FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



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Feminism and International Relations

Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions

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For **Aidan**
who keeps me true
And for **Lynn**
who keeps me there

Contents

Preface to the 1997 Reprint

Like many feminists who study in the area of International Relations (IR), I was – and am – struck by the ways in which this discipline resists the incorporation of feminist analyses. When I started this project seven years ago there were no explicitly feminist works from within IR to which I could refer: not a single publication. On the one hand, it made the project a 'safe bet' for a dissertation topic. On the other hand, it indicated the extent of the invisibility of gender issues within IR: by the late 1980s, feminist thinking and activism were not exactly new phenomena. Yet the discipline of IR had largely failed to notice them.

The explanations given, of course, were usually intellectual, more rarely political. The discipline of IR has been dominated by the realist approach. By this view, states act rationally in the pursuit of power within an anarchic system. Analyses of women or of gender were simply inappropriate to the study of 'states, power and anarchy'. Sometimes it was observed that fewer women than men were drawn to the field of IR. By this logic, there were fewer opportunities to bring feminist analyses to the discipline. Women, it seemed, were the usual, perhaps natural, carriers of feminist scholarship (the former is more true than the latter).

Less attention was given to the ways in which IR and feminism were politically at odds with one another: IR being concerned with order and feminism concerned always with disrupting those order(s). International Relations has resisted approaches which aim at the disruption of prevailing orders, whether they be feminist or marxist, critical theory or international political economy. I remain uncertain, on some days, whether there is a special resistance to feminism, or whether feminist thought is simply the easiest to delegitimise, to dismiss as 'outside of the discipline'. The answer, of course, is that there is some truth in both of these observations: an enormous amount of energy goes into demonstrating how easy it is to dismiss feminism, in IR and elsewhere. Where this cannot be done by making feminist analyses invisible, it has been done by arguing that both the substance and form taken by feminist analyses are inappropriate to the study of IR.

In the seven years since I began this project, however, there has been much feminist activity within the field and, increasingly, numerous books and articles are available. Beginning with two special editions of the journal *Millennium* in 1988 and 1989, publications have appeared regularly in anthologies, some journals and books. Indeed, in the time since the main text of this book was completed, a number of new books have appeared,

including Cynthia Enloe's *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*, V. Spike Peterson and Anne S. Runyan's *Global Gender Issues* and Christine Sylvester's *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*, to name only a few. The feminist pace, in other words, has picked up dramatically.

Nonetheless, the study and teaching of IR seems to continue much as before, largely unmoved by feminist analyses. Many mainstream journals have yet to publish their first feminist article, and most course outlines in undergraduate and graduate programmes have at best a few token examples of feminist literature, or a week at the end of term that is often taught by a guest – read female – speaker. Numerous anthologies are including a feminist chapter, but most of the work that appears throughout the rest of those anthologies seems unfamiliar with, and unaffected by, feminist scholarship. Very few publishers have released more than one feminist IR title in series which are dominated by analyses of arms races, deterrence, arms control and other such dissimilar topics.

To move our discipline – the ways we teach and are taught, read, write and watch IR – thus requires even greater effort. This should come as no surprise. Where eight years ago feminist thought could be dismissed in IR because it was too 'new', today it is too dangerous. The political climate of anti-feminism which pervades North American and European universities, the media and popular culture, characterises feminist thought and activism as undermining freedom of speech, freedom of action and freedom of thought. By this view, traditional disciplines are being replaced by ideological ones based on feminism, anti-racist scholarship and sometimes even anti-homophobic work. The ideological nature of the traditions is seldom examined. The constraints imposed by feminists (and others) is considered obvious. Often presented as an 'either/or' option, attention given to women and to gender is seen as detracting from attention to men. Not wanting to give in to ideology, many academic disciplines avoid moments for self-reflection and turn instead to retrenchment and to backlash.

Particular changes in the world of global politics have also dealt their own setbacks to feminist analyses. These changes have posed analytical problems for all scholars of IR but they pose particular problems for feminist IR scholars. In the realm of political violence (what is often described in the field as conflict and security), we have been witness to dramatic upheavals and transformation: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline of Cold War tensions, the rise of nationalist sentiments, and the like. At the same time, within the realm of global political economy, there have been equal and often contradictory movements, not limited to the economic re-integration of various European and post-Soviet states (which are them-

selves dramatic) but including as well the processes of globalisation within the spheres of both production and finance.

It was anticipated that at least some of these changes might signal more opportunities for the introduction of feminist analyses into IR. Certainly this was true within the study of conflict and security for, as the Cold War began to unravel, it seemed for a few moments that some of the issues feminists would like to see added to the agenda of IR discourse might finally find a space. East–West rivalry has so dominated the intellectual energies of practitioners, observers and scholars of international relations that to suggest nuclear deterrence may not be one of the most important issues within IR has been practically unthinkable.

Feminists are interested in a whole host of issues concerning international relations, and treat those issues in a variety of different ways. What we share, however, is the conviction that international relations are as much about international population-control policies as they are about nuclear deterrence; they are as much about sex-trade workers serving foreign military bases as they are about the arms trade; and, they are as much about sex-specific international labour legislation as they are about the foreign policies of so-called 'great' powers. In short, feminists claim that international relations are about numerous phenomena which fundamentally affect the lives of women and men throughout the world and which, because of the primacy given to the 'high politics' of peace and security policy, have gone largely unnoticed, unrecognised and unanalysed.

Any initial optimism for a new international environment in which feminist questions might be raised, however, has long since disappeared. The 'new world order' was ushered in not as an era of declining international hostility, but as a reassertion of American hegemony through the restatement of the centrality and expediency of military violence in resolving international conflicts. As riveting as the Cold War may have been, even superpower posturing did not quite capture our imaginations like the real thing, and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 'Desert Storm' gave us precisely that. Real wars are full of drama, they are exciting, and they are frightening. For some, they are even beautiful. We need only recall one US fighter pilot's description of Baghdad on the first night of that aerial bombardment: the city, he said, was lit up like a Christmas tree. We can be impressed by the logic of the strategic game and horrified by the deaths of hundreds of innocent people in one thirty-minute news broadcast.

The drama of war does tell us something about them: wars *are* important. Only in war do we see clearly and explicitly the tools of violence available to the state. Desert Storm illustrated for any who would listen what a 'monopoly of force' really means. Of course, the marginalised, the dis-

senters, the minorities, the silenced – they have long understood this dictum. But the forms of violence used to silence these groups are often exercised quietly and covertly. During the Persian Gulf War, by contrast, the overwhelming power of the state arrived graphically in our living rooms every evening.

It is the power and violence of the Gulf War that served as one of the early markers for the 'new' world order. It has been joined with violence in other areas of the world, including Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere. All of the ways in which feminist concerns have been rendered invisible in the past thus remain unchallenged. Wars, and the traditional analyses made of them, retell a familiar story: the most important elements of international relations revolve around the activities of states, diplomats and generals. By this view, international relations are gender neutral. It is this attitude which may make feminist struggle even *more* problematic in the new world order. Realists never claimed to intentionally promote the sexism which is inherent in their analysis. Rather, we are told, they seek to describe the world 'as it really is'. It is not the categories of realism that are sexist, but the world they seek to describe; it is not that relations of domination between women and men do not exist, but that they do not exist in relations between states. The new world order embodies these myths as much as the old and, having been created out of the ultimate confirmation of realist precepts, these myths will be all the more difficult to shake.

Transformations within the global political economy are no more hopeful. Early attention to political-economic issues after the collapse of the Soviet Union focused on the reintegration of national economies and the application of Western-based norms and institutions to problems of debt, production and restructuring. Like their realist counterparts within the realm of conflict and security, the demand for policy-relevant advice under such difficult circumstances rendered largely invisible the ways in which these conditions depend upon and affect gender relations.

More critical commentators within political economy have turned our attention to the centralising and disintegrating tendencies of the forces of globalisation. As writers such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Eric Helleiner have observed, the global political economy consists of at least two sometimes contradictory components: global production and global finance. Bound by few and ineffective political authorities, the global economy is nonetheless informed and maintained by a small and increasingly cohesive group of decision-makers acting on the uncontested (at least within their midsts) norms of global liberalisation. Such centralisation ensures that the margins of the global political economy become ever more

marginal – more territorially-bound as they are than those within the power centres of production and finance and suffering more directly the costs of liberalisation. This is true of the industrial working class, many 'developing' countries, different elements of national states (those not directly connected to financial decision-making and the central banks), racial and ethnic minorities, various social movements and, of course, women. The powerful forces of globalisation, in other words, both demobilise and refocus the energies of whosoever makes up the margins through constantly shifting the terrain of political action and analysis. Under such circumstances, feminist analyses again become increasingly difficult.

Despite these counter-tendencies, however, I attempt here to make one more contribution to the growing chorus of feminist voices engaging the discipline of IR. This contribution is by no means complete; it tells one small part of the story. The focus here is on an analysis of gender relations in international institutions. I argue throughout this work that we ought to be concerned with the ways in which international practices are involved in creating and sustaining assumptions around gender and gender relations. Notions of masculine and feminine or the appropriate roles of women and men in the workforce, society or family (to name only a few) are, simply put, social constructs. My claim here is that international institutions are one part of a complex process in that construction.

Our ideas about gender and gender relations derive from the real, material, lived experience of women and men, from the ideas that they hold of that experience, and from the institutions they create to embody those ideas. These institutions range in scope from a focus on local concerns, to regional issues, to the national level and to the global. As I write throughout this text, prevailing notions about gender are one of a number of issues or concerns that become embedded in those institutions. Once embedded, the institutions' policies and practices serve to reproduce those assumptions. At other times, institutional policies and practices may sometimes alter gendered assumptions.

This work illustrates this analysis through examining the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ways in which both of these international institutions 'understood' and organised around gender has varied dramatically throughout their histories. This book explores that variation, and the ways in which particular activists or particular historical, social or economic conditions shaped those understandings.

It is important to underline that this is not the only way an analysis of gender might be applied. International practices include far more than simply the activities of international institutions. Many feminist analysts

have applied the notion of gender very effectively to quite different contexts: Cynthia Enloe has worked on militarism and debt management, Deborah Stienstra has examined international women's movements, V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan have developed analyses of security issues and state-building, and the list could go on. An analysis which focuses on gender, in other words, need not concern itself exclusively with international organisations.

It is important to note also that even when applied to international institutions, a gendered analysis might be done in ways quite different from that described here: there are numerous other institutions that might be engaged, and there are numerous ways of looking at them. This analysis focuses on the policy statements and plans that emerge from the ILO and the IPPF. These are Western-created and based institutions which have particular functional concerns: birth control and labour legislation. An examination of institutions that do not originate in the West, for example, no doubt would render very different assumptions around gender within policy formulations, as would an analysis of institutions concerned with health issues or environmental concerns. Examinations of institutions may also focus more than I have here on the internal debates within particular organisations, or on particular projects engaged in by the organisation.

My point here is that there are a variety of ways in which a gender analysis might be applied, and all are useful in explicating the different ways in which international institutions and practices contain, affect and are affected by gender relations. All feminist analyses of gender relations contribute different pieces to the puzzle, the final configuration of which will remain ever-changing, but the very process of which is necessary in our own resistance against invisibility.

This resistance is facilitated through the intersection of feminism and other 'critical' areas of IR theorising. Despite the fact that it has been dominated by realist thought, the mainstream discipline of IR is being challenged from many different directions. Work by Craig Murphy, Stephen Gill and Roger Tooze within international political economy, by Mark Neufeld within critical theory, and by Laura Macdonald and Robert Cox on world order transformations and the 'emerging global civil society' are only a few of the writers whose work coincides with many of the issues raised by feminists. Indeed, much of my own work, and the work of other feminists examined here, draws heavily from these literatures.

However, the absence of feminist considerations from *some* of even these more critical works contributes yet again to the invisibility of gender analyses within IR. In some ways this absence seems even more remarkable when it occurs within, for example, historical materialist work than

when it occurs within realist work. We need to be concerned by such absences, but at the same time there are also insights to be drawn from this: whatever issues we bring to the study of IR, there are many others that continue to be excluded. Despite the resistance shown to feminist work, this is far surpassed by the continuing resistance to analyses by anti-racist scholars or work by sexual minorities, among others. Even though many feminists try to incorporate into their work a concern for racism or sexuality, there is no sustained analysis of international relations from either of these perspectives within our discipline. Feminist struggles are only one among many. The political and intellectual alliances we make must always remain cognisant of this.

Through struggles, alliances and, despite the number of years that it has taken me to complete this project, I have been supported throughout this time in numerous ways by a variety of people. I have derived my greatest intellectual inspirations – and owe the largest intellectual debts – to Jane Jenson, Cynthia Enloe, Mark Neufeld and Robert Cox. Anyone familiar with their work will see their influences throughout my own, in ways that I hope have not been subverted beyond recognition. This work has also been read in whole and in part by numerous other people who have been generous with their time and their thoughtful comments and advice: Michael Dolan, John Sigler, Susan Boyd, Oran Young, Eleanor MacDonald, Rianne Mahon, Deborah Stienstra, Michael Williams, Francine D'Amico, Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson are but a few. It is a better work as a result of their kind efforts and its failings, of course, are entirely my own.

Financial support for this work was received from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and York University. I am grateful also for the opportunity to spend a very productive summer as a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario.

I discovered during this project that while I do not like libraries very much (and so have often wondered why I chose this line of work), I do like meeting and talking with actual people. I especially would like to thank the women of Planned Parenthood: Claudette Curran of Planned Parenthood Ottawa; Sharon Coleman, Bonnie Johnson and Rhonda Stoller of the Planned Parenthood Federation of Canada; and Frances Dennis and Joan Swingler of the International Planned Parenthood Federation.

Relations and near-relations have not always understood why projects such as this seem to go on forever, but they have always taken pride in my various accomplishments. The Whitworth-Barolet-Jankowskis, the Greenes, the Andrews and the Strahlendorfs all deserve special mention

List of Abbreviations

AID	United States Agency for International Development
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
FPA	Family Planning Association
IFWW	International Federation of Working Women
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
ILC	International Labour Conference
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPE	International Political Economy
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
IR	International Relations
LWV	League of Women Voters
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NWP	National Woman's Party
PPFA	Planned Parenthood Federation of America
PPWD	Planned Parenthood and Women's Development
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organisation
WID	Women in Development
WPEC	World Population Emergency Campaign

Introduction

> In women's studies, a good piece of conventional wisdom holds that it is simply not enough to 'add women and stir'. In political science, women are just now being added, and the field has hardly begun to stir.
>
> Nannerl Keohane[1]

If Nannerl Keohane's statement is true of political science, it is perhaps even more true of the field of International Relations (IR).[2] In the more than twenty years since the new women's movement emerged in the late 1960s, progress has been made by at least some feminist academics in incorporating analyses of women and gender relations into traditional areas of academic study. The development of a feminist international relations theory, however, has been much slower to emerge. Indeed, of the work that has been done on women and international relations, one shared observation is that IR, of all the social science disciplines, has been one of the most resistant to incorporating feminist analyses of women and gender relations.[3]

There are a variety of reasons for this, the most obvious of which is the very different concerns of IR and feminism. International Relations is a subfield of political science, and one which is much younger than its parent discipline. A product of the twentieth century, mainstream IR was born in the inter-war period and located primarily in the United States.[4] It was created in large part to serve the needs of government, specifically the American government, in training diplomatic and government personnel and answering the 'What should we do?' questions about the important diplomatic and strategic questions of the time. More than most other social science disciplines, mainstream IR has had an intimate relationship with government, both through the funding of IR research institutes and the regular exchange of academic and government personnel. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, IR academics and researchers operate 'not merely in the corridors but also in the kitchens of power'.[5]

Informed by this goal of serving government, scholars of mainstream International Relations have taken as their central concerns the causes of war and the conditions of peace, order and security.[6] Such inquiry appears to be antithetical to the study of women. The 'high politics' of international security policy is, as J. Ann Tickner writes, 'a man's world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity', and from which women traditionally have been excluded.[7]

Much of international relations theorising, moreover, posits a separation between inside and outside, community and anarchy. It is argued that while one may appropriately raise questions of ethics and politics when examining relations within civil society, such questions are irrelevant outside, in the society of nations, where it is appropriate to ask only how rational states may enhance their power within an anarchic system.[8] Apparently absent from the particular substantive concerns of IR, in fact or by definition, the suggestion that women or gender relations should be examined in International Relations is often met with, at best, incredulity, or at worst, hostility.

In contrast to the field of International Relations, contemporary feminism has its roots in a social movement: the women's liberation movement. It represents a protest against prevailing gender-based power structures and against accepted societal norms and values concerning women and men. Feminists have expressed this protest in a variety of ways. Some demand that women be allowed to join the spheres in which only men, historically, have been permitted, while others have demanded more dramatic and fundamental social change. Whatever its different prescriptions, however, feminism is a politics of protest directed at transforming the historically unequal power relationships between women and men.[9]

As a politics of protest, feminism clearly follows a different path from that of IR. It is concerned with those 'inside' questions often defined as irrelevant to the study of international relations. That IR and feminism may be antithetical, then, does not follow merely from their apparently different substantive concerns, but more importantly from their normative and political predispositions: mainstream IR has been concerned primarily with maintaining the (international) status quo while feminism aims at precisely the opposite. It is little wonder that studies of feminism and international relations do not proliferate.

From this brief sketch, it should be clear that many of the issues raised by feminists about IR have previously or are currently being raised by specialists in International Political Economy (IPE). While the political motivations are usually quite different, political economists share a dissatisfaction with mainstream IR's emphasis on (among other things): questions of 'high politics'; its lack of theorising about the relationship between domestic and international politics; the inappropriate and usually untenable separation of politics and economics; and the failure to assess cooperation and interdependence to the same degree that it has anarchy.[10]

International political economists have approached their critique of IR in a variety of ways. Some have sought to enlarge the number of relevant actors through adding firms, international organisations, and sometimes

even social movements, to the usual consideration of state behaviour and the consequences of state action. Others have focused instead on the addition of new issues, arguing that trade and monetary concerns are as important in their own right as military and strategic ones. Still others examine new forms of behaviour, whether these be examples of cooperation, or the intersubjectively shared norms associated with regimes and rule-governed activities within international relations.[11]

More recently, some IPE work, and the work of Critical IR theorists more generally, has moved well beyond simply 'adding in' actors and issues to a far more profound ontological and epistemological challenge to the discipline.[12] This challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy in the social sciences generally and IR in particular has taken many forms, but primarily it entails a rejection of the Enlightenment epistemology around which much of the social sciences has been organised. This means that many of the unquestioned assumptions about the way in which knowledge is constructed are being abandoned: the primacy of the scientific method is being rejected as is the attempt to find an absolute grounding for knowledge. Replacing it is the demand for more interpretative methodologies and the assertion that there are many models for knowledge, and therefore many truths.[13]

The implications of such a challenge are numerous, but at a minimum, it gives a 'voice to many voices',[14] or, as Jim George notes:

> ... [opens] some space within modern Western theory so that voices otherwise marginalized can be heard; that questions otherwise suppressed can be asked, that points of analytical closure can be opened for debate, that issues and arguments effectively dismissed from the mainstream can be seriously reconsidered and re-evaluated.[15]

The established IR problematique of war, peace and security is being broadened to include many new questions, and many new ways of answering those questions, and IPE scholars, Critical theorists and feminists have been central to this effort. Within this context, the suggestion that women and gender may figure in international relations may not be as unwelcome a notion as it once was.

In addition, feminist analyses have also changed, moving away from the early attempts to 'add women in' to the social sciences towards a more sophisticated account of the ways in which 'gender', understood as a social relationship between women and men, is constructed out of economic, political, social and institutional practices. Feminists who sought merely to uncover the activities of women in international relations most surely were

disappointed and only able to lament the continued under-representation of women in these spheres. Feminists who seek to uncover the ways in which international institutions contribute to the creation and maintenance of particular gender relations, by contrast, may discover that while women as real living human beings are often nowhere to be found, understandings about their appropriate relationships and behaviour abound in the practices of international relations. The influence of such assumptions and practices about gender relations therefore must be analysed by IR.

But what will it mean to develop this type of analysis? International Relations theorists have long described international relations as a series of billiard-ball states in intermittent collision, or conversely as a cobweb of criss-crossing relationships between state and non-state actors.[16] Neither of these characterisations, however, captures what is necessary for an analysis of gender in international relations. In part, gender means knowledge about sexual difference. This means that understandings about the appropriate relationships between women and men, the roles which they fill, even what it is to be 'feminine' or 'masculine', vary across time, place and culture; that is, they are social constructs. Analysing gender relations entails exploring the ways in which these understandings are constructed and maintained – locally, nationally and globally.[17] To create an account of international relations which is sensitive to gender, then, is to explore the ways in which knowledge about sexual difference is sustained, reproduced, and manipulated by international institutions. It means uncovering the ideas about sexual difference which inform different international activities, and discovering the impact which these ideas have on their practices. It also means looking to the material conditions in which those activities take place with attention to the ways in which prevailing conditions facilitate or prohibit the adoption of some understandings over others. As such, it also means assessing the extent to which international practices themselves contribute to the particular understandings which we hold of gender in any given time or place.

Such a focus is a far cry from either billiard-balls or cobwebs. This is so because such an analysis is not concerned strictly with the *structures* of international relations, but also with the ways in which *action* takes place within, through and around those structures. A gendered account of international relations allows us to explore action because through it we examine the ways in which knowledge about sexual difference is transmitted by various agents to the institutions under study. The activists who create international institutions, the bureaucrats who run them and the people who oppose them all hold ideas about gender relations, as they do about many other things. Through their struggles and practices, they privilege some

ideas over others, make political or important some meanings rather than others. At the same time, however, they do not make history as they choose. They are conditioned, constrained and sometimes even liberated by the particular material and historical conditions in which they operate.[18] An IR theory which is sensitive to gender must look to the articulation of all these factors to discover the ways in which knowledge about sexual difference is manifest in international relations. Such an account both provides an analysis of the ways in which knowledge about sexual difference is sustained by international institutions and the possible avenues for changing those understandings.

It is this type of analysis which this work seeks to develop. Two international institutions, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), will be used to illustrate the value of a focus on gender in the study of international relations. The IPPF and the ILO are useful for a number of reasons, most important of which is to compare their differences. These organisations are different not only insofar as one is an International Non-Governmental Organisation (the IPPF) and the other is an International Governmental Organisation (the ILO), but also because of the different ways in which gender is treated by each.

The IPPF emerged in the post-World War II period out of the struggles of birth control activists located primarily in the United States and Western Europe. Many of the political compromises made by these activists in order to popularise birth control are also reflected in IPPF policy. While concerned with an issue which is of obvious importance to both women and men, birth control, the IPPF has tended in its policy prescriptions to de-emphasise the gendered nature of reproduction. In this way, the IPPF has tended to make invisible the role of women in reproduction, and moreover, has ignored the role of birth control in women's reproductive freedom. Institutional policies are not static, however, and much recent IPPF policy reflects the attempts of individuals both within and outside the organisation to recognise the relationship between women's equality and reproductive freedom.

The ILO, by contrast, was created at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, largely at the behest of governments, and was aimed primarily at containing any potential labour unrest that might erupt in the immediate post-World War I period. The ILO has made explicit reference to women workers throughout its history, but always in a particular way. Women have required special attention, according to the ILO, whether in the form of protective legislation or through various promotional efforts. While such instruments have served sometimes to benefit women, they also reinforce

particular views about women in the workforce, for they begin with the assumption of the male worker as the 'norm'. This view reproduces the assumption that because women workers differ from the norm they are not 'real workers', and thus not entitled to the same rights, remuneration and obligations as men. As with the IPPF, ILO policies have begun to reflect the struggles of those concerned with women's equality, and have begun to reassess the impact which previous policies concerning women may have on their role in the family, workforce and society.

Although ILO and IPPF policies toward women are quite different, then, each in their own way has been concerned with gender relations, and it will be the purpose of this work to explore these policies. It is hoped, however, that this work will do more than merely present old information about these institutions in a new and interesting way. Primarily, this work is meant as a challenge. It is a challenge, first and foremost, to the IR scholarly community, whose continued failure to acknowledge, let alone analyse, the character and bases of female subordination is itself a source of that subordination.[19] The silence of IR scholars about women has been taken to mean in the past either that international relations is gender-neutral or that women are not part of the subject-matter of international relations at all. It is argued here, by contrast, that international economic and political institutions contain, affect and are affected by understandings of gender relations and the practices which follow from them. To suggest that they are not only serves to sustain the power relations embedded in this sort of silencing within IR. The absence of women in IR is hegemonic, in a Gramscian sense, insofar as that absence is considered natural.[20] This project, then, is not one which deplores the apparent absence of women in international relations, but is one which asks, as Sarah Brown does, why a theory and history which sustains this appearance is accepted.[21]

It is important also to subject feminist work in IR to critical scrutiny. Yet it is difficult to do this in an intellectual and political environment in which *any* attempt to theorise and explore women or gender is an improvement over the silences which preceded it. Moreover, it is also true that all feminist approaches *do* share a commitment to 'unveiling' the activities of women and gender relations and thus are each, in their own way, 'subversive' of the mainstream.[22] As Joan Wallach Scott writes:

> There is a common dimension to the enterprise of these scholars of different schools and that is to make women a focus of enquiry, a subject of the story, an agent of the narrative – whether that narrative is the familiar chronicle of political events (the French Revolution, the Swing riots, World War I or II) and political movements (Chartism, utopian social-

ism, feminism, women's suffrage), or the newer, more analytically cast account of the workings or unfoldings of large-scale processes of social change (industrialization, capitalism, modernization, urbanization, the building of nation states).[23]

We must resist, however, the urge to turn off our critical faculties when considering feminist work in international relations. No matter how valuable any feminist attempt is in comparison to the silences that precede it, these feminist analyses also have theoretical and political consequences of their own which must be examined. Feminist studies which replicate the ontology and epistemology of mainstream International Relations theory contribute little to either feminist or IR theory. In doing so, moreover, feminist academics not only fall into intellectual traps, but more importantly, have lost sight of the political imperatives which inform feminism. A feminist International Relations theory is different from its predecessors not only because it looks at the world in a different way, but because its goal is to contribute to changing that world. A theory which succumbs to either the fallacy of liberalism's political neutrality or postmodernism's political paralysis does nothing to further this objective.

This work, then, has a number of different purposes. First, it will demonstrate that international relations has always involved gender and affected gender relations, and that their analysis is a legitimate focus of IR scholarly inquiry. Second, it will show the avenues from within both feminist theory and international relations theory through which such an analysis may be best accomplished. Third, it will use the notion of gender developed in the first half of the book to present an untried analysis of the IPPF and the ILO. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it will demonstrate the ways in which the analysis provided here can be used to inform the activities of people intent on transforming the ways in which international institutions sustain existing and unequal gender relations.

Notes

1. Nannerl O. Keohane, 'Speaking from Silence: Women and the Science of Politics', in E. Langland and W. Gove (eds), *A Feminist Perspective in the Academy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 87. Portions of this chapter have appeared previously in my 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International Political Economy', in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1994).
2. When referring to the academic discipline of International Relations, the acronym IR will sometimes be used. This distinguishes it from the actual

practices of international relations as carried out by states, international institutions, transnational social movements and classes, and so on.

3. Fred Halliday, 'Hidden from International Relations: Women and the International Arena', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1988, p. 419. See also V. Spike Peterson, 'Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations', *Millennium*, 21(2), 1992, pp. 183–206 and Marysia Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds) *From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 115–44.
4. See Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus*, 106(3), 1977, pp. 41–60; and Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations', *Millennium*, 16(2), 1987, pp. 207–14. As Hoffmann notes, while IR scholars attempt to trace their ancestry back to Thucydides, the discipline as such was founded only in the twentieth century (p. 41).
5. Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science', pp. 49, 58 and Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American Approaches', p. 210. For a different reading of the evolution of IR, see Quincy Wright *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1995). He argues that the field of International Relations in Britain was informed by an 'idealist' approach to international relations and dominated by a concern to find ways to promote cooperation and prevent international conflict. IR graduates in Britain, moreover, were not drawn primarily to government positions as in the United States, but rather to the bureaucracies of rapidly expanding international organisations. There are a number of ways to respond to this assertion. On the one hand, while Wright's characterisation of the discipline may be true of Britain – and even of many individual American IR academics – it is also true that the discipline as a whole came to be dominated by its mainstream American adherents after World War II, and it is this more general description of the field which is being discussed here. More profoundly, however, it can also be argued that even 'idealist' understandings of international relations were informed by a positivist approach to theory-building. And whether or not it was an intended consequence, positivism – in its 'idealist' as much as its 'realist' manifestations – fundamentally inhibited the development of IR theory concerned with social criticism. See Mark A. Neufeld, 'Toward the Restructuring of International Relations Theory', *Ph.D Dissertation*, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, December 1990, chapter 3.
6. K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), chapter 1.
7. J. Ann Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1988, p. 429 and J. Ann Tickner *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), chapter 1. See also Halliday, 'Hidden From International Relations', p. 419.
8. R.B.J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Security and the Challenge of World Politics', *Alternatives*, 15(1), 1990, pp. 3–28.
9. Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 1; see also Rosalind Delmar, 'What is

Feminism?', in Juliet Mitchell and Ann Oakley (eds), *What is Feminism?* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 8. Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1983) provides an excellent account of some of the different approaches to feminism while Drude Dahlerup, 'Introduction', in D. Dahlerup (ed.), *The New Women's Movement: Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA* (London: Sage Publications, 1986), gives an account of the contemporary women's movement in eleven European countries.

10. For general explorations of this theme, see George T. Crane and Abla Amawi, *The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), especially pp. 3–33; Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy, Perspectives, Problems and Policies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 3–24; Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 8–64; Roger Tooze, 'Perspectives and Theory: A Consumers' Guide', in Susan Strange (ed.), *Paths to International Political Economy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 1–22; Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, 'Introduction', and 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy', in C.N. Murphy and R. Tooze (eds), *The New International Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp. 1–31; Richard Higgott, 'Toward a Nonhegemonic IPE: An Antipodean Perspective', in *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 100–101.
11. *Ibid.*
12. See especially Murphy and Tooze, *The New International Political Economy*; and Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10(2), Summer 1981.
13. Susan Hekman, 'The Feminization of Epistemology: Gender and the Social Sciences', *Women and Politics* 7(3), Fall 1987, pp. 66–7.
14. Murphy and Tooze, 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy,' p. 29.
15. Jim George, 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1989, pp. 272–3.
16. Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985) p. 12.
17. Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 2.
18. See Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent–Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, 41(3), Summer 1987, pp. 335–70; Jane Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse: Protective Legislation in France and the United States Before 1914', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 22(2), June 1989, p. 236; Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 2 and chapter 2.
19. Paraphrased from Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds), *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 31.

20. This description of Gramsci (although not its application to gender) is taken from R.W. Cox, 'Production and Hegemony: An Approach Towards a Problematic', Paper presented at the IPSA Congress, Moscow, 12–18, August 1979, p. 1.
21. Sarah Brown, 'Feminism, International Theory and International Relations of Gender Inequality', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1989, p. 464.
22. Christine Sylvester discusses the ways in which different feminist approaches are involved in an unveiling project in 'The Emperors' Theories and Transformations: Looking at the Field Through Feminist Lenses', in Dennis C. Pirages and Christine Sylvester (eds), *Transformations in the Global Political Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 235–6. Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson refer to the many subversive strategies entailed by different forms of feminist theorising in 'The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory', *Alternatives*, 16 (1991), p. 72.
23. Joan Wallach Scott, 'The Modern Period', *Past and Present*, No. 101, November 1983, pp. 144–5. See also Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, p. 17.

1 Feminist Theories and International Relations

The Introduction suggested that there has been considerable resistance to bringing together IR and studies of women and gender relations. Few women become IR scholars, and fewer still (women or men) become feminist IR scholars. Despite some reluctance, and structural impediments, to identifying with International Relations as an academic discipline, feminists have long discussed many of the questions which are central to IR scholars. Feminist analyses of war, peace and development provide a substantive literature devoted to the study of women and international relations. Moreover, a small but growing literature has begun to emerge which examines directly the issue of women and gender in both the study and practice of international relations. This chapter will outline some of the various ways in which feminists have discussed these questions, and through a critical review of such approaches it will begin to develop a feminist account of international relations which takes into account gender relations.[1]

It is important to note that any attempt to categorise feminist theorists and theories is bound to do a disservice to the richness and diversity of these various approaches – and the attempt made in this chapter is no exception. Nor can one expect a brief review such as this to cover the entire range of feminist literatures which inform the work that has been done by feminists in (and outside) this field. It is, however, useful to develop a sense of the different directions and assumptions embedded within each general approach, and the implications of these assumptions.

