberation from oppression, and we must ensure that the intervention, if necessary, is conducted in a way that minimizes casualties, most particularly noncombatant casualties. In short, we must be able morally to account for the expected casualties of an invasion both to our own soldiers and to the noncombatant victims.

And (4) a normal sense of fallibility, together with a decent respect for the opinions of the entire community of nations, recommends a resort wherever feasible to multilateral organizations to guide and legally legitimate a decision to violate the autonomy of another state.

A liberal future

If, as is likely, liberal principles and institutions continue to influence the formulation of United States foreign policy in the 1990s, what opportunities and dangers might arise?

Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states. It has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. It failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims (fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination. Farsighted and constitutive measures have only been provided by the liberal international order when one liberal state stood preeminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did the United States following World War II, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as the British Loan, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the liberalization of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international liberal order.[25]

Thus the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership in the 1990s may pose dangers for the liberal world. The danger is not that today's liberal states will permit their economic competition to spiral into war, nor that a world economic crisis is now likely, but that the societies of the liberal world will no longer be able to provide the mutual assistance they might require to sustain liberal domestic orders if they were to be faced with mounting economic crises.

Yet liberals may have escaped from the single greatest traditional danger of international change – the transition between hegemonic leaders. Historically, when one great power begins to lose its preeminence and to slip into mere equality, a warlike resolution of the international pecking order became exceptionally likely. New power challenges old prestige, excessive commitments face new demands; so Sparta felt compelled to attack Athens, France warred Spain, England and Holland fought with France (and with each other), and Germany and England struggled for the mastery of Europe in World War I.[26] But here liberals may again be an exception, for despite the fact that the United States constituted Britain's greatest challenger along all the dimensions most central to the British maritime hegemony, Britain and the United States accommodated their differences. After the defeat of Germany, Britain eventually, though not without regret, accepted its replacement by the United States as the commercial and maritime hegemon of the liberal world. The promise of a peaceable transition from one liberal hegemon to the next liberal hegemon thus may be one of the factors helping to moderate economic and political rivalries among Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Choices in liberal foreign policy

In the years ahead we will need to chart our own national strategy as a liberal democracy faced with threats, but now also with opportunities for new thinking. In order to fulfill the promise of liberal internationalism, we must ensure a foreign policy that tries to reconcile our interests with our principles.

We will need to address the hard choices that no government truly committed to the promotion of human rights can avoid. Acknowledging that there may arise circumstances where international action – even force – is needed, we need strategic thinking that curbs the violent moods of the moment.

We will also need to keep our larger purposes in view. Those committed to freedom have made a bargain with their governments. We need only to live up to it. The major costs of a liberal strategy are borne at home. Not merely are its military costs at the taxpayers' expense, but a liberal foreign policy requires adjustment to a less controlled international political environment – a rejection of the status quo in favor of democratic choice. Tolerating more foreign change requires more domestic change. Avoiding an imperial presence in the Persian Gulf may require a move toward energy independence. Allowing for the economic development of the world's poor calls for an acceptance of international trade adjustment. The home front thus becomes the front line of liberal strategy.

The promises of successful liberal internationalism, however, are large and can benefit all. The pursuit of freedom does not guarantee the maintenance of peace. Indeed, the very invocation of "crusade" as a label for President Reagan's democratic initiative of the 1980s warns us otherwise. But the peaceful intent and restraint to which liberal institutions, principles, and interests have led in relations among liberal democracies suggest the possibility of world peace this side of the grave. They offer the promise of a world peace established by the expansion of the separate peace among liberal societies.

Notes

1 *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1989.
2 For an eloquent polemic defending this view, see the fine essay by Mearsheimer (1990a). For a thoughtful and thorough critique of the position and prescription, see Ullman (1991), chapter 7.
3 An important account of the many ways in which liberal ideology has served as a cloak for imperialism in U.S. foreign policy can be found in Williams (1962).
4 See the discussion of Kant's international politics and the evidence for the liberal peace in Doyle (1986). Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1 percent (p. 56), but this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other; and this is a strong assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion of significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis.
5 There are, however, serious studies that show that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes. But this should not be interpreted as a

sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or – with even greater enthusiasm – the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in particular, represent a minority in the current international system; they are strategically encircled, and, due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing defenses against both external and internal enemies.

6 See Aron (1966), pp. 151–54, and Russett (1985).

7 Kant regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them. At the same time, he argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighbouring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states.

8 For a more extensive description and analysis of the liberal community, see Doyle (1983a). Streit (1939), pp. 88, 90–92, seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the fifteen leading democracies of the 1930s. Recent work by Russett, Maoz, Ray, and Modelski has extended this field into considerations of wider strategies of international reform and the evolution of the international system.

9 For evidence, see Doyle (1983b).

10 Neo-Washingtonians (to coin a label) such as John Gaddis propose a similar strategy for the 1990s. See his "Toward the Post-Cold War World: Structure, Strategy, and Security" (forthcoming in *Foreign Affairs*).

11 See Baritz (1964) and discussion in Davis and Lynn-Jones (1987), p. 22.

12 See the evidence and argument in Gaddis (1982) and (1977).

13 Our record indicates a tendency to succumb to these alternatives, as has been well demonstrated in Ullman (1975–76).

14 See the informative debate between Laura Tyson and Robert Reich in *The American Prospect* (Winter 1991), and for a thorough background to the issues, see Gilpin (1987).

15 George Kennan, America's premier Sovietologist, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 4, 1989, that the break-up of the system of power through which the Soviet Union has been ruled since 1917 indicates that the time "has clearly passed for regarding the Soviet Union primarily as a possible, if not probable, military opponent."

16 These and similar policies are developed by Bergsten *et al.* (1978) and Cooper *et al.* (1978).

17 For a discussion of strategy toward once-enemies now in a transition zone toward potential friends, see Allison (1988).

18 See the comments of Larry Diamond on some suggestions made by Juan Linz in Diamond (1989).

19 Liberal democrats should consider that two serious rival democratic political economies might emerge. The East Asian national corporatist strategy is immensely successful (e.g., Singapore). It is a crucial minor key in Japanese development, it is the major key in Taiwan and South Korea, and it is spreading as a developmental ideal. Another is social democracy. Social insurance and egalitarianism are too deeply rooted in Eastern Europe (witness Walesa's trouncing of Mazowiecki and Yeltsin's defeat in the Russian legislature on land ownership) to allow a happy accommodation with the heavily capitalist element in Western democracy. Furthermore, there are the not as yet very democratic Third World variants, such as Islamic fundamentalism.

20 Liberals also give mixed advice on these matters. Kant argued that the "preliminary articles" from this treaty of perpetual peace required extending nonintervention by force in internal affairs of other states to nonliberal governments and maintaining a scrupulous respect for the laws of war. Yet he thought that liberal states could demand that other states become liberal. J.S. Mill said that intervention was impermissible except to support states threatened by external aggression and by foreign intervention in civil wars. Yet he justified British imperialism in India.

21 See the *ABC/Washington Post* poll reported in *Time*, November 21, 1983, and the *Washington Post*, October 24, 1984.
22 Cutler (1985).
23 Reisman (1984) suggests a legal devolution of Security Council responsibilities to individual states. Schachter (1984) argues that such rights to intervene would be abused by becoming self-serving. For a carefully reasoned revival of moral arguments for just war criteria, see Walzer (1977). The policy of sanctions against South Africa, designed to undermine the domestic system of apartheid, is an earlier instance of these efforts.
24 Lesser violations of human rights (various lesser forms of majority tyranny, for example) can warrant foreign diplomatic interference. The two severe abuses of liberal respect call for something more. The two severe abuses, of course, also tend to go together. Democratic resistance to authoritarian or totalitarian governments tends to result in the government inflicting severe abuses of human rights on the democratic resistance. Governments that systematically abuse the rights of their citizens rarely have widespread popular support. But they need not go together, hence their independence as criteria. There is one further constraint. Although the only popular movements for which one might justly intervene need not be democratically liberal, it would by these standards clearly be wrong to intervene in favor of a popular movement committed to a political program that would involve the systematic abuse of basic, "objective" human rights.
25 Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1975), and Hirsch and Doyle (1977).
26 The popular classic making these arguments is Kennedy (1987).

8 A more perfect union?

The Liberal Peace and the challenge of globalization[1]

Global democratization rose to the international agenda in the past year as the three peak global economic associations all came under attack. In Seattle, at the meeting of the new World Trade Organization, and in Washington at the meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a diverse collection of labour unions and environmentalists from the industrial North and trade and finance ministers from the developing countries of the South each launched sharply critical barbs. The critics successfully disrupted the WTO meeting that had been designed to launch (and celebrate) a "Millennium Round" of further reductions of barriers to global trade. The aims of the critics were very different, but together they derailed the entire proceedings and exposed important differences in priority among the developed states, and particularly the US and Europe. Charlene Barshefsky, the US Trade Representative and the meeting's chair, later conceded, "We needed a process which had a greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more diverse membership".[2] This highly-regarded trade-o-crat had come to recognize that the eminently oligarchic WTO needed some democratization (as yet undefined).

Joe Stiglitz, until recently the chief economist of the World Bank, offered a still broader criticism of the Bank's sister institution, the International Monetary Fund. The IMF was designed to rescue countries in temporary balance of payments difficulties. It actually operates, Stiglitz charges, more like a bureaucratic cabal than an international rescue team:

> The IMF likes to go about its business without outsiders asking too many questions. In theory, the fund supports democratic institutions in the nations it assists. In practice, it undermines the democratic process by imposing policies. Officially, of course, the IMF doesn't "impose" anything. It "negotiates" the conditions for receiving aid. But all the power in the negotiations is on one side – the IMF's – and the fund rarely allows sufficient time for broad consensus-building or even widespread consultations with either parliaments or civil society. Sometimes the IMF dispenses with the pretense of openness altogether and negotiates secret covenants.[3]

Two themes resonate through the denunciations: global governance and global (or international) democratization. The key question is how they relate to each

other. Three issues connect them. The first is the broad ethical question of how could and should the world be organized politically?[4] I present the claims for the leading organizational political framework today, one designed to bring world order while recognizing the reality of sovereign independence, which is the Kantian idea of a pacific union of free republics, or the liberal democratic peace. More controversially, I then argue that however good the Kantian peace has been and could be, it has significant limitations that have been exposed by increasing globalization. Globalization both sustains elements of the Kantian peace and also undermines it, making it less sustainable and indeed vitiating some of the democracy on which it is founded. And third, I discuss a range of possible responses to the challenges that globalization poses for the existing international order, and conclude with a comment on why global democratic sovereignty is not yet viable while global norms – more democratically derived – seem needed to promote a more perfect union of order and democracy.

Global political theory

How could and should the world be politically organized? That is, how should one assess various forms of political organization of world politics with respect to their ability to fulfill a set of human values that would be very widely shared – even if not exactly in the same way – around the world? Take, for example, these values: peace; prosperity; national independence, cultural identity or pluralism (so that people can express their identities in some public form); and individual human rights (including democracy, participation, equality and self-determination).

How well do various schemes of international order fulfill these basic human values at the global scale? Political philosophers have told us that the international system is a mix of hard choices among values. The political theorist Michael Walzer has reformulated those choices well in an essay that explores the range of values from little to much international governance, that is from national autonomy (and international anarchy) to a global, hierarchical, centralized government over all individuals.[5] There is no single arrangement that obtains everything – one that procures international peace, domestic peace, liberty, democracy, prosperity, and pluralistic identity. Instead, while the virtues of the nation state are domestic peace and perhaps national identity and national democracy, those same virtues are the foundations of international anarchy, geopolitical insecurity and international economic rivalry. Global government can be a foundation for global peace and a single efficient world market, and maybe even a global democratic polity, but it could also be the institution that represses national particularity, the global "soul-less despotism" against which the eighteenth century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, eloquently warned the liberals of his day. In between global authority and national independence, one can imagine confederal arrangements that allowed room for a diversity of civil societies, but again only at the cost of both national autonomy and international insecurity. The message of Michael Walzer's spectrum of global governance is hard choices: there is no perfect equilibrium.

Although there is no perfect solution to the problem of implementing human values on a global scale, the Kantian liberal peace lays claim to being the optimal combination, the one that gets us the most peace and global prosperity at the least cost in liberty, independence, and the least trampling on national identities. Immanuel Kant's essay, *Perpetual Peace*, published in 1795, was a direct response and alternative to both the autarkic nation state and a sovereign world government.

The key to the liberal argument is the claim that by establishing domestic liberty, political participation, and market exchange one can have the international payoff of peace as well.[6] Kant described a decentralized, self-enforcing peace achieved without the world government that the global governance claim posits as necessary. This is a claim that has resonated in the modern literature on the "democratic peace". It draws on the ideas of American presidents as diverse as Woodrow Wilson, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton and British prime ministers from Gladstone to Blair. Promoting freedom and "enlarging" the zone of democratic rule were the doctrinal centrepieces of their foreign policies. Advocates of the "democratic peace" have claimed that over time, country by democratizing country, a peace would spread to cover the entire world, building one world order – democratic, free, prosperous, and peaceful.

Kant's argument was much more complicated, presented in three necessary conditions, each an "article" in a hypothetical peace "treaty" he asks sovereigns to sign. First, states should adopt a liberal constitutional, representative, republican form of government which would constrain the state such that the sovereign would, on average, usually follow the interest of most of the people, or the majority. Second, the citizens of this liberal, constitutional, representative republic must affirm a commitment to human rights, one holding that all human beings are morally equal. Then states that represent liberal democratic majorities in their own countries will regard with respect other states that also represent free and equal citizens. Tolerance for various national liberal cultures and trust emerges, as does nonaggression and peace among fellow liberal republics. Third, given trust, states then lower the barriers that would have been raised to protect the state from invasion or exploitation in the competition of the balance of power. Trade, tourism and other forms of transnational contact grow which lead to prosperity, reinforcing mutual understanding with many opportunities for profitable exchange, and producing contacts that offset in their multiplicity the occasional sources of conflict.

For many, this seems the optimal equilibrium given both the world as it is and a commitment to the values of peace, liberty, prosperity, national identity and democratic participation. Does that mean that there are no tradeoffs? No. There is no such thing as a perfect political equilibrium. There are two major limitations. One is that this peace is limited only to other liberal republics. International respect is only extended to other, similarly republican liberal states. The very same principle of trust that operates among liberal republics tends to corrode attempts at cooperation between liberal republics and autocratic states, whether modern dictatorships or traditional monarchies. The liberal warns: "If the autocrat

is so ruthless that he is unwilling to trust his own citizens to participate in the polity and control his behavior, just think what he will do to us". Liberals then raise trade and other barriers, ensuring that conflicts are not dampened. The prejudice may be true. Many dictators – think of Napoleon or Hitler – have been aggressive. Many dictators, however, are also quite shy and cautious. They like the benefits of being absolute ruler and may fear overburdening the quiescence of their subjects with costly foreign adventures. The distrust and hostility are probably thus a joint product. The autocrats do like to gain the profits and glory of expansion and the citizens – cannon fodder and taxpayers – have no constitutional right to stop them. At the same time, the liberals are prejudiced against the autocratic regime and do not extend to those regimes the normal trust in international exchanges or negotiations and may, indeed, launch "freedom fighters" against them. Although the record of wars between liberals and non-liberals and the history of liberal imperialism testify to the depth of this tension, it can be overcome by autocratic prudence and liberal statesmanship.

The second limitation is associated with the assumption of minimal interdependence. In order for liberal republics to remain effectively sovereign and self-determining, allowing free citizens to govern themselves, material ties to other liberal republics would need to be limited. Kant assumed that those ties were limited to nonaggression, collective security and hospitality (free trade and mutual transit privileges). This is "light" interdependence[7] – some mutual sensitivity, some limited vulnerability, but not enough to challenge the liberal republic's ability to govern itself in the face of social and economic forces outside itself. Kantianism presumes marginal trade, marginal investment, marginal tourism; not extensive interdependence. This second limitation is increasingly unrealistic today.

Does modern interdependence challenge the Kantian liberal peace? Can the liberal peace sustain extensive, "heavy" interdependence? That is the question to which I turn next.

Challenges of globalization

The first challenge of global interdependence is to the sustainability of the liberal peace. Can it operate in a much more intensive environment of social and economic exchange? And the second is to the legitimacy of the liberal democratic system. Can the people truly govern themselves when much of their social and economic interaction is with other societies outside their borders and outside the reach of their representative government? Two major challenges, indeed.

Globalization I

The first challenge to liberal sustainability was articulated in one of the great books of the twentieth century, Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*.[8] His book is a profound study of the effects of the market economy both domestically and internationally. Polanyi's argument, in summary, holds that marketization makes peace unsustainable. Kantian liberals hoped that over time, with some ups

and downs, international markets would tend to liberalize non-liberal societies leading to more and more liberal republics, which would eventually cover the whole world and thus create global peace. Polanyi says it cannot work that way: there are built-in sources of corrosion produced by economic interdependence that make liberal politics and the liberal peace unsustainable.

He acknowledges that, indeed, the combination of the domestic market economy, political representation, the gold standard and the international balance of power did create a sustaining circle of mutually reinforcing economic contacts that helped produce the peace of the nineteenth century – the Long Peace of 1815 to 1914. But, he warns us, contrary to Immanuel Kant, trade is not just an exchange of commodities at arms length or at the border. Trade is a revolutionary form of exchange. Exchanging commodities changes the value in relative and absolute terms of the factors that go into producing the commodities that are exchanged. As was later elaborated in a set of theorems concerning factor price equalization, trade in commodities has potentially revolutionary effects in changing the returns to various factors – land, labour, and capital – that go into the production of these commodities. Countries tend to export commodities that intensively use the factors with which they are most endowed and import commodities that embody scarce domestic factors. Trade thus increases demand and price, and eventually factor return for relatively abundant factors as it shrinks demand, price and return for scarce domestic factors. Together this tends toward global "factor price equalization" (in theory, with many assumptions, and thus real-world qualifications).[9] In 1795, however, Kant seemed to assume that trade was arm's length commodity exchange. He neglected the potential effects of commodity trade on the factors that go into the production of the commodities exchanged (land, labour, and capital).

Why is this important? Trade, whether national or international, destabilizes the social relations among land, labour, and capital, disrupting relations that had become embedded in social hierarchies and in political power. Treating land, labour and capital as commodities dislocates established communities, village life, regional life, the relations among classes, industries and sectors and eventually changes the international balance of power. Trade therefore produces a reaction. Farmers do not like to have the prices of their farm products drop to the prices set by more competitive rivals. Consumers might prefer the lower prices, but the usually better organized producers resist. Labourers and manufacturers do not want to compete with labour that makes one tenth of their income or with firms that have costs a fraction of their own, whether in a newly integrated national or international market. When peoples's livelihoods are marginalized, they tend to react.

Polanyi recounts that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the reaction to the market took the form of either social democracy on the left or fascism on the right. National economies attempted to protect themselves from the swings of the global economy by raising tariffs in order to protect national consumption or by launching imperial conquests to expand national resources. The resulting rivalry produced, Polanyi continues, World War I, the Great Depression and its competitive devaluations, and eventually World War II. Liberal peace, prosperity, and democracy collapsed under the weight of heavy interdependence.