Even in this, however, it is difficult to know *which* assumptions and directions it is most useful to underline. Some attempts at categorising feminist theories look to the political implications of the theories, and so organise the literature in terms of whether they are liberal, radical, socialist, and so on.[2] Others emphasise the ontological and epistemological premisses and so divide the literature using terms such as feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint, feminist postmodernism and so on.[3] In order to remain sensitive to both the political and ontological/epistemological assumptions within different feminist theories, the categories used here will name their political purpose but will attempt to discuss both their political and epistemological/ontological assumptions.

LIBERAL FEMINISM: BRINGING WOMEN IN

Liberal feminists argue that women have been excluded from many of the most important, public, spheres of modern social, political and economic life. They aim, as Alison Jaggar writes, 'to incorporate women into the mainstream of contemporary society'.[4] Liberal feminists who examine women and world politics usually pursue one of two research strategies. The first is to outline the extent to which women are under-represented within traditional areas of international relations activity and to show also the ways in which women may overcome barriers to their participation. Such work describes, for example, the under-representation of women in security and arms control policy-making or in international organisations more generally.

Following from this, the second strategy pursued by liberal feminists aims usually to uncover the ways in which women actually *were* there. If, for example, women are under-represented in international organisations and were not usually on the battlefields during wartime, according to traditional scholars, then where were they? They were in the factories, at the hospitals, in the peace campaigns, wiring up the bombs, and, sometimes, even on the battlefields. Different implications follow from these two forms of liberal feminism, and so each will be treated separately here.

Liberal feminist research aimed at demonstrating women's under-representation in international relations seeks to show the ways in which women may overcome barriers to their participation. The call from this perspective, then, is to 'bring women in' to international relations. Maude Barlow and Shannon Selin, for example, have documented the under-representation of women in the arms control policy process in Canada and throughout the world. In Canada, no woman has ever been a director or deputy director of either the Arms Control and Disarmament Division or the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs. Further, it is only recently that Canada has appointed a female Ambassador for Disarmament.[5] The situation is no different internationally, with only five women occupying the approximately 800 key nuclear weapon decision-making positions identified by the Oxford Research Group worldwide.[6]

Various reasons are given for the under-representation of women in these positions. One popular form of explanation is the socialisation of women away from these activities. It is young boys, by this view, who are encouraged to play with guns and military toys, not little girls. By extension, then, arms control and security issues are 'a man's topic', about which women are assumed to have neither interest nor expertise.[7] This view is illustrated well by the comments made by Ronald Reagan's White House Chief of

Staff Donald T. Regan, when he said in 1985 that women would not be interested in the US–USSR summit at Reykjavik, Iceland, because women could not comprehend 'missile throw-weights and other unfathomables'.[8]

The socialisation argument is also used to explain women's under-representation in international decision-making bodies more generally. Betsy Thom suggests that many women within the United Nations system are less ambitious than men, having internalised society's expectations that they are not suited to policy-making positions.[9] Moreover, women often face a 'double-day', balancing career and family responsibilities, thus limiting their opportunities for career advancement.[10]

Other explanations for women's under-representation look to systemic barriers to their participation.[11] By this view, it is not simply the case that women lack the will to participate in the upper echelons of international relations activities, but that they are systematically discriminated against by men in authority who refuse to promote them, and by legislation which limits their opportunities for employment, training, and so on.[12] Even those women who are successful must work harder to be taken seriously by their colleagues. Jeane Kirkpatrick, for example, has said that she failed to win the respect or attention of her male colleagues on issues of foreign policy because she was a woman.[13] Proposals for change which emerge from this liberal feminist view suggest that societal attitudes, the division of labour within the home, educational and career opportunities must all change before we will see greater numbers of women in international decision-making positions.

Clearly, it is important to document women's activity in traditional areas of international relations. Such information provides us with a rich source of data and information to demonstrate the under-representation of women from the activities of world politics. There are, however, numerous problems associated with this form of liberal feminism. For one, the call to 'bring women in' to international relations assumes that women were not there in the first place.[14] That is, it accepts, along with mainstream IR, that the appropriate subject matter of IR is the so-called 'high politics' of security and peace issues, the public realm of policy-making, war and peace, and so on. This assumption neatly removes women, historically awarded the 'private' sphere, from the political, and international relations, arena. As Joni Lovenduski writes:

> The complication here is that there never was any way that the modern study of politics could fail to be sexist. Its empirical concerns have been almost exclusively those of the exercise of public power, aspects of political elites and aspects of the institutions of government. Such

> studies are bound to exclude women, largely because women usually do not dispose of public power, belong to political elites or hold influential positions in government institutions.[15]

In accepting the distinction between public/private, political/non-political, feminist IR scholars who try to 'bring women in' accept the liberal view that women have traditionally been excluded from international relations because war, diplomacy and high politics have not been about issues which are of interest to women, specifically, children and families.

Moreover, the claim that the greater inclusion of women in the public and political realm of international relations will constitute the elimination of sexual inequality in this field is one which ignores the structural features of social and political action. It accepts the prevailing power structures as legitimate. There is nothing, by this view, that is inherently unfair or unequal within politics or international relations (or the educational system, science, medicine or even corporate capitalism) except the historic exclusion of women from these spheres.[16] For liberal feminists, once women are represented in numbers that correspond to their presence in the general population, equality will have been achieved. In this way, the exclusive attention to the static and ahistorical category of 'woman' leads to the liberal feminist failure to problematise both 'men', and the relationships in which women and men are involved, with each other, in the workforce, in educational and other institutions, and so on.[17]

Liberal feminists who attempt to show how women *were* there, by contrast, begin with a number of different assumptions. For one, they do not assume, as do those who seek to 'bring women in' to international relations, that women were not there in the first place. Indeed, writers working from this perspective argue that the sexism and androcentric bias[18] of traditional IR scholars have blinded them to the ways in which women have been active in a variety of international activities. By this view, simply adding women in is not enough because it ignores the extent to which both the study and practice of international relations has systematically discriminated against women by making their activities invisible. The goal of this form of liberal feminism, then, is to expand the categories of international relations inquiry such that they include the activities of women, heretofore rendered invisible.

Much of the work from this perspective has been produced by historians describing the roles which women have played in the military, in medicine, and in industry during wartime. Numerous accounts exist, for example, detailing women's activities on the battlefield during wartime, thus challenging the traditional assertion that wars were entirely male affairs.[19] As Cynthia Enloe writes:

> Long before the military had women's corps, married quarters, VD classes and legions of civilian clerical workers, they had women 'in tow'. In the mid-seventeenth century, one European army was reported to have had 40,000 male soldiers and 100,000 soldiers' wives, whores, man servants, maids, and other camp followers.[20]

Usually denigrated by the military as 'common whores', these women provided many necessary support services such as cooking, finding and purchasing supplies, doing laundry, and nursing.[21] Today, there are many ways in which women may 'legitimately' partake in military service, although often with numerous restrictions and invariably with less status than men of corresponding rank or position.[22]

Other studies document the role of women on the home front during wartime, enjoined by governments either to fill positions in industry left vacant by conscripted men, or to have babies in order to ensure the continued strength of the nation.[23] Some writers also analyse the histories of women who resisted such appeals and chose instead to become active in the peace campaigns. Much of this work describes women's continued resistance to militarism in all of its facets to this day.[24]

Liberal feminist inquiries into the activities of women during war thus document their activities on the battlefront, at home in industry, in the peace campaigns and in reproducing the nation. Liberal feminist accounts of women and *development* are similar in many general respects. Like the work on women and war, much of the early work on women and development aimed at demonstrating the ways in which women were involved in the development process, and the ways in which this involvement had previously been ignored by development planners. Ester Boserup's pioneering book, *Women's Role in Economic Development*,[25] documented women's economic contributions in the Third World, and from her own and later work we now know that women constitute sixty to eighty per cent of the agricultural workforce in Africa and Asia and more than forty per cent in Latin America.[26] Development planners ignored these facts because they assumed that women in the developing world were involved primarily in household chores and tasks. As such, the policies which they produced tended to by-pass women workers, fundamentally misunderstanding the economic processes they were supposedly analysing, and exacerbating women's inequality rather than alleviating it.[27] By providing a more accurate accounting of women's role in developing societies, Boserup and her colleagues created the basis for Women in Development (WID) programmes and departments in almost all major development agencies. The WID agenda has been to take women into account in the

formulation and implementation of development policies around the world.[28]

Showing how women *were* there embodies a critique of the ways in which established scholarly inquiry has ignored the activities of women in the traditional areas of IR concern. This constitutes a move away from the traditional parameters of that inquiry, but it tends not to do so in any fundamental or radical way. Attempts to show how women *were* there accept the empiricist assumptions of traditional IR approaches and seek merely to eliminate the sexist bias in conceptualisations which has prevailed there. They accept, then, the assumption that empiricist methodology is potentially value-neutral, so long as it can be freed from the 'distorting lenses of particular [male] observers.'[29] By this view, liberal feminists seek to apply more strictly the methodological norms of social scientific inquiry,[30] correcting in this way the gender-blindness that results from the historic and systematic exclusion of women from both the study and practice of international relations.[31]

The criticisms made here of liberal feminism parallel the criticisms made of liberal political economy more generally. It is argued that the collection of empirical information about women – whether documenting where women are under-represented or where and how they are most active – is made at the expense of any assessment of the structural features of relations of inequality between women and men. Implicit in a liberal analysis, the critics argue, is the assumption that the inclusion of women into areas previously denied them will eliminate gender inequalities. By contrast, feminists who attempt to introduce analyses of class, or of patriarchy, argue that inequalities are a defining characteristic of the very structures in which women might participate, and as such their participation alone will not change this fundamental fact. What is more, once women have been assimilated into IR in liberal feminist fashion, critique may thereby be silenced: a 'feminist' approach can be taken into account without fundamentally transforming existing assumptions about either the appropriate categories of traditional IR inquiry or the appropriate manner of studying international relations activities. As Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson write, '... the implications of gender as a theoretical category are *unrecognizable*'.[32]

RADICAL FEMINISM: WOMAN NURTURER

Radical feminists argue that relations of subordination and domination between women and men constitute one of the most fundamental forms of

oppression.[33] Men seek to control women through controlling their sexuality, their roles in reproduction, and their roles in society more generally. Moreover, much of the way in which society is organised supports patriarchy, and this affects not only the ways in which the world actually operates, but even the ways in which we think about the world. In contrast to liberal feminists, then, radical feminists argue that *all* views are biased, and that the social sciences have been dominated by one particularly biased view, that of men. According to radical feminists, the social sciences cannot be 'cleaned up' simply by enlarging the categories of inquiry to include the activities of women, because the very norms and rules of social scientific inquiry used to construct even these expanded categories have been inspired by masculine thinking. Distinctions between fact and value, subject and object, rationality and irrationality – all central to traditional social scientific thought – are products of the male mind and, as such, must be transcended by feminists.[34]

Similarly, by this view, the traditional subject matter of international relations, the ways in which IR scholars investigate that subject matter, and the policy prescriptions which emerge from that analysis, all stem from a masculine worldview. This masculine worldview privileges the conflictual side of international relations, posits the separation of subject and object in its positivist methodology, and argues that policy must be informed by an understanding of national interest defined in terms of power. A feminist reformulation of these notions in which, from a 'feminine perspective', power is defined as empowerment and security as including development and ecological concerns, is an important first step, according to these writers, towards a better understanding of women and international relations.[35]

Much of the IR literature developed from a radical feminist perspective has been devoted to the study of women and war and peace.[36] Unlike liberal feminists, however, these writers are not concerned with documenting the *activities* of women in war and peace, but with outlining women's different *attitudes* towards war and peace. They argue that both war and peace would have been understood quite differently had it been women, and not men, dominating both the study and practice of international relations.

By and large, these writers suggest that because women are more peace-loving, more nurturing and more connected with life, it is they who may be our only hope of salvation in the nuclear age.[37] According to this view, the basis of wars in general and the nuclear arms race in particular is masculine behaviour. For some writers in this tradition, it is a biological inevitability that men are more aggressive, hierarchical, and territorial than women. Others deny any biological determinism and suggest instead that young boys raised in a society that devalues the work of women come themselves

to devalue the attributes they most closely associate with women: the nurturing, emotive, affective values learned from their mothers. In order to differentiate themselves from their mothers, young boys accentuate their more aggressive, conflictual tendencies.[38]

Young girls, by contrast, need not differentiate themselves from their mothers, and so may adopt many of her nurturing characteristics. As Sara Ruddick writes:

> There is a real basis for the conventional association of women with peace. Women are daughters who learn from their mothers the activity of preservative love and the maternal thinking that arises from it. These 'lessons from her mother's house' can shape a daughter's intellectual and emotional life even if she rejects the activity, its thinking, or, for that matter, the mother herself. Preservative love is opposed in its fundamental values to military strategy ... A daughter, one might say, has been trained to be unsoldierly.[39]

If it is masculine values that have created wars, then it is feminine values that can end them, by this view. Women not only emphasise their more nurturing values, but as victims themselves of sexism they understand more fully than do men the implications of war and militarism. Radical feminists join here with liberal feminists and issue a call to bring women in to nuclear and arms control decision-making. They do so, however, not to right the historic injustice of women's absence, but rather to bring women's more pacifistic views to international decision-making.

Radical feminism makes a number of advances over the liberal approach. For one, it rejects the distinction between public and private realms, embracing as it does the new women's movement's most important political slogan: 'the personal is the political'. In this way, it does not reproduce the liberal feminist identification of the political with the public, and appears, at least, to reject the notion that international relations is concerned solely with the 'high politics' of security and war issues.

More importantly, radical feminism points to a more profound epistemological critique of mainstream IR than does liberal feminism. In demanding that we examine the specifically masculine bias brought to the study of IR by men, radical feminism underlines the extent to which 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose'.[40] As Mary Hawkesworth writes:

> ... [they] reject the notion of an 'unmediated truth', arguing that knowledge is always mediated by a host of factors related to an individual's particular position in a determinate sociopolitical formation at a specific

> point in history. Class, race and gender necessarily structure the individual's understanding of reality and hence inform all knowledge claims.[41]

In this way, radical feminists reject the assumption that social science methodology can ever be value-neutral, and demand instead that all scholars, at a minimum, be explicit about the particular biases with which they operate.

The radical feminist notion of a feminine perspective, however, also has numerous limitations. For one, while it appears to widen the purview of legitimate IR inquiry beyond those questions concerned solely with security and war, this is precisely the type of issue on which most radical feminists concentrate. While they explore these issues in a way far removed from that of traditional IR scholars, bringing in as they do the more personal analytical methods discussed here, their substantive focus thus far has been precisely the same as their more traditional counterparts, and it is as yet unclear just how widely they may begin to move the parameters of IR inquiry.

In addition, the epistemological critique is not as radical as it first appears, for while it acknowledges the different 'perspectives' which emerge from different material and historical conditions, it privileges the perspective of women over that of men. By virtue of her being oppressed, according to this view, a woman's 'feminine perspective' provides her with a less distorted and more truthful account of the world than can a man's 'masculine perspective'.[42] Such a claim is tenuous at best, and ultimately does not, in fact, reject the notion of an 'unmediated truth', for it suggests that some people can more closely approximate that truth than can others.

More importantly, the idea of a 'feminine perspective' is an essentialist one which contrasts 'woman' as nurturing, virtuous and natural with 'man' as aggressive, power-seeking and arrogant. Such a view not only cannot be sustained empirically, ignoring as it does important differences amongst women (and men), but it is also dangerously apolitical.[43] As Lynne Segal writes:

> A feminism which ... insists upon the essential differences between women's and men's inner being, between women's and men's natural urges and experience of the world, leaves little or no scope for transforming the relations between men and women.[44]

A biologically determined relationship between women and men fixes those relationships firmly across time, place and culture. Feminist politics in this context becomes a concerted effort to limit the damage inevitably done, to make the best of a bad world and to hope that the more peaceful norms of 'women' may one day inform the practices of international decision-makers.

Other radical feminists claim no biological determinism and argue instead that social practices such as mothering produce fundamental differences between women and men. However, they also universalise those practices, creating yet again an essentialist vision of feminine and masculine characteristics. One single activity such as mothering, by this view, produces the same characteristics in women and men across time, place, culture, class, race and sexual orientation.[45] Except for a few incomplete attempts to imagine what might happen if men participated equally with women in parenting, these visions of masculine and feminine are practically inviolable, and the only politics left to radical feminists is to privilege what previously has been made subordinate: the 'feminine' values of nurturance, passivity, and peacefulness.

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend upon a 're-thinking' from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women.[46] Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism's reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of 'women'. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal 'man', long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal 'woman'.[47]

And indeed, that notion of 'woman' not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy.[48] Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing 'negative' or 'inauthentic' feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men).[49] In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Keohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism.[50] It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions and stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as do men under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.[51]

FEMINIST POSTMODERNISM: DECONSTRUCTING 'WOMAN'

Largely as a response to the essentialism of radical feminism, some feminist scholars are pursuing a postmodernist or poststructuralist approach.

Many hail it as the most promising avenue for the development of a feminist international relations theory, and some suggest that it is the only viable place in which to locate such work.[52] As Marysia Zalewski writes, 'The urgent need to displace realist, positivist discourse has led many feminists to climb aboard the post-modernist bandwagon with its alleged commitment to the rebuttal of tyrannical truth claims'.[53]

Feminist postmodernists take as their point of departure the attempt by radical feminists to define *woman*. As Jane Flax writes:

> Any feminist standpoint will necessarily be partial. Thinking about women may illuminate some aspects of a society that have been previously suppressed within the dominant view. But none of us can speak for 'woman' because no such person exists except within a specific set of (already gendered) relations – to 'man' and to many concrete and different women.[54]

Thus postmodernists, and post-colonial critics of feminism more generally, argue that the treatment given to 'women' by radical feminists (and others) suggests that women are a homogeneous group unaffected by class, race, culture, sexuality, history, and so on.[55]

Postmodernists reject the suggestion that subjects have an authentic core or essential identity, and argue that any attempt to define individuals as such 'forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way'.[56] Radical feminists reject the definition of women made by men (or at least the values asociated with that definition), but not the process of defining itself. In this way, according to postmodernists, they reinvoke the fundamental mechanism of oppressive power used to perpetuate sexism in their efforts to overcome it.[57]

A feminist postmodernist project aims at deconstructing the fiction of the category of woman. Deconstruction entails exploring, unravelling and rejecting the assumed naturalness of particular understandings and relationships. As Julia Kristeva writes:

> A woman cannot be; it is something which does not even belong in the order of being. It follows that a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already exists so that we may say 'that is not it', and 'that is still not it'.[58]

Political struggle for the feminist postmodernist entails rejecting 'everything finite, definite, structured, loaded with meaning, in the existing state of society.'[59]

Postmodernist insights are useful in a number of ways. As Linda Alcoff notes, they seem first to hold out the promise of an increased freedom for women, not involving any preconceived gender identity as determined by either women or men. In this way, there is no single and generic 'woman' of a particular class, race and sexual orientation, but the possibility of many women cross-cut by these and other differences. Second, and more importantly, postmodernism begins to theorise the construction of gendered identities, highlighting as it does the ways in which meaning is contingent and socially constructed.[60] The ways in which knowledge about gender relations is organised becomes the focal point for this type of analysis, thus opening up the possibility, at least, of examining the way this knowledge is organised by international institutions and by the discipline of international relations itself.

Despite these advances, however, there are numerous problems associated with feminist postmodernism. Chief among these is the political paralysis which it creates. According to critics, if the category 'woman' is fundamentally indeterminate, then there is no rational way in which a positive alternative or vision of an alternative world order can be suggested, for each such attempt can (and should, according to postmodernists) itself be deconstructed.[61] Moreover, the very idea of feminism, as such, becomes highly problematic:

> If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the possibility of a feminist politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand in the name of women if 'women' do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth that they do? How can we speak out against sexism as detrimental to the interests of women if the category is a fiction? How can we demand legal abortions, adequate child care, or wages based on comparable worth without invoking a concept of 'woman'?[62]

This points also to the serious limitations involved in feminist postmodernist understandings of 'social construction'. While acknowledging that identities and meanings are never natural or universal, postmodernists locate the construction of those meanings almost exclusively in the play of an ambiguously defined power, organised through discourse. This means that identities and meanings are constructed in the absence of knowing actors, and more importantly, that there is very little that knowing actors can do to challenge those meanings or identities. The ways in which power manifests itself, the particular meanings and identities that emerge, seem almost inevitable. They are unrelated to prevailing material conditions or

the activities of agents and institutions. Similarly, critics may describe the play of power in the construction of meaning, but cannot participate in changing it.[63] As Marysia Zalewski writes:

> The post-modernist intention to challenge the power of dominant discourses in an attempt to lead those discourses into disarray is at first glance appealing, but we have to ask what will the replacement be? If we are to believe that all is contingent and we have no base on to which we can ground claims to truth, then 'power alone will determine the outcome of competing truth claims'. Post-modernist discourse does not offer any criteria for choosing among competing explanations and thus has a tendency to lead towards nihilism – an accusation often levelled at the purveyors of post-modernism and to which they seem unable to provide any answer, except perhaps in the words of one post-modernist scholar 'what's wrong with nihilism'?[64]

Postmodernists are equally post-feminist, a title they sometimes adopt, for their analysis loses sight of the political imperatives which inform feminism: to uncover and change inequalities between women and men. As Ann Marie Goetz suggests, when many of the issues surrounding women and international relations are ones which concern the very survival of those women, postmodernism's continued back-pedalling and disclaimers are not only politically unacceptable, they are, more importantly, politically irresponsible.[65]

CRITICAL/FEMINIST IR: FROM WOMEN TO GENDER

There are, then, a number of important problems associated with liberal feminism, radical feminism and feminist postmodernism, but this is not to say that there is nothing of value in any of these attempts to produce a feminist theory of international relations. Each makes a contribution towards uncovering the ways in which women have not been absent from international relations and the ways in which world politics have always been gendered.

Liberal feminists have underscored the absence of women from both the practice and study of international relations. This absence has been used in the past to defend the supposed gender neutrality of the study of international relations. Criticising it is therefore important. Liberal feminists challenge that claim and effectively give voice to women scholars and practitioners of international relations previously silenced, as well as expanding the boundaries of the field.

Similarly, radical feminism both challenges the assumption that classical IR theory has been produced in a value-neutral way, and points to the importance of expanding the arena of legitimate IR inquiry beyond its traditional concerns. Along with other critics of this tradition, it insists on exploring the constitutive elements of all international activity, not merely the surface appearance of inter-state rivalry, as has been privileged through realism.

Finally, feminist postmodernists have emphasised the ways in which identity and meaning are contingent and socially constructed. This is important in International Relations because it underscores the ways in which the topics that are considered important, the ways of posing questions, and the approach to studying them are all created rather than somehow natural.

These are not, however, the only choices available to us, because despite their contributions they also tend towards ahistorical often essentialist categories which do not refer to either the social construction of women and men or to the historically conditioned and changing, yet materially real, inequality between women and men. By relying on work by socialist feminists and critical theorists more generally, it is suggested here that we can develop an account of international relations which is sensitive to *gender* and *gender relations* and thus incorporate many of the insights of the above types of feminist theorising while at the same time overcoming their limitations.

Like liberal feminists, we are interested in documenting the underrepresentation of women in particular spheres, or describing the unfair burdens borne by women as a result of particular legislative practices. An analysis sensitive to gender, however, calls for more than simply including women in areas closed to them, or righting previously unfair legislation, for we are interested not only in *how* women (and men) appear in international relations, but also *why* they appear in the ways that they do.

In part, gender means knowledge about sexual difference.[66] In examining gender as sexual difference, we begin to incorporate some of the insights generated by radical feminists. We are interested, for example, in notions of masculine and feminine, but avoid any singular and essentialised vision of a feminine perspective. Instead, we ask: what ideas and practices about gender have been used to create, sustain, and legitimise the underrepresentation or unfairness we have documented, and where do these ideas come from? What ideas about the appropriate relationship between women and men, about the appropriate role of women in society, about what it is to be a man or a woman, feminine or masculine, inform the practices of particular actors and institutions? And what material conditions and social forces contribute to the reproduction of those practices? Finally, are

attempts to alter those understandings and practices facilitated or hindered by prevailing material conditions?

We ask these questions because gender refers not to women or to men *per se*, but to the ideological and material relation between them, one which historically has been an unequal relationship. Additionally, gender is not given biologically, as a result of the sexual characteristics of either women or men, but is constructed socially. As Catherine MacKinnon writes:

> ... gender is an outcome of a social process of subordination that is only ascriptively tied to body and doesn't lose its particularity of meaning when it shifts embodied form. Femininity is a lowering that is imposed; it can be done to anybody and still be what feminine means. It is just women to whom it is considered natural.[67]

A critical/feminist IR theory also, then, picks up on postmodernist ideas that gender is a socially constructed inequality between women and men. However, this approach departs from postmodernism and argues that understandings about what are considered appropriate relationships between women and men *can* be discovered through an examination of particular material conditions and the habits, practices, and discourses of particular international actors and institutions. Thus, meanings do not simply 'emerge' from the play of power, but from the play of actors operating within particular circumstances. At the same time, and precisely because of this, these understandings are fluid and historically variable. They are not universalisable because they are constantly created anew and, more importantly, are often open to challenge.[68] Thus 'social construction' can be discovered without slipping into the indefinite regress and political paralysis which characterises postmodernism.

One important *caveat*, however, should be introduced here. The term gender is *not* used here to make a discussion about women more 'acceptable' or 'palatable' to the IR academic community. Some have charged, quite correctly in some cases, that:

> ... the use of 'gender' is meant to denote the scholarly seriousness of a work, for 'gender' has a more neutral and objective sound than does 'women'. 'Gender' seems to fit within the scientific terminology of social science and thus dissociates itself from the (supposedly strident) politics of feminism.[69]

The notion of gender as used here, by contrast, is not intended to obfuscate the historical inequality between women and men, but rather to highlight it.

GENDER IN IR: APPLYING IT

A critical/feminist analysis must explore how notions about the appropriate roles, relationships and behaviours of women and men are created, sustained and legitimised by international institutions. Gender relations do not fall from the sky; they are socially constructed through the social definitions of gender as developed by women and men and as constructed in and affected by international economic and political institutions (among other things).[70] Robert Cox has written that:

> ... human institutions are made by people – not by the individual gestures of 'actors' but by collective responses to a collectively perceived problematic that produces certain practices. Institutions and practices are therefore to be understood through the changing mental processes of their makers.[71]

To this it can be added that these institutions, practices, collective responses and changing mental processes include understandings of gender relations. As Cynthia Enloe writes, contemporary power relations depend upon sustaining certain notions of male and female, masculine and feminine, and the appropriate roles associated with each.[72] It is this claim which informs the questions we ask here.

Critical/feminist accounts of women and war have already been developed. These seek not merely to document the activities of women during war, as liberal feminists would do, or women's feelings about war, as radical feminists would do, but the ways in which governments and the military use, and alter, prevailing discourses about gender to their own ends. Work in this area demonstrates a coincidence of militarist and mysogynist rhetoric in mobilising both women and men to perform various wartime functions.[73] The processes of military manpower acquisition have been premissed on ideological beliefs about the different and stratified roles of women and men. The distinction between 'battle front' and 'home front', for example, has been used to mobilise men into battle and women into taking up their positions in the production process back home. Moreover, the assumption that women are not appropriately a part of that production process, but are there only for 'the duration', is sustained throughout war to ensure that they will relinquish those positions to the returning heroes at war's end.[74]

Work on women and development has also begun to transform its focus by examining gender. Nüket Kardam, for example, notes that despite the proliferation over the past twenty years of WID programmes in all of the

major development agencies, few WID policy proposals have ever been implemented. She suggests that the reason for this is that the WID discourse does not exist in a vacuum, but rather co-exists and comes into conflict with other prevailing development discourses and practices. These include discourses about the appropriate role of women in developing countries (those very discourses WID challenges), and the appropriate role of development in general. When there is a congruence of these discourses, policy emerges. So, for example, when WID policy coincides with the most recent development priority ('basic human needs' in the 1970s), women become part of the development agenda much more easily. Similarly, when development projects involving women do not threaten the assumed roles of women, they too are accepted more easily. Thus projects providing training in sewing, cooking, knitting and gardening proliferate.[75] Analyses like those of Maria Mies or Gita Sen and Caren Grown have assessed the impact of the changing international division of labour on women and the ways in which women's subordination is sustained under different historical modes of production. Forms of domination associated with class relations take advantage of, and build upon, pre-existing relations of domination between women and men.[76] For example, with the introduction of private property during the colonial period, it was women who tended to suffer more than men because they lost completely their access to traditional land-use rights.[77] Likewise, as production shifts to the export sector during the forms of structural adjustment we are witnessing today, it is again women who are moving into these poorly-paid positions with little or no opportunities to improve wages or benefits, and the prospect of only short-term, limited employment.[78] The point here, of course, is that class and gender oppression work together rather than separately.

Cynthia Enloe provides one of the most sustained accounts of the ways in which gender figures within both IR and IPE. She examines a whole series of issues including tourism, foreign domestic servants and Export Processing Zones, and the manner in which particular 'packages of expectations' associated with masculine and feminine behaviour are used to sustain and legitimise certain practices within IR. She notes, for example, the manner in which developing countries are increasingly relying on tourism as a source of foreign exchange, and the profoundly gendered nature of the tourism industry. As Enloe writes: 'On the oceans and in the skies: the international business travellers are men, the service workers are women'.[79] This includes not only flight attendants and chambermaids, but the burgeoning market for prostitutes within the sex tourism industry.

Enloe's project is not simply to recount the places in which women find themselves, however, but rather to provide some insight into 'how' this has

happened. The ways in which particular material conditions join together with existing assumptions and ideas about women and men is made clear in the following passage:

> To succeed, sex tourism requires Third World women to be economically desperate enough to enter prostitution; having done so it is made difficult to leave. The other side of the equation requires men from affluent societies to imagine certain women, usually women of colour, to be more available and submissive than the women in their own countries. Finally, the industry depends on an alliance between local governments in search of foreign currency and local and foreign businessmen willing to invest in sexualized travel.[80]

Understood in this way, not only are the activities of women placed within the realm of international relations, but they are understood in specific ways because of the particular material conditions and ideas associated with their activities: in this case, women's economic desperation is joined with the eroticisation of racist stereotypes. The entire scenario works only if all of these factors are considered together and not separately.

Developing countries' search for foreign exchange also leads Enloe to examine multinational corporations and Export Processing Zones (EPZs). She outlines in detail the various practices used, first to recruit young women into the assembly lines of EPZs, and then the ways in which their continued docility is ensured until the time that they are pushed out of such employment.[81] This is achieved not only through assumptions around women's 'cheaper' labour (both real and imagined), through which MNCs are enticed in the first place, but more importantly by sustaining a vision of the female worker as a member of a large family, a family ruled by fathers and brothers/supervisors and managers. These women, moreover, are employable for only a few short years at which time they may return to their family homes in rural areas or turn to prostitution in the larger urban centres in which they find themselves.

Finally, Enloe draws a series of links between the adoption of IMF austerity measures and the capacity of women to respond to those measures. She argues that a government's ability to maintain its legitimacy depends at least in part on the capacity of families to tolerate those measures, specifically on the capacity of women to stretch their budgets, to continue to feed, clothe and care for their families. This may include severe domestic financial management as well as travelling abroad as foreign domestic servants, often with the requirement that a significant proportion of their salaries be repatriated back to the home country. As Enloe argues, IMF aus-

terity measures are dependent upon these women and the choices they are forced to make:

> Thus the politics of international debt is not simply something that has an *impact* on women in indebted countries. The politics of international debt won't work in their current form *unless* mothers and wives are willing to behave in ways that enable nervous regimes to adopt cost-cutting measures without forfeiting their political legitimacy.[82]

A dynamic is set up around ideas about what women will and will not do, the actual material conditions of their lives and the policies produced by international organisations and foreign governments. This dynamic is one which both sustains and is dependent upon assumptions about what are considered the appropriate roles and qualities of women, and women of particular races, in specific times and places.

The present study contributes to this growing body of work concerned with gender and international relations by applying the insights of this approach to two multilateral institutions: the IPPF and the ILO. As has been noted in the introduction, the IPPF emerged in the immediate post-war period along with numerous other international organisations and was concerned overtly at least with the relationship between economic and social development and population growth. In fact, of course, the IPPF has been devoted almost exclusively to the study and manipulation of women's reproductive behaviour.[83] It employs particular understandings of the nature of birth control and the role of women and men in reproduction, which as a result has the effect of promoting policies which sometimes work to the immediate detriment of women's health and reproductive freedom.

Similarly, the International Labour Organisation has also deployed understandings of gender throughout its history. These range from its early paternalistic approach to women through special protective measures prohibiting or limiting their employment under certain conditions, to measures intended to make better use of the services of women in the labour force and the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment for women and men in terms of vocational training, employment and wages.[84] The gender ideology which the ILO employs about the appropriate role of women in the workforce has affected the policies it adopts, with some having the effect of undermining women's opportunities within the workforce by virtue of their definition as 'special' (i.e., not 'normal') workers.

In order to fully explicate the manner in which both the IPPF and the ILO have understood gender, it is necessary to examine the particular material conditions in which both organisations operate. In the case of the

IPPF, this will mean outlining the activities of nationally-based birth control activists and the political and ideological compromises which they made in order to popularise birth control. In the case of the ILO, this will mean linking efforts at international labour legislation, the real changing conditions of women's work experiences and the manner in which this has been reflected in ILO policies throughout its history. These projects will be taken up in chapters 4 and 5.

CONCLUSIONS

Feminist analyses of international relations have developed along a variety of fronts, from liberal feminism and radical feminism to feminist postmodernism. This chapter argues that while each provides some insight into the development of a feminist theory of international relations, each also contains serious limitations. While liberal feminists may be able to document the activities of women and the extent to which they are under-represented in some spheres and relegated to others, they are incapable of theorising the extent to which these phenomena are the result of relations of domination and inequalities of power. Liberal feminists assume a potential value-neutrality, both within their own epistemological positions and within the practice of international relations. As such, women's 'under-representation' or 'relegation' can only be explained as unfortunate aberrations and not the effect of very real and constantly created systems of domination and of power.

Radical feminists recognise that theories and practices are never value-neutral and instead represent the interests of certain groups, particularly for radical feminists, that of men. This means that the specific focus of IR theory has been constructed as a result of the masculine bias of its creators, and moreover, the particular issues examined in IR also reflect this bias. Thus, questions of war and security are stressed, and are understood in such a way that promotes military responses to these questions. While radical feminists get beyond any assumed value-neutrality in the study or practice of international relations, they achieve this insight at the cost of politics. The essentialised visions of women and men assumed by radical feminists leave little scope to introduce change. Moreover, rather than broadening the study of international relations, radical feminists have participated in the reproduction of IR's traditional emphasis on questions of peace and security.

Feminist postmodernists move beyond the essentialism of radical feminists, and note in part that meaning and identities are not natural but

socially constructed. However, they do not ground the creation of identities and meanings in anything other than an ambiguous play of power. As such, they too are paralysed and unable to offer answers to the most pressing feminist concern, how do we introduce change?

The most useful point of departure for a feminist IR theory is one which relies on socialist-feminist insights and critical theory more generally and takes into account gender relations. Such an analysis permits us to assess not only the particular institutional and policy biases which affect the lives of women and men, but also the manner in which these biases were created, the effects that they have, and the possibilities for change.

Beginning with gender also permits us to examine the gendered nature of IR theory. While feminists have taken up questions of interest to IR theory, as has been discussed in this chapter, until recently they have done so primarily from outside the discipline. It may be that this is the only place to develop a feminist IR theory, and so feminists will constantly work at the margins.[85] This means, however, that the vast power of the discipline in shaping the appropriate questions of international relations will be abandoned to that tradition. The great majority of people who ask questions about international relations, whether as students of IR, casual readers of IR journals, or TV viewers watching the latest analysis by an 'expert of international relations', will do so from approaches which, historically, have ignored questions about gender.

Failing to address the discipline of International Relations would be, then, an enormous political and intellectual error. Moreover, given the flux that IR currently finds itself in, as was discussed in the Introduction, spaces may begin to emerge which are more conducive to the development of a feminist IR theory than we have seen in the past. The purpose of the next chapter, then, will be to examine the spaces, if any, for the development of a feminist IR theory out of traditional approaches to the discipline.

Notes

1. Parts of this chapter have appeared previously in my 'Feminist Theories: From Women to Gender and World Politics', in Francine D'Amico and Peter Beckman (eds), *Women and World Politics* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey Ltd, 1994) and 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and International Political Economy', in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1994).
2. Marysia Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds), *From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 115–44, pointed me in the direction of making this distinction. Two of the

best reviews of feminist literature using 'political' categories are Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1983) and Rosemarie Tong, *Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

3. These categories have been suggested by Sandra Harding in *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chapter one, and 'Is There a Feminist Method?' in S. Harding (ed.), *Feminism and Methodology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 1–14. Christine Sylvester, 'The Emperors' Theories and Transformations: Looking at the Field Through Feminist Lenses', in Dennis C. Pirages and Christine Sylvester (eds), *Transformations in the Global Political Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1990) and Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory', *Alternatives*, 16, 1991 have used these categories to discuss the feminist IR literature. For a parallel discussion of this process in History, see Joan Wallach Scott, 'The Modern Period', *Past and Present*, No. 101, November 1983, pp. 141–57 and *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), especially the introduction and chapter one.
4. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 181.
5. Maude Barlow and Shannon Selin, 'Women and Arms Control in Canada', *Issue Brief No. 8*, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, October 1987, p. 2. See also Betsy Thom, 'Women in International Organizations: Room at the Top – The Situation in Some United Nations Organizations', in C.F. Epstein and R.L. Coser (eds), *Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981) and Carol Riegelman Lubin and Anne Winslow *Social Justice for Women: The International Labor Organization and Women* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).
6. Barlow and Selin, 'Women and Arms Control in Canada,' p. 3.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
8. 'Little Women, Little Man', *New York Times*, November 20, 1985, p. A30.
9. Thom, 'Women in International Organizations', pp. 175–9.
10. *Ibid.*
11. For a critique of the socialisation argument, and explanation of structural impediments in party and electoral politics in Canada, see Janine Brodie, *Women and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1985).
12. Barlow and Selin, 'Women and Arms Control in Canada', p. 10.
13. J. Ann Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1988, p. 429 and J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), chapter 1.
14. Sarah Brown, 'Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1988, p. 464.
15. Joni Lovenduski, 'Toward the Emasculation of Political Science: The Impact of Feminism', in Dale Spender (ed.), *Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Academic Disciplines* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 89. See also Susan C. Bourque and Jean Grossholtz, 'Politics an Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation', *Politics and Society*, 4(2), Winter 1974, p. 258.

16. Brown, 'Feminism, International Theory', p. 462.
17. See Jane Flax, 'Post-modernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', in Linda J. Nicholson, (ed.), *Feminism/Post-modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 45.
18. Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, p. 24.
19. Margaret R. Higonnet *et al.* (eds), ' Introduction', *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 3.
20. Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (London: Pluto Press, 1983), p. 1.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–5.
22. Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). See also Burton Hacker, 'Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe: A Reconnaissance', *Signs*, 6(4), Summer 1981, p. 653; Vera Laska, *Women in the Resistance and the Holocaust: The Voice of Emptiness* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983); June A. Willenz, *Women Veterans: America's Forgotten Heroines* (New York: Continuum, 1983); K.J. Cottam, *Soviet Airwomen in Combat in World War II* (Manhattan, Kansas: MA/AH Publishing, 1983); K.J. Cottam (ed. and trans.), *The Golden-Tressed Soldier* (Manhattan, Kansas: MA/AH Publishing, 1983); Carol R. Berkin and Clara M. Lovett, *Women, War and Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980).
23. Ruth Roach Pierson, *'They're Still Women After All' The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); Renate Bridenthal *et al.* (eds), *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984). See also Leila Rupp, *Mobilizing Women for War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), especially chaps. 2, 5, 6; Maureen Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984).
24. Anne Wiltsher, *Most Dangerous Women: Feminist Peace Campaigners of the Great War* (London: Pandora Press, 1985). See also Ruth Roach Pierson (ed.), *Women and Peace: Theoretical, Historical and Practical Perspectives* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins, *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire* (London: The Women's Press, 1984); Lynne Jones (ed.), *Keeping the Peace: A Women's Peace Handbook* (London: The Women's Press, 1983); Dorothy Thompson (ed.), *Over Our Dead Bodies: Women Against the Bomb* (London: Virago, 1983).
25. Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970).
26. Asoka Bandarage, 'Women in Development: Liberalism, Marxism and Marxist-Feminism', *Development and Change*, 15, (1984), p. 497.
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Kardam, 'Social Theory and Women in Development Policy,' *Women and Politics*, 7(4), Winter 1987, pp. 67–82.

28. See also Geeta Chowdhry, 'Women and the International Political Economy', in Francine D'Amico and Peter Beckman, *Women and World Politics* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, forthcoming).
29. Mary E. Hawkesworth, 'Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth', *Signs*, 14(3), Spring 1989, p. 535. See also Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', p. 135.
30. Hawkesworth, 'Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth', p. 535.
31. Paraphrased from Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, p. 24.
32. Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism', p. 73. See also Brown, 'Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality'.
33. Tong, *Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction*, p. 71.
34. This form of epistemological critique parallels closely that made by other 'post-modern, anti-foundational' theorists. For a summary of these arguments, and how feminists have also taken them up, see Susan Hekman, 'The Feminization of Epistemology: Gender and the Social Sciences', *Women and Politics*, 7(3), Fall 1987, pp. 69–71. See also Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism,' and V. Spike Peterson, 'Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations', *Millennium*, 21(2), 1992, pp. 183–206.
35. See Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism', pp. 430–7 and *Gender in International Relations*. For summaries of these approaches see also Kathy E. Ferguson, 'Male-Ordered Politics: Feminism and Political Science', in Terence Ball (ed.), *Idioms of Inquiry* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 220–3; and Lynne Segal, *Is the Future Female?* (London: Virago Press, 1987), chapter 5. On the project of redefining IR terms, but not explicitly from a feminist perspective, see Berenice A. Carroll, 'Peace Research: The Cult of Power', *Conflict Resolution*, 16(4), 1972, pp. 585–616.
36. For an analysis of strategic discourse which does not fall into the essentialist traps of radical feminism, see Carol Cohn, 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals', *Signs*, 12(4), 1987 and 'Emasculating America's Linguistic Deterrent', in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (eds), *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
37. See for example, Pam McAllister (ed.), *Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence* (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1982); Robin Morgan, *The Anatomy of Freedom: Feminism, Physics and Global Politics* (New York: Anchor Press, 1982); Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985); Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1938); Elise Boulding, *Women in the Twentieth Century World* (New York: Sage Publications, 1977), especially chapters 7, 8 and 9; Brigit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace: A Feminist Perspective* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985); 'Making Peace', Special Edition of *Woman of Power*, Issue 10, Summer 1988; Brian Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race* (London: Pluto Press, 1983), pp. 5, 11, and chapter 1 *passim*. See also Diana E.H. Russell, 'The Nuclear Mentality:

An Outgrowth of the Masculine Mentality', *Atlantis*, 12(1), 1987, pp. 10–17; Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors and Feminist Consciousness', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 5(3/4), 1982; 'Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just War and Feminism in a Nuclear Age', *Political Theory*, 13(1), February 1985 and *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For the review of these sources see Segal, *Is the Future Female?* pp. 179 ff.

38. See summaries of this work in V. Spike Peterson, 'Introduction', in V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992), p. 12 and *passim* and V. Spike Peterson, 'Transgressing Boundaries.'
39. Sara Ruddick, 'Pacifying the Forces: Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace', *Signs*, 8(3), 1983, pp. 478–9. In her more recent work, Ruddick seems to recognise the problems associated with this form of argument (as will be outlined below), and yet still falls into those very problems. See Sara Ruddick, 'Mothers and Men's Wars', in Harris and King (eds), *Rocking the Ship of State*.
40. R.W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in R.O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 207.
41. Hawkesworth, 'Knowers, Knowing, Known', p. 536. See also Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism', pp. 73–4. These authors are writing of standpoint theorists, which is not completely encompassed by the term radical feminism as I am using it, but which approximates it sufficiently for our purposes here.
42. *Ibid.*
43. See Teresa de Lauretis, 'Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Terms, and Contexts', in T. de Lauretis (ed.), *Feminist Studies/Critical Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 9; and Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do With It?' in *Ibid.*, especially p. 193 for an interesting discussion of this issue. For a discussion of this within IR, see Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', p. 126.
44. Segal, *Is The Future Female?* p. 37. See also Michele Barrett, 'The Concept of "Difference"', *Feminist Review*, 26, July 1987, p. 31.
45. Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Post-modernism', in L.J. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1990), pp. 29–30.
46. For one example of such work, see J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
47. Sandra Harding, 'The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory', *Signs*, 11(4), 1986, p. 646. See also Linda Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory', *Signs*, 13(3), 1988, p. 413.
48. Judith Grant, 'I Feel Therefore I Am: A Critique of Female Experience as the Basis for a Feminist Epistemology', *Women and Politics*, 7(3), Fall 1987, p. 103 and *passim*.

49. For a critique of this, see Christine Sylvester, 'Some Dangers in Merging Feminist and Peace Projects', *Alternatives*, XII, 1987, p. 499 and Segal, *Is the Future Female?*, chapter 5.
50. Keohane finds the most useful point of departure for a feminist IR theory to be standpoint theory, the basic outlines of which are the same as what I have called radical feminism. See his 'International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint', *Millennium*, 18(2), Summer 1989, pp. 245–254.
51. Marja ten Holder, 'Women in Combat: A Feminist Critique of Military Ideology, or, Will Amazons Cause Armageddon?' *MA Thesis*, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, August 1988.
52. See for example some of the commentary from V. Spike Peterson, 'Clarification and Contestation: A Conference Report on Woman, the State and War: What Difference Does Gender Make?' (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Center for International Studies, 1989) and Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
53. Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', p. 140.
54. Jane Flax, 'Post-modernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', p. 56.
55. See Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses', in Chandra Talpade Mohandy, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 55 and *passim* and 'Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism', in *Ibid.*
56. Michel Foucault, 'Why Study Power?: The Question of the Subject', in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics: Michel Foucault* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 212 cited from Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism,' p. 415.
57. Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism and Post-Structuralism', pp. 407, 415 and *passim*.
58. Julia Kristeva, 'Woman can never be defined', in Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds), *New French Feminisms* (New York: Schocken, 1981), p. 137 cited from Anne Marie Goetz, 'Feminism and the Limits of the Claim to Know: Contradictions in the Feminist Approach to Women in Development', *Millennium*, 17(3), Winter 1988, p. 489.
59. Julia Kristeva, 'Oscillation Between Power and Denial', in Marks and de Courtivron, *New French Feminisms*, p. 166.
60. Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism', p. 418.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 419; Goetz, 'Feminism and the Limits of the Claim to Know', p. 489. In defence of feminist postmodernism, Anne S. Runyan and V. Spike Peterson argue that 'just because the claim to truth has been undercut, [it] does not mean that women's accounts of their oppression, however partial, are mere fictions.' This is an important claim made by many postmodernists, however the extent to which it is inconsistent with the rest of postmodernist theorising is never fully addressed. See Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism', p. 75. For a more elaborate explication of this critique of

post-structuralism, see Eleanor M. MacDonald, 'The Political Limitations of Post-modern Theory', *Ph.D Dissertation*, Department of Political Science, York University, North York, Ontario, September 1990.

62. Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism,' p. 420.
63. MacDonald, 'The Political Limitations of Post-modern Theory', p. 131.
64. Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', p. 137. References within text removed.
65. Goetz, 'Feminism and the Limits of the Claim to Know', pp. 490–1.
66. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* , p. 2.
67. Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 234.
68. Alcoff, p. 431.
69. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, p. 31.
70. Joan Wallach Scott, 'Rewriting History', in M. Randolph Higonnet *et al.*, *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 153.
71. R.W. Cox, 'Postscript', in R.O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 242.
72. Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: Pandora, 1989), p. 4.
73. Scott, 'Rewriting History', p. 27.
74. See Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, Chapter one. See also Elshtain, *Women and War*, 'Introduction'; and, Margaret R. Higonnet and Patrice L.-R. Higonnet, 'The Double Helix', in Higonnet *et al.* (eds), *Behind the Lines.*
75. Kardam, 'Social Theory and Women in Development Policy', pp. 75–6 and *passim*. See also Adele Mueller, '"In and Against Development": Feminists Confront Development on its Own Ground', Paper Given at a Women's Studies Colloquium, August 9, 1989, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario; Adele Mueller, 'Power and Naming in the Development Institution: Targeting Women in Peru', n.d.
76. This section draws on Abigail Bakan, 'Whither Woman's Place? A Reconsideration of Units of Analysis in International Political Economy', Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Victoria, British Columbia, May 1990. See also, Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Gita Sen and Caren Grown, *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986); June Nash and Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (eds), *Women, Men and the International Division of Labor* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
77. Sen and Grown, *Development, Crises and Alternatives*, pp. 30–1.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
79. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, p. 33.
80. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, pp. 36–7.
81. *Ibid.*, ch. 7.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
83. See Betsy Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population Control and Contraceptive Choice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987); and Sandra Whitworth, 'Planned Parenthood and the New

Right: Onslaught *and* Opportunity?' *Studies in Political Economy*, 35, Summer 1991. The word 'women' is used here because women, though not the exclusive targets of population programmes (some vasectomy projects have been prevalent especially in India), are the primary focus of population programmes.

84. G.A. Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation: Its Work for Social and Economic Progress* (London: Europa Publications, 1970), p. 227.
85. For an interesting discussion of the ways in which the 'centre' of IR scholarship resists feminist scholarship, see V. Spike Peterson, 'Transgressing Boundaries,' pp. 198ff.

2 Gender in International Relations Theory

From what has gone before, it should be clear that the study of gender is largely absent from the field of international relations theory, long the preserve of what radical feminists would call 'male-stream' realist thinkers.[1] On the one hand, this lacuna in IR theory should come as no surprise: realism has been accused of a variety of 'absences', not least of which is its inability to theorise its own central unit of analysis, the state. Analyses of change, agency or race also are largely unavailable to the realist student.[2] Within this context, an inability or unwillingness to theorise about gender does not seem very unusual.

On the other hand, the field of IR is currently in a state of flux. The latest theoretical revolution in IR is one in which a diversity of theories is celebrated as freeing IR scholarship from 'the intellectual cage in which it was imprisoned by postwar traditional realism.'[3] As James Der Derian writes:

> International relations is undergoing an epistemological critique which calls into question the very language, concepts, methods, and history (that is, the dominant discourse) which constitutes and governs a 'tradition' of thought in the field.[4]

Within this debate, we are witness to a variety of critiques, all of which challenge many of realism's central assumptions. In this context, it is perhaps more surprising still that even so-called critics of realism have failed to acknowledge, let alone analyse in any sustained fashion, the character and bases of female subordination within both the practice and study of international relations.[5]

Simply to note the absence of any attention to gender within IR theory, however, does not take us very far. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of whether one *could* theorise about gender from within IR theory. That is, it will extrapolate from what *is* written within IR theory to what is not, thus constructing the possibility, at least, of a feminist theory of international relations which could take gender into account.

THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Whether described as the 'crisis' of international relations theory, the 'third debate', or the 'inter-paradigm debate', it is generally acknowledged that 'the field of international relations has experienced in recent years sustained theoretical effervescence'.[6] This new period of theoretical restructuring goes far beyond previous debates in the field, such as those between realists and idealists that marked the period up until 1950, or the behavioural revolution of the 1960s. The latter concentrated on research methods, while the former focused on values and policy prescriptions, but neither fundamentally challenged the crucial state-centred assumptions of realism.[7] Not so this new or 'third debate' in which we see the emergence of various alternative accounts of international relations.

The sources of such a challenge are varied, from the dramatic changes in world politics of the last few years, to the gradual, but more entrenched, crisis of hegemony of the last two decades – of which the former, of course, is a part. This crisis, as Stephen Gill writes, is not to be confused with the much touted crisis of US hegemony, but rather 'it is a crisis in social and political aspects of the world order system. A less consensual order appears to be emerging, unbalancing the relations between capital and labor, between capital and state, and between political and economic aspects in the system more generally.'[8] The demands posed by this crisis are many, but not least is the demand to re-think and re-evaluate the many basic tenets of international relations, global politics and world order. Within this context, the incorporation of new and different intellectual traditions is increasingly pervasive.

For our purposes, the 'third debate' is useful in a number of ways. For one, with its focus on different approaches or paradigms of IR theory, the 'third debate' accepts not only the likelihood but the inevitability of competing meta-theoretical accounts of international relations.[9] This does not mean that representative scholars from the various approaches actually communicate with one another (indeed, little of this activity appears to be taking place[10]), but rather that attention is given to the way various paradigms of IR privilege different conceptions of what is political. They define what the appropriate questions of IR should be, and the appropriate ways in which those questions should be answered.

At some times, a particular paradigm may be hegemonic, with competing interpretations over appropriate disciplinary questions and answers effectively silenced. As Jane Jenson writes, 'Invisibility can exist for those questions that are, for whatever reasons, never elevated to the status of being "political".'[11] This has certainly been true of realism within North American

post-war IR scholarship. But during periods of debate or crisis, as we are witnessing currently, previously unquestioned assumptions about the field are challenged. The 'third debate' signifies precisely this kind of struggle over interpretation, and thus a *space* is created for the possibilities of new types of questions and new types of answers, including those of interest to feminists. This new period of 'theoretical effervescence' forecloses the possibility of *invisibility* for feminists (and others) intent on redefining IR theory.

The 'third debate' is useful, secondly, because of the kinds of questions that are being raised within it. We are directed to the ways in which critique can most effectively be focused within paradigms of international relations; that is, to the criteria by which to compare and make judgements between different theoretical approaches within IR.[12] The shift in the third debate, according to Yosef Lapid, has been to examine the underlying ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions within particular paradigms;[13] or, as Richard Ashley notes, to make problematic the taken-for-granted assumptions within those world views.[14] Within this context, it is possible for feminists to problematise paradigms of international relations from the perspective of gender. A growing literature already exists which examines, for example, the gendered implications of notions such as the state, sovereignty, security and the state of nature to name only a few.[15] All of this work asks about the gendered assumptions which inform IR theory; where gender analysis does or does not exist within IR; and further, whether attention to gender *could* exist there.

GENDER AND THE THIRD DEBATE

Given what was suggested in the Introduction and chapter 1 about gender, several criteria for the project of uncovering a space for a feminist IR theory from within each of the paradigms of the 'third debate' should be apparent. It has been argued that to examine gender and international relations is to examine how ideas about the appropriate relationships between women and men, masculinity and femininity and about the role of women and men in society and the workforce, inform the activities of international relations. Examining gender also means examining the material conditions and social forces that both facilitate and constrain attempts to alter those understandings and practices. From this, several things follow. For one, an international relations theory which is sensitive to gender should allow us to talk about the social construction of ideas or meanings. As gender relations are themselves constructed (there is nothing essentialist about them), there must be room within IR theory to talk about that.

Secondly, such a theory should allow us to discuss historical variability, for gender is not constructed at one point in time once and for all, but is a set of ideas and practices that have changed depending upon both changing material conditions and the various struggles in which actors engage. Understandings about the appropriate relations between women and men, their roles in society and economy, and so on, are not fixed; rather they are fluid. Indeed, to suggest that gender is fixed across time or place invokes the same sort of ahistorical analysis that the movement to gender, as an approach, was intended to resolve.

Thirdly, such a theory should allow us to theorise power, for implicit in the notion of gender is an understanding of power as an inequality of power. Such a discussion of power should not focus simply on overt expressions of force, as so much of IR theory does, but on the ways in which power relations between women and men are made to appear consensual and are, at other times, contested. It should underscore also the extent to which the appropriateness of even raising questions about gender within both the practice and study of international relations has been silenced.[16]

Thus there are three criteria by which to evaluate IR theory: whether it permits us to discuss the social construction of meaning, whether it permits us to discuss historical variability, and whether it permits us to theorise about power in ways that uncover the very masking of those power relations as well as their contestation. Each of these criteria will be applied to the different paradigms of IR theory: realism, pluralism and critical IR theory.

The same *caveat* applies to this discussion as to the analysis of feminist theories discussed in chapter 1; that is, that the diversity and volume of IR theories cannot be covered in their entirety, but rather some general themes, tendencies and assumptions will be outlined.[17] Additionally, this review will illustrate further the requirements, both epistemological and ontological, of a gendered analysis of international relations.

REALISM AND GENDER[18]

Realism constitutes the central tradition of IR theory within North America, and one which at first glance at least may appear to be the most inhospitable to theorising about gender. It is primarily concerned with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, order and security, and contains in all of its manifestations (from Thucydides through Morgenthau to Waltz and even to realist political economists such as Gilpin) three central

assumptions: that states are the most important actors in world politics; that state behaviour can be explained rationally; and, that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power.[19]

There is little in this brief summary of realism that seems conducive to theorising about gender. And indeed, it is unlikely that most realists *would* theorise about gender. Morgenthau defines international politics as the struggle for power, which he defines as the ability of the state representatives of one nation to control the minds and actions of another nation's representatives.[20] He argues further that international relations which are not concerned with the pursuit of power are simply not about international politics.[21] Examples of international relations which are *not* international politics by this definition would include the activities of international organisations, the exchange of goods and services between nations, or the cooperation among nations in providing relief from natural disasters.[22]

More recently, Kal Holsti has argued against the increasing fragmentation and overspecialisation which he claims currently characterises the field of IR, work which he describes as on the peripheries of 'triviadom' (i.e. the coordination of labour policies among Scandinavian states), and calls for a return to the fundamental purpose of the discipline: the investigation of the causes of war, and the conditions for peace, order and security.[23] From this perspective, clearly, many of the examples of the gendered nature of international relations cited in the previous chapters, such as debt management, EPZs, international population control organisations and so on, would simply not be included within the field of IR. Of course, neither would the subfields of international organisation or international political economy.

While realists themselves may not be inclined to theorise about gender, and based on their ontological assumptions would argue against such a project, it is suggested here that there are a number of spaces within realist theory which would at least not foreclose such a possibility. This proposition will be explored by examining examples of classical realist work and the later contributions of regimes and hegemonic stability theory. While neither classical realism nor regimes theory opens up a sufficient space for a feminist theory of IR, and in fact their ontological commitments necessarily preclude such an outcome, both *do* suggest a necessary epistemological space within which such a project could begin because they do contain some of the elements outlined above as necessary for a feminist theory of international relations.

Richard Ashley argues that in its commitment to practice (the practice of diplomats), the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau rejects the 'anti-historical enclosure' of much neo-realist thought that came after it.[24]

According to Ashley, this is a Morgenthau who understands the balance of power as a moral consensus and who argues that the study of politics cannot be disinterested, that knowledge cannot be divorced from action.[25] It is not the case, for example, that notions such as national interest, power, the state system, and so on, are not clearly defined by realists (as claimed by some neorealists), but rather that realists such as Morgenthau recognise that such concepts are given meaning only within an historical context through the practices and struggles of individuals (diplomats). There is nothing essentialist about the national interest, according to Ashley's account of Morgenthau. Rather, it is given meaning in different historical periods, within different material and ideological constraints, through the often 'strategic artistry' of the practitioners of international diplomacy.[26]

Such an interpretation of classical realism acknowledges that meaning is contingent and socially constructed, and further, acknowledges historical variability. While, of course, no mention is made within Morgenthau's work of gender, such an account creates a space for the analysis of gender and IR discussed earlier. This analysis suggests, at least, that how those meanings are constructed depends upon the activities and struggles of individuals and collectivities acting within particular historical conjunctures and constrained by particular material conditions. In other words, by this interpretation, Morgenthau's realism recognises agency, and attempts to outline the extent to which agents act within particular structures of international relations.

Nevertheless, while the classical realism of Morgenthau opens up an epistemological space for feminist IR, its ontological commitments to states, and state*smen* ultimately preclude any incorporation of gender into its analysis. Further, its conception of power is one which recognises only the overt ability to control action, through force, coercion or subtle psychological means.[27] It cannot, then, recognise the ways in which the management of power relations tends to recede into the background of consciousness as part of the functioning of hegemony.[28]

Finally, even the little space that there is within realism for the development of feminist IR theory is itself rather narrow. Ashley notes that his reading of Morgenthau is only one aspect of realism. Morgenthau's suggestion that concepts such as interest and power cannot be endowed 'with a meaning that is fixed once and for all', is opposed to Morgenthau's equally assertive claim that politics is governed by objective and immutable laws which cannot be overcome merely through preference or wishful thinking. This second, ever-dominant, vision of realism is described by Ashley as technical realism, and identifies the 'true tradition' of realism in which power is paramount and idealism in all of its forms is denied.[29]

Other realists similarly exhibit these two sides of realism. E.H. Carr, for example, argues that realism reveals both the determinist aspects of the historical process and the historical contingency of thought and ideas. He writes that realism 'tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies'.[30] At the same time, however, Carr notes that one of the greatest strengths of realism is its ability to assess the *historical* character of idealism:

> The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and *a priori* principles, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interests.[31]

For writers such as Robert Cox, this disposition within Carr's work makes him a critical theorist who 'does not accept appearances at face value but seeks to penetrate to the meaning within'.[32] More accurately, Carr's commitment is to a realist philosophy of science, which seeks to get beyond the 'mere appearances' of things to their essences: for Carr, *a priori* moral principles are a façade behind which states hide their 'real' (i.e. power-maximising) motivations.[33] The 'critical' commitment of this position, however, is severely constrained not only by its political interests (which ultimately seek to preserve the status quo) but also by its epistemological commitments to positivism.[34] Thus an interpretation of Morgenthau and Carr's classical realism which emphasises history and meaning is a contentious one at best, and one for which the space for incorporating analyses of gender may be narrower than anticipated.[35]

Regimes and hegemonic stability theory are similar in this regard, suggesting at one and the same time spaces which may be conducive to incorporating analyses of gender relations while ultimately precluding such an outcome by virtue of their epistemological and ontological underpinnings. Regimes are defined as 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge'.[36] One can speak of security regimes, oil regimes, monetary regimes, environment and trade regimes among others, but most of the work in the area has been concerned with different types of economic regimes.

It is argued by hegemonic stability theorists that international economic regimes change as a result of changes in the relative capabilities of states, and that international economic regimes have been most orderly and

predictable in a hegemonic world system – one in which economic capabilities, or power, is concentrated in a single state. Orderly and predictable, by this account, means an open or liberal international economic order, characterised by lower tariffs, rising trade proportions and less regionalism.[37] Thus the periods of *Pax Britannica* of the mid-nineteenth century and *Pax Americana* of the period after World War II are described as strong or open economic orders dominated by a single hegemonic state, Britain and the United States respectively.[38]

Hegemonic stability theory has been subject to a variety of criticisms, some from its own adherents.[39] For example, Stephen Krasner argues that the theory does not 'fit' a number of periods: 1900–1913, 1919–1939, and 1960 to the present. In the first, British commitment to openness continued long after Britain's relative economic position declined; American commitment to openness, on the other hand, did not coincide with its emergence from World War I as the world's most powerful economic state and did not decline automatically with its own economic decline beginning in the early 1960s. As Krasner notes, the argument needs to be amended 'to take these delayed reactions into account'.[40]

In *After Hegemony*, Robert Keohane argues that the regimes which hegemons create continue to exist even after the disappearance of the state which created them. States have an interest in following the constituent rules, norms and procedures of regimes because international regimes serve a number of valuable functions: they reduce the costs of legitimate transactions and increase the costs of illegitimate ones; they reduce uncertainty; they link issues together, so that behaviour on one set of issues will affect others; and they facilitate negotiations among states.[41] Thus even after the decline of a hegemon's power, as in the period 1900–13 or 1960 to the present, stable and orderly relations may continue because the shared rules, norms and procedures of an international regime continue to be observed.

In overcoming the 'empirical fit' problems, regimes analysis privileges notions of shared meanings.[42] As Ruggie and Kratochwil note, 'the emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable inter-subjective quality'.[43] In this way, hegemonic stability theory begins to underscore the extent to which ideas about appropriate activities within international relations are both important and socially constructed. Rules, norms and procedures which are shared are also, to some extent, mutually constituted through the practices of international actors. Regimes analysis also, then, incorporates notions of agency within its otherwise structural understanding of international relations.[44]

Like classical realism, regime theory suggests an epistemology which is more interpretive, one in which meaning is not given, but is constituted

through the inter-subjectively shared meanings of international actors. In this way, a space for discussing gender and international relations seems to be created by underlining the social construction of ideas or meanings. Again, however, that space is a narrow one. As Ruggie and Kratochwil argue, the dominant mode of analysis in the study of regimes is positivism, which focuses on overt behaviour and thus can not comprehend the influence of intersubjectively-shared meanings which are not always manifest in overt behaviour.[45] As Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze write, 'it denies the possibility that beliefs and values are themselves just as real as the material structures and powers of the global political economy.'[46]

Likewise, regime theory's primary ontological commitment is to states as the most important actors. Witness, for example, Stephan Haggard and B.A. Simmons' formulation of the question, 'do regimes matter?', when they ask: 'Do regimes have independent influence on state behavior and, if so, how?'[47] Such a commitment to the structures of international relations ultimately precludes any analysis of gender by depositing questions about gender outside of the purview of legitimate IR inquiry.