Globalization II

Following World War II, the allied leaders successfully rebuilt liberal interdependence, constructing a new way to mix together democracy and social stability. They developed a series of safety nets that would make people less vulnerable to the vagaries of the market both domestically and internationally. Rather than adjusting to an autarkic world of intense national competition (as in the 1930's) or letting trade and finance flow freely in response to market incentives (the nineteenth century); the capitalist democracies in the postwar period constructed the IMF, the GATT, and the World Bank to help regulate and consciously politically manage the shape of the world market economy. Trade was opened on a regulated basis, currencies were made convertible when economies could sustain the convertibility and cushioned with financing to help maintain parities. Long-term financing, a form of global Keynesianism, was provided first to Europe and then (in lesser amounts) to the developing countries in order to spread opportunity and reduce the conflicts between haves and have nots that had wracked the interwar period. All this helped promote stability, cooperation, and soldiarity in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union. Thus with a set of political-economic policies that have been called "embedded liberalism", the postwar leaders of the West found a way to manage the tensions that Polanyi had described, the dangers of marketization.[10]

It was good while it lasted, but by the 1980s, frustration with over-regulation, falling productivity and the oil shock, together with a demand for ever more profit and cheap goods produced a move back to marketization, the Thatcher-Reagan "magic of the marketplace". Reacting to the welfare state's restrictions on consumption and profit and seeking a more dynamic spur to industrial reallocation and profits, many of the protections embedded in the postwar political economy were relaxed. Increasing trade, floating exchange rates, and opening financial markets became the "Washington Consensus", the watchword of international economic orthodoxy and the standard prescription of the IMF.

As the barriers to global marketization fell, the forces that propelled ever closer interdependence accelerated. One force accelerating the effects of global marketization was advances in communication and transportation technology. The costs of transportation and communication began to fall radically in the postwar period. In 1930, the cost of a telephone call between New York and London was (in 1990 dollars) $245 for three minutes. By 1998, the same call cost 35¢: a vast reduction in the cost of communications. That and the related explosion of the Internet are what makes much of global banking and all of global academia possible. If we were still paying $245 for three minutes across the Atlantic, there would be less that we could afford to say.

The second force was trade. There has been a near revolution in the amount of trade tying the countries of the world together. Let me inflict a few figures on you. Even the US, which because of its continental scale is one of the less interdependent economies, has experienced a large change in the impact of trade. In 1910 (that is, during Globalization I), 11 per cent of US gross domestic product (GDP)

was in trade (exports and imports). By 1950, this fell to 9 per cent. That is what the Globalization I crisis – the Great Depression and the two world wars – was all about. But by 1995, trade had risen to 24 per cent. This is more than double the extent of interdependence in the previous era of globalization. In the Germany of 1910, 38 per cent of its GDP was in trade exports and imports. By 1950, this fell to 27 per cent; by 1995, up to 46 per cent. The UK, the leader of the first wave of globalization and the most globalized economy at the time, in 1910 had 44 per cent of its GDP in trade. In 1950, this dropped to 30 per cent. By 1995, 57 per cent was in exchangeables. Among the highly developed industrial economies, only Japan is less dependent upon trade and investment income than it was in 1910. It is the only major industrialized economy that is less globalized now than it was in 1910.

And if you think trade is globalizing the world, you should examine foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows of finance. Between 1980 and 1994, trade doubled; but in that same period, foreign direct investment grew six times, and portfolio flows of finance grew by nine times.

As in the earlier age of globalization, these flows of trade and finance are begining to change the operation of the world's political economy – altering what is profitable, what is politically sustainable, and what is not. Perhaps most strikingly from an economic point of view, the world now increasingly appears as one large market, a single division of labour. From the standpoint of the multinational company, production strategies are genuinely global, as parts of the production process are allocated to subsidiaries and contractors in countries or regions around the world where they are most cost-effective, forming a global process of production and marketing that is a highly interdependent whole at the global level. In the old global interdependence, cars and shoes were traded among many countries or even made in many countries by one company; now one company makes cars or shoes globally with component factories spread around the world.[11]

Challenges to liberal democratic peace

The new market interdependence poses three challenges to the liberal scheme of global democratic peace.

Commodification

The World Trade Organization meeting, and demonstrations in Seattle against it, demonstrate the first tradeoff, the tradeoff between globally regulated market prosperity and democracy. The tradeoffs are becoming more politically costly as interdependence increases. Politically, the democratic challenge was well put recently by Ed Mortimer (then *Financial Times* foreign editor) when he said that too much democracy kills the market (that's Polanyi's account of national and social democracy in reaction to Globalization I) and, on the other hand, too much market kills democracy (this is the threat some see posed by Globalization II). Commodities seem to rule citizens.

US environmentalists struggled for years in order to lobby for a US Endangered Species Act that protects turtles inadvertently caught in the course of the fishing for shrimp. It requires that shrimp nets be designed in a way that permits turtles to escape. The environmentalists struggled long and hard in order to pass the Bill, but they forgot that a new arena of interdependence had engendered a new arena of regulation. When the US government attempted to reduce the impact of the Bill on favoured allies, the WTO not surprisingly declared the effort discriminatory, and therefore illegal under international trade law.

In the European Union, many of its consumer advocates struggled for a campaign to protect European consumers from genetically engineered food – so called "Frankenfood". The WTO has yet to rule on this issue that pits American corporations against European food activists. Signs of more sympathy toward health regulation are recently in evidence in WTO decisions. But the WTO earlier ruled that bans against hormone treated food were a form of trade discrimination and illegal under international trade law.[12]

In a wider challenge, the developing countries have insisted upon the right not to be bound by the standards of labour safety, child labour prohibitions, and the minimum wages that hold within the industrialized world. They believe that it is only by taking advantage of their large supplies of talented, hard-working inexpensive labour that they will be able to develop their countries. But the US, responding to pressure from labour unions and human rights advocates, argued at Seattle that the US-level standards on labour rights and environmental protection be applied to all traded goods. This the developing countries see as a denial of their ability to choose their own development path. At the WTO in Seattle, moreover, the developing countries were outraged with the prevalence of so-called "green room" procedures under which the wealthy industrial countries caucus and decide how to manage the WTO. The developing country majority of the membership want much broader participation in order to avoid having rules imposed upon them that favour the industrialized market economies. National policymakers in the developing world thank the World Bank and IMF for the doors to development they open and for not as yet succumbing to the demands for increased global regulation made by the environmentalist protesters at Seattle and Washington.[13]

In each of these cases, globally regulated norms of non-discrimination – however efficient and fair from a global point of view – are eroding democratic, or at least national, accountability.

Inequality

The second challenge to democratization concerns both intra-national and international equality. Globalization allows for those who are most efficient to earn the most. That is what markets usually do. And as the barriers fall to global sales, production, and investment, inequality also tends to rise.

Let me give you some figures. Domestically in the US, beginning about 1975, the economic fates of the top 5 per cent and bottom 20 per cent of the US population substantially diverged. By 1995, the real family income of the top 5 per cent

stood at 130 per cent of the 1973 level, but over the same period, the real family income of the bottom 20 per cent stayed at the 1973 level.[14] Internationally, let us compare the OECD (the rich industrial economies) to the rest of the world and compare the 1970s to 1995. In 1970, the OECD enjoyed 66 per cent of global GDP. By 1978, its share was up to 68 per cent; in 1989, to 71 per cent; and in 1995, to 78 per cent. The rest of the entire world lived on the complement to that: their figures go from 34 per cent in 1970, sinking to 22 per cent in 1995. Increasing global inequality is associated with global marketization. The most productive are winning, accumulating wealth in their own hands. The consequences of globalization appear to be relatively depriving some in favour of others – the rising tide is not lifting all the boats at the same rate. Not surprisingly, demands for accountable control rise.

Security

The third challenge is security. Kantian liberalism produces security and peace (among the liberal republics). But globalization challenges the stability of liberal geopolitics in two ways. On the one hand, what Americans call *globalization* is what many others call *Americanization*. That is, the US's leading role within the world economy, which to Americans appears as an economic issue of dollars and cents, is to other countries a power issue, one fraught with control and guns. The other hand is that global rules for trade and investment have allowed China to benefit from its high savings rate and labour productivity, becoming one of the fastest growing economies in the world. If you add rapid growth to a large population (and if the World Bank projections are correct and if China continues to grow at recent past rates) then by the year 2020, China will have a GDP that is not only larger than that of the United States or Europe, but as big as them both together. From an economic point of view, the prospect of many more Chinese consumers and producers should make everyone content. But from a geopolitical point of view, China's growth entails a massive shift of world political power eastward. That makes the statesmen of the US and Europe nervous, especially if, referring again to the Kantian liberal argument, China has not democratized.

Responses

Those are some of the challenges. There have been a variety of responses of widely varying purpose and consequence. The key question that faces us today is whether and how the liberal equilibrium can be renovated, reincorporating a combined prospect of peace, prosperity and self-government.

Protectionism

Polanyi called this the "crustacean" strategy – one that reinforced the hard shell of the nation state. It focuses on each nation protecting itself from globalization. This is familiar to us. In the US, Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan made these kind of

arguments; in France, Jose Bove (the anti-McDonald's impresario); in Austria, Jorg Haider. Their themes are simple: "globalization is a threat to the cultural integrity and prosperity of many of us who are vulnerable, it is a threat to democracy, to our way of life. Let us build a thick shell".

In a much more sophisticated version, this is the heart of claims made by the organizers at Seattle. Lori Wallach, the chief organizer of the wide coalition that disrupted the WTO meeting, described her alternative to current globalization in this way: "There would be a global regime of rules that more than anything create the political space for the kinds of value decisions that mechanisms like the WTO now make, at a level where people living with the results can hold decision makers accountable".[15] Interdependence would then be made subject to reach of democratic accountability at the local level. This could lead to effective global rules for interdependence, but it is more likely to build national "shells". Apart from national non-discrimination (national treatment) provisions, each country would make its own rules for environmental standards, intellectual property, child labour, wages and have a right to bar any import that did not reflect those standards.

These movements may create democratic control and they may be good for national solidarity, but they could be very bad for overall national prosperity, as nation retaliates against nation for each restriction it finds unjustifiable. A recent study by a group of economists who are associated with the European Union estimates the possible benefits from the next Millennium Round of the WTO at $400 bn per year.[16] For many, whether rich or poor, that is too much extra world income to forego. If they are correct, there is a great deal to be lost if global trade suddenly starts closing down, or global investments start being drawn back.

National champions

A second strategy is also attractive to some. If protectionism is a "crustacean" strategy, we can extend Polanyi's aquatic metaphor, bringing into view "sea slug" strategies. The sea slug, a voracious and non-discriminating eater, consumes anything that is smaller than itself. This is the strategy of *national champions*. The nation state supports its own firms in order to compete to win more global sales and seeks to lure foreign firms, increasing shares of inward FDI for the national economy. The Clinton administration was very successful in persuading Saudi Arabia to buy just American aircraft, built by McDonnell/Boeing, headquartered in Seattle. The large sale included both F-15s and passenger airliners. It was very popular in the American Northwest. Not so popular in France (which also engages in the same practice) where Airbus was seen to be just as good a plane. Why did the Europeans not get the sale to Saudi Arabia? Many speculate that the US security relationship with the Gulf, and particularly the protection offered against the ambitions of Saddam Hussein, had much to do with the business deal. But, that does not make the French or other Europeans happy. Nor were Americans pleased when Quaddafi gave the contract to build the Mediterranean pipeline from Libya solely to a European consortium.

To the extent that states try to foster national champions or subsidize inward FDI to attract capital and jobs, they produce similar behaviour by other countries.

This may benefit international consumers. It may also lead to a "race to the bottom" with fewer and fewer environmental and labour standards, or increased international conflicts, as short-term prosperity is again pitted against long-run democratic autonomy.

Democratic solidarity

Let us turn to a third strategy, "democratic solidarity". Here statesmen seek to extend the liberal *political* peace into an economic arrangement. Forget about the rest of the world, let us build a stronger WTO for the democracies, a democratic WTO. (Bill Antholis, recently of National Security Council's economic staff, is writing a fascinating book on this topic.) Why not have a *democratic* WTO where we will solve our problems more easily than we would in a *global* WTO? If you look at the recent US trade bill extending "most favored nation" status to China and exempting it from annual reviews, one of the things that made it more difficult for the Administration to mobilize a Congressional majority is that China is regularly vulnerable to charges that it is threatening Taiwan with invasion and abusing its own nationals' human rights. If democracies limited their most extensive trade privileges to the area of fellow democracies, they would find progress toward further integration easier, or at least free from the baggage of political strife over human rights and security concerns. The problem, of course, is that such a 'democratic WTO' leaves China and other rapidly developing countries out. Excluding the potentially biggest, fastest growing economy in the world is not good for prosperity or for global cooperation on other issues. If you will pardon me for paraphrasing President Lyndon Johnson's apt reference to the higher logic of cooperating with an opponent, recall his words: "Do you want him inside the tent pissing out, or outside the tent pissing in?" That is the China problem. If China is not part of the WTO, it is very likely to cause an immense amount of strife in the world political economy and be absent from important efforts to curb pollution or stabilize East Asian rivalry.

Disaggregated cooperation

The fourth response is the most pragmatic of the hopeful responses. It is "disaggregated cooperation". Proponents urge us to break down the problem. Let's let the multinational corporations (MNCs) deal with other MNCs and markets solve as many of the problems as they can. State bureaucracies will scramble to keep up, doing less than may be ideal but enough to avoid catastrophe. Genetically engineered food may be sold with less controversy if the United States labels organic food and then lets consumers buy it or not as they wish. US organic food exports, having been certified, could be sold in Europe. Consumers, not governments, will decide; hopefully, depoliticizing the issue. Furthermore, courts will deal with courts, bureaucrats with bureaucrats, experts with experts. Take it out of politics and solve the problems pragmatically.[17]

Unfortunately, there are some problems that just are not pragmatic. For the environmental organization that worked so hard to reform the Endangered Species

Act in order to protect turtles, a turtle was not a technical question that they were willing to see negotiated away. It became a part of their own sense of identity, their own sense of moral worth, their sense of responsibility to the globe – not something that they would let the bureaucrats decide. And second, when things get tougher, that is when the world economy moves into the next recession, it will be more difficult to delegate to careful bureaucrats and their allegedly objective global criteria.

Global democratization

Responding to the concerns noted above, some have begun to wonder, "Don't we need some increased accountability, increased legitimacy, to contain and govern the practical negotiations among the experts? Don't we need to have norms that are more broadly shared, or even decisions that are legitimate because people across borders have participated in outlining their direction?"[18] We want expert pilots to fly the planes we ride in, but do we want them to choose our destinations?[19] We are thus concerned about the dangers of increasingly non-democratic control of key financial decisions.[20] For some it is now time for a global parliament or civic assembly, structured on the model of the European parliament in Strasbourg. That pillar of the burgeoning EU represents voters across Europe and operates through cross-national parties, not national delegations. Others hoped that the recent Millennium Assembly of the United Nations which provided a forum for non-governmental organizations from around the world, would take a first step in this direction.

Realistically, however, no strong version of global democracy is viable at the present time. We will not soon see global legislation deciding new regulatory standards for the global economy. Why not? Because global democracy is not about being willing to *win* democratically, it is about being willing to *lose* democratically. None of the popular advocates of increased democratization, whether in Seattle or Strasbourg or New Delhi, are willing to lose an issue and accept it because it went through a democratic process. The world is simply too unequal and too diverse. To give an example, the top one-fifth of the countries have 74 times the income of the bottom one-fifth of the countries, and it is getting worse. That is more than double the greatest degree of inequality within the most unequal domestic economy, the Brazilian economy, where the ratio between the top fifth and the bottom fifth is 32 to 1. More than double the Brazilian ratio, and yet Brazil itself has found its democratic processes repeatedly subject to extra-constitutional pressures.

With respect to culture, moreover, the globe falls far short of the preconditions of ordinary democracy. India, the largest and one of the most linguistically diverse democracies, has 81 per cent of its population describing itself as Hindu and an elite all of whom are fluent in English. That is a huge core of common identity that helps sustain the Indian democracy despite all of its diversity and internal dissention. There is no such core identity in the globe today. There is no single such identity (other than the thin identity of basic human dignity) to which 81 per cent of the world will subscribe.

Our primitive political global condition is reflected in disputes about the very meaning of global democracy. Is the world more democratic when the majority of nations decide, when the most populous nations decide, when only democratic nations participate, or when the majority of the world's people decide? Unfortunately, there is as yet no agreed meaning of "global democratization".

Therefore, I suggest that we must be more moderate in our democratizing ambitions. The role of global democratization should be limited to helping to develop norms. Not legislation, but deliberation over norms will make the process of cooperation among the bureaucrats easier, more readily achievable, more legitimate, less contested. We must be very modest because norms do not do that much work, usually. What they do, however, is make it easier for national politicians and international bureaucrats to cut pragmatic deals. Therefore, global democratization should be limited to endorsing measures such as those advocated in the Carlsson-Ramphal Commission, the *Global Neighborhood* report.[21] In addition to sending diplomats to the annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly, we should also send legislators. Every country can put five members in the General Assembly. At least two of them should be elected from the legislatures of their home countries. Bringing in the other branches of government, those somewhat more tied to the people, may help to begin to create a transmission belt between home and globe, fostering a more legitimate articulation of global standards at the international level. The hope is that these elected legislators will take the role seriously and participate actively in the annual general debate in the fall of each year and interject a sense of democratic legitimacy and accountability.

The second way to enhance global normative articulation is to bring in civil society. In 1955 there were fewer than 2,000 international non-governmental organizations; today there are more than 20,000.[22] None of them are genuinely democratic; their virtue is that they are voluntary and broad-based. But it is worth establishing an annual global forum that brings together representatives of global civil society, meeting the week before the General Assembly meets each year. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be invited from all over the world to discuss and issue recommendations about global standards for the environment, humanitarian intervention, international economic assistance and reforms of international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, or the United Nations itself.

Conclusion

These recommendations constitute far from a cure-all. Electing legislators from non-democratic legislatures to the UN does not enhance global democracy strikingly. Others will ask who elected the NGOs, for whom there is no internal process of democratic accountability to their members or to those whom their policies affect. But, merely that act of debating in a global forum about who is there legitimately and who is not – all in the same room, talking about global problems – will itself be a process which helps build global norms and gives more voice to those who will bear the consequences of globalization. This is far short of democratic

legitimation. In terms of democratic evolution, this represents much less than a modern equivalent of the meeting of the English barons at Runnymede in 1215, a cautious consultation far short of accountability. There will be mounting tension among prosperity, stability and accountability. Global interdependence will subject the liberal peace to increasing stress. But it can be the preliminary to increasingly responsible deliberation. And that may well be the best we can do in the world as it is today.

Notes

1 A version of this article was delivered as "The 2000 Welling Lecture" at George Washington University, on 9 March, 2000. I thank Monique Ramgoolie and Daniel H. Else for assistance. I am grateful for comments and discussion at a Millennium Seminar of GWU on 10 March, organized by Harry Harding, and for comments from William Antholis and Sophie Meunier.

2 Quoted from Martin Khor, "Take Care, the WTO Majority is Tired of Being Manipulated", *International Herald Tribune*, 21 December, 1999.

3 Joseph Stiglitz, "What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis", *The New Republic*, 17 April, 2000.

4 A similar debate engages the European Union. See, for example, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone (eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Jack Hayward (ed.), *The Crisis of Representation in Europe* (Ilford, UK: Frank Cass, 1995); and Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), *The New European Community* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).

5 See Michael Walzer's essay in *Dissent* (Fall, 2000).

6 I contributed a two-part essay to the elaboration of Kant's proposition ("Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Summer and Fall, 1983). The extensive debate is well presented in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. M. E. Brown *et al*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

7 For a discussion of the features of interdependence see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977).

8 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (New York: Beacon Press, 1980). Originally published in 1944.

9 The key theoretical contributions were made by Heckscher, Ohlin, Rybczynski, Stolper and Samuleson. For a non-technical survey, see John Williamson, *The Open Economy and the World Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), ch. 3.

10 See John Ruggie's "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order", *International Organization*, 36 (Spring, 1982), pp. 379–415.

11 Peter Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation State", *Foreign Affairs* (Sep/Oct, 1997) calls this "transnational strategy", p. 168. Marina Whitman, *New World, New Rules: The Changing Role of the American Corporation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1999) explores how American companies that were once stable, lumbering, globe-striding giants with paternalistic ties to their home communities have become lean, mean and footloose.

12 Sophie Meunier, "Globalization and the French Exception", *Foreign Affairs*, 79:4 (July/August, 2000).

13 Ambassador Francisco Aguirre-Sacassa, "A Debt of Thanks to the World Bank", *Financial Times*, 4 May, 2000.

14 Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 307. For global GDP comparisons, see Tahir Beg, "Globalization, Development and Debt-Management", *The Balance* (Spring 2000),

table 2, http://balanced-development.org/articles/globalization.html. (Web address correct at time of first publication.)

15 FP Interview, "Lori's War", *Foreign Policy*, 118, Spring 2000, p. 34.

16 http://www.europa.eu.int/commm/trade/2000_round/ecowtomr.htm (Web address correct at time of first publication.)

17 See Wolfgang Reinicke, *Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998) and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, 76:5 (September/October, 1997), pp. 183–97.

18 A good introduction to this issue is in Daniele Archibugi and David Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). For further discussion of cosmopolitan individual rights and democratic governance, see Thomas Pogge, "Creating Supra-National Institutions Democratically", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5:2 (June 1997), pp. 163–82, and Dennis Thompson, 'Democratic Theory and Global Society', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 7:2 (June 1999), pp. 1–15.

19 Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), ch. 5.

20 Sheri Berman and Kate McNamara, "Bank on Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, 78:2 (March/April, 1999), pp. 2–8.

21 Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal, *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Geneva: The Commission on Global Governance, 1995) [as seen at World Wide Web address http://www.cgg.ch/contents.htm] (Web address correct at time of first publication.)

22 Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (New York: UN, 2000), Figure 13, p. 70.

9　A few words on Mill, Walzer, and nonintervention*

> *There is a country in Europe . . . whose foreign policy is to let other nations alone. . . . Any attempt it makes to exert influence over them, even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others, than itself: to mediate in the quarrels which break out between foreign states, to arrest obstinate civil wars, to reconcile belligerents, to intercede for mild treatment of the vanquished, or finally, to procure the abandonment of some national crime and scandal to humanity such as the slave trade.*
> (John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention")

> *States can be invaded and wars justly begun to assist secessionist movements (once they have demonstrated their representative character) to balance the prior interventions of other powers, and to rescue people threatened with massacres . . . because [these actions] uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an expression.*
> (Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*)

Nonintervention has been a particularly important and occasionally disturbing principle for liberal scholars, such as John Stuart Mill and Michael Walzer, who share a commitment to basic and universal human rights.[1] On the one hand, liberals have provided some of the strongest reasons to abide by a strict form of the nonintervention doctrine. It was only with the security of national borders that peoples could work out the capacity to govern themselves as free citizens. On the other hand, those very same principles of universal human dignity when applied in different contexts have provided justifications for overriding or disregarding the principle of nonintervention.

In explaining this dual logic I present an interpretive summary of Mill's famous argument against and for intervention, presented in his "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" (1859), that illustrates what makes Mill's "few words" both so attractive and alarming to us. We should be drawn to Mill's arguments because he is among the first to address the conundrums of modern intervention. The modern conscience tries simultaneously to adhere to three contradictory principles: first, the cosmopolitan, humanitarian commitment to assistance, irrespective of international borders; second, respect for the significance of communitarian, national self-determination; and, third, accommodation to the reality of international anarchy,

which puts a premium on self-help national security. I stress, more than has been conventional, the consequentialist character of the ethics of both nonintervention and intervention. It makes a difference whether we think that an intervention will do more good than harm, and some of the factors that determine the outcome are matters of strategy and institutional choice. I also engage in a one-sided debate with Mill as I explore the significance of the many historical examples he employs to support his argument. Do they really support his conclusions? *Could* they, given what he knew or should have known? Given what we now think we know? My conclusion is that, persuasive as the moral logic of his argument for liberal intervention sometimes is, the actual histories of the cases he cites actually tend to favor a bias toward nonintervention – that is, against overriding or disregarding nonintervention. That said, enough of his argument survives to warrant a firm rejection of strict noninterventionism.[2]

Principles of nonintervention and intervention have been justified in various ways. In international law, "intervention" is not *any* interference but, according to Lassa Oppenheim, the influential late-nineteenth-century international legal scholar, it is "dictatorial interference" in the political independence and territorial integrity of a sovereign state. No single treaty has codified principles underlying this prohibition, and customary international law, while condemning intervention, contains numerous but contested exceptions.[3] Relevant principles in the just war tradition have been proposed by scholars, by politicians, and by citizens who have sought to provide good reasons why one should abide by these conventional principles of classic international law and good reasons why one should, on some occasions, breach them.[4]

Mill made one of the most persuasive (though far from the first) contributions to this ongoing debate. And Michael Walzer has modernized, limited, and deepened three of Mill's most important arguments. Comparing Mill's "Non-Intervention" and Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977) links two classic statements on just wars of intervention. Both are rooted in the liberal tradition that values freedom and equality and holds that those values should enter into foreign policy. Liberals tend to reject the moral skepticism of the realists that prioritizes the quest for power as the essential aim of statecraft.[5] But liberals also differ among themselves. Liberals supporting intervention fall into various camps. Some – strong cosmopolitans – hold that the rights of cosmopolitan freedom are valuable everywhere for all people. Any violation of these rights should be resisted whenever and wherever such violation occurs, provided that we can do so proportionally, without causing more harm than we seek to avoid.[6] But other liberals – and here we include Mill and Walzer, both often labeled as communitarians – limit the cases that justify intervention. Significantly, Mill argues for much more intervention than Walzer accepts. Both, however, start with nonintervention as the default position.

Underlying principles

John Stuart Mill developed the core of a modern understanding of human dignity as "autonomy" and its implications for hard political choices. He saw humans as fundamentally equal, sentient beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain.

Our natural sympathy should thus lead us to choose acts and rules that maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest number. But – an important qualification – he wanted to constrain this maximization of utility by prioritizing both the freedom to lead unrestricted lives (as long as those life plans did not harm the freedom of others) and the realization that not all pleasures and pains were equal. Some pleasures were higher, some lower. Some expressed human creativity, others did not. Poetry was better than "pushpin."[7]

Michael Walzer starts from a less foundational premise when he discusses rights and duties, one that looks at the practices of political communities and encompasses a wide set of varying spheres in which "complex equality" principles of justice apply differently to different goods.[8] Nonetheless, resting his arguments on consent, he arrives at liberal principles of basic human rights that shape both domestic and international policy.

Politically, both Mill and Walzer defend two ideal principles. The first is maximum equal liberty, allowing each adult to develop his or her own potentiality on the view that each individual is the best judge of what is and is not in his or her interest, so long, however, as no one interferes with the equal liberty of others. When public regulation is necessary, the second principle, representative government, should govern. To maximize effective consent and the utility of collective decisions it would be best to give decisive weight to the preferences of the majority, as represented by knowledgeable politicians.[9]

Internationally, one might think that these principles would give rise to a commitment to an international version of the U.S. Constitution's "Guarantee Clause" (Article 4, Section 4), in which each state is guaranteed (that is, required to have) a republican representative form of government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in which all states are required to provide equal protection of the laws to all persons. But neither for Mill nor for Walzer is this so. Instead, they argue against that kind of a global guarantee, drawing thereby an important line between domestic and international justice.

Arguments against intervention have taken the form of both direct principles and indirect (or procedural) considerations. Like many liberals, Mill dismissed without much attention some realist arguments in favor of intervention to promote "territory or revenue" in order to enhance national power, prestige, or profits. However prevalent those motives have been in history, they lack moral significance, as, Mill noted, do justifications associated with some liberal or socialist arguments that favor intervening to promote an idea or ideology.[10] War and intervention, according to Mill, has to be justified by morally relevant reasons of self-defense or beneficence.

The most important *direct* consideration for liberals was that nonintervention reflected and protected human dignity. Nonintervention allowed citizens to determine their own way of life without outside interference. If democratic rights and liberal freedoms were to mean something, they had to be worked out among those who shared them and were making them through their own participation. Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1795) had earlier made a strong case for respecting the right of nonintervention because it afforded a polity the necessary territorial space and political independence in which free and equal citizens could

work out what their own way of life would be.[11] For Mill, intervention avowedly to help others actually undermines the authenticity of domestic struggles for liberty. First, a free government achieved by means of intervention would not be authentic or self-determining but determined by others, and not one that local citizens had themselves defined through their own deliberations and actions. "But the evil [of intervention]," Mill declares, "is, that if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own, will have nothing *real*, . . ."[12]

Mill provides a second powerful direct argument for nonintervention, one focusing on likely consequences, when he explains in his famous 1859 essay that it would be a great mistake to export freedom to a foreign people that was not in a position to win it on its own. In addition to not being "real," forcibly imported freedom would have "nothing *permanent*" to it.[13] A people given freedom by a foreign intervention would not, he argued, be able to hold on to it. Connecting *permanence* to *reality*, he notes that it is only by winning and holding on to freedom through local effort that one acquires a true sense of its value. Moreover, it is only by winning the "arduous struggle" for freedom that one acquires the political capacities to defend it adequately against threats of foreign invasion or domestic suppression, whether by force or subtle manipulation.[14] The struggle made self-determination a reality and sustainable by mobilizing citizens into what could become a national army capable of guarding the frontiers and into a citizenry willing to tax themselves to sustain a state.

If, on the other hand, liberal government were to be introduced into a foreign society, in the "knapsack" (so to speak) of a conquering liberal army, the local liberals placed in power would find themselves immediately in a difficult situation. Not having been able to win political power on their own, they would have few domestic supporters and many nonliberal domestic enemies. They then would wind up doing one of three things:

1   Begin to rule as did previous governments – that is, by repressing their opposition and acting to "speedily put an end to all popular institutions."[15] The intervention would have done no good; it simply would have created another oppressive government.
2   Simply collapse in an ensuing civil war. Intervention, therefore, would have produced not freedom and progress, but a civil war with all its attendant violence.
3   Become dependent on interveners who would continually have to send in foreign support. Rather than having established a free government, one that reflected the participation of the citizens of the state, the intervention would have created a puppet government, one reflecting the wills and interests of the intervening state.

A third argument against intervention points to the difficulties of transparency or uncertainty. Historically, it has proven difficult to identify authentic "freedom fighters." Particular national regimes of liberty and oppression are difficult for foreigners to "unpack." They often reflect complicated historical compromises –

contracts of a Burkean sort among the dead, the living, and the yet to be born. Michael Walzer acknowledges, as did Mill, that sovereignty and the legitimacy of intervention ultimately depend upon the consent of those intervened against (or as Mill says, are subject to "their own spontaneous election"[16]). If the people welcome an intervention, then, Walzer adds, "it would be odd to accuse them [the interveners] of any crime at all."[17] But we cannot make those judgments reliably in advance, either because our information is incomplete or because the case is complicated by competing reasonable claims to justice. We should assume, Walzer suggests, that foreigners *will* be resisted, that nationals will protect their state from foreign aggression. For even if the state is unjust, it is their state, not ours. We have no standing to decide what their state should be. We do not happen to be engaged full-time, as they are, in the national historical project of creating it. Not every injustice that justifies a domestic revolution justifies a foreign intervention.

Fourth, the necessarily "dirty hands" of violent means often become "dangerous hands" in international interventions.[18] International history is rife with interventions justified by high-sounding principles – ending the slave trade or suttee or introducing law and order and civilized behavior – turning into self-serving, imperialist "rescues" in which the intervener stays to profit and control. Requiring that the intervener govern its actions according to the interests of the intervened, looking for something more than a unilateral decision, and respecting the multilateral processes of international law – these are important procedural considerations in weighing the justice of an intervention.

Fifth, almost all commentators in the just war tradition posit that just interventions may not violate the principles of proportionality and last resort. Villages should not be destroyed in order to be saved, and negotiation should be tried before forcible means are adopted.

Indirect reasons for nonintervention have also been important constraints. Interventions foster militarism, expend resources needed for other national and international goals, and violate international law. International laws embody the value of coordination and consensual legitimacy, for rules – almost any rules – have a value in themselves by helping to avoid unintended clashes with severe consequence to human life. International laws, moreover, are painstakingly achieved compromises among diverse moralities. The mere process of achieving consent makes them legitimate. They were agreed upon and *pacta sunt servanda*.[19]

Despite their commitment to nonintervention, both Mill and Walzer identify exceptional circumstances that justify intervention. Mill identifies seven; Walzer, three. Some cases involve reasons to override the nonintervention principle; others, to disregard the principle. In the first, the principles in favor of nonintervention still hold, but other considerations seem more important. In the second, the presuppositions underlying the principles do not apply to the particular case.

Exceptions that override

Mill argued that there are three good reasons to override what should be the usual prohibition against intervention. In these arguments the considerations against

intervention are present, but other more important values, "considerations para-
mount," as Mill says, trump them.[20]

   First, Mill noted, "We must except, of course, any case in which such assistance
is a measure of legitimate self-defense."[21] Acknowledging the primacy of self-help
in an anarchic international system, just war philosophers and international lawyers
typically raise the difficult cases of intervention to enforce the rights of nationals
or rescue them from unjust imprisonment (for example, the Don Pacifico Affair in
the nineteenth century; more recently, the 1976 rescue of the Israeli airliner at
Entebbe), or preemptive or preventive interventions designed to remove a looming
threat before an attack takes place. But Mill, in the "Few Words" essay, focuses on
a less familiar case: international civil war. In an international-system – wide war
that is also an international *civil* war, such as that waged between Protestantism
and Catholicism in the sixteenth century, or liberalism and despotism in Mill's era,
nonintervention can neglect vital transnational sources of national security. "If . . .
this country [Great Britain], on account of its freedom, should find itself menaced
with attack by a coalition of Continental despots, it ought to consider the popular
party in every nation of the Continent as its natural ally: the Liberals should be to
it, what the Protestants of Europe were to the Government of Queen Elizabeth."[22]
In the extreme case, if other governments are aligning with their ideological
fellows overseas, irrespective of collective national interests or interstate borders,
then not intervening in support of yours is dangerous.

   This kind of logic led Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, the ambassador of Elizabeth
I to France, to advocate intervention in support of fellow Protestants by warning:
"Now when the general design is to exterminate all nations dissenting with them
in religion . . . what will become of us, when the like professors [co-religionists]
with us shall be destroyed in Flanders and France."[23] It also resonates in twentieth-
century Cold War logic, and neatly matches the rhetoric of the Brezhnev Doctrine
and the Reagan Doctrine. The latter pledged, "We must not break faith with those
who are risking their lives . . . on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua
. . . to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours since birth.
Support for freedom fighters is self-defense." Reagan thus adds "rollback" to the
original "containment" of the Truman Doctrine.[24]

   In practice, the early Cold War witnessed covert actions by the United States in
Albania and China, and Soviet efforts to control local communist parties in Europe
and elsewhere. Reagan and Brezhnev practiced their doctrines in Nicaragua and
Czechoslovakia, respectively.[25] But the exceptions to Cold War interventionism
were at least as important. These included the West's support for Tito's Yugoslavia
and the East's support for Third World nationalists, such as India's Nehru and
Egypt's Nasser, not to speak of the effective combination of East–West détente
with the "triangulation" effort devised by the Nixon administration to exploit the
Chinese split from the Soviets in the 1970s.

   Even during the polarizing religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, we should recall the lesson that Queen Elizabeth learned from the disas-
trous 1562–63 armed expedition to "Newhaven" (today Le Havre, in Normandy,
France). In 1559 she had successfully intervened to roll back the Catholic threat

Table 9.1 Cases for intervention: Mill and Walzer

| | *J.S. Mill's cases favouring intervention* | | | *Disregarding* | | | |
	Overriding			*Walzer's cases for intervention*			
Case	Legitimate self-defense	Post-war standing menace	Forcible mediation of a protracted civil war	Self-determination secession	Counter intervention	Humanitarian intervention	Benign imperialism
Mill's examples	Sixteenth-Century Protestant–Catholic Wars; Nineteenth-century "Liberals vs. Despots"	Napoleon; Reconstruction in U.S. South	Portugal, mid-nineteenth century	Greece from Turkey, 1821–31; Belgium from Holland, 1830–31; Hungary from Austria 1848–49	Against Russia's intervention in Austria–Hungary, 1848–49	Mill's "severities repugnant to humanity"	Oude, India (now Awadh)
Walzer's and other contemporary examples considered	Cold War; Brezhnev and Reagan Doctrines	Occupations of Germany and Japan	UN peace enforcement and peacekeeping	Hungary, 1956; Kosovo; East Timor; South Ossetia	Vietnam	Cuba, 1898; India–Bangladesh, 1971; Tanzania–Uganda, 1978–79	Chapter VII, mandates in peace enforcement

in Scotland by sending troops to assist the more powerful faction of Scottish Protestant lords who were struggling against a regime sustained by French forces. When her more radical advisers pressed her to do the same in France, she reluctantly agreed to intervene in support of the French Protestant nobles in Normandy, only to see them defect to a better deal with their own monarch.[26] She thus learned to limit intervention to matters and territories of vital necessity (Scotland and preserving the independence of the Low Countries), and to armed action only with the support of strong local allies. She also developed a policy of alternately aligning with Spain and France, and successfully played them against each other.[27] A half century later Cardinal Richelieu wisely aligned with the Protestant principalities that would support France against the Holy Roman Empire and Catholic Spain, which were its greatest threats.

Thus, consistent as the logic of ideology-based intervention in internationalized civil war is, probing the actual examples suggests that Mill should want to adopt a bias toward more essential conceptions of "legitimate self-defense." These kinds of interventions should be limited to vital national security and to cases where strong overseas allies can reduce the costs.

Second, Mill argues that following a successful defensive war against an aggressive despot, the liberal victor, rather than halting his armed forces at the restored border, can intervene to remove a "perpetual" or at least standing "menace" to peace, whether a person or a regime.[28] Mill's implicit reference was the sending of Napoleon to Elba, off the Italian coast, and later, after Waterloo and as if to prove the point, to St. Helena, far in the South Atlantic. Reconstruction in the U.S. South might also be seen to draw inspiration from these considerations. Indeed, in that case Mill later explicitly noted the need not just to remove Jefferson Davis from office but to "break altogether the power of the slaveholding caste" so that they did not "remain masters of the State legislatures [where] they will be able effectually to nullify a great part of the result which have been so dearly bought by the blood of the Free States."[29]

In modern times the relevant reference is "de-Nazification" in Germany following World War II and the breaking up of the imperial principle, the militarist faction, and the *zaibatsu* in Japan. The Allies clearly had a right to end German and Japanese aggression and drive their armies back to their borders. But could they reform Germany and Japan? And, if they could, what, asks Walzer, should the victors and vanquished pay to guarantee reliable security?[30] When should the victors relinquish the goals of unconditional surrender and pacific reconstruction in order to avoid further death among the vanquished, as well as the (soon to be) victors, that a campaign for total conquest will inevitably cost?

Walzer sharpens this dilemma, without (to my mind) fully resolving it. Should a negotiated arrangement have been struck with Nazi Germany, had it been willing to surrender to the Western Allies? The special nature of the evil of Nazism makes it apparent that this was not a deal Walzer would have wanted made, even to save the lives of many Allied soldiers and noncombatant Germans that the invasion of the German homeland consumed. Walzer does not address directly the Millian argument that an aggressive leader or regime could be removed by outside forces.