PLURALISM AND GENDER

The pluralist paradigm, in contrast to realism, would appear at first glance to be quite conducive to theorising about gender. Most of the work done from this perspective – from the early work of Keohane and Nye through the World Order Modelling Project (or WOMP), to the World Society Perspective of Burton and to the work of liberal political economists more generally – has sought to enlarge the purview of IR theory away from the strictly state-centric concerns of realism. Some seek to add new actors, while others attempt to incorporate values and norms different from those suggested by realism.

One of the most dramatic departures from realism within the pluralist paradigm may be that of the world society perspective.[48] The world society perspective was launched in the late 1960s by John Burton when he argued that global politics resembled more a 'cobweb' in which a large proportion of international relations and transactions take place between non-governmental actors, than the 'billiard-ball' model of the realists.[49] In addition, the world society perspective constitutes a fundamental challenge to the realist assumption of the primacy of power as a motivating principle and explanatory concept in IR theory and argues instead that 'legitimacy rather than power is the fundamental concept in politics'.[50]

By this view, problems of international politics such as war, terrorism, arms races, ideological conflict, famine and so on, are conceptualised along

with other apparently unrelated problems such as alcohol and drug abuse, muggings and racial conflict, as having common origins. Conflictual relationships of all variety have as their origin, according to Burton, the denial of human needs.[51] The East–West conflict during the Cold War, by this account, was essentially an identity conflict, one in which the United States and the Soviet Union were each concerned with the preservation of their identity and their culture. Each perceived the other as set to destroy its identity and hence a conflict situation ensued because of a denial, or perceived denial, of this basic human need.[52]

Burton thus argues that such conflicts are not over a material good or symbol which cannot be shared but over commonly-held or universal goals such as identity. The goal of conflict resolution is to uncover these underlying conflicts, which are (incorrectly, for Burton) expressed in terms of conflicts over scarce resources. Parties to disputes are brought together in problem-solving workshops in which a 'true' understanding of the conflict is pursued.[53] As Chris Brown characterises it, 'the claim of the problem solving approach is that all conflict ... can be reconciled by the application of appropriate, knowledge-based, redefinitions and reperceptions'. [54]

While the world society perspective does much to expand the legitimate area of IR inquiry away from the strictly state-centred concerns of realism, its analysis is severely limited. Such an account is ahistorical, ignoring as it does the material bases of conflict, inequality and power and assuming that conflict results from cognitive misperceptions rather than real material inequalities. It denies the extent to which wealth and other resources are unevenly distributed throughout the world, based on country of origin, race, class and gender, among other things. The aim of problem-solving workshops is not to transform those structural inequalities but rather to encourage participants to reconcile themselves to them.

Nevertheless, in expanding the purview of IR theory to include various non-state and sub-state actors, Burton seems to open up a larger ontological space than realism might for considerations of gender and IR. This, too, is misleading; for, while the world society perspective may be able to develop an analysis of *women* and IR, it forecloses any possibility of discussing *gender* and IR precisely because it is so ahistorical. Women as a category may figure in conflicts over security and recognition, just as any other interest group is important in Burton's problem-solving problematique. In this way Burton's project, if it were applied to women, would be very much that of liberal feminists: to 'bring women in' to IR. But this ahistorical and non-material understanding of conflict and human needs suffers from the same limitations inherent in liberal feminism: it fails to analyse the structural features of women's oppression. Burton's approach ignores structural

sources of inequality and conflict, and as Brian Fay writes, 'makes it sound as if all conflict ... is generated by mistaken ideas about social reality rather than by the tensions and incompatibilities inherent in this reality itself.'[55]

This can be illustrated by exploring the dichotomy used by the world society perspective between legitimacy and power politics. By this view, power politics, rather than being the norm of international behaviour, represents a 'pathological outcome of failures of legitimacy, both in domestic and in international affairs.'[56] While attempting to go beyond realism's narrow power politics view of international relations, the world society perspective only serves to reproduce realism's equally narrow definition of power as the overt expression of force. This view ignores the extent to which legitimised relationships may themselves serve to mask power relationships. As Robert Cox notes, the exercise of power entails a necessary combination of coercion *and* consent.[57] Enforcement of particular power relations may be achieved through overt expressions of force, but in addition,

> ... force will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the strong to the extent that the weak accept the prevailing power relations as legitimate. This they may do if the strong see their mission as hegemonic and not merely dominant or dictatorial, that is, if they are willing to make concessions that will secure the weak's acquiescence in their leadership and if they can express this leadership in terms of universal or general interests, rather than just as serving their own particular interests.[58]

In its almost exclusive attention to individuals' subjective perception of legitimacy,[59] the world society perspective cannot comprehend the structural constraints to legitimacy and the material constitutive elements of inequality, power and oppression. In this way, while it could theorise about *women*, as actors in aspects of international relations, it cannot discuss the structural features inherent in the definition of *gender*.

A second pluralist approach in IR is that of the World Order Models Project (WOMP). Richard Falk lists three fundamental inadequacies of realism and neo-realism: they fail to acknowledge the important differences that phenomena such as population growth, industrial development and the technology of violence mean to the field of international relations; they fail to recognise that the statism of realism and neo-realism has been superseded by these changes; and, they fail to develop any normative position upon which genuine foundations for hope may be developed.[60] By contrast, according to Falk, since 1968 WOMP has developed a new approach to the study of international relations which is explicitly

normative, making goals explicit; which is futuristic, developing ideas about alternative world orders; which is systemic as opposed to statist; and which is interdisciplinary, including politics, economics, sociology, and so on.[61]

WOMP does not suggest a radical restructuring of the state system, but neither does it have any faith in incremental repairs.[62] Rather, it provides a set of values which would serve as the basis for assessing our present world order and for creating a future world order, on the understanding that in order for change to come about what must first be changed is people's ideas and values about the world.[63] The five world order values – economic equity, social justice, ecological balance, political participation, and peace – guide much of the WOMP work.[64] Like the world society perspective, however, WOMP is concerned primarily with people's ideas about issues and lacks any analytical focus on either the structural sources of inequality, real material constraints on political action or of history.[65] In this way, it is also not a particularly useful starting point for a gendered analysis of international relations.

So, ironically perhaps, it is argued here that there are no more spaces within pluralism to discuss gender than there were within realism. While realism is limited in its ability to discuss questions of agency, pluralism is unable to theorise social and political structures. This is so because in its exclusive attention to individuals or actors, pluralism ignores the structural features of power and inequality, central to the development of a feminist account of international relations.

CRITICAL IR AND GENDER

I have left critical theory to the end not only because in some ways it is the most recent approach to the study of international relations, but because much of this work holds out the greatest promise for incorporating gendered analyses into IR. This is so because, at its best, critical IR theory attempts to theorise the articulation between structure and agency, rather than privilege one over the other as we have seen in both realism and pluralism. As Mark Hoffman describes it, critical IR theory stands apart from the prevailing order and asks how that order came about, it entails a theory of history and questions the origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions, and it contemplates the social and political complex as a whole.[66] Clearly, such a view replicates almost precisely the gender and IR project outlined here, both being attempts to theorise about historical variability, power and the social construction of meaning.

Much of the current critical IR work is done from a postmodernist perspective and is concerned with what Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian describe as 'making strange' or 'denaturalising' accepted authors, texts or concepts. As they write, 'the first step in showing how a process, a perspective, a concept, or a fact is socially constructed is to distance it, to make it seem strange.'[67] Postmodernist authors have challenged, among other things, the time-honoured claim that the realist tradition is a long and venerable one dating back to Thucydides and including Hobbes, Machiavelli, Carr, Morgenthau, Waltz and others. Some recent critical re-readings of the classic texts in IR suggest that there is no such tradition, with some arguing that the 'classics' may even serve as a source of critique of contemporary realism and neo-realism.[68]

Daniel Garst argues, for example, that the traditional interpretation of Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* as the first great realist work is misguided and that instead it marks the beginning of a critical theory of international relations.[69] Garst describes a Thucydides who is concerned with the language and practices through which interests are articulated, and the question of whether these norms and conventions decay over time.[70] This is a Thucydides concerned with the making of history by actors:

> Thucydides emphasizes the *deliberate* choices made by individuals and the close relationship between these choices and the events of history. Far from viewing historical figures as driven by forces outside their control, Thucydides sees them as conscious initiators of events.[71]

It is also a Thucydides for whom the power of Athens depends not only on its material capabilities, but also on its ability to defend a way of life and secure the consent of other city-states. As such, power and hegemony are conditional and depend on some form of activity, they are a 'contingent and open-ended process'.[72] This is a Thucydides, then, concerned with historical variability, the social construction of meaning, and a notion of hegemonic power.

Critical IR theorists have also focused on traditional interpretations of Machiavelli. Robert Gilpin cites Machiavelli as one of the three great realist writers (along with Thucydides and E.H. Carr) and Alex Hybel and Thomas Jacobsen note that 'his name is synonymous with the idea of "realpolitik", evoking praise or admonishment for proclaiming the primacy of *raison d'état* over ordinary moral considerations'.[73] R.B.J. Walker, by contrast, argues that Machiavelli, like Thucydides, is an interpretive theorist sensitive to the historicity of political action. Machiavelli's task, according to Walker, was to make sense of the historically specific circumstances

during which he wrote and to understand political action within the context of the emergence of a new form of political community, the city-state, in a period dominated by Christian universalisms.[74] It is an unfortunate manipulation of Machiavelli's work, for Walker, that it has been a part of the modernist project to replace Christian universals with, in the case of international relations, realist universals:

> For ironically, while Machiavelli contests the universalism of the static universals of his time, and contests it on the ground of the temporality of human existence, the Machiavellian community, the state, has itself become the static universal, the fixed point from which the world may be commanded by the latter-day heroes who claim power and legitimacy in a world of evident flux.[75]

Other work within postmodern IR is concerned with the ways in which debate and dialogue have been foreclosed within traditional international relations theory because of the way mainstream IR has been constructed. This approach is concerned with the discourse and resultant practices created through traditional IR theory. Thus Bradley Klein argues that within the area of strategic studies, which emphasises the state and the role of organised violence in making the anarchic realm a safer place, questions posed by peace researchers who may not share these assumptions are simply nonsensical. The possibility of even raising alternative visions is effectively foreclosed.[76] The same is true of assumptions around sovereignty and the anarchy problematique within IR which demarcate the boundaries between national and international politics in such a way that questions appropriate to the former are not so in the latter. In this way, the possibility of raising questions around ethics, or even politics, are precluded within IR theory.[77]

These postmodern IR theorists clearly present the most hospitable space for a gendered account of international relations discussed thus far. They cite historical variability, power and the social construction of meaning as central to theorising about international relations. Despite this welcoming stance, however, there a number of limitations for a feminist appropriation of this particular critical literature. Chiefly, it is subject to many of the criticisms made against feminist postmodernism in chapter 1. Later work by Richard Ashley, for example, has been accused of political paralysis, or of an intentioned neutrality, unable to give expression to the evaluations that arise out of his analyses.[78] As Ramashray Roy writes:

> If this is how history must be conceived, how do we, then, come to a judgement about the appropriateness or otherwise of a particular structure

> of domination? In itself, the inexorable process of domination following domination cannot yield any criterion of valuation and evaluation.[79]

Indeed, many of the analyses which demonstrate how traditional IR theory forecloses different kinds of questions seem unable themselves to show how we may remove ourselves from this cycle of defeat. Rob Walker's work on sovereignty, for example, is ultimately a despairing one, unable to show how once the assumptions around sovereignty become entrenched, there is any possibility for a movement away from the narrowly proscribed debates that result.[80] He argues that the principle of state sovereignty must be challenged, but he gives us no sense of how this might be done. In fact, the logic of state sovereignty appears to be so compelling, by Walker's account, that it becomes impossible to see a resolution. As Walker writes, 'the dilemma before us seems so obvious and yet irresolvable'.[81]

There are two literatures which open up the same kinds of spaces for feminist analyses as does postmodernism, while avoiding its many political problems. The first comes from scholars of International Political Economy working within a Gramscian or historical materialist tradition such as Craig Murphy, Roger Tooze, Stephen Gill and Robert Cox. The second includes the meta-theoretical work of Mark Neufeld. Their work will be reviewed briefly here.

Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze suggest that, even though orthodox analyses have constituted the vast majority of scholarly contributions to IPE, heterodox analyses have also 'flourished'.[82] In part, this may be that IPE re-emerged in the early 1970s explicitly as a critique of the discipline of International Relations. While much of that critique has not strayed dramatically from the central currents of traditional IR theory, this early critical stance has permitted greater openness to a variety of perspectives, including what Robert Cox describes as critical theory, Stephen Gill as historical materialism and Murphy and Tooze as the 'new' IPE.[83] Indeed, it is often in IPE anthologies, more so than elsewhere, that chapters examining women or gender relations have been solicited.[84]

Defining these critical approaches within IPE is no easy task, but what they share is a rejection of the 'traditional questions' of IPE; those around trade and managing an open trading system are not the only or primary questions asked; as well, they reject the separation of politics and economics; they aim at historical specificity; and, they confront and reflect upon the epistemological and ontological underpinning of orthodox or positivist IPE.[85] As Stephen Gill writes:

> ... in contrast to the tendency in much of the (American) literature to prioritise systemic order and management, from a vantage point associated

> with the ruling elements in the wealthy core of the global political economy, the historical materialist perspective looks at the system from the bottom upwards, as well as the top downwards, in a dialectical appraisal of a given historical situation: a concern with movement, rather than management.[86]

The point here, of course, is that the work of critical IPE scholars does not foreclose discussions of gender. However, even in this work, the question remains: why does it offer important intellectual and political spaces within which feminist analyses might be developed but does not itself offer a sustained analysis of these relations? The fact that few critical IR theorists have yet discussed gender in any sustained fashion is the most damning criticism that can be made against it.[87] As Nancy Fraser notes, Marx's definition of critical theory as 'the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age', positively demands an account of gender.[88] If one of the most important struggles of our age has been that of women, and I would argue that it has been, then critical IR is simply not deserving of the name until it develops an analysis of gender.

The answer for this absence lies in this literature's greatest strength, and correspondingly, its greatest weakness. Critical IPE has been unable to raise analyses of gender as described in this chapter because even in its more sophisticated forms there has been an almost exclusive emphasis on questions of production, work, exchange and distribution. There is, in other words, a general inattention devoted within IPE, and indeed IR more generally, to ideas and ideology.[89] This has been true of traditional approaches within IPE which examine the activities of states or other institutional actors, but it is even true of those approaches which claim to privilege the notion of ideas. Robert Cox, for example, has consistently stressed the importance of ideas in his theoretical work and yet falls back to more straightforward class analyses in his empirical work. As Mark Laffey writes:

> Cox and his cohort fail adequately to incorporate into their analyses the ways in which social subjects understand themselves and their relations to social structures, structures which are in turn constituted in and by social practices informed by intersubjective understandings.[90]

It is these very social practices and self understandings, however, which are central in any account of gender. The corrective for this absence is found in both critical and feminist IR. As Mark Neufeld writes:

> The 'web of meaning' spun by human beings is fundamental to the nature of their behaviour. For it is the 'web of meaning' which makes the behavioural regularities observed in the social world what they are – human practices – and distinguishes them from the non-human regularities observed in the natural world. And it is for this reason, affirm interpretive theorists, that the practices in which human beings are engaged cannot be studied in isolation from the 'web of meanings', which is, in a fundamental sense, constitutive of those practices, even as it is embedded in and instantiated through those same practices.[91]

Without a more thorough analysis of ideas and ideology, the notion of gender as discussed above cannot be incorporated within existing work in Critical IPE because gender does not exist simply at the material level, but at the level of ideas and institutions as well. It will be in the development of such analyses that IPE and critical IR more generally, will move away from analyses which continue exclude analyses of gender and gender relations.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has examined the question of whether there are spaces within traditional IR theory which may be conducive to the development of a feminist IR theory. A number of features were considered necessary in order to be able to entertain the question of gender, including the ability to discuss historical variability, the social construction of meaning, and power. It was argued that there are some spaces even within realism, the hegemonic approach to the study of International Relations within North America, which lends itself to an analysis which is sensitive to gender. Much of Morgenthau, Carr and contemporary hegemonic stability and regimes theory may be able to encompass such an approach. Each discusses the extent to which meanings can be socially constructed, and each is concerned with historical variability. Ultimately, however, each has ontological commitments to states and states*men* such that a feminist analysis currently is precluded.

Pluralist approaches, too, are an inappropriate place to locate a feminist IR theory which is sensitive to gender. This is so because the pluralist approaches, by and large, are ahistorical and unable to account for change. Their notions of power also suffer from the same limitations as liberal feminism. Pluralist approaches to IR theory may be able to 'bring women in' to international relations but they cannot incorporate the more challenging forms of questioning posed by a gender in IR approach.

Perhaps the most hospitable place to locate a feminist IR theory which is sensitive to gender is within critical international relations theory and recent IPE scholarship. Numerous limitations were cited, but the relationship between critical IR and feminist IR can and should be a reciprocal one. While critical IR theory is as yet underdeveloped, there is much within feminist theory from which it can draw. The feminist insight that 'women are made not born,' as Jane Jenson writes, 'compels us to think not only about the social construction of gender relations but also about the ways in which *all* social relations are constructed.'[92] Examinations of the social construction of meaning pointed to by feminist analysis can be applied to a variety of traditional IR concerns such as international organisations, militarism, the state system, and so on. Critical IR, despite the problems discussed here, presents the most appropriate place to raise feminist questions within international relations. Thus the 'next stage' of IR theory will not be one which is merely 'critical', but one which is *both* critical *and* feminist.

Notes

1. This term is Mary O'Brien's from *The Politics of Reproduction* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 5 and *passim*. This is a revised version of my 'Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, 18(2), Summer 1989.
2. See Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in R.O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255–300; and Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', *Millennium*, 16(2); N.J. Rengger, 'Serpents and Doves in Classical International Theory', *Millennium*, 17(2), Summer 1988, p. 215; John G. Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in *Neorealism and its Critics*, pp. 131–57; R.B.J. Walker, 'Realism, Change and International Political Theory', *International Studies Quarterly*, 31, 1987, 65–86; V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).
3. Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 20. See also Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1989, pp. 235–54.
4. James Der Derian, 'Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations', *Millennium*, 17(2), Summer 1988, p. 189.
5. For a parallel discussion see Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds), *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,

1987), pp. 31–55. Although this is true generally, the oft-cited example of this is the special edition of the journal *International Studies Quarterly* devoted to 'dissident' voices in IR which did not bother to include a feminist author. See Marysia Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds), *From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 136.

6. Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 238; see also Emin Fuat Keyman and Jean-François Rioux, 'Beyond the Inter-Paradigm Debate: Four Perceptions of the "Crisis" in the Study of International Relations', Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec City, June 1–3, 1989, p. 1.
7. Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 11. See also Ernie Keenes, Gregg Legare and Jean-François Rioux, 'The Reconstruction of Neo-Realism from Counter-Hegemonic Discourse', *Carleton University Occasional Papers*, No. 14, Spring 1987, p. 9; and Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium*, 16(2), 1987, pp. 189–206.
8. Stephen Gill, 'Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time', *Alternatives*, 16, 1991, p. 278.
9. Lapid, 'The Third Debate', pp. 239–41.
10. See for example K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), chapters 5 and 6.
11. Jane Jenson, 'Changing Discourse, Changing Agendas: Political Rights and Reproductive Policies in France', in M. Katzenstein and C. Mueller (eds), *The Women's Movement in Western Europe and the USA: Consciousness, Political Opportunity and Public Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 65.
12. See Mark Neufeld 'Interpretation and the "Science" of International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 19, 1993, pp. 39–61 and 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', *Millennium* 22(1), 1993, pp. 53–76.
13. Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 241.
14. Richard Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War', in J. Der Derian and M.J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989).
15. For an excellent collection of such work see Peterson, *Gendered States*.
16. See R.W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium*, 12(2), Summer 1983, p. 164; R.W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10(2), Summer 1981, p. 137; Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 34.
17. Banks suggests that there are currently three paradigms within IR: realism, pluralism and structuralism. The realist paradigm is largely state-centric, envisioning world politics as a system of 'billiard-ball' states in intermittent collision, the pluralist paradigm sees international relations as a 'cobweb', a network of numerous criss-crossing relationships including the state in

combination with other actors such as multinational corporations, ethnic groups and so on, and the structural paradigm is concerned primarily with modes of production, envisioning world politics as a multi-headed octopus, with powerful tentacles constantly sucking wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful centres. The last of these, structuralism, is a rather confused collection of theories (in which, for example, Banks includes both Richard Ashley and Robert Cox, two writers who explicitly reject purely structural accounts of IR), and which, it is argued here, was not engaged in 'debates' with realism in the same way as was the pluralist paradigm during the 1970s and early 1980s. As such, Banks' notion of the inter-paradigm debate will be modified here to include realism, pluralism and critical IR theory, what Mark Hoffman has described recently as the next stage of IR theory, ('Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, 16(2), Summer 1987, pp. 231–49). Critical IR theory will include a variety of approaches which, in Robert Cox's words, '[do] not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing', (in Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 238). Writers such as Wallerstein, more recent Falk work, Ashley and Cox would be included here.

18. Realism and its economic variants, economic nationalism or mercantilism, will be discussed together under the term realism. For an excellent introduction to realist thinking in IPE, see Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), especially chapter 2. For a feminist critique of different approaches to IPE which is different from the one outlined here, see J. Ann Tickner 'On the Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective', in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds), *The New International Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) and *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), chapter 2.
19. R.O. Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', in *Neorealism and its Critics*, pp. 163–5; Holsti, *the Dividing Discipline*, p. 8. Critiques of this so-called 'tradition' are discussed below.
20. H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 9, 30.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 29–30.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.
23. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, pp. 139–40.
24. R.K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization*, 38(2), 1984, p. 270.
25. Richard K. Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25(2), June 1981, pp. 209–10. Ashley's references to Morgenthau on this point are to his *Politics Among Nations*, 5th edition, pp. 5, 23, 224.
26. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', pp. 270–1; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 8–9.
27. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 9.
28. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 137.

29. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 4, 8; Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', pp. 210, 225. See also Robert G. Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, p. 306.
30. E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966 [1946]), p. 10; see also chapter one and pp. 67–8.
31. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 68.
32. Robert W. Cox, 'Multilateralism and World Order', *Review of International Studies*, no. 18, 1992, p. 168.
33. See Russell Keat and John Urry, *Social Theory as Science* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), Introduction and chapter 2.
34. For a detailed elaboration of this critique see Neufeld, 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory'.
35. Rob Walker argues that rather than creating a space for 'an openness to the incomplete and historicist character of human experience', Morgenthau and Carr's work effectively closes off such discussion. Ramasharay Roy, R.B.J. Walker and Richard K. Ashley, 'Dialogue: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives*, 13 (1988), p. 85. There are other ways in which this space is progressively narrowed; for example, in realism's treatment of ideology. See Sasson Sofer, 'International Relations and the Invisibility of Ideology', *Millennium*, 16(3), 1987, pp. 489–521.
36. Stephen Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in S. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), Introduction.
37. R.O. Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977', in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander L. George (eds), *Change in the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 136–7; J.G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization*, 36(2), Spring 1982, p. 381; Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences', pp. 322–3; Duncan Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', *International Organization*, 39(4), Autumn 1985, pp. 579; Oran R. Young, 'International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', *World Politics*, 32, April 1980, pp. 332–3.
38. Cox, 'Social Forces', p. 139; Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences', pp. 335–8. Britain in the mid-nineteenth century and the United States in the mid-twentieth century can both be characterized as hegemons by this understanding. In 1820, Britain produced two-thirds of the world's coal, half its iron, five-sevenths of its steel and about half of its cotton cloth. By 1880, it had the highest per capita income in the world and almost double the share of world trade and investment as that of any other state. As hegemonic stability theory predicts, international trade during the mid-nineteenth century, when Britain was at the peak of its power, was characterized by increasing openness. Britain began lowering trade barriers in the 1820s and signed the Cobden–Chevalier Tariff Treaty with France in 1860. It used its military strength to open up Latin America and Africa to colonial trade. Similarly after World War II, the United States equalled the relative share of world trade and investment achieved by Britain in the 1880s

and achieved much higher levels of productivity than Britain had ever known. And again, during the period after World War II the structure of the international trading system became increasingly open and by 1958 European convertibility had been restored. See for example, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 36; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (UK: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 134.

39. For a critique from outside of regimes analysis, see Susan Strange, '*Cave! hic dragones*: A Critique of Regime Analysis', *International Organization*, 36(2), Spring 1982, pp. 479–96.
40. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences', pp. 338–41.
41. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 85, 107 and chapter 6 *passim*.
42. See especially R.O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, 1988.
43. F. Kratochwil and J.G. Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', *International Organization*, 40(4), Autumn 1986, p. 764.
44. See especially Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), parts one and three.
45. Kratochwil and Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', p. 764. See also Neufeld, 'Interpretation and the "Science" of International Relations', pp. 54–5.
46. Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze, 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Othodoxy', in Murphy and Tooze, *The New International Political Economy*, p. 18. Murphy and Tooze are discussing positivism more generally, but the critique applies to the regime analysis under consideration here.
47. S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes', *International Organization*, 41(3), Summer 1987, pp. 492, 513–15.
48. Keenes *et al.*,'The Reconstruction of NeoRealism from Counter-hegemonic Discourse'. p. 15.
49. See John W. Burton, 'World Society and Human Needs', in Light and Groom, *International Relations*, p. 47; C.R. Mitchell, 'World Society as Cobweb: States, Actors and Systemic Processes', in Michael Banks, *Conflict in World Society* (1984), pp. 59–61.
50. A.V.S. de Rueck, 'A Personal Synthesis', in Light and Groom, *International Relations*, p. 101.
51. Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, 'Lessons for Great Power Relations', in E.E. Azar and J.W. Burton, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), pp. 117–18; and John W. Burton, *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp. 12–13.
52. Azar and Burton, 'Lessons for Great Power Relations', p. 122.
53. J.W. Burton, 'The Procedures of Conflict Resolution', in Azar and Burton, *International Conflict Resolution*, p. 99 and *passim*; Burton, *Global Conflict*, p. 140 and chapter 16.
54. Chris Brown, 'International Theory: New Directions?', *Review of International Studies*, 7, 1981, p. 177.
55. Brian Fay, *Social Theory and Political Practice*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 90–1.

56. A.V.S. de Rueck, 'Power, Influence and Authority', in Light and Groom, *International Relations*, p. 114.
57. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', p. 164.
58. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 137.
59. Mitchell, 'World Society as Cobweb', p. 70; Burton, *Global Conflict*, chapters 1, 2, 15, 16.
60. Richard Falk, *The End of World Order* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers , 1983), pp. 11–15.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
62. *Ibid.*; see also Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, 16(2), Summer 1987, p. 242.
63. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 242; Falk, *The End of World Order*, pp. 77, 89.
64. Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985), pp. 26, 31.
65. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 242.
66. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', pp. 237–8 and *passim*.
67. Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian, Foreword, in M.J. Shapiro and J. Der Derian, *International/Intertextual Relations*, p. xiv.
68. See for example, Daniel Garst, 'Thucydides and Neorealism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(3), 1989, pp. 3–27; Michael Williams, 'Reason and Realpolitik: Kant's "Critique of International Politics"', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25(1), March 1992; and 'Rousseau, Realism and Realpolitik', *Millennium*, 18(2), Summer 1989; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 2 and *passim*; Alex Roberto Hybel and Thomas Jacobsen, 'Is there a Realist Tradition? Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes Revisited', Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, London, March 29 to April 2, 1989. Not all 'challenges to the discipline' (Williams in particular) are from a postmodernist perspective.
69. Daniel Garst, 'Thucydides and Neorealism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1989, pp. 3–27. See also Alex Roberto Hybel and Thomas Jacobsen, 'Is There a Realist Tradition? Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes Revisited', Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, London, March 29 to April 2, 1989.
70. Garst, 'Thucydides and Neorealism', p. 6.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
73. Robert Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in R.O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics*, p. 306. Hybel and Jacobsen, 'Is There a Realist Tradition?', p. 33.
74. R.B.J. Walker, 'The Prince and "The Pauper": Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of International Relations', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, *International/Intertextual Relations*, p. 33.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
76. Bradley Klein, 'After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace', *Alternatives*, 12, 1988, pp. 293–318; Bradley S. Klein, 'Strategic

Discourse and its Alternatives', *Occasional Paper No. 3* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987).

77. R.B.J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Security and the Challenge of World Politics', *Alternatives*, 15(1), 1990; Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines'; Richard K. Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', *Millennium*, 17(2), Summer 1988, pp. 227–62.
78. This is paraphrased from Charles Taylor's more general critique of post-structuralism and Foucault in 'Foucault on Freedom and Truth', *Political Theory*, 12(2), May 1984, p. 162. See Richard Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives*, 12, (1987), pp. 403–34.
79. Ramashray Roy 'Limits of Genealogical Approach to International Politics', *Alternatives*, 13, 1988, p. 79; see also the other critique in this dialogue and Ashley's reply, R.B.J. Walker, 'Genealogy, Geopolitics and Political Community: Richard K. Ashley and the Critical Social Theory of International Politics', in *Ibid.*, pp. 84–88, and R.K. Ashley 'Geopolitics, Supplementary, Criticism: A Reply to Professors Roy and Walker', in *Ibid.*, pp. 88–102; for another debate on foundational vs. anti-foundational critical IR theory, see N.J. Rengger, 'Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman', *Millennium*, 17(1), Spring 1988, pp. 81–89 and Mark Hoffman, 'Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory', in *Ibid.*, pp. 91–5.
80. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Security and the Challenge of World Politics'.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
82. Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze, 'Introduction', in Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds), *The New International Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 4–5.
83. R.W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'; Murphy and Tooze, 'Introduction' and 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy'; Stephen Gill, 'Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post-Hegemonic Research Agenda' and 'Epistemology, Ontology, and the "Italian School"', in S. Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
84. See for example the Murphy and Tooze collection and Dennis C. Pirages and Christine Sylvester (eds), *Transformations in the Global Political Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1990) and Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., forthcoming).
85. Murphy and Tooze, 'Getting Beyond the "Common Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy', pp. 27–8.
86. Gill, 'Epistemology, Ontology and the "Italian School"', p. 25.
87. Whitworth, 'Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate', pp. 265, 270. See also Christine Sylvester, 'Reginas and Regimes: Feminist Musings on Cooperative Autonomy in International Relations', in *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
88. Fraser, 'What's Critical About Critical Theory?', p. 31.

89. This argument is inspired by Mark Laffey, 'Ideology and the Limits of Gramscian Theory in International Relations', Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meetings, April 1–4, 1992, Atlanta, Georgia.
90. Laffey, 'Ideology and the Limits of Gramscian Theory', p. 2 and passim. In this regard it is instructive to compare Cox's "Social Forces" paper with his later *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
91. Neufeld, 'Interpretation and the "Science" of International Relations', p. 44.
92. Jane Jenson, 'Different but not Exceptional: the Feminism of Permeable Fordism', *New Left Review*, 184, November–December 1990, p. 60.

3 Gender and International Organisation

The previous two chapters examined the possible avenues through which an international relations theory which is sensitive to gender might be constructed. The strengths and weaknesses of both feminist theory and international relations theory have been examined, and it has been argued that, while often limited, there are some spaces within each which would permit such an analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to describe more fully the feminist IR theory proposed here and to locate the study of gender and international relations within the more specific study of international organisation.

GENDER AS SOCIAL RELATIONS

A variety of things have been written thus far about gender and it will be useful here to review and synthesise these arguments before proceeding to an examination of international organisations. It has been argued that a feminist international relations theory which is sensitive to gender is concerned with more than outlining the gender bias that prevails within international practices. That is, it is concerned with more than simply describing the inequities and under-representation of women in international relations activities, or the extent to which women have been relegated to particular spheres. Rather, it asks also about the ideas and practices which have been used to sustain that gender bias, and the effects, in the lives of women and men, which result from those ideas and practices.[1]

It has been argued further that an international relations theory which is sensitive to gender must be able to discuss at least three variables: the social construction of ideas and meanings; historical variability; and power. Gender relations are constructed out of the activities of actors and the institutions that they create, and as such they are subject to change. In other words, they vary historically. Gender relations, moreover, have been unequal relations. To date, they signify relations of subordination and domination between women and men. Finally, the conditions of their existence and transformation depend upon existing and changing power relations, upon the material conditions which give rise to existing and new forms of social action.