He would have preferred a German revolution that toppled Nazism, with which the Allies could then have made peace. But he also argues that the Nazi leaders should have been tried and punished, and that, lacking a German revolution, the occupation of Germany was necessary to achieve this. For Walzer, the Nuremberg trials should have been an act of "collective abhorrence" for their crimes, rather than an act to prevent future aggression.[31] But that might have limited the occupation of Germany solely to conducting the trials.

An even harder case is Japan. Walzer argues that Japan's government should have been accommodated and that therefore Hiroshima and Nagasaki were two bombs too many (especially coming on top of the also unjustified firebombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities, which violated *jus in bello* restrictions on attacking noncombatants). Unfortunately, Walzer's preference for a negotiated settlement would have required compromise from both the Japanese and the Americans. The United States failed to introduce flexibility into the meaning of the Potsdam terms early enough. But whereas Walzer sees the two bombs as too many, in fact they were barely adequate for their purpose, if their purpose was the surrender of Japan on terms likely to make a lasting peace. Ultimately, the victors conceded the emperor, but they demanded the authority to reconstruct Japan. It is not at all clear that the War Cabinet would have accepted this deal without the shock of the two bombs, and it has been argued that the threat of even more atomic bombs helped turn the tide toward a negotiated surrender.[32]

Leaving Japan in the hands of the same militarists who launched the conquest of Asia would indeed have been unwise. Clearly, negotiation should have been tried earlier. But were there also other, less unjust, means of coercing the Japanese War Cabinet into a sufficiently complete surrender that would have permitted political reconstruction? Would a demonstration detonation have worked? What about a protracted naval blockade that prohibited Japan access to any goods other than food and medicine necessary for survival? Neither of these looked promising at the time (the looming competition with the Soviet Union also colored U.S. estimations of how to end the war); but in retrospect both seem to have been worth further exploration.

Mill's third exception, and one pertinent for today's debates on multilateral mediation and peacekeeping,[33] covers a "protracted civil war, in which the contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country."[34] Here, Mill argues that some civil wars become so protracted and so seemingly irresolvable by local struggle that a common sense of humanity and sympathy for the suffering of the noncombatant population calls for an outside intervention to halt the fighting in order to see if some negotiated solution might be achieved under the aegis of foreign arms. Specifically, he cites the at least partial success of outsiders in calling a halt to and helping settle the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire and the protracted mid-nineteenth-century Portuguese civil war.

In such circumstances outsiders can call for separation or reconciliation. In some cases, two peoples contending a single territory have been forced to separate

and partition it. Greece was thus separated from Turkey. In 1830, Belgium was separated from Holland following the forceful mediation of two liberal statesmen, one British, one French – Palmerston and Guizot.[35] In others, two factions struggling to control and reform a single state, each in order to fulfill their own visions, have been forced to reconcile and share the territory.

Impartial mediation imposed power-sharing reconciliation without separation – the "equitable terms of compromise" insisted upon by Mill – on the Portuguese factions. This produced two generations of peace among the contesting factions under the rules of King Pedro (1853–61) and King Luis (1861–69). H. V. Livermore, one of the leading historians of Portugal, described the political scene in the first half of the century during the reign of Queen Maria as follows: "There were now three main currents of opinion in Portugal: absolutist, moderate and radical. Each had its constitutional and institutional preferences: the absolutists stood for no written constitution and the traditional *cortes*, summoned and not elected; the Chartist moderates for an *octroye* charter and a parliament of two houses; the Septembrist radicals for the constitution of 1822 and a *cortes* of a single chamber."[36] Britain intervened in 1827 with a naval force, but only (Prime Minister Canning claimed) for the sake of "nonintervention," in order to deter a right-wing intervention supported from Spain.

The intervention that Mill appears to have had in mind took place in 1846. Portuguese politics by then had split between the last two groups of liberals, the Chartists and the Septembrists – one "moderate" and pro-monarchical, the other "radical" and pro-constitutionalist. In the 1830s, Britain supported Queen Maria and her monarchist ministers. When the Septembrist constitutionalists took up arms, Palmerston (then foreign secretary) was cross-pressured between his ideological preference for the constitutionalists and Britain's established relationship with the monarchists. When France and Spain also agitated for intervention (on various sides), Palmerston sent Colonel Wylde as a special envoy to exercise what Palmerston called "a perspective of force" that involved pressuring them both and eventually led to a joint Anglo-Spanish armed force that cornered the recalcitrant Septembrists in Oporto. Palmerston required the queen to restore the constitution and civil liberties and deal with the constitutionalist rebels indulgently, and the rebels to lay down their arms.[37] It looked "ill at the commencement," Mill commented, but "it could be justified by the event . . . a really healing measure."[38]

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to credit the 1846 intervention with either so much of, or so unequivocal, a benefit. The intervention may have been necessary, but it was far from sufficient to launch Portugal on a path of genuine peace-building. The decisive impetus for "healing measures" was less the compromise of 1846 than the (unpredictable) reform led by the wise and industrious King Pedro, who (a child in 1846) succeeded his mother in 1853. During his short reign (he died of cholera in 1861), Pedro helped construct a political center that served as the foundation for more extensive administrative reforms and the launching pad for an ambitious program of road and rail construction that began the economic modernization of the countryside.[39] Still, beneficent as that outcome was, England remained a constant presence, promoting the interests of British merchants in

Portugal, bullying the Portuguese overseas when Britain's trade and colonial interests required interference, and, overall, limiting the effective sovereignty of Portugal. Better forcible mediations thus seem to require peacebuilding follow-through, focused on development and sovereignty.

Exceptions that disregard

While some external considerations thus call for *overriding* nonintervention, there are other injustices that justify *disregarding* the prohibition against intervention. Sometimes the national self-determination that nonintervention is designed to protect is so clearly undermined by the domestic oppression and suffering that the principle should simply be disregarded. In these circumstances, the local government in effect loses its claim to rule as the representative of a singular national authority. The reasons for nonintervention, Mill then claims, should be disregarded because they operate in "an opposite way," "the reasons themselves do not exist," and intervention "does not disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent maintenance of freedom in a country depends."[40]

Building on Mill's essay, Walzer now reengages the Millian argument and discusses three cases where an intervention serves the underlying purposes that nonintervention was designed to uphold.[41] The first is when too many nations contest one piece of territory. When an imperial government opposes the independence of a subordinate nation or when there are two distinct peoples, one attempting to crush the other, then *national* self-determination cannot be a reason to shun intervention. What is missing is the "one" nation. Here foreigners can intervene to help the liberation of the oppressed people, once that people has demonstrated through its own "arduous struggle" that it truly is another nation. In such cases Mill adopts the principle of decolonialization, allowing a people to form its own state and shape its own destiny. One model of this might be the American Revolution against Britain; another in Mill's time was the 1848–49 Hungarian rebellion against Austria.[42] In another Hungarian case that Walzer considers, Hungary's 1956 rebellion against the Soviet empire, he warns that proportionality considerations also must be taken into account and that they rightly deterred effective assistance that might have escalated to World War Three.[43] Statespersons have long been hard-pressed to identify reliably when a people is truly a people and to recognize consistently what steps are needed to prove a nation's fitness for independence and justify foreign assistance. The many anticolonial movements in Africa and Asia and the secession of East Timor from Indonesia and Kosovo from Serbia seem to fit well into this category, but each also illustrates how much considerations of proportionality and necessity enter into the judgment of whether the particular secession warrants international support.

The second instance in which the principle against intervention should be disregarded is counter-intervention in a civil war. Generally, a civil war should be left to the combatants. When conflicting factions of one people are struggling to define what sort of society and government should rule, only *that struggle* should decide

the outcomes, not foreigners. But when an external power intervenes on behalf of one of the participants in a civil war, then another foreign power can, in Mill's words, "re-dress the balance" – that is, counter-intervene to balance the first intervention. This second intervention serves the purposes of self-determination, which the first intervention sought to undermine. Even if, Mill argued, the Hungarian rebellion was not clearly a national rebellion against "a foreign yoke," it was certainly the case that Russia should not have intervened to assist Austria in its suppression. By doing so, Russia gave others a right to counter-intervene: if "Russia gave assistance to the wrong side, England would aid the right."[44] Following Mill, Walzer explores the Hungarian case and then extends the discussion into the Vietnam interventions of the 1960s (the Americans and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam). Here he bolsters Mill's conclusions on the importance of ensuring that foreign intervention or counter-intervention does not overwhelm the local struggle, the only legitimate determinant of who should govern.[45]

Third, one can intervene for humanitarian purposes – to halt what appears to be a gross violation of the rights to survival of a population. When we see a pattern of massacres, the development of a campaign of genocide, the institutionalization of slavery – violations that are so horrendous that in the classical phrase repeated by Walzer they "shock the moral conscience of mankind" – one has good ground to question whether there is any national connection between the population and the state that is so brutally oppressing it. In discussing protracted civil wars in his "Non-Intervention" essay, Mill has already given "severities repugnant to humanity" as closely related humanitarian reasons to forcibly mediate a civil war. And humanitarian motives also arise in the next case for intervention, against the uncivilized "barbarians." But, lacking the advantages of a twentieth-century perspective, Mill does not directly consider the case of an established, civilized government turning to massacre its own subjects or appear to understand how barbaric the thoroughly civilized can be.

Walzer, adding to Mill, argues that humanitarian intervention is different from intervening in a civil war, which also involves much suffering, for here the government may be in altogether too much control. But Walzer makes a good case that a disregarding logic should apply. Outsiders can intervene, but the intervener should have a morally defensible motive and share the purpose of ending the slaughter and establishing a self-determining people. Furthermore, interveners should act only as a "last resort," after exploring peaceful resolution. They should then act only when it is clear that they will save more lives than the intervention itself will almost inevitably wind up costing, and even then with minimum necessary force. Humanitarian motives have often been exploited, as Walzer shows they were in the U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1898. But even though often abused, those motives can apply in a reasonable case. Such was the Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971, designed in part to save the people of what became Bangladesh from the massacre that was being inflicted upon them by their own government (in West Pakistan). Despite India's mixed motives, this was a case of legitimate humanitarian intervention.[46] In more recent times, intervention in Rwanda in 1994 could have been justified in these terms.

Today, Mill's most controversial case of disregard would be benign colonialism. His principles of nonintervention only hold among "civilized" nations. "Uncivilized" peoples, among whom Mill dumps most of Africa and Asia, are not fit for the principle of nonintervention.[47] Like "Oude" (now Awadh, in India), which he references, they suffer four debilitating infirmities – despotism, anarchy, amoral presentism, and familism – that make them incapable of self-determination. The people are imposed upon by a "despot . . . so oppressive and extortionate as to devastate the country." Despotism long endured has produced anarchy character-ized by "such a state of nerveless imbecility that everyone subject to their will, who had not the means of defending himself by his own armed followers, was the prey of anybody who had a band of ruffians in his pay."[48] The people as a result deterio-rate into amoral presentism in which present gratification overwhelms the future and no contracts can be relied upon. Moral duties extend no further than the family; national or civic identity is altogether absent.

No civilized government, Mill adds, can maintain a stable relationship with these uncivilized societies. "In the first place, the rules of ordinary morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate." And, second, these "nations have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners."[49] In these circum-stances, Mill claims, the best that can happen for the population is a benign colo-nialism, such as he recommended during the annexation of Awadh in 1857. Normal interstate relations cannot be maintained in such an anarchic and lawless environment. The most a well-intentioned foreigner owes these peoples is paternal care and education.

It is important to note that Mill advocates neither exploitation nor racialist domination. Indeed, as Mark Tunick has to my mind persuasively argued, the imperialism Mill recommends is in many respects "tolerant," neither totalitarian nor racist.[50] Instead, it is grounded in the principles of human dignity that also ground his view of just relations among "civilized" states. Significantly, Mill applies the same reasoning to once primitive northern Europeans who benefited from the imperial rule imposed by civilized Romans. Unlike the paternalism of his father, James Mill, and other imperial liberals, Mill's educative imperialism does not require conversion to Christianity, nor does it call for the adoption of English culture – only the cultivation of the ethos of the rule of law and the material sciences that are needed for economic progress. The duties of paternal care, more-over, are real, precluding oppression and exploitation and requiring care and education designed to one day outfit the colonized people for independent national existence.

Nonetheless, the argument also rests on what appear to be wildly distorted read-ings of the history and culture of Africa and Asia. Ancient cultures embodying a deep sense of social obligation made nonsense of presentism and familism.[51] But anarchy, corruption, and despotic oppression did afflict many of the peoples in these regions. Two current experts, Rudrangshu Mukherjee and T. R. Metcalf, agree with Mill's indictment of the nawabs (rulers) of Awadh, who "abandoned the attempt to govern . . . and amused themselves with wine, women and poetry."[52]

Sources contemporary to Mill, including the Treaty of 1837, negotiated but never ratified between Awadh and Britain, warned that if "gross and systematic oppression, anarchy and misrule" continued, the nawab's land would be seized.[53]

More significantly, while Mill's treatment does convey Britain's responsibility for some of the misrule and consequent responsibility (in Mill's judgment) to redress it, Mill does not seem able to parcel out the responsibilities of the shared causation he does acknowledge, including the responsibility not to contribute to the weakening that later justifies imperial rule.[54] Awadh's condition was very much a product of the irresponsible dependent condition to which the nawabs had been reduced by the Treaty of 1801. That treaty established the British protectorate, for which Awadh paid a heavy subsidy to the East India Company and guaranteed unfettered access for British merchants to Awadh's markets. The nawabs soon found themselves without local authority (usurped by the British resident ambassador), incapable of fostering native industry, and responsible for seventy-six lacs of rupees ($3.8 million in 1856 dollars) in annual tribute to Britain. If Awadh's misrule was partly occasioned by the harms inflicted by British rule, Britain may have had the obligation to correct it that Mill notes, but it also had an obligation not to (partly) cause it in the first place and use the misrule as a justification for annexation.[55]

Mill thus admits that the anarchy of Awadh was partly "morally accountable" to British rule, and that this was known to be the case "by men who knew it well."[56] But what he does not mention is that *he* was the responsible official under the Court of Directors of the East India Company charged with the oversight of the company's relations with the Indian princely states including Awadh. Indeed, Awadh was his first (beginning in 1828) and continuing assignment in the London headquarters of the East India Company.[57]

Shorn of its cultural "Orientalism," Mill's argument for trusteeship addresses one serious gap in strategies of humanitarian assistance: the devastations that cannot be readily redressed by a quick in-and-out intervention designed to liberate an oppressed people from the clutches of foreign oppression or a domestic genocide.[58] Nonetheless, interveners have a special obligation to consider how one can prevent benign trusteeship from becoming malign imperialism, particularly when one recalls the flowery words and humanitarian intentions that accompanied the conquests of Asia and Africa. Just how far are the humanitarian Anti-Slavery Campaign and the Aborigine Rights Protection Society from the exploitation of King Leopold's Congo and Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*?

Conclusion

John Stuart Mill sketched a powerful moral geography of when and when not to intervene, advancing seven circumstances that would favor overriding or disregarding nonintervention. Michael Walzer limited the circumstances to three, which he deepened and developed. Their arguments for ethical intervention are ones that no international moralist who subscribes to principles of beneficence, self-determination, and national security can neglect.

Compared to Walzer, who supports intervention in very limited circumstances, Mill makes a reasonable case that nonintervention should be overridden both to prevent the recurrence of aggressive war and to end protracted civil wars. Moreover, from a twenty-first-century perspective, we can add that the interdependencies of globalization seem to make these two reasons even more persuasive than they were in the nineteenth century, if only because we both see and experience the effects of ever more lethal wars. But the more extensive list of examples Mill invokes reveals more complexity than he recounts, and in each case that complexity argues against the interventionist conclusions he reaches. Internationalized civil wars tend to display less ideological consistency than would justify ideological solidarity. Reconstructive occupations raise material and moral costs that may not be worth incurring for a marginal gain in long-run security. Successful coercive mediation in protracted civil wars depends both on the local balance of forces and well-designed peace-building operations. National liberations, counter-interventions, and humanitarian interventions also raise problems and require clearer doctrines than we now have. The case for imperial annexation is made problematic because local anarchy is rooted in ills inflicted as much by previous informal interference as by local "barbarism."

In short, interventionist arguments should go beyond the three paradigmatic cases Walzer explores in *Just and Unjust Wars*. But while they can draw on Mill's "Non-Intervention," they need to offer a more convincing set of criteria for when such interventions are likely to do more good than harm.

Notes

1 Citations to the 1859 "Non-Intervention" essay are to John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in *Essays on Politics and Culture*, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 368–84. Citations to Walzer (1977) are to Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). I have also found helpful in comparing the two Walzer's "Mill's 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention': A Commentary," in Nadia Urbinati and Alex Zakaras, eds., *J. S. Mill's Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 347–56.

2 In the Castle Lectures to be delivered at Yale University in Fall, 2011, I will explore the possibility that the deeper interdependence embodied in globalization (1) requires a stronger commitment to intervention in order to prevent or halt crimes against humanity; (2) prioritizes multilateral authorization; and (3) fosters a greater capacity in the United Nations to halt protracted civil wars.

3 Lassa Oppenheim, *International Law* (London: Longmans, 1920) vol. I, p. 221. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force in general and GA Res 2131 (XX) (1965) provides partial evidence for customary law norms when it outlines potential

violations and declares the "Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States." For the complicated legal record, see Lori Damrosch *et al.*, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2001), chap. 12.

4 As surveys of a large literature, I have found especially valuable R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Anthony Ellis, "Utilitarianism and International Ethics," in Terry Nardin and David Mapel, eds., *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158–79; Fernando Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality* (Irvington-On-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1997); Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Deen Chatterjee and Don Scheid, eds., *Ethics and Foreign Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jennifer Welsh, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Thomas Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); and Gary Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Knopf, 2008).

5 Hans Morgenthau famously states: "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power," in *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 25, and Michael Walzer begins *Just and Unjust Wars* with a chapter titled "Against 'Realism.'" For one discussion of the varieties of realist, liberal, and socialist philosophy of world politics, see my *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

6 See, e.g., the influential works of David Luban, "Just War and Human Rights," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 9, no. 1 (Winter 1980), pp. 160–81; and Hadley Arkes, *First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). Both Luban and Arkes are cosmopolitans in this sense, but their conceptions of which rights are fundamental differ profoundly, the first tending toward social democratic and the second libertarian in orientation, with correspondingly large differences in judgment on interventions.

7 Pushpin was a mindless game in which boys stuck pins in each other's hats and then took turns knocking them off. Good discussions of the wider aspects of Mill's ethical theory are in Alan Ryan, *J. S. Mill* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and Nicholas Capaldi, *John Stuart Mill: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 249–65.

8 See his *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), and *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), for his more general reflections on justice – domestic and international.

9 For analysis of Mill's politics, see Dennis Thompson, *John Stuart Mill and Representative Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); for Walzer, see his *Thick and Thin*.

10 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 376.

11 Kant's fifth preliminary article of Perpetual Peace prohibits forcible interference in "the constitution and government of another state," for to do so would violate "the right of people dependent on no other and only struggling with its internal illness." Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in *Kant's Political Writings,* ed. Hans Reiss, trans.

H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 93–130. For comment, see also Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), chaps. 4, 5.

12   Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 381; emphasis added. The voluntarist and deliberative element in Mill's conception of political liberty is captured in Nadia Urbinati, "The Many Heads of the Hydra," in Urbinati and Zakaras, eds., *J. S. Mill's Political Thought*, pp. 66–97.

13   Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 381; emphasis added.

14   Ibid., p. 382.

15   Ibid.

16   Ibid., p. 380.

17   Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," in Charles R. Beitz *et al.*, eds., *International Ethics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 221, n. 7.