All of this is to say that the concept of gender is located in an analysis of social relations, and this analysis is developed in a number of ways. On the one hand, gender *is* a social relation. It refers to the real conditions and the particular understandings about relationships between women and men, about the appropriate roles of women and men in society and in the workforce, even about what it is to be a woman or a man. Thus speaking about gender means in substantive terms that we are concerned with these particular social relations.

But gender is also constructed *through* social relations, because it is only through these relationships and struggles that understandings about gender are both created and discovered. It is only through the relations that we know what gender is and how it exists. As Jane Flax writes:

> 'Gender relations' is a category meant to capture a complex set of social processes. Gender, both as an analytic category and a social process, is relational. That is, gender relations are complex and unstable processes (or temporary totalities in the language of dialectics) constituted by and through interrelated parts. These parts are interdependent, that is, each part can have no meaning or existence without the others.[2]

Thus gender is a social relation, but it can only be understood as a social relation in a complex way. It refers to both the content of the relationships and the manner in which they are constructed. Moreover, we cannot speak of one without the other, for neither makes sense in isolation.

Understood in this way, meanings about gender are maintained and contested through the practices and struggles of actors engaged in relationships with each other and the institutions in which they are involved. Thus the content of what relations of gender look like is arrived at not in any static way but through the activities of real, living human beings operating within real historical circumstances. These people may be engaged in what are for them the normal routines of their daily lives or, on the other hand, dramatic and demanding political struggles.

What gender looks like is a result of a wide variety of activities, from the daily rituals of the traditional nuclear family, activities in schools and the workplace through the personal struggles of the single parent, to women and men engaged in anti-sexist demonstrations demanding the adoption of more egalitarian policies by the state. These experiences, moreover, will be different for the different people involved, and depending where, and under what circumstances, they are practised. So, for example, the ways in which gender is constructed and sustained will be different for a 'foreign domestic servant' working in Canada than it will for a 'foreign domestic servant' working in

Kuwait, or in Italy, or in France.[3] So too, the experiences and effects of political activism, single parenthood, families, workplaces and schools will differ dramatically depending upon historical, cultural, race and class contexts.

Gender is shaped also by the policies produced by the state and its numerous ancillary organs, and as well by the policies rendered by international institutions. All of these activities take place within particular material conditions and so the specific meanings surrounding gender very much depend upon these circumstances. Race, class, culture and sexual orientation – and prevailing assumptions around each of these – will fundamentally affect the ways in which gender is understood and the practices associated with reproducing or challenging those understandings in all of these places.

Knowing which activities to look at will depend at least in part on some sensitivity to the nature of the particular historical circumstances under consideration, and whether it is a period of relative stability or of flux. Not unlike our discussion of IR paradigms in the previous chapter, some meanings about gender may be hegemonic during particular periods of time, but during periods of debate or crisis those understandings are open to question, and far more likely to be challenged. Debates or crises are material or institutional moments in which the shared consensus around gender begins to unravel. Possibilities exist then for redefining or reconstructing those understandings.[4] Even when not challenged, periods of crisis often make obvious what was not obvious before, laying bare relations of domination and presenting choices to those who wish to invoke change.[5]

During periods of crisis, then, we will be more interested in examining the activities of those engaged in struggles against prevailing assumptions about gender. During periods of stability, we are more interested in examining the activities of those engaged in normalised routines, whatever they may be. In order to make sense of gender, we must map out these activities and the particular, and variable, historical circumstances surrounding them. All of these contingencies must be taken into account when considering gender and international relations.

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY

It is in the ways discussed above that an IR theory which is sensitive to gender attempts to address what Philip Abrams describes as the 'paradox of human agency'. As Abrams writes:

> The problem of agency is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognises simultaneously and in equal

> measure that history and society are made by constant and more or less purposeful individual action **and** that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society. How do we as active subjects make a world of objects which then, as it were, become subjects making us their objects?[6]

This tension between structure and agency is an important one because it underscores the extent to which human agency is neither wholly determined nor completely free. By understanding gender as something which both *is* a relation and is constructed *through* relations, it is hoped that this tension may be underlined. The content of what gender is will always be understood as a product of both the daily reproduction of meanings within particular structures and the struggles to change those meanings against particular structures.

Some of the criticisms made against feminist and IR theories in previous chapters were concerned with this tension. Liberal and radical feminists, realists and pluralists, privilege *either* agency *or* structure and thus disregard the extent to which structure and agency are mutually constituted.[7] Those that privilege structure over agency – radical feminists and realists – are unable to account for change because of their reliance on predetermined categories to account for behaviour. Those that privilege agency over structure – liberal feminists and pluralists – may account for change but do so at the expense of any analysis of power relations, the social and political structures which both constrain and facilitate the activities of agents.

A Critical/feminist IR theory must address this tension because it is concerned with the structured inequalities within which agents operate. It is aware also of the ways in which agents, as gendered agents, both create and are created by the structures they face. Women and men not only contribute to the construction of gender relations through their actions; their actions are also informed by gender relations. Assumptions about the appropriate roles of women and men in society, their place in the workforce, what it is to be masculine or feminine, all inform the practices of particular women and men. But these practices, whether as individuals, in social movements or through institutions, also serve to reproduce, and sometimes to challenge, particular assumptions about gender. All of these activities, moreover, do not take place in a vacuum but always exist within particular historical and material conditions. Gender relations make sense only if we remember that all of these elements must be considered together.

IDEAS, MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

The single most important question which remains to be asked is how do we describe and analyse these practices and struggles around gender, and how do we apply this to international relations? We are concerned here with developing some analytical tools in order to make connections between our conceptual understanding of gender described above and the study of particular phenomena, both of a general nature and in the more specific case of multilateral institutions.

One resolution to both of these problems would be to develop and modify what Robert Cox has described as 'frameworks for action, or historical structures'. As Cox writes:

> At its most abstract, the notion of a framework for action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure.[8]

This picture or configuration of forces is, as Cox notes, a limited totality. It does not represent the whole world, 'but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality'.[9]

Historical structures are, for Cox, made up of three categories of forces – material conditions, ideas and institutions. Each creates the structure and possibilities for change within the structure. Since our project here is to develop an IR theory which is sensitive to gender, we must look at these forces paying particular attention to gender relations.

Understandings about gender depend in part on the real, material, lived condition of women and men in particular times and places. These are the conditions which structure possible interactions between actors.[10] Understandings about the appropriate role of women and men in the workforce, for example, are informed at least in part by the specific material condition of those roles. Periods of low levels of labour force participation by women have often been reflected in assumptions by individuals and institutions that women are not appropriately a part of the work force. Likewise, women's increasing workforce participation is often reflected in assumptions that women are appropriately a part of the workforce.

Material conditions, however, are more than simply the class location of individuals. Their real, lived conditions are made up of their sex, race,

sexual orientation and class assignments, as well as the specific historical situations in which they find themselves. Thus, while norms about women's workforce participation often correspond to the actual levels of their labour force participation, those norms will change depending on these other conditions and circumstances. During times of war, for example, women's workforce participation usually is not only considered appropriate, but it is actively encouraged. More importantly, the 'norms' associated with women's workforce participation do not usually apply to women of colour: African American women, for example, have long participated in the paid labour force regardless of the norms associated with white women's employment. Indeed, assumptions about gender are informed as much by racism as they are by sexism.

In addition, the resources available to individuals – whether in the form of wealth, technology, organisational capabilities,[11] and so on – will all affect the manner in which they are engaged in activities promoting or opposing prevailing assumptions about gender. Thus when we look at material capabilities, we will be involved in a historical analysis which seeks to uncover all of these various components.

But gender depends on more than the actual material conditions of people's lives, for it is not merely reality but the meaning given to that reality that constitutes gender. Gender also, then, clearly refers to the ideas women and men have about their relationships to each other and to the institutions they create. As Bradley Klein writes:

> In the terms of interpretive theory, ideas help constitute practices. The understandings and interpretations open to people are not to be dismissed as merely subjective, soft data; they are to be considered indispensable to any meaningful accounting of what the practice is all about. Only on the basis of shared norms is human activity possible. Insofar as a common activity is meaningful to those engaged in it, participants become wedded to a range of norms and standards of interpretation. Without these norms, shared 'inter-subjectively', human activity would begin to break up.[12]

It is the significance given to particular real conditions that make them meaningful to those participating in them. In any social formation, a whole variety of real differences exist, such as age, race, sex, sexual orientation, and so on. Those differences, however, are not necessarily or naturally political. Rather, it is an important analytical question, to be explored in each particular instance, how and whether these differences are politicised.[13] Thus it is the meanings given to these real differences, as much as the actual differences themselves, which are the focus of our study.

We can discover these ideas and meanings in part through examining historically and culturally specific symbolic representations made of women and men and the normative interpretations given to those symbols.[14] In traditions other than that of political science, as Joan Scott writes, these may include the representations of Eve and Mary as symbols of woman, myths of light and dark, purification and pollution, innocence and corruption. The important questions to ask, Scott argues, are: which symbols are invoked and in what contexts, and how are those symbols interpreted?[15]

We may also discover ideas held about gender through the practices of actors. As Robert Cox notes, ideas are 'shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior'.[16] The ideas which inform these habits and expectations are often expressed through the activities and practices of actors, both in their day-to-day activities, and in the forms of the social activism which they pursue. Thus it will be, in part, an examination of the practices of individuals which directs us to the ideas behind them.

In examining gender we must ask also how the particular material conditions and ideas about gender are taken up and expressed in social and political institutions. Individuals operating in particular historical and material circumstances create institutions. These are organisations which are intended to serve some sort of collective purpose, whether that be to make money, distribute health services, provide child care services, or whatever. Embodied in those institutions are the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions.[17] In those institutions as well are the particular, sometimes hegemonic, power relations available to the creators of these institutions. As Cox writes:

> Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on their own life; they can become a battleground of opposing tendencies, or rival institutions may reflect different tendencies. Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities.[18]

While of course Cox does not write specifically of gender relations, the claim here is that institutions encourage collective images consistent with numerous types and forms of power relations, including those of gender. Those collective images, moreover, are as much subject to debate and struggle as is gender itself. We may uncover the ways in which institutions encourage particular collective images through examining the

policy directives, aims, objectives and projects of the institutions under question. It is important to note that the claim here is not that institutions have an autonomous impact in the creation or maintenance of gender relations, but rather that their policies serve to legitimise, shape and reinforce prevailing understandings.

Thinking about gender in terms of these three inter-related elements of ideas, material conditions and institutions, ensures that we will be sensitive to historical change. None of the elements is fixed, each changes in response to changes within the others. As Cox writes:

> No one-way determinism need be assumed among these three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal. The question of which way the lines of force run is always a historical question to be answered by a study of the particular case.[19]

The material conditions of people's lived existence, the ideas held by actors and the ways in which women and men engage with each other and with the institutions in which they are involved serve to create, maintain and change particular understandings of gender. Observing these activities provides us with some insight into why and how those understandings are sustained.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In one very straightforward way, then, we can draw lines of connection between gender and international institutions. International institutions, like institutions more generally, are one of the three elements of our model described above. But our treatment of institutions also parallels in a more conceptual manner our understanding of gender relations. The way in which international organisation is understood here recognises it as both a *process* of international activity aimed at regulating conflict (international organisation) and a particular *mechanism* through which that organisation is achieved (the specific institution or organisation being studied). However, this understanding and treatment of international organisation and institutions is a very specific one, and so must be situated here within the study of international organisation more generally before we can proceed.

The study of international institutions and organisations within the field of international relations has a long and varied history.[20] Much of the work within this area has attempted to define and describe particular institutions. One regularly made distinction is that between International Governmental

Organisations (IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), with the former having been established by agreements among governments and the latter established by private individuals, or associations.[21] While IGOs and INGOs share numerous commonalities, there are important differences between them as well. For example, IGOs, as assemblies of states, are usually hierarchically organised and centrally directed, in contrast to INGOs which often act as a representative of their constituent members and therefore adopt a more federal form of organisation.[22] INGOs greatly outnumber IGOs, but within the mainstream of the international organisation literature are considered to be politically less significant than IGOs.

Another approach to the study of international organisation is to examine the decision-making process within particular organisations. The attempt is made not to draw strict distinctions, but rather to look at what international organisations actually do.[23] This work examines the types of decisions made by international organisations, the actors involved in the decisions, the resources available to actors, and so on. It is concerned less with the outcomes of decisions than with the process of decision-making and routes to influence within international organisations themselves.[24]

Other approaches to the study of international organisation are concerned more with the particular functions, or roles which the organisation fills within the international system. Some look to the particular substantive focus of the institution (i.e., agriculture, environment, and so on) and evaluate the extent to which it can resolve conflicts within these specific issue areas. Others examine the long term implications of international governance more generally. Others still are concerned with the extent to which international organisations are reflections of some of the characteristic features of the international system;[25] that is, the ways in which they 'embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the dominant economic and social forces'.[26] Multilateral institutions, by this view, are a reflection of the particular interests, norms and ideas of hegemonic groups within the system.

It is this work that we draw upon in this chapter. While much of it is concerned with the promotion of 'cooperation' within international relations, it also looks to the particular power relations prevalent within any given historical context. As Robert Cox writes:

> International organization can be thought of as a historical process rather than as a given set of institutions. International organization is the process of institutionalizing and regulating conflict – either that which may arise directly among states or that which has its roots in transnational society.[27]

This means that international organisation is a process which is achieved, at least in part, through the creation of specific international institutions. It means also, however, that the particular issue which an institution is created to address – whether it be monetary, trade, labour, security, population, or any other issue – is only one part of a more generalised context of power relations which are reflected in, and sometimes even challenged by, the process of international organisation.

The Bretton Woods agreements, for example, created a series of institutions, including the IMF and World Bank, a system of fixed exchange rates and the pursuit of greater trade liberalization. While the institutions were created to re-build Western Europe and Japan after the devastation of World War II, they aimed also to preserve the principles of economic liberalism throughout, at a minimum, the western world.[28] Thus the process of international organisation in this case was far broader than the concerns of the particular institutions themselves.

At the same time, however, the norms embodied within international institutions may also come to reflect counter-hegemonic forces within the international system:

> International institutions universalize the norms proper to a structure of world power, and that structure of power maintains itself through support of these institutions. In that sense, institutions are a ballast to the status quo. But international institutions may also become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values. In this way they may become mediators between one world order and another.[29]

So, for example, many of the particular institutions of the Bretton Woods system became a forum during the 1970s in which Third World countries launched their critique against the principles of economic liberalism embodied in those institutions.[30] While the institutions had been created to maintain the status quo, they were also a place in which actors could organise to oppose that status quo.

Thus our treatment of international organisations is concerned less with categories of description or decision-making processes within an organisation and more with the ways in which specific international organisations or institutions both reflect and may come to change prevailing ideas and material conditions within specific contexts. While describing the international organisations under study is not entirely unimportant, our main purpose is to show how international organisations are sites of struggle, around which actors mobilise to both promote and oppose particular

interests. The interests around which people organise within international institutions may reflect a whole variety of power relations, including, of course, gender relations.

What should be clear also is the extent to which the treatment of international organisations used here is a product of much of the insights generated from critical international relations theory and International Political Economists discussed in chapter 2. By this view, the international institution is not viewed discretely, but rather as part of a larger whole, part of the process of international organisation.[31] They are, moreover, an avenue through which we may begin to locate sources of change within the international system.

International organisations are thus one of the triad of variables (ideas, material conditions and institutions) that we will use to locate assumptions around gender relations within international relations and are part of the more general *process* of international organisation. It should be reiterated, however, that international organisations are more than one variable in a triad. No element of the triad exists independently of the other, for the process of international organisation only makes sense considering all three together. Institutions are a product of the ideas of people and the particular material conditions prevalent at any given time or place. But the ways in which those material conditions and ideas are organised are also a reflection of institutions.

In trying to locate gender through these three elements, we will be interested in a number of things. One, as has already been noted, will be the social, political and economic conditions which may have informed activities around the creation of the international organisation and the extent to which those conditions change throughout its history. We will also be interested in the ideas which early activists in the creation of the institution brought to their struggles. These can be determined in part through their mobilising rhetoric, in part through the organisational structures they adopted, and in part through the early policy statements produced by the organisation. Finally, of course, we are interested in the policies and projects pursued throughout the institution's history, the people within the organisation who advocated official policy, and the opponents located both within and outside the organisation.

In part, this means looking for strategic actors within the institution, or those involved in creating it, and being particularly sensitive to their statements and actions. It also means looking at the institution itself as a strategic actor, for once policy has been produced by the organisation it participates in the creation and reproduction of particular assumptions and meanings.

VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY

In looking for gender in policy statements, or the histories surrounding the creation of an institution, it is often just as important to look for silences and absences as it is to search for explicit statements concerning women and men. The construction of assumptions around gender is produced as much by what *is not* said as what *is* said. Indeed, it is part of the very way in which issues around women and gender relations have been made invisible throughout history that there is often no record of the importance of gender. Instead, issues are mobilised in ways which incorporate particular assumptions about gender relations without making them explicit. Additionally, while in some cases the silencing of assumptions around gender may be an intended tactic or cloaking device of particular dominant forces, it is also often the case that the silence or invisibility accorded to gender is an unintended consequence of other political strategies with which actors are engaged. Nonetheless, such strategies, and the invisibility which results, can be seen to reproduce unequal relations between women and men.

This can be illustrated by anticipating the arguments made in the next two chapters. It will be shown that both the IPPF and the ILO were concerned with the role of women in reproduction, but that concern was made manifest in dramatically different ways. The IPPF has been concerned with the relationship between birth control and the role of women in reproduction while the ILO has been concerned with reconciling women's role in reproduction and their protection in the workforce. In each we can discover moments of both visibility and invisibility.

In chapter 4 it is argued that early birth control activists recognised the relationship between women's control over their reproduction and their empowerment. In order to popularise birth control, however, this rhetoric was abandoned in favour of one stressing the role of birth control in promoting social and international stability. Thus the relationship of birth control to women drops out and more explicit references to women are not made. This does not mean that this tactic is not gendered, however, for the relationship of women to birth control is still understood and is manipulated, and the result of this tactic is one which has profound effects on the lives of women and men, all seeking access to birth control information and services. Much of the IPPF's more recent history, moreover, has focused on struggles to raise again the relationship between women's reproductive freedom and their liberation.

Chapter 5 will argue that the ILO's early treatment of women recognised their place in the workforce but also saw that place as a special one

requiring protection. Even as women moved increasingly into paid labour and ILO policies shifted to address these changing conditions by promoting women's workforce opportunities, these policies also continued to protect women by virtue of their role in reproduction – in pregnancy, childbirth and childrearing. Except insofar as women are childbearers, however, they are not recognised as requiring special protection. In most other ways, once women become workers, their special status drops away altogether and they become, like men, 'normal' workers. The assumption that once women become workers they are the same as men, is as much a gendered assumption as any overt claims about a natural division of labour based on sex. The gendered nature of workforce participation, then, is made visible when noting the role of women and reproduction, but invisible once women's childbearing role is no longer emphasised. These assumptions, as in the case of IPPF policies, have profound effects on the lives of women and men.

The issue of invisibility is even more important when considering the intersections of race and gender. As will become apparent in the two subsequent chapters, much of the understandings of 'women' with which both the IPPF and ILO operated assumed white western women. Race is thus invisible, but this does not mean that the discourse is not racialised. Indeed, it is through making black women and women of colour invisible that the understandings reproduced by these institutions had racial effects as much, if not more, as they had gender effects. This is most obvious in the case of the IPPF, which could justify sometimes coercive and racist population policies by virtue of its understandings of population and stability. Less obvious, but equally important, is the ILO's movements around labour legislation, which have often been in response to white women's political activism and labour market activities. The involvement of black women and women of colour in western labour markets, as was noted above, does little to alter assumptions around gender and employment. Thus the understandings deployed by these organisations depend as much on assumptions around race – both visible and invisible – as they do gender.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that one of the ways in which we can make sense and apply the complex notion of gender developed throughout this work is to look at historical structures. To do this, we must examine the ideas, material conditions and institutions which prevail in particular times and places. This analysis obviously lends itself to an examination of inter-

national institutions which will become one of the triad of categories which make up the historical structure. Since our concern is to uncover gender in international relations, our emphasis as well will be to examine ideas, material conditions and institutions while paying special attention to the ways in which gender is manifest in each.

Much of the discussion in this chapter has noted the extent to which the conceptual understanding of gender and the application of it to particular instances requires an intellectual disposition towards both the substance and process of these phenomena. Gender is both a social relation and constructed through social relations. Neither exists without the other, and gender relations simply do not make sense without considering both dimensions at the same time. The same is true of historical structures. While we may examine each element of the triad of ideas, material conditions and institutions separately, the manner in which gender is constructed is nonsensical unless we also consider them together.

The treatment of both substance and process in this way is intended to make clear the extent to which an analysis of gender relations also recognises the inevitable and continual tension between structure and agency. That tension is one usually resolved through focusing on either structure or agency, but as was argued above, it is hoped that the analysis presented here can sustain the claim that structure and agency are mutually constituted.

The purpose of the next two chapters, then, will be to apply the analysis developed thus far to particular instances of international relations. This application is important not only because it will help to clarify the conceptual work that has preceded it, but more importantly because it will show how the practice of international relations has always been gendered. By uncovering the manner in which ILO and IPPF policies both sustain and manipulate particular assumptions about gender, the centrality and importance of gender within the international arena will be illustrated.

Notes

1. These terms have been taken from Jane Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse: Protective Legislation in France and the United States Before 1914', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 22(2), June 1989, pp. 235–58.
2. 'Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', in Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 44. See also Mark Neufeld, 'Interpretation and the "Science" of International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 19, 1993, p. 44.
3. For this example, I am grateful to Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: Pandora, 1989), chapter. 8.

4. See Jane Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse', p. 239.
5. Although he is not discussing gender and international relations, I have taken this treatment of crisis from Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chapter 6.
6. Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. xiii.
7. See Alexander E. Wendt, 'The Agent–Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, 41(3), Summer 1987, for a discussion of this tension within IR theory.
8. Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10(2), Summer 1981, p. 135. Cox's notion of 'historical structure' is similar to what Jane Jenson describes as a 'societal paradigm'. See Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse', pp. 236–40.
9. Cox, 'Social Forces', p. 137.
10. See Wendt, 'The agent–structure problem', p. 338.
11. Cox, 'Social Forces', p. 136.
12. Bradley S. Klein, 'Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives', *Occasional Paper No. 3* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987), p. 3. Klein is writing of interpretive theory generally, but not about gender. See also Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, 'Introduction: Beyond the Politics of Gender,' in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds), *Feminism as Critique* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
13. Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse', p. 238. See also Jane Jenson, 'Gender and Reproduction: Or, Babies and the State', *Studies in Political Economy*, 20, Summer 1986.
14. Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 43.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
16. Cox, 'Social Forces', p. 136.
17. This is a modification of Wendt, 'The Agent–Structure Problem', p. 359.
18. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 136.
19. *Ibid.*
20. This section draws heavily from Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', *International Organization*, 40(4), Autumn 1986. See also J. Martin Rochester, 'The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study', *International Organization*, 40(4), Autumn 1986.
21. Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 4–5 and chapter one. See also Lyman Cromwell White, *International Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Purposes, Methods and Accomplishments* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1951), pp. 3–4; Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, *International Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), chapter 1.
22. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, pp. 7–12; Feld and Jordan, *International Organizations*, pp. 11–14, 25–9. There are, of course, always exceptions to any classificatory scheme and many IGOs may appear to be

more federally organised and INGOs more hierarchically organised. The point here is merely to indicate the different ways in which scholars of international relations have sometimes approached the study of international organisations and institutions.

23. Kratochwil and Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', pp. 755–6. See also R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobson, *Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
24. Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*, p. 3.
25. Kratochwil and Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', pp. 756–8.
26. Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium*, 12(2), Summer 1983, p. 172.
27. R.W. Cox, 'The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s', *International Journal*, 35(2), Spring 1980, p. 375.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 380. See also Mark Neufeld, 'Interpretation and the "Science" of International Relations', *Review of International Stuaies*, 19, 1993, pp. 54–6.
29. Cox, 'The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s', p. 377.
30. See Robert W. Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order', *International Organization*, 33, 1979.
31. Cox, 'Social Forces', *passim*; Cox, 'The Crisis of World Order', p. 377; Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', pp. 172–3.

4 The International Planned Parenthood Federation

If international relations have always affected gender relations, then at a minimum we must be able to illustrate this by looking to the practices of international relations and documenting the manner in which gender relations figure there.[1] The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to illustrate an analysis of gender in international relations through the example of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). In order that this may be more than a liberal feminist account of 'women in the IPPF', however, it will be done not by providing a history of the IPPF with women 'added in', but by exploring the ways in which ideas about gender and the particular historical and material conditions in which the institution operated affected its assumptions, policies and prescriptions. We will be concerned, moreover, with the ways in which the institution itself reflected and manipulated understandings about gender and the impact this had in the real life conditions of women and men.

To this end, attention must be paid first to the ways in which the birth control activists who preceded the IPPF understood, and mobilised around, birth control. Their mobilisational efforts very much influenced the form and shape taken by the IPPF. It will be shown here that Planned Parenthood's early emphasis on *family* planning displaced birth control from being a *woman's* issue to one concerned strictly with family, social and in the case of the IPPF, global *stability*.

Once the IPPF was established, it continued to be influenced by these early concerns and activists, by newcomers to the birth control movement and by the changing historical and material conditions in which it operated. Women's increasing workforce participation, the rise of a women's liberation movement, the reactionary forces that challenged it, and other events have all served to change the ways in which the IPPF understands gender. Today, it is an international organisation which explicitly acknowledges the relationship between women's emancipation and women's reproductive freedom. It is only in understanding these more general historical trends that we can uncover the different ways in which the IPPF has understood gender and reproduction and thus the emergence of practices at the international level which affect gender relations.

THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT

Throughout history, women and men have sought and found ways to prevent conception, but only relatively recently have they organised around the issue of birth control as a social and political movement.[2] Much of the very early attempts to organise around the issue of fertility limitation were inspired by the conservative ideas of Thomas Robert Malthus who argued in 1798 that excessive birth rates among the poor would soon outstrip available food supply. By the early part of this century, neo-Malthusians attributed most social problems, including World War I, to population growth among 'undesirable' segments of society. Such an obviously classist and racist doctrine was denounced by most progressive peoples. Indeed, although it was eventually through the activities of socialists, anarchists and communists that nationally-based birth control movements emerged, at the turn of the century many on the left opposed fertility limitation because of its Malthusian connection.[3]

Women's organisations during this period were also ambivalent about contraception, but for different reasons. Prior to the 1920s, the treatment of fertility control by women and women's movements varied greatly in orientation, emphasis and prescription. In Britain, purity reformers and suffragists rejected movements for artificial forms of contraception and similarly in the United States, the movement for 'Voluntary Motherhood' sought to impose chastity on men rather than endorse birth control. By contrast, the anarchist Emma Goldman and Margaret Sanger (also for a time a self-described anarchist) discussed and distributed contraceptive techniques and supplies in their quest to reduce the plight of poor women subject to frequent pregnancies.[4]

Despite apparent differences, women's movements shared a basic commitment to defend a woman's right to protect herself against pregnancy, male sexual demands and venereal disease. They differed only on how this was to be achieved. For the British purity reformers and the American movement for Voluntary Motherhood, women exercised control over their own bodies through imposing periodic abstinence on men. As Linda Gordon writes:

> The nineteenth-century marital system rested, legally as well as in custom, on women's sexual submission to their husbands; refusal of sexual services was grounds for divorce in many states. Feminist insistence on women's right to say no and to justify this on birth control grounds was a fundamental rejection of male dominance in sex.[5]

By this view, then, rather than emancipate women, contraception would give control back to men by eliminating a woman's only reason for declining her husband's sexual advances and as such would serve to exacerbate the unequal power relations between women and men within marriage.

Advocates of birth control, on the other hand, argued that because it could not always be imposed, abstinence provided insufficient protection against unwanted pregnancies. Further, the suggestion that women should impose chastity on men was based on the fallacious assumption that a woman's sexual needs were not as great as those of a man.[6] These debates should not obscure the common ground which these groups shared, for each was concerned with women's reproductive autonomy, however achieved.

After 1920, the struggle for birth control lost much of its radical potential. Marie Stopes in Britain and Margaret Sanger in the United States sought to make birth control 'respectable' by dissociating it from radicals such as Goldman and making it a broader, more middle-class issue.[7] Both followed very similar strategies, eliciting support from doctors, eugenicists and wealthy philanthropists. As Sanger became one of the founders and first co-President of the IPPF in 1952, her story will be examined here.

MARGARET SANGER AND PLANNED PARENTHOOD

Sanger was exposed originally to sex education and birth control ideas through her involvement with the Socialist Party of America and with anarchists such as Emma Goldman. As well, her experiences as a visiting obstetrical nurse in New York's Lower East Side brought her face-to-face with the tragedies of women's lives facing numerous unwanted pregnancies and the prospect of illegal, unsafe abortions. She later claimed that the death from an attempted abortion of one particular woman, Sadie Sachs, had propelled her into the birth control campaign. Sachs had been warned by her physician that another pregnancy could endanger her life, but the only advice he could offer her to prevent conception was to sleep on the roof.[8]

In 1914, Sanger promised in her small newspaper, the *Woman Rebel*, to provide information about the prevention of conception in order to free women from the bonds of wage slavery, bourgeois morality, customs, laws and superstitions. The term birth control appeared for the first time in the June 1914 issue of the *Woman Rebel*. She also urged women 'to look the whole world in the face with a go-to-hell look in the eyes; to have an ideal; to speak and act in defiance of convention', and blasted capitalists such as

John D. Rockefeller Jr. and the social workers and philanthropists who acted as his minions.[9]

Sanger, however, began to differentiate herself from the left and act independently early in her involvement. In part, this resulted from a different understanding of the potential of birth control which she held. For socialists, birth control was at best a reform measure, assisting the working class within capitalism but not contributing ultimately to any radical transformation of capitalist society. For Sanger, birth control was revolutionary because it would free women from the burden of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, and thus contribute to their greater independence and autonomy.[10]

In addition, Sanger sought to legitimate birth control by seeking financial and public relations support from wealthy and conservative reformers. After an indictment under Section 211 of the Criminal Code of the United States – the 'Comstock law' prohibiting mailing or importing obscene, lewd or lascivious articles – Sanger fled to the United Kingdom. There she met and was much influenced by Mr. and Mrs. C.V. Drysdale, the leaders of the English Neo-Malthusian league, and Havelock Ellis, author of *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*. They encouraged her to concentrate on the issue of birth control, and to leave her denunciations of capitalism, religion and marriage aside.[11]

They also suggested that she moderate her appeals, and develop more expertise on the history of birth control, and what they saw as her obvious allies, the eugenicists and neo-Malthusians. In addition, visits to European birth control clinics persuaded Sanger that women could not teach each other contraceptive methods as she had earlier suggested in pamphlets and the *Woman Rebel*. She came to believe instead that contraception was a medical matter.[12]

Sanger's European experiences dramatically changed the course of her birth control activities. She began to solicit professional participation in the birth control movement from those closest to the issues of reproduction and population. Physicians, eugenic-minded academics and administrators of the social welfare bureaucracy were all invited to participate in order to give birth control an aura of scientific and medical respectability.[13] Those very people she had earlier denounced in the *Woman Rebel* became her new supporters, and in doing so she became alienated from the socialists and anarchists who had been her original inspiration.[14] For some, Sanger's strategy was both necessary and a success:

> The disassociation of contraception from radicalism was essential to its acceptance by doctors and social workers of professional standing and to

> the support of state and local health agencies which provided the only medical treatment most of the poor received. The biggest task in winning over the middle-class majority of public opinion was to show that birth control was neither 'ANTI MARRIAGE' nor 'ANTI CHILDREN' but a means of strengthening marriage in modern society.[15]

In many ways, this assessment is quite accurate. It was only after the 1920s that contraceptives as a commodity increasingly became legal and widespread and the growing legitimacy of birth control through Sanger's efforts certainly contributed to the self-esteem and independence of many women.[16] However, the alliances which Sanger sought in broadening birth control's appeal inevitably meant political and ideological compromises. These included depoliticising birth control by linking it not to the emancipation of women, but rather to a defence of the family. The family would be strengthened, by this view, through the greater mutual sexual enjoyment of the marital partners. Any exploration of unequal power relations within the family was abandoned. The very name Planned Parenthood was chosen as one which emphasised families and children rather than women and sexual issues.[17]

Planned Parenthood also promoted a 'strong' family as an important element for social stability. The strong family meant one which was based on white middle-class norms: small in scale and 'planned' according to income capabilities. A concern for social stability was in part a function of the new leaders of the movement: 'The depression and the spectres of working-class unrest and racial degeneration that it conjured up goaded eugenically-minded businessmen, club women, academics and clergymen into supporting a campaign aimed at lowering the fertility of the working-class.'[18]

Some suggest that Sanger herself was inspired by eugenicist motivations. As early as 1918 she had written that 'all our problems are the result of overbreeding among the working class', and stated later: 'More children from the fit, less from the unfit – that is the chief issue of birth control.' She decried the costs to society of supporting the 'unfit' – the poor and handicapped – and she warned of the threat posed to American national security by high birth rates among the poor.[19] More likely, however, eugenics was just one mobilising tactic among many, the political consequences of which Sanger, because of her single-mindedness (and many say bull-headedness), did not foresee. As David Kennedy writes:

> Mrs. Sanger had first embraced eugenic rhetoric as just another addition to her grab-bag of arguments for contraception. Soon, however, eugenics

> dominated birth control propaganda and underscored the conversion of the birth control movement from a radical program of social disruption to a conservative program of social control. Ironically, Margaret Sanger's earliest attempts to shift the justification for birth control from emotional to rational grounds had ended in the temporary capture of the movement's ideology by a philosophy that masked prejudice in the guise of efficiency.[20]

The question of whether or not Sanger was a eugenicist is, in fact, incidental, for the alliances which she sought did promote these and other ends as a legitimate aim of birth control. The consequences of this strategic choice, whether intended or not, recast the birth control movement. As James Reed notes:

> [The new leaders of the birth control movement] insisted that the changes in emphasis they brought were necessary if organized medicine, professional social workers, and government were to increase their part in the spread of contraception.[21]

These decisions also had personal costs for Sanger. By the time the Planned Parenthood Federation of America was established in 1942, out of a merger of Sanger's Clinical Research Bureau and the American Birth Control League, there were attempts from both within the organisation and outside of it to dissociate it from Sanger's name and reputation. It was decided that the first president should be a man, and as David Kennedy writes:

> She must have found it ironic, after all her pushing and pulling to keep the movement going, that the new, businesslike Planned Parenthood Federation often found her and her notoriety detrimental to the cause. It was ironic, too, that the movement she had launched allegedly to free women from the fetters of male tyranny had deliberately called upon a man to lead it.[22]

The compromise, then, was complete and a movement to defend women's reproductive freedom effectively became an organisation concerned with the far more 'respectable' enterprise of promoting family and social stability.