18   For discussion, see Jennifer Welsh, "Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention," in Welsh, ed., *Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 56–68.

19   "Agreements must be upheld." See Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Thomas Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

20   Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 383.

21   Ibid., p. 382.

22   Ibid.

23   Quoted from Lord Burghley's State Papers in Wallace MacCaffrey, "The Newhaven Expedition: 1562–1563," *Historical Journal* 40, no. 1 (1997), p. 2. For an insightful and wide-ranging analysis of religious internationalism in this period, see John Owen, "When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005), pp. 73–99.

24   Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, 1985. President Truman's doctrine promising to defend free peoples from external or internal aggression was presented to a joint session of Congress in justification of the assistance he proposed for Greece and Turkey in March 1947. President Brezhnev presented his doctrine in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish Workers' Party in November 1968, following the intervention against the Czechoslovak Prague Spring. Brezhnev proclaimed: "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."

25   See Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), esp. pp. 45–46, 58–61; and for a general comparison, the classic by Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking, 1961).

26   MacCaffrey, "The Newhaven Expedition," p. 19.

27   See R. B. Wernham, *Before the Armada* (London: Cape, 1966); and G. D. Ramsay, *The Reign of Elizabeth I*, ed. Christopher Haigh (London: Macmillan, 1984), who describe dual balancing, against both foreign and domestic threats.

28   Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 383.

29   See Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper, 2002), for background and Mill's letter to Parke Goodwin quoted in Michael St. John Packe, *The Life of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 427.

30   Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, pp. 111–24.

31   Ibid., p. 117. See Gary J. Bass, "Jus Post Bellum," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 32, no. 3 (2004), who explores the justice of these kinds of settlements, but limits his arguments to the demonstrably necessary case of post-genocide.

32   Ian Buruma surveys the debate on the issue in "The War over the Bomb," *New York Review of Books*, September 21, 1995, pp. 26–34. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 2005), pp. 205ff., discusses the difficulty of persuading the Japanese Cabinet to limit negotiations to the preservation of the emperor, even after the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been dropped.

33 For a discussion of the circumstances favoring successful peacekeeping and peace building in a civil war context, see Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), and the large literature we cite. For discussions of the ethical issues raised in reconstruction, see Stefano Recchia, "Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction," pp. 165–88, and related articles in the special issue of *Ethics & International Affairs* 23, no. 2 (2009), on the Responsibility to Rebuild.

34 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 380.

35 Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, chaps. 4–12, treats this conflict under the rubric of humanitarian concern. It fits there, but it was also a war for secession, as noted below. Conflicts typically overlap: great powers forcibly mediated a protracted civil war with large casualties and promoted the secession of Greece from an established empire, Ottoman Turkey.

36 H. V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 274.

37 See Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London: Constable, 1970), pp. 317–20; and W. Smith, *Anglo-Portuguese Relations, 1851–1861* (Lisboa: Centro de Estudios Historicos Ultramarinos, 1970), p. 16.

38 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 381.

39 Livermore, *New History of Portugal*, pp. 288–90.

40 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 383.

41 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, chap. 6.

42 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 383.

43 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p. 95.

44 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 383. For a modern interpretation stressing Hungary's success in civil reform despite its failure in acquiring independence, see Domokos Kosáry, *Hungary and International Politics in 1848–1849*, trans. Tim Wilkinson (Boulder, Colo.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2003).

45 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, pp. 97–99.

46 Ibid., pp. 101–08.

47 Mill, however, conceives of many circumstances in which analogous forms of paternalism or benign despotism can be justified, including over children and domestically when populations are not fit for self-government; see discussion of various forms of despotism in Nadia Urbinati, "The Many Heads of the Hydra" (unpublished paper, 2007); and Mark Tunick, "Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill's Defense of British Rule in India," *Review of Politics* 68, no. 4 (2006), pp. 586–611.

48 Mill, "Non-Intervention," pp. 377, 379.

49 Ibid., p. 377.

50 Tunick, "Tolerant Imperialism"; and see Stephen Holmes, "Making Sense of Liberal Imperialism," in Urbinati and Zakaras, eds., *J. S. Mill's Political Thought*, pp. 319–46, for related arguments.

51 Jennifer Pitts points out that J. S. Mill, like his father, James Mill, stressed the moral and intellectual failings of the "barbarous" peoples and lumped their various social structures, from nomadic tribes to feudal and bureaucratic empires, into one category of barbarism. In doing so, the Mills broke with earlier liberal traditions that posited a common rationality and varying societal and political regimes, as did Bentham and such philosophers as Adam Smith. See Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 5, passim; and for Smith, Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, chap. 7.

52 Rudrangshu Mukherjee, *Awadh in Revolt, 1857–1858: A Study of Popular Resistance* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), quoting Metcalf, p. 33.

53 Lt. Col. C. E. Luard, "The Indian States: 1818–1857," in H. H. Dodwell, ed., *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. 5 (Delhi: S. Chand, 1987), chap. 31.
54 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 379.
55 See Karl Marx, "The Annexation of Oude," *New York Daily Tribune*, May 28, 1858.
56 Mill, "Non-Intervention," p. 379.
57 For background on Mill's career in this connection, see Lynn Zastoupil, *John Stuart Mill and India* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 87.
58 In "The Politics of Rescue," *Dissent* (Winter 1995), Walzer discusses the challenges of interventions from which there is no quick exit.

10   After the freedom agenda

The promotion of democracy has fallen on hard times. The fiasco of George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq gave democracy promotion, the invasion's last and most desperate justification, a bad name. Fueling the retreat from such projects is pessimism about the worldwide prospects for democratization. Democracy itself seems to be in retreat after the "third wave" that brought a tide of democracies to Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America in the 1990s. Pointing to the failure of the new democracies to deliver material welfare and to the rise of autocratic China, the deepening authoritarianism in Russia, and the successful defiance of theocratic Iran, pundits now proclaim an age of authoritarian advantage. But recent studies suggest that the pessimism is overdone, and democracy is still worthy of prudent and principled promotion.

In *The Freedom Agenda*, James Traub, a journalist for the *New York Times Magazine*, sets out to rescue U.S. democracy promotion from the choke hold of the Bush administration. He begins his lively account with Bush's remarkable second inaugural address in January 2005, when the president declared, "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." Using classic doctrinal prose, the president proclaimed, "So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." The words "democracy," "freedom," "liberty," and "tyranny" appear forty-seven times in the short address.

Barack Obama set a very different tone in his inaugural this past January. He stood before his fellow citizens and said he was "humbled by the task before us" with "an economy badly weakened," seeking "a new way forward" that includes an offer to "extend a hand" if those who rule through corruption and the silencing of dissent will but "unclench their fist." "Democracy," "freedom," "liberty," and "tyranny" appear only five times in the address. Most strikingly, he ended his address not with global transformation but with an evocation of the spirit of local resistance, recalling the winter patriots of George Washington's bedraggled army of insurgents, driven from their new capital by a mighty imperial army, hungry and chilled in the fields of Valley Forge.

Obama's foreign policy truly seemed to push the "reset" button, and not just in relations with Russia. Indeed, given the record of the previous eight years it was

easy to be ABB (anything but Bush). But what would Obama be for? During Hillary Clinton's nomination hearing as secretary of state, she said "We need to focus on the three Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development." Where, the pundits asked, was the fourth D, democracy?

A more careful reading of Obama's campaign statements and Vice President Joseph Biden's important speech at the Munich Security Policy conference in February offers an answer. "Freedom on the march" was over, would-be candidate Obama explained in an unmistakable reference in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2007), because it had become associated with "war, torture, and forcibly imposed regime change." Democracy promotion for Obama had to be part of a package that allowed citizens to "choose their leaders in climates free of fear," with "accountable institutions that deliver services and opportunity: strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, honest police forces, free presses, vibrant civil societies . . . freedom from want." To avoid "disease, terrorism and conflict," we "need to invest in building capable democratic states that can establish healthy and educated communities, develop markets and generate wealth." And for this holistic strategy of democracy promotion he was prepared to pledge $50 billion by 2012.

In February 2009, Biden gently revised Clinton and reaffirmed this strategic package in Munich:

> Defense and diplomacy are necessary. But quite frankly, ladies and gentlemen, they are not sufficient. We also need to wield development and democracy, two of the most powerful weapons in our collective arsenals. Poor societies and dysfunctional states . . . can become breeding grounds for extremism, conflict, and disease. Nondemocratic nations frustrate the rightful aspirations of their citizens and fuel resentment.

In the first test case of the new approach, the administration announced on March 28, 2009, a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan best described as a mélange: "The following steps must be done in concert to produce the desired end state: the removal of al-Qaeda's sanctuary, effective and democratic government control for Pakistan, and a self-reliant Afghanistan that will enable the withdrawal of combat forces while sustaining our commitment to political and economic development." Keep al Qaeda out, make Pakistan democratic, and help Afghanistan become self-reliant and politically and economically developed (not necessarily democratic), without trying to "dictate its future."

Is this because, unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has the economic preconditions for democracy? Dispelling this conventional wisdom, Traub nicely tells the story of desperately poor Mali, whose culture welcomes popular deliberation, despite its lack of economic development that would sustain schools or a press that would sustain a developed democracy. Or is it because the administration thinks any self-reliant Afghanistan can reliably promise to keep out al Qaeda? Here one should recall that before September 11, 2001, the Taliban theocrats, with remark-able self-reliance, endured comprehensive, multilateral, international sanctions

and yet harbored al Qaeda. Then, after 9/11, its leaders promised to prosecute al Qaeda. Should we have believed them?

Or is it that President Hamid Karzai is widely believed to be popular and yet ineffective and tolerant of corruption? Does the administration have in mind a better ruler who could not win the upcoming elections but who would be a more reliable guardian against al Qaeda than someone who could be elected?

Lest today's Afghanistan-Pakistan policy seem an accident of strategic incoherence, we can refer to Traub's account of how conflicted and yet central the promotion of democracy has been in the history of U.S. foreign policy. A telling chapter on the occupation of the Philippines shows how U.S. colonialism carried with it a promise of democratic self-determination, repeatedly compromised in practice to satisfy security and commercial concerns for stable and accommodating rule by local elites. This pattern continued in U.S. foreign policy. Republicans tended to favor commercial interests; Democrats, ideology. But the compromises with security were a constant. We can supplement Traub's account with the Cold War maxim of John F. Kennedy's administration. Kennedy promoted the democratic Alliance for Progress, but the president also acknowledged that there were choices between principles and interests in our policy toward the Dominican Republic: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo [dictatorship by his followers], or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we cannot really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third."

Ronald Reagan relit the fires of democratic rhetoric in his famous speech before the British Parliament in 1982 but also found it difficult to disengage from the friendly dictators with whom the United States was allied against communist or left forces.

Democracy promotion was less conflicted for the Clinton administration, which, benefiting from George H.W. Bush's dismantling of the Cold War, could welcome a democratic spring across Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. With the public seeking a "peace dividend" and a government focused on the economy, the administration floundered in the former Yugoslavia, and democracy promotion received little concerted action beyond support for the National Endowment for Democracy and its two institutes, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute.

George W. Bush started out with a policy against nation building that resonated with old-fashioned nationalism and isolationism. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 turned him into a world revolutionary, a Trotsky of the Right, trumpeting a global civil war against authoritarianism. His practice, however, fell far short of his rhetoric. He applauded democracy but, as Traub shows, made very few hard choices in its favor, backing down from early efforts to push democracy in Egypt after Hamas won the elections in Palestine. He also made little actual investment in democracy in very poor countries, such as Mali, that were attempting a transition to democracy.

The combination of Bush's purple rhetoric and Baghdad's political reality tarnished democracy promotion, but they were not the only reasons for moving

away from it. Another reason lay in the world trends I have already noted. Thomas Carothers, one of the few expert scholar-practitioners of democracy promotion, recently published a thoughtful essay urging us not to overestimate those trends and to step back from democratic pessimism and belief in authoritarian resurgence.

Democratic pessimism flows from the sense that the new democracies of the 1990s were especially fragile. Voters have since turned against elected regimes that failed to deliver material progress, toward ethnic and religious rather than civic parties. Authoritarian resurgence shows up in the attraction of the Chinese model of growth and the new assertiveness of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

In a survey of the status of democracy in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, Carothers demonstrates that the only significant change is the authoritarian trend in Russia. Elsewhere, democracy is advancing as much as it is retreating. Banglades and Thailand may have had coups, but they are being reversed, and Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has made notable advances over the past decade toward elected constitutional rule. Since 2000, the number of free countries in Freedom House's measurement "has risen from 86 to 89 and [the number of] partly free from 58 to 62, while the number of not-free countries has diminished from 48 to 42."

Even today – even post-Bush – Larry Diamond, another democracy expert, finds that 80 percent of the public in every region of the world say in polls that democracy is the best political system. The instability of the new democracies is real, but far from being unusual, it is typical of new democracies almost everywhere in the past. And Russia's and China's authoritarian-promotion policy has not extended effectively beyond their immediate neighborhoods. Even there, Ukraine and Georgia survive, as do democratic South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan.

In short, neither Bush nor democratic pessimism nor authoritarian resurgence is a good reason to abandon the promotion of democracy. But what are the reasons in favor of the project?

Traub, despite the promise of his subtitle, says little about why the United States (or any other democratic people) *should* try to promote democracy. His key argument appears to be existential. How can the American people tell another people that says it wants democracy to wait until the country is richer or more ethnically or religiously homogeneous? This is telling, but he also could have added practical and instrumental reasons. Among them are that democratic institutions:

- promote peace and mutual respect among democratic peoples. For two centuries, democracies committed to the ideal of individual liberty and endowed with well-established constitutional governments have tended to maintain, and likely will continue to maintain, a reliable peace with each other. This legacy of liberal peace helps account for the success of the NATO alliance in the Cold War and the end of the Cold War itself, as the USSR/Russia under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin temporarily liberalized. It is statistically

significant from the perspective of social science and strategically well worth protecting and fostering;

- enhance human rights, produce higher levels of political participation, and decrease state repression;
- serve to protect the mass of the population from state indifference during a natural disaster, thus reducing the danger of large-scale famine;
- tend to foster economic growth. Although there is no appreciable direct effect, democracy not only does not harm growth (as some have charged) but has robust, positive indirect effects by increasing human capital, lowering inflation, reducing political instability, and enlarging economic freedom – all of which are positively associated with economic growth;
- and reduce economic inequality. Although autocrats sometimes buy popular support with economic well-being, and authoritarian socialists sometimes defend economic equality, expanding the democratic franchise tends, over-all, to reduce inequality as politicians respond to the majority's demand for greater welfare.

Being a democracy, however, is no cure-all. The very international respect for individual rights and the shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal democracies establish grounds for additional conflict between liberal and illiberal societies – as in U.S.–Russian and U.S.–Chinese relations today. Liberal internationalism is no simple recipe for peace; it needs constant, prudent vigilance to avoid crusades and misguided interventions. Liberal Britain, France, and the United States have been among the most expansionist empires, sometimes producing order and progress and at other times fostering chaos, oppression, and war. The "liberation" of Iraq is only the latest in these costly adventures. We still need improvements in the overall governance of world politics.

Nor is becoming a democracy a cure-all. Globally, comprehensively and on average, every step toward greater democracy within countries reduces the chances of war. That is the good news. But the good news needs to be qualified: where the rule of law and public institutions are weak and where society is fractionated along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, politicians can be tempted to use violence to achieve and hold office.

Democracy is thus a vital source of transformation with enormous upside and some downside potential. The question remains: how to foster the first and avoid the second? Let us begin with what we need to avoid and conclude with what we can reasonably expect to do to promote sustainable democratization.

We need to avoid a repeat of the Bush administration's "forced democratization." After Iraq, it is unlikely to be repeated soon, but the ethical and practical lessons still need to be absorbed. Self-government should mean authentic "self" government, not laws and regulations imposed by foreigners, however well-meaning. And, practically, forcing democracy tends not to work. Democracy is not only government "for" and "of," it is also government "by" the people. Unless

the people see themselves as a people and are prepared to pay taxes, defend their borders, and abide by majority rule, democracy is not sustainable. When even well-meaning foreigners seek to liberate a country whose people haven't been able to liberate themselves, they fall into one of three traps. The newly designated forces of freedom find that they cannot rule, and, as in Iraq, a civil war follows the liberating invasion. Or, second, the new freedom faction finds that it can stay in power only with ongoing foreign support. So, rather than a free nation, it becomes a cog in an imperial machine. Or, third, the freedom faction learns that to stay in power it must govern as the previous dictators did, by force. The liberating invaders are thus responsible not only for the costs in lives and money of the invasion but for an invasion that has literally done no good – produced a civil war, a colony, or one more tyranny with a new ideological label attached.

We should also avoid attempts to replace the United Nations with leagues of democracies. Few if any of the world's major challenges can be met by dividing democratic sheep from non-democratic goats. Effective trade negotiations and effective arms control need to include all the world's major producers that are prepared to abide by agreed-upon rules, whether they are democratic or not. Meeting the challenge of climate change will also require the cooperation not just of the established democratic powers of Europe, Japan, and the United States, but also of China and Russia and democratizing (or not) states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Indeed, the very hope of a peacefully democratizing world rests on persuading patriotic autocrats, in nondemocracies that their countries will be better off if they transfer authority to their peoples. Shunning a potential Gorbachev or a new De Klerk is not the best way to win their confidence.

Democratic transformation is best fostered peacefully. It spreads by good example, by incentives and assistance. Promoting democracy is best done indirectly through trade, investment, and foreign aid. These three can help diversify societies, and diversified, growing societies tend, over the long run, to demand responsive goverance. Among the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of international democratic transformation – think of them as the shock troops of democratization – are students, tourists, and business investors. They build bridges to friends and associates overseas. They send a message of solidarity and opportunity to subjects who are prepared to take the risks of becoming active citizens. Assisting the formation of civil society organizations that crosscut ethnic, regional, and other divides helps produce stable and productive democracies. Building the institutions of the rule of law, a free press, and education also contributes, indirectly, to democratic transformation. As Carothers has pointed out in another publication, bilateral assistance can play a valuable role if it is carefully planned with local actors in the lead. And the informal "Community of Democracies" usefully serves as a kind of "trade" association, encouraging coordination and democracy promotion, without undermining multilateral institutions.

Multilateral assistance is particularly useful because it frees the recipient organization from the taint of foreign control. The recently established UN Democracy

Fund has an especially significant role in this endeavor. Authorized at the 2005 World Summit in a unanimous General Assembly resolution, it distributes about twenty to thirty million dollars per year, predominantly to civil society organizations that apply for a grant to promote measures such as voter education and mobilization. Directed by a small staff of UN officials, it is overseen by a board composed of the seven leading state donors, six other states representing the rest of the UN membership, two civil society organizations, and a few individuals appointed personally by the secretary-general.[*]

Carothers shows that we need not be pessimistic, but we do need to be patient. By chronicling the fate of the freedom agenda and its precursors, Traub suggests that peaceful strategies offer the best chance for expanding the zone of peace among fellow democracies and reaping the internal and external benefits of democratization.

Note

[*] See the UNDEF Web site at www.un.org/democracy-fund/index.htm. Disclosure: I am currently one of the secretary-general's individual representatives and chair of the board of UNDEF. These comments do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDEF, its donors, or the UN.

Conclusions and reconsiderations

In this collection of essays, I have portrayed liberalism as a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics – for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity. Liberal-democratic states share them, though to different degrees. In relation to this, political theorists identify liberalism with an essential principle – the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only.