Thus we can see how both the ideas and material conditions available to early Planned Parenthood organisers contributed to its treatment of gender and birth control. Planned Parenthood's thrust was twofold: a defence of the family and the promotion of social stability. Birth control could provide both, the former by making relations within the family more satisfying and

the latter by ensuring a strong (white middle-class) family and a reduction of birth rates among the 'unfit'.

Birth control became popularised because those most able to mount the resources necessary to promote its legitimacy – academics, bureaucrats, demographers and eugenicists – did so as understandings of birth control were increasingly dissociated from notions of women's sexuality and control over reproduction. These groups could provide the financial support and administrative expertise necessary to create Planned Parenthood and even to lead it. Moreover, Planned Parenthood's rhetoric of social stability was a much broader and more popular way to mobilise around the issue of birth control. A concern for women's rights or the restructuring of existing power relations within society was abandoned in favour of making birth control a 'respectable' and legitimate activity. The effects of this respectability, however, was to make the movement a classist and racist one, in addition to its making women and women's reproductive freedom invisible.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Sanger's involvement in birth control did not end with the establishment of Planned Parenthood. She had long been active in attempts to coordinate international endeavours in the family planning field, and her efforts internationally reflect many of the strategic choices and political costs associated with the birth control movement at the domestic level. Sanger, however, did not operate alone. A variety of institutional, political and economic opportunities and constraints served to shape the international planned parenthood movement. An increased faith in international institution-building in the post-1945 period, for example, was coupled with a growing concern about 'the population explosion'. Within this context, the creation of an international organisation aimed at coordinating international population control efforts was welcomed on many fronts. These and other conditions affected the course of the international birth control campaign, as directed by Sanger and others, and will be examined here.

In 1925 the Sixth International Birth Control and Neo-Malthusian Conference was held in New York City. The change of the title to include for the first time the term birth control symbolised Sanger's growing influence in the movement. She also organised a World Population Conference in Geneva in 1927, the purpose of which was to assemble the world's leading scientists, demographers, sociologists and physicians in order to impress international statesmen and especially the League of Nations with the global significance of population issues.[23]

While not immediately successful, by World War II the international importance of population questions began to be treated more seriously in many quarters. The American government, statistical demographers, geographers and eugenicists began to signal a global 'population explosion'. Adapting Malthusian ideas to the twentieth century, they warned that excess population would deplete food supplies, accelerate poverty and unemployment and create conditions ripe for Communist takeovers – thus threatening both foreign investments and world peace.[24] The main actors involved in promoting this ideology were private organisations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Milibank Memorial Fund and the Hugh Moore Fund, whose founders and directors were drawn mainly from the top corporate and financial circles or elite population research centres in the United States.[25]

The period around World War II, in fact, was one of considerable instability – especially from the perspective of western governments. It was a time in which the threat of famine, within both developing and industrialised countries, appeared to be very real. In economies ravaged by depression and then war, there were important concerns about the ability of industrial and agricultural production to meet the needs of quickly growing populations. Within this context, the appeal of Malthusian predictions found some resonance, and gave the cause of birth control an even broader appeal.[26]

By the end of World War II, East–West conflict was escalating rapidly. Military build-ups and frozen diplomatic relations, combined with active propaganda campaigns aimed against one another, marked some of the central features of US–Soviet relations after World War II.[27] The creation in the West of an elaborate network of international organisations aimed at coordinating trade, finance, oil and security was also intended to contain the Soviet Union both politically and economically by strengthening allied relationships and by rebuilding Western Europe and Japan.[28]

This meant that the potential disruption caused by newly independent colonies or general economic hardship in the 'Third World' took on special political significance. Within this context, as Linda Gordon notes, population control policies became a part of American Cold War strategy, aimed at minimising the potential instability caused by these changing and disruptive global circumstances.[29] The association of birth control, global stability and the promotion of peace – and the creation of an international institution to ensure that association – was congruent with larger western aims.

The birth control movement was also in the midst of its own rebuilding efforts. Most nationally based birth control organisations, especially those

located in Europe, had been devastated by the war. Many of those active in the movement had been forced, at a minimum, to redirect their energies, and the simple availability of contraceptive supplies also posed severe problems. The rejuvenation of the birth control movement through the creation of an international coordinating body seemed for many to be a positive strategy for renewal.[30]

Rising fears in developed countries about overpopulation, however, were accompanied by growing concerns in many developing countries that population control would serve as a new form of imperialism.[31] The implementation of population policies, it was clear, could be used as a way of manipulating the peoples of developing countries or at worst as a form of genocide. What was needed, according to Frederick Osborn, chief financier of the American Eugenics Society, was an unofficial organisation 'able to work closely with foreign governments without the publicity about Americans which so often arouses nationalistic feelings'.[32]

It was in this environment that the International Planned Parenthood Federation emerged. Many of the moving forces within the IPPF strongly believed in the threat of a population explosion. Tom Griessemer, who would help to write the IPPF's first constitution and would become Secretary of the Western Hemisphere Region of the IPPF, also authored a book entitled *The Population Bomb* which equated the population problem with a ticking atomic bomb.[33] Dr. C.P. Blacker, first Vice-Chairman of the Governing Body of the IPPF was also the President of the British Eugenics Society and author of *Eugenics: Galton and After*.[34] These and other central IPPF organisers were concerned primarily with the population implications of birth control services, either in terms of the quantity or quality of human life created.[35]

Those who did not find much purchase in notions of a population explosion or eugenicist concerns reluctantly acquiesced to their mobilising potential.[36] The rhetoric of social stability used to organise the birth control movement at the domestic level easily lent itself to the international sphere. As one early organising committee noted, the birth control movement had emerged interested mainly in maternal health, but then recognised:

> ... [that planned parenthood] had gained new significance in the minds of men and women throughout the world, especially leaders in many countries, as an indispensable tool for reducing the economic and social tensions that, resulting from overpopulation, increase the danger of war.[37]

It was hoped by many early IPPF organisers, including Margaret Sanger, that India would assume the leadership of the international birth control

movement once an international organisation for family planning was established. There was considerable support for family planning in India. Here, governmental, institutional and public support combined to produce a very influential family planning movement. Because of its severe population problems, apparently low levels of opposition to family planning, government support, and some rather strong women's organisations that had long promoted birth control, India appeared to be the ideal place to launch the IPPF.[38]

Having a developing country lead the IPPF, moreover, would prove to be an effective ideological weapon against those who accused population controllers of racism and imperialism. Several years later Sanger was the first American woman to address the Japanese Diet and noted how important it was that Japan and India,

> ... are the *first* countries of the world to place population control within the functions of the state. Japan and India have looked squarely at the population problem before them and each has drawn the necessary conclusions. Planned Parenthood has to be a part of the national planning if there is to be any hope of a peaceful society ...[39]

Countries devastated by over-population, by this view, can and should make the difficult decisions necessary to overcome these debilitating and destabilising problems.

After several years of organisational efforts and international meetings, the International Planned Parenthood Federation was proposed in Bombay in 1952 and ratified at Stockholm a year later by the representatives of the national family planning associations (FPAs) of eight countries: Holland, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States and West Germany. The IPPF was led then through the joint presidency of Sanger and Lady Rama Rau of India. It operated on a shoestring budget, with small grants and emergency donations keeping the organisation together.[40] Today, the IPPF is the world's largest non-governmental family planning organisation with member FPAs in 130 countries and an annual budget approaching $100 million (US).[41]

The international context in which the IPPF emerged, then, was a very specific one in which fears over the instability caused by overpopulation combined with a commitment to the creation of international organisations more generally. This facilitated the increasing dissociation of birth control from women's sexuality and reproductive freedom which had been put into motion earlier through the efforts of Sanger and her cohort. The commitment to resolving population problems meant that the early organisers made

invisible the connection between women and birth control. The context in which the IPPF emerged, however, cannot be examined in isolation from the institution itself. The following sections will explore the institutional structure of the organisation and the impact that this has had on its policies.

IPPF – THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The IPPF operates at three levels: the national, regional and international. The national level is comprised of the 130 member FPAs; the regional level is comprised of six regional offices, each with a Regional Council and programme staff; and, the international level is comprised of the Central Council, the Members' Assembly, the Executive Committee and various other committees, and by the Secretariat.[42] Each level will be examined in turn.

The IPPF is a federation composed of its nationally-based Family Planning Associations. Each FPA is autonomous and indigenous to its own culture and is directed by local volunteers. This is considered a strength within the IPPF for at least two reasons. Firstly, as non-governmental bodies, FPAs are expected to be flexible and creative in their approaches to family planning. Secondly, and more importantly, because they are indigenous organisations, each FPA is expected to have greater credibility within its own national boundaries than would a Western-based international organisation. FPAs rely heavily on volunteers, who donate an estimated 80,000 person days of effort per year throughout the Federation. These volunteers, moreover, are usually drawn from the professional classes, with important connections to government decision-makers. Being volunteer-based, the local FPA often gains people with both expertise and local connections, the employment of whom would otherwise have consumed scarce resources if their services had been 'purchased' by the association.[43]

As a result of their autonomy, there is a wide variety of positions and programme content among FPAs within the IPPF. Some FPAs work very closely with local government programmes while others act in direct opposition to them.[44] Some are very small operations while others are huge, multi-million dollar ones. Some provide only educational and referral services, while others provide full clinical facilities. Some work in close collaboration with the IPPF, partaking in decision-making at the international level and participating in many joint activities, while others operate much more independently. However, all share a basic commitment to the aims of the IPPF, promoting birth control on both human rights and development grounds.[45]

At the regional level, six Regional Councils within the IPPF oversee a group of FPAs, the number of which varies. For example, the Indian Ocean

Region has five member associations while the Western Hemisphere Region contains forty-one. The Councils too are composed of volunteers, with each member FPA within the region sending at least one delegate. The Regional Councils monitor the development and performance of their member FPAs, and act as an information liaison between the various members. In addition, the Councils review the programmes, strategies and budgets of each member FPA to ensure that they are acceptable with respect to IPPF policy. Staff support for the regions is provided by the Regional Bureaux of the International Office and their field staff.[46]

The international level of the IPPF contains numerous component parts. The Members' Assembly, created in 1977, brings together representatives of all 130 member FPAs every three years for discussions about the role of the IPPF, challenges to family planning, ways in which the IPPF's objectives may be met, and so on. The Members' Assembly does not make policy, but approves the Three Year Plan created by the Central Council. The Central Council is another voluntary body and is the major policy-making body of the IPPF. It is comprised of representatives of all six Regional Councils, the President of the IPPF, and the Chairs of the Central Council Committees. When it is not in session, the Central Executive Committee, comprised of representatives of the Central Council and the Treasurer, is empowered to make decisions in the Central Council's stead. In addition, the Central Executive Committee initiates and develops policy for consideration by the Central Council.[47]

A number of committees advise the Central Council and the IPPF as a whole on matters such as budget and finance and programme policies. In addition, the International Medical Advisory Panel, also a principal committee of the Central Council, is composed of members who are experts in the field of contraceptives, service delivery methods and medicine and advise the Central Council on medical matters.[48]

Finally, the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General, provides professional, technical and support services for the IPPF as a whole. While in principle the Secretariat is intended to serve the national, regional and international offices, because of its cumulative expertise in the area of family planning the Secretariat increasingly has taken on a leadership role within the IPPF. This leadership role, moreover, is one which has been encouraged by local FPAs, who view the Secretariat as having a more centralised control of available information, resources, and organisational structures, and as such the IPPF can present a stronger, more unified voice.[49]

As an international non-governmental organisation created by its member associations to serve their needs, one of the chief functions of the IPPF is a representative one, expressing the concerns of FPAs, coordinating

the flow of information among members, and providing financial, technical and administrative support. Moreover, because of its size and the relative success of its efforts throughout its history, membership in the IPPF accords new member associations a legitimacy they may not have otherwise, especially those operating in settings hostile to birth control and family planning.[50]

More importantly for our concerns here, however, is the role of the IPPF in promoting family planning and population control at the international level.[51] In this role, the IPPF seeks to shape public opinion internationally both through its representations as an international organisation to governments and to other international organisations, and in demanding that FPAs adhere to the principles of the IPPF and implement particular themes and projects established by the IPPF. Thus the relationship between the IPPF and local FPAs is a reciprocal one, with the IPPF both representing member association interests, and coordinating and directing overall IPPF policy and procedure as reflected through the FPAs.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT

Much of the early years of IPPF activity was taken up with the twofold agenda of developing further the organisation's philosophical disposition toward birth control and of developing some legitimacy amongst those most interested in birth control and population issues. It was hoped that both of these would contribute also to fundraising efforts. To this end, the IPPF concentrated on gaining recognition by members of the United Nations system such as the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the Economic and Social Council, and on mobilising support from the 'technical community' (i.e. biochemists, gynaecologists, biologists and researchers).[52] This period was also devoted to establishing the principal themes around which the IPPF's work should be organised.[53]

Many of the debates around how the IPPF should promote international population control focused on three issues: the role of birth control in the prevention of abortions; birth control as a human rights issue; and the extent to which population growth detracts from economic development.[54] The emphases chosen were that of human rights and development. Although it was decided that the IPPF should not privilege the issue of abortion, much subsequent IPPF policy has noted that in countries lacking birth control services, there tends to be an 'over-reliance' on abortion as a means of fertility regulation.[55]

The IPPF argues that a knowledge of planned parenthood is a fundamental human right and that a balance between the world's population and its natural resources and productivity is a necessary condition for human happiness, prosperity and peace. Based on these beliefs, the IPPF aims 'to initiate and support family planning services throughout the world [and] to increase understanding by people and governments of the interrelated issues of population, resources, environment and development.'[56] It is the role of all member FPAs to share a basic commitment to these beliefs, and for the IPPF to elaborate the various ways in which the human rights and development themes may be articulated by the FPAs.

It is through examining the IPPF's treatment of human rights and development that we may better understand the particular and changing meanings of gender developed by the organisation. The IPPF's first formulation of human rights, for example, focused exclusively on the rights of families and couples to birth control information and services.[57] This, of course, was congruent with Planned Parenthood's more general emphasis on families. As with the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the IPPF identified the family as the primary locus for birth control decisions and sought also to strengthen the family. The IPPF's project, however, was to shape family planning to the particular and unique conditions of families throughout the world. At the Sixth International IPPF Conference in 1959, Dr. Muktha Sen of Calcutta commented:

> ... We have a cultural pattern of our own to consider and take into account in attempting to make family life happier and fuller ... Family life education should be so carried out that people do not recognise that they are being educated with this aim in view.[58]

The concern for family rights and family stability was closely associated with the IPPF's emphasis on development. As Margaret Sanger wrote in 1958:

> Whether the idea of birth control be respectable or not in some particular country or some particular time, we know that birth control is the greatest service to protect the child's welfare, the mother's health, the man's peace of mind, and the happiness of the marriage. We do realize that birth control by contraception brings the hope of population limitation which alone can bring peace to the world.[59]

Thus the international birth control movement, and the IPPF as its institutional embodiment, continued to address the domestic concern of marital

happiness and family stability while adding to it the issue of the global impact of population growth.

The IPPF's understanding of development was inextricably interwoven with its eugenics orientation. This was more than an ideological relationship: the British Eugenics Society was one of the main financial supporters of the IPPF during this period, providing it with rent-free accommodation in London at its very beginnings.[60] As was noted above, many of the IPPF's founding members had eugenicist connections and were not reluctant to voice their ideas. At the 1959 Calcutta Conference, for example, Dr. C.P. Blacker argued that the West and its allies should adopt positive eugenic policies: the promotion of birth rates among those people exhibiting the necessary special skills for the nuclear age (high intelligence and a gift for mathematics) in order to maintain a dominance over Communist regimes.[61] A eugenics applied internationally was also a powerful mobilising tool, as is evidenced by Sanger's rhetoric:

> When there is a great fire, a serious accident, an epidemic, the local mobilization of human effort is an astonishing thing. Yet each day there are born – in all countries – human defectives; mentally and physically lost children, children who cannot be loved or cared for. Such births bring no dramatic mobilization of public resources. True, we make colossal efforts to care for them in thousands of institutions – *after* they are born. The fundamental problem is left untouched.[62]

The IPPF presented its two central principles of human rights and development in a relatively 'gender-neutral' manner, however both were profoundly gendered. As has been argued already, mobilisation around birth control was gendered as much through its silences as through explicit statements concerning women and men. The rhetoric of human rights and development was a far more popular mobilising tool than recognising the relationship between women's subordination and their reproductive freedom. Individual women and men disappeared in the IPPF's treatment of human rights, concerned as it was solely with the rights of families and couples. Conscious attention to changing gender relations and empowering women disappears as well in the IPPF's understanding of development, concerned as it was with the relationship between population demographics and economic growth.

Conjoined with the eugenicist concerns of early IPPF organisers, and traditional assumptions about women's role in the family, the strategy thus moved even further away from early birth control activism interested in the emancipation of women. In fact, not only does such a policy ignore

women, it disempowers them as a result. While this strategy informed IPPF policy and pronouncements in its early period, it was not a fixed one, and the evolution of IPPF understandings of human rights, development and gender will be examined in the next sections.

IPPF – THE 1960s AND 1970s

The IPPF's most dramatic growth period was during the 1960s, when a whole series of organisational, financial, and philosophical changes took place. Under the Presidency of Mrs. Ottesen-Jensen during the early 1960s, the management of the IPPF and its regions was streamlined. By 1963, it was also decided to create the position of a Secretary General which would have, in part, a public relations function aimed at raising the status of the organisation internationally. Sir Colville Deverell, first Secretary General of the IPPF, proved very successful in this regard as the IPPF achieved consultative status at numerous United Nations agencies during his tenure.[63] This was an important achievement for the IPPF as it served to raise not only its own profile internationally, but also that of the 'population issue' more generally.[64]

The 1960s also marked a period of growing ideological support for family planning and population control, and congruently with that growing financial support for the IPPF. The Hugh Moore Fund began to distribute Tom Griessemer's booklet, *The Population Bomb*, in 1954. Originally panned by expert reviewers, sales of the book took off during the 1960s and by 1969 one and a half million copies had been sold. The booklet not only lent some ideological support to the IPPF, but the Hugh Moore Fund also made financial contributions to the organisation and Hugh Moore provided executive and administrative support to the IPPF, either through his own services or those of Tom Griessemer. Greissemer's salary was provided for during much of his tenure with the IPPF through the Fund.[65]

As various public and private bodies produced research indicating the potentially disastrous consequences of unchecked population growth, governments hesitantly and private organisations more eagerly began to channel funds into various population control organisations. One particularly successful fundraising initiative launched in 1960 was called the World Population Emergency Campaign (WPEC). It raised $100,000 for the IPPF during its first meeting and continued to appeal successfully to a small number of wealthy donors throughout its two-year lifespan. The campaign talked little of clinics and maternal health and concentrated instead on a public education campaign about the 'population emergency.'[66]

The year 1966 marked a real turning-point for the IPPF in terms of funding. Prior to this time, the IPPF operated primarily on grants and donations from private foundations such as the Brush and Ford Foundations, Hugh Moore, John D. Rockefeller Jr., or other NGOs such as Oxfam, through public appeals such as WPEC, and from some Family Planning Associations, especially the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA). In 1966, the IPPF received grants from both the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and from the United States. This marked the first time that governments became involved in directly funding the IPPF budget (prior to this SIDA had occasionally supported specific projects). Other governments soon followed suit, and now the IPPF receives the bulk of its funding from government sources, with between eighty and ninety percent of IPPF income coming from donor governments.[67]

Thus despite attempts to dissociate American involvement from population control, the IPPF had long received funding from private American sources, as well as the PPFA, and eventually the American government also became actively involved in population activities and support for the IPPF. The American government officially recognised the 'population problem' in the 1959 Draper Committee Report which recommended that the American government respond to requests for population control assistance by developing countries. President Eisenhower opposed such a position, and argued that population aid was the purview of private organisations. President Kennedy after him was also ambivalent, arguing that, 'it would be the greatest psychological mistake for us to appear to advocate limitation of the black, or brown, or yellow peoples whose population is increasing no faster than the United States'.[68]

But Kennedy and later Lyndon B. Johnson were lobbied extensively around the population question. In addition to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the IPPF, the Hugh Moore Fund, John D. Rockefeller III, appeals by Nobel Prize winners, and appeals from within the US government itself, including the Secretary of State, all served to sway official government opinion on the question of population aid to developing countries.[69]

By the mid-1960s, population control became a top priority within American foreign aid policies and the adoption of a population control programme usually was required from any country receiving American assistance.[70] US President Lyndon B. Johnson became an active proponent of family planning, both at home and abroad, making his 'War on Poverty Funds' available to birth control projects, and lobbying the Organisation of American States on the importance of population problems. In his address to the United Nations on its Twentieth Anniversary, he said, 'let us act on

the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth'.[71] The US Agency for International Development (AID) funded more than half of the IPPF's total budget during the 1970s and over ninety per cent of the Pathfinder Fund's budget, another non-governmental organisation involved in population control.[72]

In 1967 the IPPF operated on a $3.3 million budget, and only six years later the budget stood at $30 million. Increased funding for the IPPF during the 1960s and 1970s also had a more indirect influence on IPPF thinking during that time. While the public face of the IPPF had always been dominated by the largely American-influenced 'scare-mongering' around the so-called population explosion, many of the people working within the IPPF remained motivated by a fundamental concern for the role of birth control in women's reproductive freedom. Like Margaret Sanger, these women, and some men, realised that however unpalatable the American tactics were, they were effective in attracting a wider audience and bringing resources to the international birth control movement. As the IPPF established a stronger financial base from a variety of sources, however, the 'public face' of the IPPF became better established *within* the IPPF as well. Able to offer greater monetary rewards, and with its growing prestige within the international community, the IPPF attracted more professional men, and some women, to the organisation. Bureaucrats, physicians and demographers now not only led the IPPF, but they ran it as well.[73]

The increasing 'professionalisation' of the IPPF was manifest in a number of ways. Julia Henderson took over the position of Secretary-General in 1971 after a long career in the UN, including terms at the Bureau of Administrative Management and Budget, the Division of Social Welfare, and the Population Division, among others. She contributed to the creation of the Evaluation Division of the IPPF in 1972, the aim of which was to submit family planning programmes to statistical evaluative procedures and to coordinate and centralise the collection and dissemination of information about changing demographic trends.[74] The application of these more 'scientific' approaches to family planning programmes had a number of results, not least of which was the representation of people primarily as statistical results. Thus people become 'target groups', those who adopt family planning 'clients' or 'acceptors', and the results of that contraceptive use 'births averted' or 'couple-years of protection'.[75]

Thus by the 1970s the IPPF was an international organisation that commanded considerable financial resources, held a respected position within the international community and saw increasing numbers of professionals

drawn not only to leadership positions but also to the management of the organisation. It was committed also, by the 1970s, to making the administration of population control policies as 'scientific' as possible through developing objective and verifiable measurement techniques in order to determine both population growth rates and the impact of different programmes on those growth rates. In these ways, the material conditions in which and with which the IPPF operated, and the ideas which it reproduced, meant that the relationship of birth control to the emancipation of women was rendered almost entirely invisible. Population explosions, eugenics and scientism continued to be much more effective mechanisms by which to distribute birth control information and services.

POPULATION vs. DEVELOPMENT: THE DEBATE

Fear of a population explosion and its disruptive potential dominated thinking within the IPPF and other population control agencies until the mid-1970s. The first challenge to this view emerged at the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest.[76] This challenge was aimed not at the population controllers' emphasis on family stability or its eugenicist orientation, but rather at its understanding of the relationship between development and population control. At the conference opening, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim made the previously acceptable assertion that the 'problem posed by world population not only constitutes a danger, but the world's population is in danger'.[77] By contrast, representatives from developing countries argued that 'development is the best contraceptive', and claimed that it would be higher standards of living, not merely the development of more efficient contraceptive methods and family planning programmes, which would influence population levels.[78] Delegates from industrialised countries were reportedly shocked by the opposition they faced and by calls such as that by the representative of the People's Republic of China demanding that the conference 'thoroughly liquidate the absurd theory of the population explosion'.[79]

International population control did not emerge in a vacuum. It was perfectly congruent with post-War international management in areas such as international monetary, trade and strategic issues. Likewise, the 'Third World's' rejection of American visions of population planning was part of a broader offensive by representatives of many developing countries at that time involving calls for a new international economic order.[80] Population controllers may have been surprised by these demands, but anyone sensitive to these more general international trends would not have been.

Declining American hegemony opened up a space for a 'Third World' challenge to the dominant understanding of population and growth.

This critique was certainly important, and it was one of the many ways in which representatives from developing countries struggled to define their own problems for themselves. However, it should be noted that both parties to this debate were concerned strictly with understandings of fertility and social and economic development and *not* a woman's control of her fertility. Recommendations concerning the status of women did emerge from Bucharest, but they were secondary to the primary debate around population and development, and were concerned strictly with raising the status of women so that they may more readily accept birth control.[81] Population controllers in general and the IPPF in particular did not move at this time to re-insert a consideration of women's control over reproduction into their understanding of birth control.[82]

THE IPPF AND WOMEN

In organising its treatment of birth control around development and human rights, the IPPF has often ignored the manner in which its policy and prescriptions both affect and are affected by understandings of gender. Since the 1970s, however, the IPPF has begun to deal explicitly with both women and men through these two fundamental principles of human rights and development. These changes emerged in an environment increasingly receptive to the issue of gender relations. The second wave of the women's liberation movement emerged in the late 1960s in most advanced industrial countries. This second wave demanded not only the greater inclusion of women into spheres previously denied them, but challenged also traditional assumptions about relationships between women and men, and the roles of women and men in society.[83]

One common organising demand of the second wave was that of reproductive choice, made especially pertinent given the increased workforce participation of women in the post-World War II period. After the emergence of the new women's movement, country after country has addressed the issue of reproductive freedom, with many eliminating prohibitive laws around both birth control and abortion. Linda Gordon argues that the demands for reproductive freedom mounted in the 1970s were the most intense and explicitly feminist calls for birth control ever made throughout the history of the birth control movement.[84]

Feminist activism was not confined to national boundaries. The United Nations Decade for Women added international institutional legitimacy to

the women's movement, at least in the eyes of other international organisations.[85] The UN Declaration of International Women's Year in 1975, and the ensuing declaration of the International Decade for Women from 1975–1985 gave INGOs such as the IPPF the incentive to 'conceive [of] new ways in which it might contribute to the advancement of women'.[86] Within this context, a greater recognition of the rights of women, women's development, and male involvement in family planning – approaches that acknowledged the gendered nature of international population control – were welcome innovations within the IPPF.

As was noted above, the IPPF's early approach to human rights made no distinction between women and men. The human rights banner proved very successful for the IPPF, and is considered one of its most popular and effective strategies for popularising birth control.[87] Given this success, and as the IPPF moved towards developing more fully the relationship between basic human rights and the right to family planning, it began to note important differences in the ability of women and men to exercise their fundamental rights. As one working group document notes:

> The right to family planning is first and foremost a right of women. The link between basic human rights and the right to family planning is nowhere more pronounced than in its interaction with women's rights. Unless women have a real choice in regard to childbearing, their ability to enjoy their other rights will be inhibited. Similarly, they are less likely to take advantage of their right to control their own fertility if they are denied opportunities to have meaningful alternative roles to continued childbearing.[88]

Thus the IPPF's treatment of human rights moved from one in which gender bias was effectively ignored to one in which clearly important differences in the rights of women and men were recognised. This changing view acknowledged that not only do women and men differ in their reproductive roles, and thus have different rights to family planning services, but without the ability to exercise control over reproduction, women may be unable to exercise numerous other rights to which they are otherwise entitled.

Conflict between those within the IPPF who were concerned with the population dynamic of birth control and those concerned with women and women's empowerment found new ways to resolve this tension during the 1970s. One effective, and for the actors involved, satisfying compromise has been the IPPF's emphasis on maternal and infant health and mortality. This was an easily quantifiable measure of both the strains of overpopulation, and the very real burdens borne by women who must face numerous

unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions. It was an issue around which both groups could mobilise, and which, while important throughout the IPPF's history, became a central feature of IPPF policy statements from the 1970s onwards.[89]

Certainly, the issue of maternal and infant health is a serious one. Some 500,000 women die each year as a result of pregnancy and child-bearing, and the risk to women in developing countries is as much as three hundred times that of women in developed countries. Maternal deaths create over two million orphans each year, and some 9.5 million infants annually die before the age of one.[90] Maternal and infant health was also one of the first impetuses to early birth control activists. However, like issues of family stability and population and development, the IPPF finds the message of the health benefits of birth control an appealing one because it is so acceptable:

> At a time when family planning programmes are increasingly attacked by various groups opposed to planned parenthood, the value of a strong argument, advocating family planning on the relatively uncontroversial health grounds, with evidence which is difficult to contest, is particularly significant.[91]

Thus again, while recognising the gendered nature of reproduction through its emphasis on maternal health, the IPPF did so in part because of the acceptability of the message in promoting family planning.

A more dramatic departure for the IPPF was its 1976 initiative, the Planned Parenthood and Women's Development Programme (PPWD). As early as 1972 the IPPF had recognised the relationship between family planning and the status of women, at least insofar as improving women's status directly influences their acceptance of birth control, and moreover, that having access to family planning services may improve the status of women.[92] But it was in its response to the UN Women's Decade Plan of Action that the IPPF began to give meaning to this understanding through policies and projects.