This ideal version of liberalism is thus marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their representative authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved. Most pertinently for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor to the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military bureaucracies over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition (for example, by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes communism or state socialism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

Liberal internationalism consists, at its most fundamental level, in the attempt to promote these principles and institutions across national borders and apply variations thereof to relations among states. The realists from Thucydides onward described an international state of war that could be mitigated, but not overcome, short of a world Leviathan. The liberals, with important variations epitomized by Lockean Institutionalism, Smithian Commercialism and Kantian Internationalism, broke with this skeptical tradition and announced the possibility of a state of peace among independent states.[1]

In this collection, I have concentrated on an explanation of the separate peace among liberal republics, based on Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" (1795/1991).[2] As argued in the previous selections, Kant's hypothetical peace treaty presented in "Perpetual Peace" shows how liberal republics lead to a separate peace, a dichotomous international politics: peaceful relations – a "pacific union" among similarly liberal states – and a "state of war" between liberals and nonliberals.[3]

In this conclusion, I revisit two key issues of the separate liberal peace now much contested. First, an interpretive question: did Kant envision a separate peace among republics or a general peace, open to all states such that Kant's pacific federation, the *foedus pacificum*, is intended to include all states and not just republics. In defending the separate peace thesis, I will then comment on Kant's vision of how relations between republics and non-republics would and should be governed. Second, an analytic question: how can liberal republics be both peaceful and non-peaceful? Critics of the separate peace proposition question whether the peace is significant or could be explained by other factors, such as bipolarity and the related strategic alliance among western democracies in the Cold War period. So, how can the same republican institutions, liberal principles and transnational (including commercial) interests that shape inter-liberal peace be compatible with the record of extra-liberal war?

Kant's separate peace

The interpretation I have presented is simple and straightforward. Kant's hypothetical treaty of perpetual peace is best understood in modern terms as an argument for the three necessary and sufficient conditions of an inter-liberal peace.

First, republican, that is constitutional, representative governments (Kant requires that they be established in his First Definitive Article of "Perpetual Peace") tame the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies and ingrain the habit of respect for individual rights. Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They merely introduce republican caution, Kant's "hesitation," in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal states only fight for popular purposes, since they need to be constantly concerned about domestic support for the war effort. Modern democratic liberalism does not need to assume either that public opinion rules foreign policy or that the entire governmental elite are liberal. It can assume that the elite typically manage public affairs but that potentially nonliberal members of the elite have reason to doubt that illiberal policies would be electorally sustained and endorsed by the majority of the democratic public.

Second, in order to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states but not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second article of peace, the pacific alliance. Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source – a pledge of peaceful respect. As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that

caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the citizens they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples are essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends.

The key to reliable peace is that even though all ethical statesmen and liberal republics should reject imperialism, they cannot assume reciprocal peace with all other states. Instead, they understand that states subject to international anarchy are potentially aggressive. Only republics tend to be consensual, constrained, and therefore presumed capable by other republics of reliable mutual accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial.

Third and lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material and moral incentives to moral commitments and mutual trust. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality (discussed in Kant's Third Definitive Article of "Perpetual Peace") opens the possibility for the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus creating incentives for states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Modern liberal economic theory holds that under a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage, each economy is better off than it would have been under autarky. Each participant thus acquires an incentive to solve disputes peacefully and generally avoid policies that would lead the other to break mutually advantageous economic ties. A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of citizens and state officials help educate one citizenry about the values and interests of other peoples and help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. Recent liberal scholarship on international relations has largely confirmed these hypotheses, suggesting that international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create crosscutting ties and interests in favor of accommodation. The variety of ties among liberal states across different issue-areas also ensures that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation.

The most considerable challenge to the interpretation above argues that Kant intended "Perpetual Peace" to be equivalently, or homogeneously, available to all states at any time.[4] There is evidence to support the homogeneous thesis in Kant's work, but it is less compelling than the evidence supporting the separate, or heterogeneous, thesis I advanced. There is no question but that Kant hoped that some day the peace would be extended to all peoples, but that would occur when all states will have accepted the First Definitive Article, that is, become republics. The debate is over what happens before then.

Cavallar and MacMillan correctly note that Kant did not state in the Second Definitive Article of "Perpetual Peace" that the *foedus pacificum* had to be limited to other republics. It was instead a "federal association among other states" (*PP*: 104). without specifying fellow republics. Kant does say in the previous phrase that this pacific league is practicable when "by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace) this will provide a focal point for federal association."[5] But further progressive widening of the association is not here explicitly limited to republics.

Moreover, in the "Contest of the Faculties," Kant makes two important points in this connection. First, we should not assume that any instance of elected institutions constitutes an authentic republic. Kant excoriates the British constitution of his time as an absolutism made absolute by the manipulation the monarch exercises over the parliament "by bribery." (*CF*: 187). Few of Britain's eighteenth-century parliamentary constituencies – "rotten" and "pocket" boroughs – would have met Kant's own (very restrictive, see below) ideas for citizen representation. Added to that, the practice of bribery made eighteenth-century British politics absolute, subject to monarchical whim and interest, not a limited republican government reflecting the true interests of the citizens.

His second point is that not all monarchies need be corrupt or bellicose. Because of the dangers of "furious struggles," striving toward a "constitution which would be incapable of bellicosity, i.e., a republican one" should be an evolution, not a revolution. So, in order to foster evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, Kant argues that in addition to respecting republics in "form" (i.e., representative, constitutional republics) we should respect republics in "mode." These latter are monarchies in which the monarch is "acting by analogy with the laws which a people would give itself in conformity with universal principles of right" (*CF*: 184). The challenge here is reliably identifying these special monarchies capable of reliably mirroring republican constitutionalism, given all the uncertainties and insecurities of international politics and particularly given Kant's estimation of the typical political behavior of monarchies (quoted below). Thus both these points qualify republicanism as a simple institutional criterion, but they also reaffirm its significance as a political behavioral requirement.

In this connection, Kant dismisses in "Perpetual Peace" (*PP*: 102, fn*) the poet Alexander Pope's old saw, "For forms of government let fools contest: Whate'er is best administered is best," by highlighting the special importance of constitutional stability and its absence in hereditary monarchies, where a wise Titus or Marcus Aurelius could be succeeded by a vicious Domitian or Commodus. And this is especially important because the peace treaty he wants states to sign is designed to be permanent.

In the "Metaphysics of Morals," Kant returns to the *foedus pacificum* theme in his discussion of international rights. After stating that a true "state of peace" that secures all international rights and property requires a world union of states (a single global state) and further arguing that such a universal state would be impossible to govern, he then explores progressive "approaches" that, short of

global government, are feasible. In this connection he cites the "permanent congress of states . . ." open "to all neighbouring states" – again without specifying republics. He then offers two examples of such congresses. One is the diplomatic gatherings attached to the Dutch States-General in the first half of the eighteenth century that mediated some European disputes. Kant's own skeptical rhetoric concerning the prospects of this diplomatic approach was well-reflected in its actual practice. This congress system soon collapsed and lost what (little – it hardly preserved a European peace in this warlike era) effectiveness it had. A better example for him is the American states, "based on a political constitution and . . . therefore indissoluble." Unfortunately, Kant doesn't tell us what about the American political constitution made it indissoluble (an issue not settled in the US until the Civil War). Clearly, something more than the legal formalism that proved so weak for the Dutch congresses was needed. Presumably, something less than the intrusive governing federal role in which the federal and state governments have complementary and joint jurisdiction is suggested. This would have been too state-like for Kant.[6] Unfortunately, Kant doesn't say.

But when he concludes the section of International Right he seems to me to present in its most moving, insightful, and eloquent evocation the project of perpetual peace. Reaffirming the moral predicate "there shall be no war" and acknowledging that complete perpetual peace may be impossible (clearly, not yet possible), he calls upon us all to begin to act as if it is by "establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively)" (*MM*: 174).[7]

Let me now turn to the evidence that supports Kant's "perhaps" – his practical hope for peaceful republicanism, both within individual republics "and" collectively among them.

First, look at the whole. "Perpetual Peace" is a hypothetical treaty. It includes preliminary articles and "definitive articles." The latter are needed to "formally institute" a state of peace and take states out of state of enmity. The "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Civil Constitution of Every State Shall Be Republican" (*PP*, p. 99) is seemingly thus definitive. In a formal sense, the "states" he refers to later in the treaty have already "signed" the first article. In the Kantian framework, it makes no more sense to forget the first article than to forget the second or third, to assume that states do not need to respect and acknowledge their commitment to each other to maintain peace with each other and to protect the rights of universal hospitality they have offered to all mankind.

Second and more significantly, we should examine what interstate relations are like before peace has been instituted by the three definitive articles. Kant, like Hobbes, begins with the "state of nature," which is a "state of war." "States," he bluntly says, "like lawless savages, exist in a condition devoid of right . . . this condition is one of war . . ."[8] International law constitutes no guarantee of justice or safety in these circumstances. States therefore have the right to make war (*jus ad bellum*) in this condition when they are injured (and legal proceedings do not provide satisfaction). But they also may make war when (1) they "believe" they are injured (and legal proceedings fail to satisfy the grievance) or (2) when the

state experiences a "threat" as another state makes preparations for war or (3) when another state achieves an alarming increase in power.[9] From this last consideration follows the right to maintain a balance of power.

These are the *rightful* uses of force in the inter-state state of war. In addition, actual states regularly engage in *wrongful* aggressive imperialist uses of force when they seize territory or property or when they presume to punish other states as if there were a lawful international order that they alone can adjudicate. On top of that, rightful and wrongful are themselves problematic categories in the state of war.

How then can states institutionalize peace? They cannot establish a world state, Kant avers, even though statehood is the means by which domestic peace is instituted and a federal "world republic" may be the only ultimate guarantor of stable world peace (*PP*, 105).[10] Instead, we are left with a "negative substitute," the best we can now get. For it to work there must be internal reasons for independent states to autonomously institute peace in a way that can be reliably communicated to other states. Lacking international enforcement, the peace must be self-enforcing. This is what republicanism provides. The fundamental reason is this:

> If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debts which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the constant threat of new wars. But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any significant reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready for such purposes) to justify the war for the sake of propriety.
>
> (*PP*, p. 100)

A *foedus pacificum* among such monarchs or between republics and monarchs is simply unreliable, not one a responsible republic would regard as having institutionalized an expectation of peace. The common ethical duty that all have to treat other individuals as ends can be realized internationally among republics, because citizens voice their duties and interests through representation. Republics are not easy to identify and attention must be paid to their reality, not just to superficial (e.g., eighteenth-century British) resemblances. And some monarchs may successfully mimic republican principles so accurately that they are reliable partners in a peace. But it will be hard to identify them reliably. As a rule, monarchs cannot

reliably be assumed to reflect the will of the citizens of a republic. Hence a separate, heterogeneous peace.

Kant's foreign relations with non-republics

What then are the duties that republics have to non-republics? Here Kant departs from Hobbes. The state of war does entail limited rights. The rights of peace include neutrality, rights to guarantees, and defensive alliances. During war all means of conflict (*jus in bello*) are allowed except those that render one's own citizens "unfit to be citizens" of a possible eventual peace based on international law. Thus spies, assassins, poisoners, sharpshooters, and propaganda are all banned. So, too, are war aims (*jus ad bellum*) that involve punishment, permanent conquest, subjugation, or extermination. Just wars are defensive in nature. No peace should constitute a violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens of a conquered state.[11] Conquest for the sake or reforming an unjust enemy state – an aggressive state that repudiates lawful behavior – is permitted, enabling it "to accept a new constitution of a nature that is unlikely to encourage their warlike inclination."[12] But that does not mean that states should be coerced into joining the peaceful league. Members of the pacific union can "demand" that other states join (implicitly, become republican too) but that demand should be read as "try to persuade," not force.[13]

The state of war requires decisions on the basis of right, but it does not allow for security or welfare. For Kant, the will to subjugate is always present and the production of armaments for defense ("which often makes peace more oppressive and destructive of internal welfare than war itself") can never be relaxed. Only a true "state of international right" (the three definitive articles) can establish peace. That does not mean that states are always at war. Thus, for example, the US and the USSR were peaceful in their Cold War relations, experiencing very few direct casualties. And Venezuela and Argentina have never fought a war against each other; nor have Iceland and Indonesia. But nuclear deterrence goes a long way to account for the Cold War "peace," and distance and lack of capacity go a long way to account for the latter peaces. None of these sets of relations escaped from the state of war. The Kantian peace on the other hand, is a state of peace, not just the absence of war. It is experienced while relations are close and interdependent and irrespective of arms levels or technologies.

Kant goes further and outlines a strategy that prepares for the definitive steps that a reliable peace requires. Kant begins "Perpetual Peace" with a set of six preliminary articles designed to build confidence among states still in the state of war.[14]

1   No peace treaty will be considered valid if the state harbors a secret intent to resume war at some more favorable opportunity. True peace agreements should be distinguished from truces if states are going to learn to trust each other.
2   No independent state should be subject to conquest, purchase, or inheritance. This provision is designed to establish the norm of "territorial integrity."

3   Standing armies will be gradually abolished.
4   No national debt will be incurred with the purpose of enhancing international power. This provision is designed to limit the incentives to engage in war by requiring that wars be fought from current revenues.
5   No state will forcibly interfere in the constitution or government of another. Supplementing the second provision, this guarantees "political independence" – the second of the two principles underlying modern sovereign equality.
6   No state will commit war crimes – use poisoners, assassins, promote subversion – because these are acts that destroy the mutual confidence a future peace will require.

Together these principles are designed to build the mutual confidence and respect that establishing a true peace will require. Well-intentioned, "enlightened despots" (Kant praises his own Frederick the Great) should seek to further these principles, and they sometimes have.[15]

The preliminary articles are regulative, establishing the modern norms of political independence (5), and territorial integrity (2) and humanitarian law (6).

They also establish what contemporary political scientists call unitary rational action, both procedural (by means–ends calculation) and substantive (by internalizing potential externalities). They do so by enhancing information (1) and ensuring that present costs cannot be evaded by borrowing that forces future generations to pay for present decisions (4). In addition, by beginning to abolish standing armies (3), the incentive to consider war as a sunk cost (standing armies) is reduced and this makes the expense of war more evident and, hence, war less rational.

But these principles alone are not likely to be effective in the state of war when confusion and powerful incentives for aggression are prevalent. Defensive wars are legitimate and the state of war will give rise to opportunities in which rational states, sometimes accurately and sometimes inaccurately, will perceive other states as threats that must be countered. What is needed, Kant argues, is an institutionalization – a constitutionalization – of peace. The continuing dangers of the state of war make it ". . . necessary to establish a federation of peoples . . . [to] protect one another against external aggression . . . going beyond an alliance which can be terminated at any time, so that it has to be renewed periodically."[16] That is what the definitive articles then do: republicanism, international respect and cosmopolitan connection.

I do not want to say that we can simply apply Kantianism as a modern political theory. On the one hand, Kant's standards of republicanism are far too ideal to apply without adjustment to modern liberal republics, partly because he assumes effective publicity, accurate information and effective equality among "active" (but see below) citizens. Today, few, if any, modern liberal republics are so politically responsible and egalitarian. Instead, few modern republics formally require specific legislative approval of a declaration of war; and those that do, such as the US, regularly skirt the constitutional provision.[17] Economic inequalities make citizens politically unequal and corporations exercise undue influence. Significant

aspects of foreign relations are conducted under a veil of secrecy. And representation is affected by disinformation, ignorance and limited alternatives. Modern republics are at best flawed quasi-Kantian republics.[18]

Moreover, and on the other hand, much of Kant's thought is far too inadequate, remote from modern circumstances and liberal norms. His condemnation of illegitimate birth should strike readers as odd. In contemporary liberal societies few condemn childbirth outside of marriage and even fewer understand why an innocent child should suffer for the decisions of its parents (*MM*, pp. 158–9). In addition, Kant's distinction between active (elite, independent male property holders) citizens versus disenfranchised passive (dependent wage workers, females) citizens is today an unacceptable distinction, even though we value the ideal of an independent voter (*MM*, pp. 139–40 and *Theory and Practice*, pp. 74–9).

Kant should not and cannot be simply applied. But some of Kant's ideas can still be inspiring, analytically and normatively, including most centrally his vision of an expanding separate peace grounded in republican institutions, liberal norms and commercial interdependence.

The logic of a separate peace[19]

Much empirical scholarship on liberalism and international relations supports the claim that liberalism does leave a coherent international legacy on foreign affairs: a separate peace. Liberal states are peaceful with each other, but they are also prone to make war on nonliberal states (an argument I first made in 1983 and included above in chapters 1 and 2).

It is also worth stressing that there are other sources of international peace. Realist theory highlights military deterrence and certain configurations of the balance of power. Philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, however, would describe these peaces as a continuing state of war, "cold" but spared "hot" hostilities. Socialist theory envisions a peace among working classes. And other traditions within liberalism, Lockean individualism with international law, and Smithian and Schumpeterian capitalism with commercial peace, also posit deep sources of potential peace.[20]

Attempts to demonstrate liberal peace empirically go back at least sixty years. Clarence Streit (1939) and D.V. Babst (1972) first pointed out the tendency of liberal democracies to maintain peace among themselves, by means of qualitative-historical and statistical analysis, respectively.[21] They can thus be seen as the pioneers of contemporary democratic peace scholarship. Subsequently, R.J. Rummel (1983) found a general, or so-called monadic, tendency toward democratic pacifism. Small and Singer (1976) criticized the monadic peace, finding only a peace among democracies. In my own work (1983; 1986) I argue that this separate peace was a coherent result, rather than a failure to preserve peace. Weede (1984) and Russett (1993) find a peace among democracies but not between democracies and non-democracies.

It is only over the past three decades that international relations scholars broadly associated with the liberal paradigm have begun to systematically study

the relationship between domestic politics and the wider phenomenon (beyond peace) of institutionalized cooperation at the international level (Milner 1997; Martin 2000; Milner and Moravcsik 2009). Among other things, this research has sought to explain the unusually high levels of international cooperation achieved among liberal democracies. Another puzzle this scholarship has confronted is that liberal democracies typically achieve higher-than-average levels of delegation to complex multilateral bodies such as the EU, NATO, NAFTA, and the WTO. The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: transnational actors such as NGOs and private corporations, which thrive in liberal democracies, frequently advocate increased inter-democratic cooperation;[22] elected democratic leaders, who are merely temporary office holders, rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line into the future and especially to "lock in" fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements;[23] and finally powerful democracies such as the U.S. and its allies may voluntarily bind themselves into complex international institutions as a means to demonstrate strategic restraint, which in turn creates incentives for other states to cooperate and thereby reduces the costs for maintaining international order.[24] Recent scholarship has also shown that formal international institutions independently contribute to international peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities.[25] In short, research on international institutions and the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic-peace proposition.

Some recent scholarship on the democratic peace focuses either exclusively on the role of liberal-democratic institutions,[26] or of liberal norms,[27] or economic interdependence,[28] highlighting a general tendency towards peaceful behavior based on each of those factors individually. The institutional explanation offers an especially incisive model. Representation together with transparency (what Kant (1970) called "publicity") may provide for effective signaling, assuring foreign decision-makers that democratic commitments are credible because rash acts and exposed bluffs will lead to electoral defeat. Able to make more credible commitments than regimes with more narrow selectorates, democracies would thus be less likely to stumble into wars.

We should not, however, overemphasize rational signaling to the exclusion of other factors that contribute to peace. Even though the shared powers of republics should encourage better chances of deliberation, the division of powers and rotation of elites characteristic of democratic republic regimes can also permit mixed signals, allowing foreign powers to suspect that executive policies might be overturned by legislatures, courts, or the next election. Most importantly, the combination of representative institutions and purely rational material interests do not control for the possibility that powerful states can have rational incentives to conquer or exploit wealthy, weak democracies, especially if they are endowed with extensive natural resources or control strategic assets, such as shipping lanes. If reputations are short and differentiable and supposedly pacifying long-run

interests are indeterminate, as they often are, something more than rational material interest will be needed to explain why at some hypothetical future point a majoritarian Iraq would not want to conquer a majoritarian Kuwait.

Contrarily, Kantian liberal peace theory, as I have argued, is neither solely institutional, nor solely ideological, nor solely economic; it is instead (see Chapters 2 and 4) only together that the three specific strands of liberal institutions, liberal ideas, and the transnational ties that follow from them plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.

Statistical data sets on the liberal peace do not adequately code for these three factors together. The most thorough empirical test of the liberal peace hypothesis (Russett and Oneal 2001) shows the separate positive effects of democratic institutions and trade (and membership in international organizations), but it doesn't separately code for liberal norms, which may indeed be difficult to capture through quantitative analysis. The substantial statistical confirmation that inter-democratic peace (coding for democratic institutions) does receive is thus probably a reflection of the tendency for principles of liberal individualism and democratic institutions to evolve together.

Another statistical problem is that we only code for liberal states among the recognized states of the international system. We do not code for "extrasystemic" polities in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It is unlikely that many were liberal states with the characteristics of representative government, private property and civic equality coded for elsewhere, but some may have been (including, possibly, the Cherokee Nation). But most importantly, excluding the extrasystemic world likely greatly reduces the statistical significance of the peace among clearly liberal republics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Compared to other testable international theories of similar scope, the empirical confirmation of the liberal peace is exceptionally strong, but that does not mean that the theory does not need additional testing and additional research into the micro-dynamics of its underlying causal mechanisms.

Some of the more interesting challenges to the separate liberal peace thesis question whether the peace is truly significant, arguing that there are other better valid explanations of the peace among liberal democracies.[29] Others question how a theory that explains peace can also, logically, explain war.[30]

Testing the peace

What is the correct test of the international political significance of liberalism? The ideal test would probe whether a liberal state, replacing a nonliberal state in the same territorial space, would in its relations with other liberals and nonliberals behave the same way in the same circumstances for as long as would have a continuation of the original nonliberal state, and vice versa. Such a proposition is not readily testable.

Partly this depends on how we define a liberal state. For states before World War II, I used criteria that track the four elements of liberalism I note at the beginning of this chapter.[31] For states after World War II, I use the Freedom House

scale, in order to avoid arbitrary designations, which includes both elections and civil liberties (at least 4 on the political scale, and 5 on the political liberties scale) for comparative purposes. The key is to find a scale that neither restricts the set to democracies so pure and so few that their peace is inconsequential, nor so loose that any state that holds any form of an election is classified a liberal republican democracy.

We also need to consider rival explanations. We can control for contiguity, income, and so on, across an entire sample,[32] but not for all those factors at once, together with geopolitical position. This is a key neglect; international history has been described as "geography in motion."[33] We will need to settle for something less. Another (still-incomplete) test that would be interesting would be to compare for each country its war experience during its liberal periods with that during nonliberal periods.[34] Case studies usefully explore whether liberal factors were or were not involved in particular decisions during foreign policy crises. The complexities of history reveal a mixed record, generally combining many factors (Owen 1995; Ray 1995) with some liberal peaces being produced partly by fortunate accident. History also provides its own tests of a rough and ready character when we compare Europe's warlike experience from the seventeenth century, through World Wars I and II, to the postwar period of Western European democratic peace. Moreover, during world wars, when states are forced to chose on which side of an impending conflict they will fight, interestingly, liberals tend to wind up on the same side (with a few anomalies), despite the complexity of factors that drive them there.

Hard cases

Looking into cases can give a sense of how a variety of factors interweave. Imperial Germany is a case of complicated identification. The Reichstag was not only elected by universal male suffrage but, by and large, the state ruled under the law, respecting the civic equality and rights of its citizens. Moreover, Chancellor Bismarck began the creation of a social welfare society that served as an inspiration for similar reforms in liberal regimes. However, the constitutional relations between the imperial executive and the representative legislature were sufficiently complex that various practices, rather than constitutional theory, determined the actual relation between the government and the citizenry. The emperor appointed, and could dismiss, the chancellor. Although the chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag, a defeat in the Reichstag did not remove him nor did the government absolutely depend on the Reichstag for budgetary authority. In practice, Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues. But the emperor's direct authority over the army, the army's effective independence from the minimal authority of the War Ministry, and the emperor's active role in foreign affairs (including the influential separate channel to the Austrian emperor through the military attachés), together with the tenuous constitutional relationship between the chancellor and the Reichstag, made imperial Germany a state divorced from the control of its citizenry in foreign affairs.

This authoritarian element not only influenced German foreign policymaking, but also shaped the international political environment (a lack of trust) that the Reich faced and the domestic political environment that defined the government's options and capabilities (the weakness of liberal opinion as against the exceptional influence of junker militaristic nationalism). Thus, direct influence on policy was but one result of the authoritarian element. Nonetheless, significant and strife-generating episodes can be directly attributed to this element. They include Tirpitz's approach to Wilhelm II to obtain the latter's sanction for a veto of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's proposals for a naval agreement with Britain in 1909. Added to this was Wilhelm's personal assurances of full support to the Austrians early in the Sarajevo Crisis and his, together with Moltke's, erratic pressure on the Chancellor throughout July and August of 1914, which helped destroy whatever coherence German diplomacy might otherwise have had, and which led one Austrian official to ask, "Who rules in Berlin? Moltke or Bethmann?"[35]

The British non-intervention in the U.S. Civil War tested liberal pacification in a demanding manner.[36] The civil war that broke out in 1861 constituted not an easy but a difficult case for British liberals. Southern propagandists (such as Hotze) working in London advertised the Southern cause as a war for self-determination, for the rights of small nations, for free trade against Northern tariffs, and for (incongruously and perhaps in appeal to British Conservatives) an aristocratic way of life as against the crass industrial democracy of the North.[37] Liberals, such as even Gladstone and Russell, leaned South. Prime Minister Palmerston was cautious and looked for Southern victories to establish effective independence. Napoleon III, seeking Southern support for his adventure in Mexico, lobbied Britain for recognition.

Both the British constitutional state and the economy thus seemed to lean South. Public opinion was divided, with the elite generally pro-South and the radicals pro-North. Lincoln brilliantly turned the tide, however, and averted European recognition of the South with his Emancipation Proclamation in 1862. Cynics taunted the North Americans for only freeing the slaves they could not reach.[38] But the Proclamation, slowly at first then with a gathering tide, mobilized the mass of liberal middle class and working class support for the Union cause, leading young Henry Adams to enthuse: "The Emancipation Proclamation has done more for us here than all our former victories and all our diplomacy."[39]

In the Fashoda Crisis of 1898, we can see the opposite – how popular passion worked against peace, and against constitutional and economic interest. Indeed, according to some scholars, passions, colonial uncertainty and a long history of rivalry overwhelmed liberal restraint, and peace was rescued by the balance of power.[40]

In 1893, 1894, and 1896, France sent expeditionary missions to the Sudan. Angered by having been excluded from their once Anglo-French condominium over Egypt when Britain intervened in 1882 and established sole control, the French colonial ministry was determined to grasp the upper Nile and perhaps obtain a stranglehold on North Africa running all the way from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, slicing the equally ambitious (and fanciful) British ambitions of "Cape

to Cairo" at the "waist." Unlike earlier efforts, Marchand's 1896 expedition survived and reached the Nile in 1898. Meanwhile, fearing a French plot to dam and control the Nile, the British had responded by sending Kitchener south from Egypt in a bloody campaign against the Mahdist forces that had expelled Egypt from the suzerainty it had long claimed over the Sudan. Kitchener met Marchand at Fashoda and the crisis began.[41]

The crisis was greatly complicated by the hazy legal status of the Sudan and Britain's very indirect claim (through Egypt's claim) over it. The French regarded the region as *terra nullius* (today, anachronistically, we would say it belonged to the Sudanese). On the other hand, the crisis was greatly simplified by Britain's overwhelming military superiority – both locally (Marchand depended on Kitchener for supplies) and at sea.

Contrary to liberal expectations, war soon loomed on the horizon. Britain mobilized the fleet. The French Right and its anti-Dreyfusard press (more anti-British and less pro-German) demanded firmness. The British Tory-Unionist (Chamberlain) and liberal imperialist (Lord Roseberry) factions demanded French withdrawal. The jingoist press on both sides called for standing firm. Although no one wanted war, neither seemed at first willing to back down.

The crisis was, however, eventually resolved through liberal politics (but also with very good fortune). The good fortune, from the liberal Anglo-French point of view, was simply the long-standing and widely shared French hostility to Germany. This hostility, reflecting the German conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, had not been strong enough to stand in the way of Franco-German colonial cooperation against Britain in the 1880's, but the prospect of going to war against Britain with only Germany as a potential ally was not a prospect that the mass of the French, elite or mass, appeared to welcome.

But also leaning against the war were three more directly liberal internationalist factors. The elected leadership of both countries were decidedly "bourgeois liberal" (if "bourgeois" can be used to describe the Marquess of Salisbury). Anti-jingoist, deeply concerned about political stability, hostile to the moods of mass democracy, imbued with the cosmopolitan culture of Europe, and seeking to cultivate the growing economic interdependence of the two economies, both Salisbury and Theophile Delcasse sought a close understanding between the two neighbors. Very importantly, throughout the crisis the French Ambassador to London (Courcel) and Delcasse appeared to believe that Salisbury was doing everything he could to avoid war and although he could not say so in public that he would be prepared to accommodate France elsewhere (in Morocco) after the crisis was resolved by a French withdrawal.[42] The liberal press – the *Manchester Guardian* and the radical pro-Dreyfusard press in France – were both thoroughly opposed to escalating the crisis. And the business elite on both sides of the Channel were appalled at the idea of war.[43]

In the end, the two appear to have been very close to war. Indeed, without French resentment of Germany's conquest of Alsace-Lorraine there might have been war. On the other hand, if the Sudan had been clearly delimited territory, there is little indication that the two sides would have felt themselves to have been

so firmly in the right. Colonial disputes between liberals elsewhere were resolved through negotiation. Both geopolitical and liberal forces rescued the two from war.

Statistical assessment

Can we rely on statistical data sets for anomalies? Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman find World War I unproblematic as a confirming case (probably too unproblematic, given Germany's mixed status – a rechtstaat at home and absolute monarchy in foreign policy, as discussed above).[44] However, as a disconfirming case, Finland's formal status as a democratic belligerent of the Allies in World War II is driving much of the recent statistical differences. Ruling Finland out by the thousand battle deaths criterion of Singer and Small is a useful statistical convenience but does not resolve the issue.[45] If today the United States and Britain or Canada or France or India suddenly attacked each other and stopped before sustaining one thousand casualties, no advocate of the liberal thesis should regard the theory as vindicated. Here is where we need careful case studies. A good place to begin would be Allied and Nazi relations with Finland. Was Finland regarded as an enemy by the Allies and, if so, was this in a way similar to how the other enemy states were regarded? If yes, then this should be regarded as a disconfirming case; if not, not.

Once we have identified the best criteria to construct data sets, there is a key role for statistical assessment. An article by Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa presents a valuable contribution to a more refined statistical testing of the "democratic peace" proposition. Drawing on evidence from 1816 and 1980,[46] they confirm the three major propositions: that "democracies" are as likely as any other regime to get into war, that they are significantly less likely to go to war with one another, and that they are less likely to get into militarized disputes with one another.[47] (The authors follow much of the literature in including all participatory polities irrespective of whether they are liberal or not.)

The authors then proceed to segment the dependent variable – both war and dispute data – into five periods: "1) pre-World War I (1816–1913); 2) World War I (1914–18); 3) the interwar years (1919–38); 4) World War II (1939–45); and post-World War II (1946–80)."[48] Doing so, they discover that before 1914, although democratic states were less likely to engage in war with one another, this result is no longer statistically significant (it could have occurred by chance). (The democratic probability of war is lower in every period but World War II, but the relationship is statistically powerful only during World War I and the Cold War.) Moreover, democratic states before World War I are more, not less, likely to get into low-level disputes with one another than are nondemocratic states with other nondemocratic states. (Democratic states are less likely to get into disputes in every period but the pre-1914 period, but only the period of World War II and the Cold War are statistically significant.) The results are interesting.

The reasons for segmenting the data, however, are less clear. Segmenting the data in that fashion makes no more sense than picking a random set of decades or

half centuries, unless one is testing the democratic or liberal model against some other model. It is worth paying some attention to their justifications.

The authors offer two reasons for breaking up the data set of democratic peace and war. First, they note that general wars such as World War I and World War II are different from dyadic wars. These wars are seen to involve systemic effects and attempts to "pass the buck" that operate over and above dyad-specific and domestic regime effects.[49] This may be so, but if so, these periods of general war should constitute an especially difficult time for liberal cooperation. General systemic wars constitute especially severe tests of dyadic conceptions of war as states are pressured to choose sides on strategic alliance criteria ("the enemy of my enemy is my friend"), rather than regime criteria. In World War II this produced the well-known anomaly of the formal state of war existing between the liberal Allies and liberal Finland, because Finland was an enemy of the nonliberal Soviet Union, which was allied to the United States and Britain. Nonetheless, liberal logic should resist systemic logic and hold up here. Why exclude those challenges?

A second reason offered for separating pre-World War I data from post-World War II data is unspecified differences in "processes underlying alliance formation [and] war outbreak," on the one hand, and "bipolarity and nuclear weapons," on the other. First, it is of course just these processes that we seek to test; what is the alternative set of processes? Second, one could and should test the liberal or democratic model against other theories such as international structure – bipolarity and multipolarity, nuclear or conventional weapons. Indeed there have been – so far – no wars between atomic and nuclear armed powers.[50] Nuclear deterrence thus might account for peace among the United States, Britain, and France in the Cold War, and it widens the argument to incorporate US–Soviet relations. Does it also account for fewer militarized disputes and as extensive cooperation? Does it not leave unaccounted for the preatomic peace among liberal republics? More promisingly, do multipolar alliances perhaps generate interallied strife, and bipolar alliances interallied peace? Perhaps common security interests are stronger in alliances in bipolar systems, or perhaps the bipolar hegemons preserve the peace by policing the weaker allies. It would be worth testing whether bipolar peace is the true underlying cause of the peace among democracies in the US bloc of the Cold War. But we must ask the same question of bipolarity in the other, the Soviet, bloc. Both sides intervened in the nonliberal Third World. But the degree of constraint imposed by the USSR on its Warsaw Pact "allies," and the repeated military interventions against its fellow communists in 1953 (East Germany), 1956 (Hungary) and 1968 (Czechoslovakia), and border war with China (1969), contrast significantly with US relations with its fellow democracies in NATO (although NATO relations were far from equal or harmonious).

None of the measures captures the temporal or institutionalized dimension of the liberal peace. Liberalism claims to avert not merely war in any given year but any war among liberal states as long as they are liberal. It looks to the probability not that war was avoided by Britain and France in 1898 but that it was avoided continuously for as long as they both were liberal. If we multiply the probabilities

in each given year to find the joint probability over almost two hundred years, the probability that the liberal peace is a statistical accident becomes remarkably small (as noted above it is 2 preceded by a decimal point and twenty zeros, in Bruce Russett's calculation.)[51] Wars, however, are not independent events. War in one year makes war in the next likely, as peace connects to peace, so the statistical measure is suspect. But not measuring the joint probability is equally suspect because it is that very jointness that is the essence of the liberal claim.

Commerce is a source both of conflict and, for liberals, of peace. If one controls for commerce, does the relationship between democracies and disputes change?[52] Or, perhaps, the pre-1900 disputatiousness of democracies is due to the incompleteness of liberal democracy in the earlier era when the franchise was limited (*inter alia*, women were denied the franchise) and democratic principles were new. The best we can do is test theoretical models against each other. Until we have an alternative model, segmenting the data does not produce meaningful results.

In the end, as with most theoretical disputes, the debate will turn on the alternatives. Liberal theory should not be compared with the statistical residual, a richly described case study, or "History," but with the comparative validity of other theories of similar scope. To do this, we need disconfirmable versions of the two other leading modern candidates of similar scope, Realism and Marxism (one of my aims in *Ways of War and Peace*).

The logic of liberal interventions

Sebastian Rosato has raised the interesting question of how interventions can be consistent with liberal peace.[53] We know that the actual record of liberal states is far from pacific. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display exceptional degrees of distrust in their dealings with powerful nonliberal states.[54] Liberal states ("libertarian") acted as initiators in 24 out of the 56 interstate wars in which they participated between 1816 and 1980, while nonliberals were on the initiating side in 91 out of the 187 times in which they participated in interstate wars.[55] Liberal metropoles were the overwhelming participators in "extrasystemic wars", colonial wars, which we can assume to have been by and large initiated by the metropole. Furthermore, the US intervened in the Third World more than twice as often in the period 1946–1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946–1979.[56] Relatedly, the US devoted one-quarter and the Soviet Union one-tenth of their respective defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely security-defensive character).[57]

One straightforward answer is that just as not all peaces among liberal, and other states need be explained by liberal factors, so too wars may have various nonliberal sources. Real people and real polities are complex creations and contingent creations. The wars and interventions could be products of Realist balance of power and evidence that the strong still do what they can to promote security, prestige and profits, and that the weak suffer when they must. Or, Marxian socialist factors could be at play, and the interventions could be imperialist enforcement of the interests of the capitalist ruling class.

Alternatively, racism can also partly explain the interventions and the liberal peace. Among the liberal corruptions, factors such as racism or deep ethnic prejudice may be at play.[58] The peace works well among Caucasian or European peoples, perhaps, but not between them and non-Caucasians and non-Europeans. Given the actual history of racism and ethnic chauvinism we cannot dismiss these interpretations, but we can note that fellow Anglo-Saxonhood did not do much to prevent the two world wars of the twentieth century that pitted Germany on one side and the US and UK on the other.

Genuinely liberal features also offer coherent accounts. I have argued that the liberal peace rests on the joint determination of three pillars operating at once: republican restraint, interliberal respect, and transnational connections. But what happens if we drop one or more? This indeed is what may be occurring when interventions, other than defensive, take place. In relations with nonliberal societies, liberal societies can be governed by economic interests alone or principled liberal motives can join material interests in liberal imperialism.

The concern for individual rights that reinforces respect among liberal states can be a source of suspicion and distrust between liberals and nonliberals. Liberals wonder whether the foreign nonliberal states can be trusted if they are not prepared to trust their own people to hold the government accountable. Campaigns against the slave trade destabilized commercial oligarchies, making them prone to collapse. The *mission civilatrice* and the "dual mandate" imperial ideologies both included liberal principles, albeit non-Kantian ones that allowed for liberal imperial paternalism of the sort J.S. Mill (1973) endorsed for societies he and his fellow liberals saw as incapable of governing themselves. Commercial and property interests, which lacked institutionalization in much of Africa and Asia, were even more important and defending them appeared to some to be just, when they lacked the security that laws of property would afford (see Chapter 2).

Kant would only justify access according to the third definitive article, the opportunity to negotiate trade or investment agreements. If the local ruler rejected such access, and the applicant's life was not in danger, there would be no right to trade or invest. But what if one local potentate or tribal ruler offered trade and investment rights and a rival, local tribal ruler rejected such rights or awarded the same property to rival foreign interests. Where then would the liberal home country stand, if violence ensued? Would the rights agreed to by contract and the protection of citizens from seizure be abandoned in the face of violent usurpation? In the colonized periphery, this situation, unfortunately, was as typical as the simple imperial looting and gunboat diplomacy that shapes the narrative of imperial intervention.