The Plan of Action called on governments, UN Agencies and INGOs to develop projects aimed at solving problems of women's subordination and the structural barriers that impede their improving status.[93] The IPPF announced PPWD in 1976 and established four objectives: to implement IPPF resolutions and guidelines on the status of women, as well as the recommendations of the UN Conferences on Population and International Women's Year; to promote cooperative projects between FPAs and other local NGOs, including women's organisations, especially those that aim at the integration of family planning programmes with programmes for

improving the health, welfare, nutrition, education and economic prospects of women; to broaden the base of FPA membership and increase volunteer involvement; to involve women in the reproductive age group in decisions around family planning services.[94] Guidelines for project funding indicated also that they should be grass-roots projects with some clear impact on the lives of women, and that they should not concentrate exclusively on women's reproductive role.[95] Projects which both directly or indirectly improved the status of women were encouraged. Direct approaches included education projects, projects which focused on wage-earning activities, projects which provided social services for women such as day care, and projects which involved women directly in the delivery of family planning services and education. Indirect approaches included projects aimed at strengthening women's networks and organisations, those which aimed at improving the legal status of women, or those which promoted compulsory education for women.[96]

The PPWD programme was quite extensive and funded a wide variety of projects. Within a year of its announcement, over 150 proposals were received by the IPPF, and by 1981 some 81 had been funded.[97] The size of funding varied dramatically, from $750 for a project in the Solomon Islands to over $40,000 for a project in Tunisia.[98] And the type of project varied dramatically as well: some, as in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, employed revolving loan funds used in income generation projects such as candy making or handicraft production; some, as in Nicaragua and Ecuador, involved vocational training; others, as in Jamaica, were concerned with the education of adolescent mothers who would normally drop out of the school system; and others still, as in Egypt, were concerned with reforms of the legal status of women.[99]

What is clear from the PPWD programme is that it was not intended either to ignore the gendered nature of family planning, nor did it rely exclusively on traditional understandings about the appropriate role of women in reproduction and in society. While some PPWD programmes employed traditional assumptions about women's role in society, and so emphasised craft production and 'domestic life skills', others aimed at altering traditional assumptions about women's role in society. Many of the projects contained no direct family planning component, and so, unlike many family planning programmes, were unconcerned with the number of 'acceptors' of family planning services or of 'births averted'.

More importantly, the IPPF began to articulate during this period the importance of women's control over their reproduction. One of the main focal points of IPPF policy statements during this period, even from outside the PPWD programme, highlighted this issue. As one resolution noted:

> ... basic to the attainment of any real equality between the sexes is the ability of women to regulate their own fertility, and that without the achievement of this basic freedom within the sexual partnership women are disadvantaged in their attempt to benefit from other reforms.[100]

Thus in PPWD we saw in the strongest form since early activists such as Margaret Sanger shifted the emphasis on birth control away from women's reproductive freedom, an explicit recognition of the necessity, desire and the right of women to control their own fertility.

While recognising the changing treatment of birth control by the IPPF during the 1970s, we must be sensitive also to the fact that understandings and assumptions around gender are often contradictory. In response to the demands of an increasingly articulate women's movement, and with the leadership and incentives offered through the UN Decade for Women, the IPPF began to link women's reproductive freedom and their emancipation. Even more importantly, the IPPF committed resources to developing that understanding in their policies and practices. However, at the same time, IPPF policies were still informed by an understanding of birth control that saw it as central in reducing population growth rates and therefore contributing to development. This is reflected in its emphasis on maternal health, but even more profoundly when the IPPF has adopted policies which work to the immediate detriment of women's health and interests. The example of the Depo-Provera controversy provides a good illustration of this.

The IPPF during this period was one of the largest distributors of the injectable contraceptive Depo-Provera. The American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had, until just recently, repeatedly denied licensing applications from the drug's manufacturer, the Upjohn Corporation, based on tests linking the drug to cervical and endometrial cancer, breast and liver tumours, and a variety of other side-effects.[101] With its headquarters in London, however, the IPPF was not subject to the FDA ban and so was able to purchase Depo-Provera for international distribution, allegedly using AID funds. The IPPF defended this position arguing that the World Health Organisation (WHO) had not banned Depo-Provera, and as an international organisation it should be guided in these matters by the WHO rather than individual national bodies such as the FDA. By this view, the IPPF should not appear to be relying exclusively on information supplied by industrialised countries for its medical decisions. According to the federation, a decision based on WHO policy would be more acceptable and more representative of developing countries' interests than one based on FDA policy.[102]

Such a defence avoided a number of important issues. It is, for one, questionable that the peoples of developing countries would feel that the decisions of the WHO were somehow more acceptable than the FDA. More importantly, however, Depo-Provera is produced in the United States, and yet was banned for sale there. By distributing Depo-Provera, the IPPF allowed Upjohn to sell an otherwise unmarketable product, effectively dumping an unsafe pharmaceutical on the developing world. Other international family planning institutions refused to participate in Depo-Provera for precisely this reason: even the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, an IPPF member, did not make Depo-Provera available through its international division.[103]

Depo-Provera is appealing to population controllers because it provides effective birth control and, by virtue of its being injectable, the 'control' need not lie in a woman's hands but in the 'more motivated' hands of the family planning worker. As well, many rural women do request Depo-Provera because it can be used in secret if need be, and does not require regular visits to primary health centres for check-ups; but, they often do so without being informed of its full side-effects. Even when women were told of the possible side-effects of Depo-Provera, they often were not also told that many western governments did not consider this drug to be safe enough for use by women in their own countries.[104]

What we see clearly through the Depo-Provera policy is the extent to which the IPPF's understandings of birth control and women's reproductive freedom was (and remains) a site of struggle within the organisation. On the one hand, with its emphasis on the reduction of fertility rates in developing countries as its prime objective, the IPPF could justify the adoption of contraceptive measures which were both unsafe for women and which disempowered them as well. On the other hand, programmes such as PPWD were the beginnings of attempts to find ways in which women may empower themselves by gaining control over reproduction. What is important to note is the way in which ideas and programmes which previously made gender relations invisible within the operation of the IPPF were being opened to question. The manner in which gender is contested currently within the IPPF can also be illustrated by examining its treatment of men.

THE IPPF AND MEN

Since 1982, the IPPF began to emphasise the specific role of men in reproduction. This new initiative, called 'male involvement in family planning',

was aimed at encouraging the greater participation of men in family planning through programmes aimed specifically at their needs and interests. Male involvement was justified in a number of different ways. For one, there was concern raised within the IPPF that the almost exclusive attention to women in most of its family planning projects effectively ignored the actual involvement of men in decisions around contraceptive practice. Men, like women, have a basic right to family planning information and services, by this view, and so have a right to programmes which address their needs. Secondly, it was argued that by incorporating men into family planning programmes, their opposition to birth control might be eliminated. It was argued that the acceptance of birth control by women was often predicated on the attitudes of their male partners. Programmes aimed specifically at men, if they did not actually encourage them to become acceptors of contraceptive measures, encouraged them to accept their partners' contraceptive choices.[105]

Thus the two central themes of IPPF policy, human rights and development, were used to justify a whole variety of projects aimed at increasing the involvement of men in fertility decisions. Many of the projects in this area were aimed at public education campaigns, providing men with information about family planning methods. Some provided services, or the provision of, for example, condom machines in areas frequented by men (i.e. male workplaces). Much of the emphasis in the educational services for men, and women, was to popularise a generally unpopular contraceptive method, the condom.[106]

The male involvement initiative highlighted the gendered nature of international population practices, underlining as it did the different roles and attitudes women and men bring to reproduction, and the different assumptions about those roles brought by population planners. In part the male involvement initiative also may be of some benefit to women, who by default have been in the position of making most birth control decisions in many societies. Caution must be exercised in this kind of assessment, however, for the policies assume at least in part rather traditional assumptions about relations between women and men. As one IPPF adviser wrote:

> The second reason [for promoting male involvement in family planning is the] 'de facto' role of men as head, protector and provider of families in almost, if not all societies. As such, men make most of the decisions about matters affecting marital and family life ... men's support or opposition to their partner's practice of family planning has a strong impact on contraceptive use in many parts of the world.[107]

In this way, the IPPF policy accepted the assumption that the man, as 'head of the household', was responsible for all important decisions, including control over reproduction. Rather than attempt to transform women's subordinate position within the family, 'male involvement' in some ways sought merely to take advantage of it for birth control purposes. More importantly, such a policy made a very western assumption about men as heads of households – an assumption which may not be accurate in all national/cultural contexts.

Thus again, the contradictory way in which gender was being articulated within the IPPF is illustrated well by the 'male involvement' initiative. On the one hand, the policies made visible the different roles which women and men may play in reproduction, and even underscored the extent to which women may have unfairly borne the burden of contraceptive decisions and practices in many countries throughout much of our recent history. On the other hand, the initiative relied upon assumptions about women which served to reinforce their domination. Contested in this way, however, notions about gender are at least made visible in the struggle over policies within the IPPF. This also has been true of the IPPF's struggles with the 'New Right' which will be examined in the next section.

THE IPPF AND THE NEW RIGHT

In recent years, the IPPF has been subject to attacks by the New Right. The New Right's agenda involves both an anti-feminist backlash, as expressed through opposition to birth control, homosexuality and alternatives to the nuclear family; and, an attack on the welfare state and the principle that the state is obliged to provide for economic and social needs.[108] Much of the activism against Planned Parenthood originated in the United States and has been focused at the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. A number of PPFA offices, for instance, have been firebombed.[109] American National Right to Life President Dr. J.C. Wilke has stated of Planned Parenthood:

> It is they who are doing violence to our beloved nation by their systematic undermining of the basic unit of our society, the family. They do violence by their so-called sex education which is encouraging sexual promiscuity in our children and leading to more and more abortions. They do violence to us by driving wedges, barriers and suspicion between teenagers and parents. They do violence to marriage by helping to remove the right of a husband to protect the life of the child he has fathered in his wife's womb.[110]

This opposition escalated to the international arena as well. The Reagan Administration's full-fledged assault on the IPPF opened up at the 1984 World Population Conference in Mexico City. In the United States, Congress had banned the use of American funds to pay for abortion or abortion-related activities abroad since 1974. As a result, many organisations such as the IPPF had kept segregated accounts to separate American aid from other funding which could be used to support abortion or abortion-related activities. In its position paper for the conference, the Reagan Administration stated that aid would be withheld from all international organisations using any funds for abortion services.[111]

The administration offered a threefold explanation for the proposed ban. First, it stated simply and strongly that the Reagan administration opposed abortion. Secondly, it suggested that some population control programmes employed coercive measures, such as forced sterilisation, which the United States could not support.[112] Finally, the American government reversed its position on the notion of a population explosion and argued that there had been a massive overreaction to the world population boom. Population growth is an asset, the government claimed, where the free market is left to work. It is governmental control of economies and 'economic statism' that disrupts the natural mechanism for slowing fertility rates.[113]

Criticisms of the new policy were varied. On the one hand, it was argued that by reducing family planning funding, the Reagan administration would actually be promoting abortions rather than reducing them. It is only with the ability to reduce the number of children, critics argued, that the health and well-being of families in developing countries can be maintained without resort to abortion. Opponents of the new policy also criticised what were considered 'election year' tactics: the Reagan administration was forcing onto the international stage a domestic election year issue, and in effect was telling international organisations not to do something which was permitted in the United States. Finally, critics noted that institutions such as the IPPF were in no position to dictate policy to its autonomous member federations.[114] It should be noted, again, that as in the 'development versus population' debate which emerged at the 1974 Bucharest conference, critics did not ask how the reduction of family planning services in developing countries would affect women.

In December of 1984 the AID announced that it would not renew IPPF funding for 1985. This meant a $17 million reduction in the IPPF's proposed $55 million budget, or approximately thirty per cent. The cut came despite the fact that only 0.05 per cent, or $200,000, of the IPPF's budget went to abortion or related activities. Abortion-related activities includes abortion referral, sending delegates to conferences in which abortion is

discussed as an element of family planning, and treating women who are suffering the effects of illegal abortions.[115] The IPPF refused to comply with the American policy arguing that local member associations were free to make their own decisions and that it was unacceptable for one donor, US AID, to determine and place conditions on the use of other private and government funds.[116] In the summer of 1985, however, a split emerged within the IPPF when the Western Hemisphere region section agreed to AID's conditions for funding. Betsy Hartmann reports that this move infuriated the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, IPPF's American affiliate, which had been active in trying to reverse the US decision and in trying to find alternative sources of funding so that the IPPF could maintain its pro-choice position.[117]

THE IPPF INTO THE 1990s

The IPPF's emphasis on population and development was inspired in large part by its American activists and by financial backing received from the United States. Ironically, opposition to the IPPF came from some of the very sources that had earlier shaped this approach and despite the fact that the IPPF had long attempted to de-link birth control from notions of women's sexuality and reproductive freedom. There are numerous reasons for this. On the one hand, opponents recognise that whether or not the IPPF accentuated the role of birth control in women's reproductive freedom, by providing women access to birth control and in some cases abortion services, the IPPF has created choices for women where previously there were none. While aimed at the institution, the New Right seeks not merely to paralyse Planned Parenthood, but to roll back whatever gains women have made in achieving reproductive freedom.

The New Right also challenged the population and development component of IPPF policy. Where previously the American government was one of the primary exponents of this emphasis, in its attempts to undermine the IPPF it attacked the population explosion as a myth and argued that free market mechanisms would naturally bring population levels in line with resources. This undercut the primary mobilising mechanism around which the IPPF had organised the international family planning movement, and left it with little support for the legitimations it had previously relied upon.

Crises such as this one, however, provide windows of opportunity as much as they de-stabilise institutions. Within the IPPF today we are witness to a struggle around how to respond to these attacks. While policies such as those that emphasise, because of their acceptability, maternal

health and male involvement, other programmes such as PPWD have emphasised the central importance of women's control over reproduction on both a human rights and development ground. In some ways at least, the IPPF today privileges women rather than tries to make them invisible.

In part this shift in emphasis is a result of the changing make-up of those most active within the IPPF. To the extent that the IPPF is still dominated by physicians, many more of those physicians are women than was previously the case. Moreover, as the struggle to make birth control a legitimate activity has increasingly been successful throughout the world, the IPPF has attracted a much broader base of activists. No longer is the organisation dominated by demographers and eugenicists. Instead, teachers, feminists, social workers and other professionals have been drawn to the IPPF, expanding its understandings of birth control away from those concerned strictly with the population and development dynamic.[118]

The funding crisis of 1984, moreover, broadened IPPF donor support away from the United States and brought it support in other forms as well. Many countries and international organisations respected the IPPF's stand on the principle of the autonomy of the national federations, and this was probably at least one of the reasons why the IPPF received the United Nations Award for Population in 1985. In addition, other countries moved in to fill the gap left by the loss of American funds so that by 1986 five governments, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway, provided more than seventy-five per cent of IPPF's core funding.[119] By 1993, under a new Democratic Administration led by President Bill Clinton, the United States reversed its stand and resumed funding of the IPPF.[120]

The IPPF today is also led by people with women in mind. The IPPF's current Secretary-General Dr. Halfdan Mahler has taken as one of his organisational themes the emancipation of women. Indeed, he suggests that the very reason he was drawn to the IPPF position was because of its centrality in the fight for women's freedom.[121] This fight, he says, is one which entails creating more choices for women, choices which are being eroded by opposition to family planning throughout the world.[122]

Mahler responded to the challenges faced by the IPPF by initiating a review of the IPPF mission statement and goals. The 1992 Strategic Plan, approved by the 1992 Members' Assembly in New Delhi, states that the IPPF and its member associations are committed to promoting and defending 'the right of women and men, including young people, to decide freely the number and spacing of their children, and the right to the highest possible level of sexual and reproductive health'. It states also that they are committed to 'obtaining equal rights for women', and further that they aim at the empowerment of women.[123] The IPPF also committed itself to reduce

the number of unsafe abortions, and to promote safe abortions. In this way, as Mahler noted, '[the] IPPF has become actively involved in the abortion crisis, and ... we are no longer shy of the realities surrounding us.'[124]

This new mission statement, and the goals and strategies outlined within, are in many ways a dramatic departure from the early IPPF history, and give an indication of the ways in which struggles around gender are being resolved within the IPPF. Not only do these commitments reflect an interest in the empowerment of women, but also the language of sexuality has been re-introduced to the IPPF vocabulary. No longer is the IPPF making invisible the relationship between birth control and women's sexuality, indeed they are now making a point of underlining it. Joined with this, they have also adopted an openly pro-choice position. As one IPPF staff person has commented, 'This is a very exciting time to be involved in this organisation.'[125]

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the ways in which different assumptions about women's and men's roles in reproduction informed the policies of one international organisation, the International Planned Parenthood Federation. The mobilising rhetoric of the early activists in the birth control movement, the creation of Planned Parenthood and the IPPF and the policy statements and programmes adopted throughout the IPPF's history have been examined. The specific historical and material context in which the IPPF emerged and operated has also been outlined. In this way, the ideas, material conditions and the institution itself have been explored in order to discern the ways in which the IPPF has participated in the process of organising gender relations through the specific concern of population control.

That an organisation concerned with population control has reflected assumptions about gender relations may not be too startling to some, for the observation that the control of reproduction must have something to do with relations between women and men seems, at least, obvious. But the ways in which the IPPF has represented gender throughout its history has been, by and large, to deny differences between women and men. Early organisers such as Margaret Sanger came to privilege the role of birth control in promoting family and social stability, despite an original inspiration to improve the lives of women. The stability argument was applied as well to an international scene committed to the creation of international organisations and reeling from the supposed threats of international instability, population explosions and communism. Despite an increasing awareness of the import-

ance of birth control in the emancipation of women during the 1970s, the IPPF's treatment remained at best contradictory, promoting at one and the same time traditional visions of women's role in the family, dangerous contraceptive practices and yet also seeking to link women's control over reproduction to their improved status. With new activists both within and outside the organisation, however, the IPPF in the 1990s has broadened its mandate to promote the empowerment of women, and has reintroduced a language of sexuality to discussions of birth control and reproduction.

Thus an international organisation which seems to be quite conducive to discussions around gender had, until only quite recently, kept silent about the gendered nature of birth control and reproduction. This silencing did not emerge naturally, but rather was a political outcome, a result of choices made by early birth control activists and reproduced in a variety of ways throughout the history of the IPPF. Those choices, moreover, reflected not only the ideas available to activists but also the material conditions in which they operated. Early activists sought to legitimise birth control by gaining support from bureaucrats, academics, eugenicists and demographers. By the 1970s, as the organisation gained in size, prestige and financial resources, these groups were fully entrenched within the IPPF and their influence continued to be reflected in policies and programmes. That influence, however, has been mediated by the activities of others within the IPPF who are struggling to return birth control policies to their original aims: the emancipation of women.

Thus the ideas, material conditions and institutional opportunities available to those involved within the IPPF shaped their changing understandings and treatment of gender throughout the organisation's history. This is true also of the ILO, which will be examined in chapter 5.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of my 'Planned Parenthood the New Right: Onslaught *and* Oportunity?' *Studies in Political Economy*, 35, Summer 1991.
2. Beryl Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry: Chronicles of the International Planned Parenthood Federation* (London: IPPF, 1973), p. 2. The term 'birth control' used in this way is something of an anachronism, as the term was coined by Margaret Sanger only in 1914. See David M. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 23, 77.
3. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, p. 23; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 2; Angus McLaren and Arlene Tigar McLaren, *The Bedroom and the State: The Changing Practices and Politics of Contraception and Abortion in Canada, 1880–1980* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), pp. 13, 72.

4. Angus McLaren, *Birth Control in Nineteenth Century England* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 197; Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (London: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 98; Linda Gordon, 'The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of Feminism', in Z. Eisenstein, *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 113; James Reed, *From Private Vice to Public Virtue: The Birth Control Movement and American Society Since 1830* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), chapter 4.
5. Gordon, 'The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom', p. 113.
6. McLaren, *Birth Control in Nineteenth Century England*, p. 198; Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, pp. 99–100; Gordon, 'The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom', p. 113; and Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, chapter 2.
7. McLaren and McLaren, *The Bedroom and the State*, p. 12; Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 53. See Jane Lewis, *The Politics of Motherhood* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), chapter 7, and Ruth Hall, *Marie Stopes* (London: André Deutsch , 1977) for a discussion of Stopes.
8. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, pp. 1, 16, 22.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, pp. 215–16.
11. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, p. 30.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 27, 30–2.
13. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, p. 293.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 257, 293; Rosalind P. Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom* (New York: Longman, 1984), p. 92; Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, pp. 93–4, 105–7, and chapter 4.
15. Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 53.
16. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, p. 343.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 343–4; Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice*, p. 92; Gordon, 'The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom', p. 119. There is some debate about the extent to which Sanger believed in this change of emphasis, or adopted it only as a strategic ploy. James Reed, for example, suggests that Sanger only reluctantly agreed to these compromises and that she 'despised' the term Planned Parenthood (*From Private Vice*, p. 122).
18. McLaren and McLaren, *The Bedroom and the State*, p. 13; Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, pp. 111–15.
19. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, pp. 281–2, 349; Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, pp. 111–12.
20. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, p. 121.
21. Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 137.
22. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, p. 270, see also p. 257; IPPF, *IPPF Issues Manual*, n.d. (c. 1987–88), 1.1.5.1/03–04.
23. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America*, pp. 101n, 103; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 3–4; McLaren and McLaren, *The Bedroom and the State*, p. 175, fn. 36; Reed, *From Private Vice*, chapters 21 and 22.
24. Bonnie Mass, *Population Target: The Political Economy of Population Control in Latin America* (Brampton: Charters Publishing Co., 1976), p. 33;

Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice*, p. 118; Reed, *From Private Vice*, pp. 303–4.

25. Mass, *Population Target*, pp. 36, 37, 40; Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice*, p. 118; Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 282; Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: Birth Control in America*, Second Edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 393–4.
26. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 27, 31.
27. Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 8.
28. R.W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in R.O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 224. See also, Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, Fourth Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), chapter 1; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 140.
29. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, Second Edition, p. 398; Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p. 8.
30. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 17–18, 67.
31. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, Second Edition, p. 396.
32. Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 286 and p. 284; Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, p. 276.
33. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 74, 197, 314. Greissemer's version of *The Population Bomb* was the forerunner to Paul Ehrlich's book of the same title. See Betsy Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population Control and Contraceptive Choice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 101.
34. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 32, 54, 71.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
36. Interviews, former IPPF staff, November 10, 1989; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 42.
37. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 72.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 49.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
40. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process* (London: IPPF, 1982), pp. 13–14; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 1, 56, 57, and chapters 1 and 2, *passim; IPPF in Action* (London: IPPF, 1984), p. 32.
41. S. Avabia B. Wadia, 'Opening Address', *IPPF Members' Assembly, 1989*, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, November 7, 1989. IPPF, *1992–93 Annual Report* (London: IPPF, 1993), p. 30.
42. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 17.
43. IPPF, *Three Year Plan, 1991–1993* (Ottawa: IPPF, 1989), Draft Copy, p. 25; IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 17; IPPF, *Annual Report Supplement, 1986–1987* (London: IPPF, 1987), p. 6.
44. In 1957, the IPPF added a new category of membership to the IPPF, that of affiliate member. This category of membership was intended to allow government organisations or agencies an opportunity to participate in the organisation. See Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 160.
45. IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World* (London: IPPF, 1987), p. 27; IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, pp. 16, 17.

46. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 18; IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World*, pp. 42–3.
47. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 19; IPPF, 'The Process of Policy Formulation Within the IPPF', *IPPF Fact Sheet* (London: IPPF, 1981), pp. 1–3; IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World*, p. 42.
48. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 21; IPPF, 'The Process of Policy Formulation', pp. 1–2.
49. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, pp. 21–6; IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World*, pp. 46–7; Coopers and Lybrand Associates, *Renewing the IPPF Secretariat* (London: IPPF, 1986), pp. 1–5.
50. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 47. See also Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 5–11 for a review of the characteristic features of international non-governmental organisations.
51. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 28.
52. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 74, 125.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–5, 131 and chapters 4 and 5 *passim*.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 131.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
56. *IPPF in Action*, p. 32; 'Constitution of the IPPF', in Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 398.
57. IPPF, *The Human Right to Family Planning: Report of the Working Group on the Promotion of Family Planning as a Basic Human Right* (London: IPPF, 1984), p. 8.
58. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 173.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 184–5.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 171.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 171–2.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
63. IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World*, p. 20; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 192, 256.
64. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, chapter 11.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 75, 197.
66. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 198–200.
67. IPPF, *A Review of the IPPF Programming Process*, p. 27; IPPF, *Family Planning in a Changing World*, p. 38; IPPF, *1992–93 Annual Report*, p. 30; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 92, 93, 96, 197, 268, 299, 311.
68. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 195–6.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 204–5. See also Mass, *Population Target*, pp. 36, 37, 40; Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice*, p. 118; Reed, *From Private Vice*, p. 282.
70. Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, p. 393. See also Carmen Barroso and Cristina Bruschini, 'Building Politics from Personal Lives: Discussions on Sexuality Among Poor Women in Brazil', In Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) for another review of this history and an excellent account of the ways in which IPPF policies

were implemented in the particular national context of Brazil and the ways women and others responded to those policies.

71. Germaine Greer, *Sex and Destiny* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1984), p. 323; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, pp. 308–9.
72. Donald P. Warwick, *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 44–5.
73. Interviews with former IPPF staff, November 6–10, 1989; Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, chapter 11.
74. Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 396.
75. Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs*, pp. 56, 57, 61, 63.
76. More accurately, this was the first time a challenge to the 'population and development' scenario took the form that it did. As early as the Sixth International Conference in New Delhi, debate ensued around the question of whether birth control could make a sufficiently large impact on population growth rates to affect economic and social development. The basic assumption that population growth rates caused underdevelopment, however, remained unchanged. See Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry*, p. 170.
77. Mass, 1976, *Population Target*, p. 66.
78. 'The Great Population Debate', Editorial, *International Family Planning Perspectives*, 9(4), December 1983, p. i.
79. Bonnie Mass, 'An Historical Sketch of the American Population Control Movement', in V. Navarro, *Imperialism, Health and Medicine* (London: Pluto Press, 1982), p. 198.
80. See Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), chapters 8–14; Joan E. Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 4th edition (New York: St Martin's, 1990), chapters 1–3, 7 and Conclusion; R.W. Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order', *International Organization*, 33, 1979, pp. 257–302.
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112. Many population programmes *are* extremely coercive. Some provide incentive payments to recipients of birth control measures while others employ more overt coercive techniques. The most dramatic known example may be the case of India during the 1970s in which individual states were permitted to introduce compulsory sterilization legislation and the crash programme of sometimes forced sterilization which followed resulted in eleven million sterilizations (a large proportion of which were vasectomies) between June of 1975 and March 1977, as compared with 1.3 million in the 1974–75 period. See Henry P. David, 'Incentives, Reproductive Behaviour and Integrated Community Development in Asia', *Studies in Family Planning*, 13(5), May, 1982, p. 166; and Veena Soni, 'Thirty Years of the Indian Family Planning Program: Past Performance, Future Prospects', *International Family Planning Perspectives*, 9(2), June 1983, p. 36.
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5 The International Labour Organisation

This chapter will examine gender in international relations through the example of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).[1] As in the previous chapter, we are interested here in the ideas, material conditions, and the role of the ILO itself in reflecting and shaping understandings of gender throughout its history. The ILO is an older organisation than the IPPF, established with the League of Nations in 1919. It began with forty-two members and presently has one hundred and sixty. Additionally, it is an international governmental organisation (IGO), unlike the IPPF which is an international non-governmental organisation (INGO). The ILO's substantive concerns also are very different from those of the IPPF. While the IPPF is functionally concerned with family planning and population control, an issue which is of obvious importance to women and men, the ILO's focus on labour seems less directly an issue which involves gendered understandings and practices. Yet, from its beginnings, the ILO has developed policies which quite explicitly recognise certain assumptions about the appropriate role of women and men in the family, labour force and society more generally.

As in our examination of the IPPF, we are interested in more than a liberal feminist description of ILO policies toward women. However, it should be noted that such an approach would be possible, at least initially, when applied to the ILO. This is because ILO policy has always made explicit reference to women throughout its history, quite unlike the IPPF which tended to make the relationship between women and birth control invisible. While we may be able to locate 'women and the ILO' with some ease, this provides only some description of ILO policies towards women, but little analysis. In applying an analysis sensitive to gender to the ILO, we are trying to uncover the social construction of gender within ILO policies. In other words, and as was noted above, we are seeking to explain not only *how* women and men appear in the ILO, but *why* they appear in the ways that they do.[2]

To this end, early efforts at international labour legislation will be examined. As early as the turn of the century these attempts reflected particular assumptions about the role of women and men in paid labour and in the family. It was assumed that when women worked, they required protection

from the rigours of paid employment either because of their role as childbearers or as childrearers. By this view, women needed protection during pregnancy from hazardous substances or practices which might have a deleterious effect on the pregnancy and from anything that might detract from their ability to serve as primary caregivers to children within the family. On the other hand, it was assumed that women required no special protection outside their role as childbearers and rearers. When not being considered as either pregnant women or mothers, that is, women workers were treated as 'normal' (i.e. male) workers.[3]

While these assumptions reflected a particular view of women in the workforce and family, they also pointed to a particular way of understanding the needs of male workers. Men held, for the ILO, the double and sometimes contradictory positions of being both the 'normal' worker and at the same time being entirely invisible. In ILO policies and programmes, a 'worker' is assumed to be a man – usually a white European man, for much of the ILO's history. Thus the universal standard with which women are compared is that of the male worker. This is obviously significant with respect to women, and will be examined throughout this chapter, but the gendering effects of this assumption also had a real impact on men. Men were assumed to require no special protection by virtue of their role in reproduction or their sexuality, nor was their role in the family considered sufficiently important to demand safeguarding or protection.

These assumptions changed slowly after World War II as more women were drawn into the workforce and the emphasis of ILO policies shifted from protective legislation to the promotion of the equality of women within the workforce. As the ILO began to respond to the demands of the women's movement after the 1970s, its policies changed even more dramatically and they began to question the tensions between protective legislation for women and the promotion of equality. Increasingly it was realised that the one detracted from the other. Men, too, became more visible within ILO policies as responsibilities of raising children were no longer assumed to fall automatically to women.

In examining the ways in which the ILO treatment of women and men has changed throughout its history, we can develop an analysis of the ways in which the ILO has both reflected and organised gender relations internationally. Thus, policies focusing on international labour legislation, the protection of workers and the promotion of equality reflect existing and changing power relations, between classes, races and genders. The institutional concerns of the ILO are part of the larger process of the organisation of conflict, on a whole variety of fronts, at the international level. This chapter will begin with a review of the early history of the ILO in order to

outline its institutional structure and then move to an analysis of gender in ILO policies and practices.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ILO

The ILO was established at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 as part of the League of Nations. International attempts to regulate labour conditions and establish standards had begun a century before by philanthropic and religious industrialists such as Robert Owen of Wales, Charles Hindley of England and Daniel Legrand of Switzerland.[4] These individual reformers argued that family life, national health and human dignity came before profits, and that state legitimacy ultimately would be threatened as a result of growing labour unrest. They achieved some limited success in shifting public and governmental opinion around labour legislation, but could not overcome both the ideological and material persuasiveness of those who argued that restrictions placed on employment would leave domestic producers less competitive on the international market. Appeals to the power of the market were much more popular during this era of expanding industrial capitalism and liberal *laissez-faire* principles.[5]

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, much of the labour unrest these early reformers had predicted came to pass. While societies were not transformed as a result, these events established both for governments and workers the conviction that the working conditions of labour must be addressed, if not by reformist then by revolutionary means. Workers' organisations and their representatives addressed the issue in a variety of forums, including the First and Second Internationals, the International Working Men's Association and the International Federation of Trade Unions. Governments also took up the issue, led by the Swiss government which began to approach other governments in 1889 and again in 1896. In the Swiss efforts, the fiercest opposition came from governments concerned that any international body attempting to legislate international labour standards would threaten the sovereign integrity of individual nation-states.[6]

In part to meet this opposition, the International Association for Labour Legislation was established in 1900. It was hoped that a private non-governmental organisation would be less threatening to national governments but could also serve as a research centre through which a body of information on international labour legislation would be created which could be used to sway public and government opinion. At its 1906 Convention in Berne, the Association proposed two conventions: the limitation of night work of women to ensure a minimum rest period of ten hours, and the

prohibition for all workers of white phosphorus in the production of matches. Both conventions were considered uncontroversial and were chosen specifically because their easy and straightforward adoption would produce some speedy victories in international labour legislation.[7] Other attempts at labour legislation were initiated, such as the 1913 agreements to prohibit the night work of children and to provide maximum working days for women of ten and one half hours, but were abandoned at the onset of World War I.[8]

While attempts at international labour legislation had long preceded the establishment of the ILO, its emergence in 1919 can be linked as well to a number of very specific concerns on the part of the Allies after World War I. These were that widespread social unrest would follow the cessation of hostilities, and that the revolutions of the Soviet Union might spread to the West.[9] The advanced industrial countries sought a mechanism through which organised labour could participate in reforms within capitalism rather than from without.[10] These concerns to mitigate the effects of labour conflict through international organisation, conjoined with the various activities of the preceding century, laid the groundwork for the introduction of international labour legislation into the Versailles Peace Treaties in 1919.[11]

A Commission on International Labour Legislation was established immediately after the opening of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919. The general structure of the organisation was adopted fairly quickly, in part because the British delegation arrived at the first meeting with a draft proposal for an international organisation and much of this proposal was accepted.[12] It included plans for a tripartite system of representation, making it structurally unique as an IGO. All member states of the ILO would meet once a year at the International Labour Conference (ILC) and would be entitled to send a delegation consisting of two government representatives and two representing workers and employers, respectively.[13] The Commission also agreed to a small administrative board called the Governing Body and a Secretariat, known as the International Labour Office, which would have a Director.[14]

British faith in an international organisation stemmed in part from their experiences in managing labour conflict at home. As Ernst Haas notes, the Lloyd George government in 1916 had sought ways to both secure the support of organised labour and increase labour productivity. It did this by raising wages in some sectors and creating a Ministry of Labour which permitted labour input into government policies. The officials responsible for the creation of the Ministry of Labour in Britain, Harold Butler and Edward J. Phelan, also drafted the British proposals for the ILO.[15]

While the structure of the ILO was agreed on easily, the scope and power of the organisation was a more contentious point. The original draft for an ILO mandate noted that the League of Nations aimed at the establishment of universal peace, but 'such a peace can be established only if it is based upon the prosperity and contentment of all classes in all nations'.[16] The Americans objected to the word 'class' and a revised mandate stated that its aim was the promotion of 'lasting peace through social justice', by improving the labour conditions of working men and women.[17] This objective continues to inform ILO policies and programmes to this day.