Liberals were all too ready to enforce those property claims both as a matter of material interest and principled defense of rights. Interliberal peace rests on the combined effect of the three pillars. Remove one of them from either state and pacific policy is under-determined and undermined.

During the Cold War, the US did intervene against or take measures to covertly undermine numerous popular regimes in the Third World. The reasons are extensive and complex, but liberal factors may have played a role. In many cases the

US Administration in office was convinced that the regimes in question (Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Jagan in Guyana, Allende in Chile, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua) were threats both to property and the rule of law. The fact that these regimes were more progressive and popular than any regime in those countries before (and, in some cases, since) did not make them well-established liberal democracies. Many US officials doubted their stability as democracies. They were also seen as influenced by and allied with communist regimes. President Kennedy articulated the logic clearly, referring to the assassination of Trujillo in the Democratic Republic: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we cannot really renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third."[59] As importantly, all of these interventions were covert; they lacked the mechanisms of publicity on which the liberal peace rests. The explanation underlying the liberal peace makes no assumption that every official, always and everywhere, is motivated by liberal principle and interest – just that over the normal political cycle nonliberal principles and interests will not become the norm in the formation of liberal foreign policy.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 illustrated another intervention, widely regarded as both illegitimate and imprudent. US hostility stemmed from factors that any great power and any state committed to the international rule of law would have found provoking. These included Saddam Hussein's record of aggression against his neighbors (particularly Kuwait), the implicit threat he posed to security of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and his unwillingness to assure the international community that he had eliminated programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction as he had been required to do as part of the settlement of the first Gulf War in 1991 (Security Council Resolution 687). Distinctly liberal factors were also at work. Saddam's genocidal campaigns against the Kurds and his record of flagrant abuses of the Iraqi population shaped his international reputation. But the particular circumstances of the run-up to the 2003 invasion appeared more significant than either of the longer trends in hostility. The Bush Administration, aware that the American public held it responsible for preventing another 9/11 attack and benefiting from a public mood that politically rewarded a "war-on-terror presidency," read – and presented to the public – every piece of pre-invasion intelligence according to the most threatening interpretation.[60] It attempted to justify the war by denouncing alleged Iraqi programs to build weapons of mass destruction and foster ties to al-Qaeda (for which no support could be found afterwards) and it promised to induce a transformative spread of democracy in the region, beginning with Iraq.[61] Reacting to the insurgency that greeted the invasion, the poor planning that characterized the occupation and mounting US and Iraqi casualties, by 2005 a majority of the US public, as had the publics of other democracies earlier, had turned against the war. The long-term results of the invasion and effort to democratize Iraq were far from clear. Iraq had experienced a referendum on a constitution and national elections, but splits among its three major communities (Shia, Sunni, and Kurd) threatened a civil war. Even aggressive liberals who

might have welcomed a democratic transformation of the region questioned the method, with the widely controverted legality of the invasion and the long-run costs expected by some to mount to two trillion dollars.[62]

A much more logical explanation comes with costs. Data sets on the liberal peace do not adequately code for these three pillars together and separately. My own coding (1983 and 1997) was approximate. The most thorough recent empirical test of Kantian propositions (Russett and O'neal 2001) shows the separate positive effects of democratic institutions and trade (and membership in international organizations), but it doesn't separately code for liberal norms. The substantial statistical confirmation that inter-democratic peace does receive is thus probably a reflection of the tendency for principles of liberal individualism and democratic institutions to evolve together. But we cannot be sure of this. Compared to other testable international theories of similar scope the empirical confirmation of the liberal peace is exceptionally strong, but that does not mean that the theory does not need additional testing.

Foreign policy choices

Farber and Gowa have suggested that the United States should abandon the pursuit of democratic enlargement and instead recognize that states in fact pursue "common interests" over "common polities."[63] But "common interests" do not constitute an alternative model. The debate is not about whether states pursue their interests; it is about how to define and judge the interests of states. Realists (of a Structural persuasion) see those interests in terms of the balance of power; Liberals, in terms of liberal accommodation; Marxists in terms of class warfare and solidarity. When we have to choose, is democratization a better long-term strategy for the United States than enhancing our position in the balance of power? It is over choices such as these that the debate should continue.

Even if our answer favors democratization, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have warned us that democratization is not enough.[64] Given all the instabilities of regime change, democratization may provoke more war. Their statistical analysis has been challenged, and the evidence is still in dispute, by Andrew Enterline.[65] But if Mansfield and Snyder are correct, liberals have little to be surprised about, but much to worry about. Without liberal principles and international interdependence, all of which take time, democratizing regimes may well be war-prone.

We have here a useful warning. Yet in the long run, liberalization across nations seems to hold great promise. How does one get from here to there? Golden parachutes for ex-dictators and the military are one idea with a considerable history that may contribute to at least short-run stability.[66] Extending international institutions, or enhancing them, may be another answer.[67] Can the promise of European Union membership and the presence of assistance and association be an institutional bridge over a difficult transition? Can similar institutional mechanisms become operative in Africa and Asia? These are well worth our attention.

Preserving the legacy of the liberal peace without succumbing to the legacies of liberal imprudence has proven to be both a moral and a strategic challenge. The

bipolar structure of the international system and the near certainty of mutual devastation resulting from a nuclear war between the superpowers created a "crystal ball effect" during the Cold War that helped constrain the tendency toward miscalculation present at the outbreak of so many wars in the past.[68] But this "nuclear peace" appears to have been be limited to the superpowers. It did not curb military interventions in the Third World. Moreover, it was subject to a desperate technological race designed to overcome its constraints, and to crises that pushed even the superpowers to the brink of war. Today, we must still reckon with the imprudent vehemence and moods of complaisant appeasement that have almost alternately swept liberal democracies.

Yet restraining liberal imprudence, whether aggressive or passive, may not be possible without threatening liberal pacification – unless liberal peoples themselves become capable of principled self-restraint of the very sort Kant advocated. Improving the strategic acumen of our foreign policy calls for introducing steadier strategic calculations of the long-run national interest and more flexible responses to changes in the international political environment. Constraining the indiscriminate meddling of our foreign interventions calls for a deeper appreciation of the "particularism of history, culture, and membership."[69] But both the improvement in strategy and the constraint on intervention in turn seem to require an executive freed from the restraints of a representative legislature in the management of foreign policy or a political culture indifferent to the universal rights of individuals, unless the people themselves can acquire a cosmopolitan appreciation or legitimate difference. Short of the popular enlightenment, executive independence could break the chain of constitutional guarantees, the respect for representative government, and the web of transnational contact that have sustained the pacific union of liberal states.

Liberalism at the twentieth century's end looks remarkably robust. Ironically, so it did at the beginning. If nothing else, we should have learned something about peace, war, and cooperation from our very bloody twentieth century. We have paid a high tuition; let us hope we have learned that liberal democracy is worth defending. The promise of peace may well be one more reason for doing so.

Notes

1 I discuss each of these variants as well as variants of Realism and Socialism in *Ways of War and Peace* (NewYork: W.W. Norton, 1997).

2 A partial list of significant studies on Kant's international theory that I have found helpful includes, in addition to ones I discuss below: A.C. Armstrong, "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," *The Journal of Philosophy* 28 (1931), pp. 197–204; Carl J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1948); W.B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); William Galston, *Kant and the Problem of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Pierre Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds, *History of Political Philosophy*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 554–93; F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace," in S. Hoffmann, ed., *The State of War*, (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 45–87; Patrick Riley, *Kant's*

Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983); Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *American Political Science Review* 56 (1962), pp. 331–40; Yirmiahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Susan Shell, *The Rights of Reason* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980); Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Roger Sullivan, *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Sissela Bok, *A Strategy for Peace* (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and Pierre Laberge, "Kant on Justice and the Law of Nations," in Terry Nardin and David Mapel, eds, *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 82–102; G.W. Brown, *Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); and especially Susan M. Shell, "Kant's True Politics: Völkerrecht in *Toward Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals,*" Chapter 6 of *Kant and the Limits of Autonomy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Theory of Peace," in Paul Guyer, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 477–504.

3 To be compatible with the published essays here, I cite Kant's works from Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Political Writings*, Hans Reiss, ed., and H.B. Nisbet, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). I cite "Perpetual Peace" (1795) as *PP*; "The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," (1784) as *UH*; "The Contest of Faculties" (1798) as *CF*; "The Metaphysics of Morals" (1797) as *MM*. But I recommend the new translation by David Colclasure in Pauline Kleingeld, ed., *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

4 Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1999), pp. 75–6; John MacMillan, "A Kantian Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter-Liberal State Peace," *Millennium* 24, no. 3 (1994), pp. 549–62.

5 Kant probably had in mind Revolutionary France. The French Constitution of 1791, in a thoroughly Kantian spirit, declares: "The French nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view to making conquests, and will never employ its forces against the liberty of any people." French forces, however, in the course of initially defensive wars, were soon waging war in an anti-Kantian spirit "for" the interests of popular liberty, overthrowing ruling autocracies in what we now call the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Italy. See Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) pp. 77–8ff.

6 He may, of course, have had in mind Article 4, section 4, the "Guarantee Clause" of the US Constitution, in which each state is guaranteed (required) to be a republic, but I am aware of no evidence that he had this aspect of the US Constitution as his model.

7 Kant becomes even more skeptical of the practicality of peace at the end of his life, in the short "Anthropology," but he still reaffirms the duty of working toward peace, with the expectation that, in the long run, nature is heading in that direction. See the discussion in Murray G. Forsyth, *Unions of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981), pp 102–3.

8 Kant, *MM*, para. 54, p. 165.

9 Kant, *MM*, para. 56, p. 167.

10 Pauline Kleingeld in a recent paper presented at Goethe University in November, 2010, makes a persuasive argument that Kant kept this ideal of a supranational federal republican order even while he explored the then feasible ideal of a non-supranational separate peace among republics. See also her "Approaching Perpetual Peace: Kant's Defense of a League of States and his Ideal of a World Federation," *European Journal of Philosophy* 12 (2004), pp. 304–25.

11 Kant, *MM*, para. 57, pp. 168–9.

12 Kant, *MM*, para. 60, p. 170. This "unjust enemy" is not identical to, but resembles the "outlaw states" discussed by Rawls in *Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1999), pp. 5 and 90. The Reiss translation uses "made to accept" a new constitution. Pauline Kleingeld has informed me that a better translation is "let the people accept." The unjust state can be defeated and the people then allowed to form their own constitution, which Kant implied would be a republican.

13 Kant, *PP*, p. 102. I thank Susan Shell for the suggestion in conversation that this is a better interpretation of the original German and the Third Definitive Article and the preliminary articles preclude coercive intervention.

14 Kant, *PP*, pp. 93–7.

15 Kant remarks on Frederick in *PP*, p. 102. This point was drawn to my attention by Dr. Dominique Leydet.

16 Kant, *MM*, para. 54, p. 165.

17 At best, representatives exercise budgetary controls over war decisions and can punish or, in rare cases, impeach the executive for illegitimate wars. Rational executives should be able to anticipate these constraints, if the representatives are backed by public support.

18 For a persuasive discussion of what it might take to improve modern republics along these lines see Rawls's, *Law of Peoples* (discussed in Chapter 6 above) and an insightful recent paper by Luigi Caranti, "One More Time Back to Kant: From the Democratic Peace to the Kantian Peace" (draft, 2010). The best modern political science can ascribe to representation is the semi-responsible electorate thesis originated by V.O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (New York: Vintage, 1968), and the literature that builds on it, where retrospective voting by "switchers" might provide a representative connection sufficient for a degree of Kantian responsibility when rational politicians anticipate the possibility of switching.

19 I draw some of the section that follows from *Ways of War and Peace* (pp. 277–300), an essay co-written with Stefano Recchia (forthcoming), and from "The Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (August 2005), pp. 463–6.

20 I explore all these in *Ways of War and Peace*.

21 Clarence Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Altantic* Vol. 14 (New York: Harper, 1939) pp. 88, 90–2, seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the fifteen leading democracies of the 1930s. D.V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," *Industrial Research* (April 1972), pp. 55–8, performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace." And R.J. Rummel did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of laissez-faire) focusing on the postwar period in "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (1983), pp. 27–71. I use the term liberal in a wider (Kantian) sense in my discussion of this issue in Chapter 1 above, where I survey the period from 1790 to the present, and find no war among liberal states. Recent work supporting the thesis of democratic pacification is discussed in Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (March 1989), pp. 3–35, and John Oneal, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett in "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950–1985," *Journal of Peace Research* (February 1996), pp. 11–28. A valuable survey of the debate over the empirical evidence for the democratic peace, assembling much of the best of the criticism and responses to that criticism, can be found in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds), *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

22 Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft: Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 267–306.

23 Andrew Moravcsik, "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe," *International Organization* 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 217–52;

Giandomenico Majone, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance," *European Union Politics* 2, no. 1 (2001), pp. 103–22; Darren G. Hawkins *et al.*, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Democratization and International Organizations," *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006), pp. 137–67.

24 G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Judith Goldstein and Joanne Gowa, "US National Power and the Post-War Trading Regime," *World Trade Review* 1, no. 2 (2002), pp. 153–70.

25 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Charles Boehmer *et al.*, "Do IGOs Promote Peace?" *World Politics* 57, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–38.

26 James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994), pp. 577–92; De Mesquita *et al.* "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *APSR* 93 (December, 1999), pp. 791–807; Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform: Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* Vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 233–66; Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

27 John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* Vol. 19, no. 2 (1994), pp. 87–125; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 4 (1995), pp. 491–517; Spencer Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

28 Havard Hegre, "Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?" *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2000), pp. 5–30; Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007), pp. 166–91.

29 Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Politics? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace," *Journal of Politics* 59, no. 2 (1997), pp. 393–417.

30 Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003), pp. 585–602.

31 See Chapter 2 above and Doyle (1997), fn. 1 to Table 8.1, p. 264.

32 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions* 17, no. 3 (1992), pp. 245–68.

33 I have heard the tag most often from Robert Gilpin.

34 This is the strategy employed by John Owen in the *International Security* 20 (Fall 1995) collection, reprinting his *IS* 1994 article. James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).

35 Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. xxviii and discussed further in chap. 6. For an excellent account of Bethmann's aims and the constraints he encountered, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History* 2 (1969), pp. 48–76.

36 This case and the British–American War of 1812 are examined insightfully by John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace".

37 James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 548.

38 The Proclamation only applied to the states currently in rebellion and did not affect slaves held in the occupied border states.

39 Ibid., p. 567.

40　See the article by Christopher Layne, reference discussed below, and Erik Yesson, *Power and Diplomacy in World Politics* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1992). Other difficulties for the liberal thesis are raised by Hongying Wang, "Liberal Peace? A Study of the Fashoda Crisis of 1898," APSA Conference Paper (1992). But for a contrast favoring liberal explanations over Realist in the Fashoda and Spanish–American War crises, see James Lee Ray, "Comparing the Fashoda Crisis and the Spanish American War," *APSA* Conference Paper (1994). And see the discussion of Fashoda below.

41　Valuable sources on the incident include Darrell Bates, *The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); G.N. Sanderson, *England, Europe, and the Upper Nile* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965); Roger Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa 1893–1898* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Christopher Andrew, *Theophile Delcasse and the Making of the Entente Cordiale* (London: Macmillan, 1968); and Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1981).

42　At the same time the French were told that the Queen was also urging moderation on Salisbury and the Cabinet. See Courcel to Delcasse, 29 October 1898, No. 465, Min. des Affairs Etrangeres, *Documents Diplomatiques Francais*, 1st Serie, Tome XIV (Paris: 1957) pp. 731 and 751.

43　See William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902* (New York: Knopf, 1951) pp. 552–3; Lebow, p. 322; and Bates, *The Fashoda Incident*, pp. 154–5.

44　Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

45　J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982).

46　Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995) pages 123–146.

47　Ibid., pp. 119, 121. The authors are raising issues that should concern liberals. Even if democracies get into fewer disputes, why democracies get into militarized disputes at all is a problem worth more attention. Perhaps they are more commercially interdependent – and thus have more to dispute about? Their disputatiousness may also be an ironic product of their success in avoiding war; militarized signaling may be employed simply because neither party assumes real war will result. Thus the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, one of the most serious disputes of the Cold War period, which involved naval intimidation and bumping and may have resulted in a casualty, could have been a product of the assumption that the dispute would never go as far as real war. In this respect it resembles perhaps the bumping games (constrained by nuclear deterrence) that the U.S. and Soviet submarines played during the Cold War.

48　Ibid., p. 119.

49　Ibid., p. 114.

50　Kenneth Waltz has elaborated the reasons for nuclear peace in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: Norton, 1995). One exception to the nuclear peace might be the battles in 1969 between the USSR and the People's Republic of China along the Ussuri River Border. But casualty figures are uncertain in that conflict, and so was the status of China's deliverable nuclear weapons.

51　Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace – and Yet It Moves," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164–75.

52　John Oneal, Frances Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett in "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950–1985," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 33, no.1 (February 1996), pp. 11–28, examine these questions and find both interdependence and democracy contribute to peace.

53　Rosato (2003).

54　For a discussion of the historical effects of Liberalism on colonialism, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and post World War II interventions see Chapter 2 and the sources cited there.

55 Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 4 (1984) p. 636.

56 Walter Clemens, "The Superpowers and the Third World," in Charles Kegley and Pat McGowan, eds., *Foreign Policy; USA/USSR* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982) pp. 117–118.

57 Barry Posen and Stephen VanEvera, "Overarming and Underwhelming," *Foreign Policy* 40 (1980), pp. 99–118; and "Reagan Administration Defense Policy," in Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds, *Eagle Defiant* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983) pp. 86–9.

58 They often come into play during wars, explaining crimes such as strategic bombing of cities. Helmut Schmidt persuasively denounced allied bombing of Germany in World War II as "wholly unjustified, indeed inexcusable" (p. 326 of Max Hastings, *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945*, New York: Vintage, 2005). Bombing civilians achieved no strategic end; only precision bombing of oil and transport were effective constraints on the Nazi war machine.

59 Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769; quoted in Chapter 3 above.

60 One instance was the neglect of information widely available in the Administration that Niger was very unlikely to have sold uranium ore to Iraq. The charge that it did nonetheless wound up as the infamous 16 words in the President's 2003 State of the Union Address justifying the march to war. See Eric Lichtblau, "2002 Memo Doubted Uranium Sale Claim," *NYT* Ja 18 (2006). I discuss the illegitimacy of the Iraq case in *Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

61 For an informative collection of speeches by President Bush and Secretary Powell justifying the war and Senator Byrd and others criticizing those rationales see "Why Attack Iraq?" in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, eds, *Ethics and Politics*, 4th edn. (Belmont, CA: Thomson, 2006), pp. 45–60, 88–95. For a thoughtful legal analysis, pro and con, see Lord Peter Goldsmith, "Downing Street Memo to Tony Blair." (Office of the Prime Minster, 2002) and Thomas Franck, "Agora: What Happens Now?" *AJIL* 97 (2003), p. 607. And, for policy analysis, pro and con, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Threatening Storm* (New York: Random House, 2002) chapters 5 and 11, and Chaim Kaufmann "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5–48.

62 See the January, 2006, paper by Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes in which one trillion is the low estimate and two the high, taking into account the long-term medical and other indirect costs associated with the war, http:/www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/Cost_of_War_in_Iraq.pdf.

63 Farber and Gowa (1995), p. 122.

64 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 183–207.

65 Andrew Enterline, "Driving while Democratizing: A Rejoinder of Mansfield and Snyder," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 183–207.

66 Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 6.

67 See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5–41.

68 Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909, and Albert Carnesale *et al.*, *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam, 1983), p. 44.

69 Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 5.

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