In order to both promote social justice and improve the labour conditions of workers, the ILO was to establish international labour standards. However, this had to be reconciled with the principle of state sovereignty, that no state should interfere with the internal situation of any other nation-state.[18] The Commission debated a number of options, and considered an Italian suggestion that all decisions taken at the International Labour Conference should be binding on member states, a British proposal for an opting-out plan and American concerns that, among other things, federal states would be unable to implement ILO decisions without state or provincial authority.[19] The compromise solution was that labour Conventions and Recommendations must be adopted by a two-thirds majority at the International Labour Conference and Conventions would then be submitted to member states for ratification. Member states would not be required to ratify Conventions, but once they did they would then be obliged to implement the associated measures and report their progress to the ILO. Recommendations would be standard-defining instruments which would be submitted to member states for consideration only.[20]

The compromise permitted members of the ILO not to be bound by ILO Conventions or Recommendations, and so addressed the concerns that an international organisation formulating labour legislation would threaten the sovereign integrity of nation states. But, the compromise was also a disappointment for many who were looking for precisely this kind of constraint on individual states. The International Federation of Trade Unions in particular saw the compromise formula as permitting member states to ignore ILO Conventions and thus as greatly diminishing the authority of this new body.[21] For those who remained optimists, as John Mainwaring notes, it was hoped that if the ILO could establish itself with sufficient legitimacy within the international community, the moral pressure to adopt Conventions might replace its lack of legal authority.[22]

More importantly, the compromise also permitted the quick adoption of the tripartite structure, a structure which under different circumstances would not have been so well-received. Ernst Haas has noted that governmental

preoccupation with the larger issue of the period – establishing the peace – and a general inclination to make some sort of gesture toward labour led to the approval of the ILO's structure and goal of promoting social justice. These background conditions, conjoined with the fact that governments were not required to abide by ILO Conventions, led to the creation of what Haas describes as a 'radical new departure' in international governance.[23]

THE EARLY PERIOD

The ILO began with a flurry of activity. The first Labour Conference was held a few months later in October 1919 in Washington, the agenda for which had been established at the Peace Conference. The Americans were in a difficult situation. Not only had their President just suffered a stroke, but they were hosting an ILO Conference to which they were not members. The American Senate refused to ratify the League of Nations Treaty and so the United States was not a member of the ILO (and would not become one until 1934).[24] Thus, despite the important role played by the US in establishing the ILO, it could not be represented by a delegation at the Washington Conference. While the British had been instrumental in giving form to the ILO and in shaping the compromise solution in terms of its powers, it was the French who gained considerable influence at the first International Labour Conference. The two top ILO offices, the Chair of the Governing Body and Director of the International Labour Office, went to the French candidates.[25]

Thus one of the 'unintended consequences' of the adoption of a tripartite structure was made apparent immediately, for it had permitted an important shift of power within the ILO within months of its being established. While the ILO structure and mandate had been drafted by British governmental representatives intent on containing labour unrest, a propitious alliance between worker and employer representatives at the first ILC in Washington resulted in a French trade union leader, Albert Thomas, leading the ILO. Thomas' vision of the ILO was not one which sought to contain labour unrest but rather to politicise the role of labour internationally through the ILO.[26]

The first International Labour Conference adopted six Conventions and six Recommendations detailing international agreements around an eight-hour day and 48-hour week, maternity protection, night work, minimum age guidelines and so on. Indeed, in the first two years of the ILO, sixteen Conventions and eighteen Recommendations were adopted, and a number of ILO publications were established.[27] This initial activity met with some

resistance, as member-states of the ILO were unable to keep up with reviewing the various Conventions and Recommendations, all of which were supposed to be considered by their governments. In response to this opposition, the output of legislation was reduced, such that in the twelve sessions between 1922 and 1931, fifteen Conventions and 21 Recommendations were adopted, roughly the same as had been passed in the first two years.[28]

WOMEN AND THE ILO

Although women were not represented in large numbers during the early period of the ILO, neither were they entirely absent, as readings of the traditional histories of the organisation would lead one to believe. There were no official female delegates to the Commission for International Labour Legislation which established the ILO, but women lobbied the various delegations quite extensively. At the same time, women also lobbied delegates working on the covenant of the League of Nations. In both instances, the women involved felt that they achieved a few small but important victories.[29]

Margaret Bondfield, a member of Britain's TUC General Council, took advantage of her connections with the British delegation and proposed two amendments to the ILO Constitution, one demanding that when questions concerning women's labour were being discussed, one of the advisers to each delegate should be a woman and a second requiring the Director of the International Labour Office 'to employ a certain number of women on his staff'.[30] In part because of the influence of the British delegation at the Commission meetings, and in part because of the rather limited nature of the resolutions, both were adopted. Other recommendations were submitted to the Commission as a whole, but received less overall attention. Mme Brunschwig of France represented the views of the Conference of Allied Women Suffragists, for example, and submitted proposals relating to the content of ILO legislation, including child labour, unemployment, duration of work and hygiene. Only some of these were reviewed by the ILO Commissioners.[31]

When the first ILC met in Washington, the first International Congress of Working Women also met there and formulated proposals which were taken to the ILC meetings. The purpose of the parallel meeting was twofold, both to protest the underrepresentation of women at the ILC and to develop a 'programme for women' which could be considered by the ILC. The Congress of Working Women chose as its mandate the consideration of

issues which would be addressed at the first ILC and which seemed to be of particular importance to women. These included the employment of women before and after childbirth and their employment at night or around hazardous substances. It also included similar issues around children's paid employment and, of a more general nature, the eight-hour day and the adoption of the Berne Convention prohibition of white phosphorous in matches.[32]

The ILC treated the Congress of Working Women seriously and considered their Resolutions within its various sub-committees. Most were adopted, however not always in the form recommended by the Congress.[33] As Anne Winslow and Carol Riegelman Lubin note:

> The general thrust of ILO's standard setting was ... consonant with the goals of the Congress but it was far more conservative. This could only be expected in an organization concerned with legislation. Governments are seldom prepared to act on international agreements until similar provisions exist within their own legal framework. Furthermore ... if the organization is to achieve any form of consensus-making action possible, the standards must reflect [the divergent range of views among its member states].[34]

By far the most important achievement of the Congress was the establishment of the International Federation of Working Women (IFWW) which very quickly began to formalise its relationship with the ILO, permitting ILO observers at IFWW Congresses, and expecting the same invitation in return from the ILO.[35]

A few women served as delegates at the ILC, and considerably more acted as advisers to delegates. The British delegation, for example, sent women advisers for all four of its delegates. In many cases the women, whether delegates or advisers, had attended the Working Women's Congress before arriving at the ILC. The women tended to be assigned to committees dealing with issues thought to be of special interest to women, a designation assigned as much by the Congress of Working Women as by the ILO. These included resolutions dealing with the night work of women, women's work around maternity and the work of children.[36]

One of the debates raised by women at the Washington Conference would be reflected throughout the history of the ILO; that is, the debate between what Winslow and Lubin call the 'protectionists and the equal righters'.[37] This debate focused on the role of protective legislation for women workers, specifically at the first ILC around the Convention prohibiting the night work of women. Protectionists argued that women workers

required special protection from the hazards of the workplace, either because of their roles in childbearing or because of the various other ways in which women differed from men (i.e. physical strength, role as mothers, and so on). Equal righters argued, on the other hand, that establishing special protective measures for women meant that employers would be less likely to employ them and thus they were a threat to women's equality on the labour market. Protective measures, moreover, detracted from the overall aims of labour legislation by protecting only women workers instead of all workers. Betzy Kjelsberg of Norway said in Washington:

> I am against special protective laws for women, except pregnant women and women nursing children under one year of age because I believe that we are furthering the cause of good labor laws most by working toward the prohibition of all absolutely unnecessary night work. It is hard to see old worn out men and young boys in the most critical period of development work during the night.[38]

The equality rights position was carried also by British trade union and Labour Party representatives as well as the International Congress of Working Women held in Washington prior to the ILC. It was, however, rejected by the international socialist movement, the international trade unions and the International Council of Women.[39]

GENDER AND THE ILO: THE EARLY PERIOD

The debate around protective legislation that emerged at the first ILC reflected the complex and contradictory understandings of gender with which the ILO was forced to grapple, and the ways in which those understandings were already changing. As recently as the 1906 Berne Conventions, for example, there had been no debate at all and, as was noted above, the prohibition of women's work at night was chosen precisely because it was considered so uncontroversial. But by the first ILC in Washington, the debate was quite heated at moments. The ILO was also a complex organisation. Unlike the IPPF, which emerged out of the activities of a rather narrow group of people and institutions which had formulated some consensus around understandings of gender by the time the organisation was established, the ILO was created by a variety of state, labour and employer groups, and was influenced by the lobbying efforts of many more groups. As a result, no single understanding of the appropriate role of women and men in the workforce was presented to the ILO in this early period, but

rather a variety of different and competing understandings surfaced and, in different ways, were reflected in ILO policies.

Jane Jenson has argued, for example, that at the turn of the century many countries sought to enact legislation to protect maternal and infant health. Her examination of the cases of Britain, France and the United States indicates that in each case there was an interest in reducing infant mortality rates. While each state shared this interest, however, the manner in which they sought to achieve this aim differed markedly, reflecting different assumptions about the appropriate role of women as mothers in the workforce. In France, state policies usually were informed by the assumption that women did and should work, and as such their working lives must be reconciled with their other roles such as childbearing. Protective legislation in this case often attempted not to remove women from the workforce, but to find ways in which their return to paid labour could be facilitated. In Britain and the United States, by contrast, the gender ideology reflected in state policies tended to assume that women, like children, should not work. As a result, protective legislation tended to focus on excluding women from particular workplaces, or the workforce entirely, by virtue of the primacy given to women's role in reproduction. In this case, there was no apparent need to *reconcile* the protection of mothers and infants with work, assuming that the role of motherhood should always be privileged.[40]

The ILO was established primarily out of the activities of these three states, Britain, France and the United States. In each case, somewhat different gender ideologies were reflected in attempts to reduce infant mortality rates. As an international organisation, the ILO was to some extent expected to reflect these different understandings, as it was the debates by different women's organisations and representatives around the question of equality versus protectionism.[41] In addition, there was the history of intergovernmental labour legislation that ILO officials turned to which, although brief, also reflected the protectionist position.[42] And, in the end, these different and sometimes contradictory understandings about women's appropriate role in the workforce *were* reflected in ILO policies and pronouncements. Although greater emphasis was given to the protection of women, attempts were made within the first few months of the ILO's existence both to promote the equality of women and at the same time to call for their protection and prohibition from certain areas of work.

Efforts aimed at promoting women's equality included the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value, affirmed in the ILO Constitution in 1919. At the same time, however, drafters of the Constitution assumed that sufficient differences existed between male and female workers to note the following distinction when listing the goals of the

ILO: '... the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women ...'[43] Thus, while men and women deserved equal pay for work of equal value, the ILO Constitution also embodied the assumption that while workers were men, women were a different or special type of worker deserving of special forms of protection beyond those accorded to normal workers.[44]

At the first ILC, the adoption of Conventions No. 3 and 4 provided women with maternity protection and prohibited their work at night.[45] Recommendation No. 4, also adopted in 1919, set standards to prevent the lead poisoning of women and children.[46] Maternity protection reflected both elements of the debate. On the one hand it was intended to protect women workers in the immediate post-partum period. But, on the other hand, by ensuring that they could return to work after a period of six weeks' rest, and by encouraging employers to pay women benefits 'sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of her child', Convention No. 3 also assumed that women could be both workers and mothers.[47]

The approach to women's work, then, was quite mixed, and the balance of that mix changed throughout the history of the ILO. During the early period, there was more formal legislative attention accorded to the 'protectionist' position, in terms of maternity protection, night work and lead poisoning, however the 'equality' position clearly was also represented in a number of forms. Equal remuneration was recognised in principle, but it would be more than thirty years before the ILO would consider Conventions on equal remuneration. In part, the greater emphasis given to the protection of women reflects the greater importance of protection for those most active in the ILO during this early period – those, in other words, whose ideas about gender had gained greater resonance. The Americans and the British, who operated on protectionist assumptions, were the most influential states in the formation of the ILO at the Peace Conference, and even set the terms of the agenda of questions which would be considered at the first ILC, as was noted above. Activists from women's organisations, although not entirely homogeneous in their views, also tended to support the protection of women workers during this early period and likewise the history of intergovernmental labour legislation had until that time favoured protectionist policies.[48]

In addition to the efforts of the various activists involved in the establishment of the ILO, prevailing ideas and material conditions also served to reinforce the protectionist position. Often, the push for protective legislation for women workers arose from the assumption that the appropriate place for a woman was in the home attending to her family, and her highest

function was that of mother. In many countries, if women did work, it was usually regarded as temporary, and because of the demands placed on these women as a result of their employment, the primacy of their role in the family had, in some way, to be preserved.[49] In part, this reflected the reality of harsh working conditions in industry at that time. Factory or mine workers were engaged for long hours, often without interruption, in conditions which were dirty, uncomfortable and unsafe. Images of women working in cotton mills, standing for twelve hours a day in stinking hot factories, or hauling trucks of coal half-naked through dangerous passageways horrified many well-meaning reformers.[50]

The response to these conditions in different national contexts and also at the ILO was to implement protective legislation.[51] Numerous assumptions about the impact of industrial work on women informed the push for protective legislation. By these views, women were more vulnerable to the physical challenges of industrial work, and this was especially significant given their role in childbearing. Exposure to the hard life associated with industry might also, it was argued, corrupt women's morals. Because of women's role in raising children, and as the voice of morality within the home, this threat to their morality was considered very serious indeed.[52] As Lord Shaftesbury said of working women to the British Parliament:

> They know nothing that they ought to know ... they are rendered unfit for the duties of women by overwork, and become utterly demoralized. In the male the moral effects of the system are very sad, but in the female they are infinitely worse, not alone upon themselves, but upon their families, upon society, and, I may add, upon the country itself. It is bad enough if you corrupt the man, but if you corrupt the woman, you poison the waters of life at the very fountain.[53]

Clearly, the impact of industrial employment was considered to be much more detrimental to women than it was to men. Even young boys were thought to withstand the strains of industrial employment better than women. The employment of men at night, or under conditions of considerable hardship, was not assumed to weaken the family unit as was assumed with women. Moreover, women's work, it was argued, contributed to the demoralisation of husbands stripped of their role as the primary breadwinner.[54]

This narrow focus on protective legislation had a number of results. For one, prohibiting women's work did not address the real reasons for their employment. As Ross Davies writes: ' ... attempts to mitigate this suffering of working women often ignored the fact that the work, harsh though it

was, was badly needed'.[55] Once banned from the mines, women with no other employment opportunities often disguised themselves as men in order to return to the coal pits.[56] In areas in which they were not banned entirely, protective legislation prevented women from competing equally with men for jobs.[57] More importantly, prohibiting women's work also shifted the attention of social reformers to removing women from the workplace rather than attempting to improve the working conditions of all workers.[58] While the aim of many reformers had been to improve, if only slightly, the conditions of working women, their focus on prohibiting women's work both played into a misogyny used to exclude women further, and moreover did not address the extent to which *all* workers faced difficult and hazardous working conditions as a result of the changes wrought by the industrial revolution.[59]

In addition to social reformers, trade unions also tended to oppose the employment of women and supported various forms of protective legislation. For unions, however, the motivation was to restrict the employment of women in order that they would cease to threaten men's employment.[60] As technology improved, women took over jobs formerly performed by men and usually at lower rates of pay. By this view, women's entry into industrial employment threatened men's wages and contributed to their unemployment. In numerous cases, unions sought either to prohibit the entry of women into unions, or sought to prohibit their entry into the labour force altogether.[61] Motivated by a concern to protect men from competition by women, the unions relied on commonly held assumptions about the appropriate role of women in society. Like the social reformers, trade unionists lamented the breakdown of the traditional nuclear family, and of women's central place in that family, as justification for their exclusionary practices.[62]

Thus the changing labour process and conditions of women's work, and the activities of social reformers and of trade unionists all underpinned notions around the protection of women workers that made their way to the ILO in its early years. Notions about women's role in reproduction, and their position within the family as mothers – often above all else – informed many of those most active in promoting the protection of women workers. Indeed, it is the resolution of women's roles in reproduction and production that most profoundly affected ILO policies toward women, and as noted earlier, was dealt with in sometimes contradictory ways. This exclusive attention to women workers also meant that men were effectively ignored, for their roles in reproduction and the family were not assumed to be as important as those of women. The next section will explore in more detail ILO protective measures and the gendering effects which resulted.

THE SPECIAL CASE: PROTECTION AND PREGNANCY

The committment to protect women workers during pregnancy was established at the ILO at its beginnings, and continued to inform ILO policy prescriptions throughout its history. The vast bulk of ILO protective legislation aimed at women addresses their role in reproduction. As one ILO spokesperson wrote in 1935: 'Women's constitution has certain peculiarities as compared with man's, and legislation must take these into account.'[63] The ILO has long prided itself on its maternity protection conventions. The first international standard for maternity protection was adopted by the ILO in 1919 as Convention No. 3, as was noted above. It established for women workers their right to maternity leave, cash benefits during that leave, nursing breaks, and the right to retain employment throughout pregnancy, childbirth and childrearing. In 1952, the International Labour Conference adopted the Maternity Protection Convention (Revised) No. 103 which set a minimum rate of maternity cash benefits. At the same time, the ILO adopted Recommendation No. 95 which proposed a longer period of maternity leave, increase in cash benefits and additional benefits and facilities for women who were breastfeeding.[64]

Underground work was prohibited by Convention in 1935. Women also have been prohibited from working with dangerous substances such as lead (Recommendation No. 4, 1919 and Convention No. 13, 1921), radiation (Recommendation No. 114, 1960), and benzene (Convention No. 136, 1971). Since 1967, the ILO has established a maximum weight Convention in which it is urged that women be prohibited from lifting, and if this is not possible, that the weight or duration of the lifting be reduced for women. A maximum weight Recommendation prohibits a pregnant woman from being assigned to jobs requiring heavy lifting or carrying during the ten weeks after confinement.[65]

Thus women, by virtue of their childbearing role, require special protection from hazardous substances and activities, and moreover require that their employment remain secure during times of pregnancy and in the post-partum period. Such assumptions rest on the prevalent understanding of women and childbearing. Women *do* bear children, and it was and still is assumed that this role in reproduction makes them more vulnerable to physical stress, toxic chemicals, and so on, than are men by virtue of their role in reproduction.[66]

Such protection is, of course, laudable in many respects. As Zillah Eisenstein notes, pregnancy *is* engendered; women do, or may, bear children. This fact already structures their choices within the labour force, and protective legislation which recognises pregnancy may protect some women from further discrimination based on it. As Eisenstein writes:

> Recognition of pregnancy through sex-specific legislation undermines discrimination at least as much as, if not more than, it enforces it. Such recognition means if a woman has obtained a job and then gets pregnant, she will be protected against discrimination on the basis of her pregnancy. It is true that with such legislation in place, some employers will think twice about hiring a woman, but many of them think twice about doing so anyhow.[67]

The tension which results from such protective legislation is, for Eisenstein, a difficult one to resolve for it assumes women's difference at the same time that it seeks to address it.[68]

The implications of this tension are numerous. For one, protective legislation which removes women from reproductive health hazards leaves men subject to those same hazards. Research on the male reproductive system and the effect on the foetus is not extensive, but neither is it non-existent. As early as 1860, the reproductive effects on men exposed to lead were documented with indications that their wives had a very high incidence of spontaneous abortion. More recently, lead and other substances have been linked to low sperm counts, childhood cancers, heart defects, genetic damage to sperm and chromosomal aberrations.[69] By assuming that only women play an important enough role in reproduction to require protection, it becomes clear that men's role in reproduction does not entitle them to any sort of special consideration – they become, in effect, invisible.

Secondly, the hazardous substances from which women must be protected are usually those found in industries dominated by men, such as in metals and chemicals. As Michael Wright notes:

> Women beauticians are exposed to halogenated hydrocarbon hairspray propellants ... women in the dry cleaning industry are exposed to tetrachloroethylene, a mutagen. Airline flight attendants are exposed to higher than average levels of radiation.[70]

Operating room personnel such as nurses, technicians and anaesthesiologists also report a higher rate of miscarriages and malformations in their children. Teachers have been exposed to German measles for centuries, and even with immunisation programmes outbreaks continue to occur.[71] In none of these cases has the prohibition of women from these professions ever been considered. As Carolyn Bell notes: 'Clearly, female elementary schoolteachers will not be replaced – we rely on them too heavily and it would be too costly – yet female vinyl chloride workers are denied jobs.'[72] These hazards tend to be ignored, in part because it is simply inconvenient

or considered inappropriate to move women out of these industries. Thus women's difference is a double one which is recognised not merely through the fact of pregnancy and childbearing, but through their entry into non-traditional (i.e. male) sectors of the economy.

Indeed, much of the emphasis of protective legislation for women aims at protecting potential children rather than the woman herself. This is illustrated well through the example of lead and benzene prohibitions.[73] As was noted above, a Recommendation to prevent lead poisoning was adopted in 1919 and in 1921 a Convention was adopted prohibiting women from working in industries using white lead paint. Restrictions on benzene, however, were not adopted until 1971. The relationship between lead and women's reproductive capacity was observed as early as the mid-nineteenth century; women exposed to lead were more prone to sterility, miscarriages, still births and high infant mortality rates. At around the same time, the effects of exposure to benzene were also being documented: in women, bleeding from the nose, gums and vagina often preceded death. Haemorrhagic complications during pregnancy and more frequent and excessive menstruation was also reported. In a number of cases, autopsies indicated haemorrhage in the ovaries. However, what distinguished benzene from lead was that there were few reported cases of sterility, miscarriages, still births, infant mortality or congenital malformations in offspring.[74] As Vilma Hunt notes:

> The effects of lead and benzene on the female reproductive system are of comparable severity, although there are clinical differences in the symptoms experienced. There are few examples of efforts to exclude women from working with benzene throughout the same ninety years that protective legislation and/or practices excluded women from working with lead. There is no strong explanation for this inconsistency, but it appears that the worker, woman or man, was expendable. The children of workers were not, and it was the children of lead workers who were obviously affected.[75]

Protective legislation, then, often is aimed at protecting the children of women workers more than the women themselves.

Finally, and most importantly, the ILO, because of its emphasis on protective legislation for women as childbearers, virtually ignores women who are not pregnant. Surprisingly few ILO health and safety regulations indicate important differences between standards for women and men workers, except insofar as women require special protection as a result of childbearing. Outside of reproductive health, women are seldom accorded

'special' status, although they may in fact require it. Specifications for safety wear, for example, seldom reflect different size or proportion requirements to adequately meet women's specific needs.[76] Thus women as workers gain special protection by virtue of their special role as child-bearers. However, once outside of that role, women as a specific category of worker requiring special attention drops away altogether. Women, by this view, have been recognised only insofar as they are different from men, and different only in ways deemed important by men or the state.

These examples point to the ways in which the policies which protect the pregnant woman and foetus are pursued only when they are consonant with prevailing assumptions about women's and men's appropriate role in the workforce. Men are workers first and fathers only secondarily, and as such the extent to which they may require protection because of their role in reproduction is downplayed or ignored. More importantly, the protection of male workers would require an enormous investment of resources. Female workers are protected when they find themselves in non-traditional employment or when they are doing things they are supposed to be doing, such as having babies. Women are ignored and not provided protection when they are no longer easily situated within the role as real or potential mother.

FROM PROTECTION TO PROMOTION

While the ILO would always promote the protection of women workers by virtue of their role in reproduction, by the late 1920s and the 1930s, the 'mix' of equality versus protection had begun to shift so that many ILO initiatives toward women reflected attempts to promote women's equality within the workforce rather than protect them by virtue of their child-bearing and rearing roles.[77] On the one hand, there was an already existing institutional predisposition to an equality rights discourse, as laid down in the Constitution and first ILC. In addition, this period saw a marked increase in activism against protective legislation: women's organisations either lobbied the ILO directly or indirectly through governments which exercised influence within the ILO, to abandon protective policies for women. Finally, women's increased workforce participation after World War II also facilitated the adoption of promotional policies over those concerned with protectionism.

The first and most dramatic indication of the shift to a greater emphasis in promoting women's equality came with the ILO's treatment of women's unemployment during the Depression. The ILO estimated in 1935 that

there were some four million women unemployed globally. This reflected not only general economic trends, but the increasing use by national governments of legislation restricting women's employment. Britain had a long-standing tradition of restricting women's employment in the civil service after marriage, and in the early 1930s began to extend this to the private sector. In 1933, Germany, Austria and Italy enacted legislation restricting women's employment, followed in 1934 by Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Belgium.[78] In contrast to the efforts of national governments, ILO publications during this period criticised the resort by some countries to restrictive legislation in order to alleviate the unemployment of men. As Henri Fuss, Chief of Unemployment, Employment and Migration wrote:

> The outstanding problem, therefore, is not to find ways of ousting women from their jobs in order to replace them by men, but rather that of a general reduction of unemployment among women as much as men.... No arbitrary distinction can be made between the placing of women and of men ... So long as they do not offer their work for wages lower than those earned by men, women cannot without injustice be excluded *a priori* from any occupation....[79]

The ILO did not, during this time, abandon its position on the necessity of protective legislation for women in order to ensure their (childbearing) health. Rather, the ILO opposed restrictive legislation on any grounds other than this. Legislation intended to 'make room for men in vacancies produced by the exclusion of women' could not be justified, by this view.[80]

This shift to the promotion of women's equality reflected the increasing activism of women's organisations from the mid-1920s onwards which aimed at promoting equal rights. These groups became increasingly organised in opposition to ILO protective labour legislation. The National Woman's Party (NWP) in the United States had opposed protective legislation within the American context for over a decade and by the mid-1920s began to direct its energies internationally. From 1928 onwards they were active in trying to get states and organisations to adopt the Equal Rights Treaty, which dealt with both a woman's right to work and the extent to which protective legislation violated that right.[81]

In 1927, an organisation comprised mainly of British activists began to meet to discuss workplace equality for women and in 1929 formally constituted itself as the Open Door International. Its aims were the promotion of equal access to employment for women, equal protective treatment of women workers as workers, and the freedom for women to choose the paid

employment of their choice. Another British organisation established in 1930 was Equal Rights International. Finally, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom also lent its support to the NWP's Equality Treaty in 1931.[82]

At the same time, and in opposition to these groups, numerous organisations attempting to maintain and promote the protection of women workers also sought to extend their activities to international organisations. Most important among these was the League of Women Voters (LWV) in the United States which was the NWP's chief rival. Individual women in policy-making positions within governments or the ILO itself also were active in supporting protectionist policies. Mary Anderson, for example, headed the Women's Bureau in the American Department of Labor and opposed the NWP within the United States and at the ILO.[83]

By 1935, this struggle around representation erupted at the League of Nations and the ILO. The NWP had been trying to get the League to examine the Equal Rights Treaty and, hopefully, to adopt it in some form. When consideration of the Treaty was placed on the agenda of the 1935 Assembly of the League of Nations, LWV members prepared a formal protest which was delivered through the World YWCA.[84]

Once at the ILO, the pressure was applied by both the LWV and the NWP and their respective supporters. Mary Anderson maintained a regular correspondence with Grace Abbott, one of the American delegates to the ILO and Harold Butler, at that time Director of the ILO, lobbying for the importance of protective legislation. In a letter to Butler, Anderson wrote:

> Miss Paul [head of the NWP] does not represent the working women of the US. Her views are diametrically opposed to those of working women, who believe in special legislation for women and work for such legislation through their trade union organizations.[85]

The LWV's president Marguerite Wells also lobbied Frances Perkins, the US Secretary of Labour, who instructed the American delegation to oppose the Treaty and promote protective legislation.[86]

The LWV discovered, however, that there was little support for their position outside the US delegation. Abbott suggested that with the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Europe, many women anticipated even greater prohibitions to their employment and were therefore more likely to support the Equal Rights Treaty.[87] The same could also be said of the Depression: during periods of massive unemployment, a right to work clearly had some appeal for working women and their representatives. The Open Door International also was successful in mobilising around the Treaty as a solidarity

issue, encouraging different women and women's organisations to support it at the ILO in one united feminist front.[88] Thus increasing activism of women's organisations in promoting equality and rising concerns about the impact of restrictive legislation on women's employment during this period meant that groups promoting protective legislation found that they were less and less influential.[89]

While the Equal Rights Treaty was not adopted in its entirety in ILO Conventions and Recommendations, it did inform the shift to the adoption of instruments aimed at promoting women's equality. This coincided with changing conditions of white women's work experience in industrialised countries. While unemployed during the Depression, women's workforce participation rose steadily from World War II onwards. They were mobilised into jobs left vacant by men during the war, and although after the war women were initially forced out of industry, the post-war period was marked by the dramatic and steady rise of women's participation in the workforce. Not only were single women entering the workforce in unprecedented numbers, but it was the entry of married women into paid labour that most uniquely characterised this period. For some, this was explained by the impact of women's war work on their consciousness and expectations of employment. More likely, however, it was the changing nature of the economy that created this burst of women's employment.[90]

The expansion of the services sector, which had been taking place since the turn of the century, continued to increase after the war in most of Europe and North America. Most women were drawn into clerical work, which had expanded as a result of expanding welfare state bureaucracies, businesses and commerce.[91] Demographic changes also contributed to the employment of women. Increasing population growth in the advanced industrial countries created a need for nurseries and teachers. Where previously single women filled these positions, after the war the pool of single women had contracted: a decline in population growth meant fewer women were coming to adulthood in the 1950s, and as well women were marrying at a younger age. Thus more married women entered the workforce.[92] As health care services improved and child care facilities became increasingly available, women were also freed to pursue employment outside the home – their role in ensuring the survival of children had declined.[93] Today, over half of the adult women in most advanced industrial countries are in the work force, although many are segregated into part-time work as well as service occupations.[94]

As women were drawn increasingly into the workforce during World War II and during the post-war period, and as ideas about protective legislation were increasingly challenged within the ILO by different women's

organisations, so too did the policy prescriptions of the ILO change to reflect this changing status. Assumptions about women as workers became increasingly the 'norm'. ILO response to both the changing fact and perception of women's employment was to reformulate the 'woman problem' as one of human rights and the demand for equality of opportunity for both women and men. This included the adoption of non-discrimination legislation and, of course, equal pay. More than this, however, the ILO began to rethink women's 'special' status.

Where previously women's special status had required their protection, in the post-war period women's special status required their promotion. ILO policies reflected the realisation that women's equality required more than equality rights legislation, it required active intervention on the part of governments to remedy the various structural impediments to women's full and equal access to the workforce. While the protection of women's reproductive health remained important, in the post-war period women deserved 'special' attention in the form of training, apprenticeship and employment programmes.[95] The Declaration of Philadelphia had stated that:

> ... all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.[96]

These principles informed at least in part the equality rights policies pursued by the ILO for the next forty-five years.

EQUALITY RIGHTS

While the ILO had always been committed to the principle of equal pay, it was in 1950 that Ann Godwin, the British worker's delegate to the ILO, said: 'Now, after thirty-one years, we are asking you to take the next step'.[97] The ILO noted that because of the increasing importance of women in the paid labour force, equal remuneration was required not only to promote social justice, but to enhance labour mobility and efficient utilisation of the labour force.[98] In 1951, Convention 100, Equal Remuneration, was adopted. This required governments to 'promote' the principle of equal pay for women workers for work of equal value and to 'seek to ensure' it by appropriate methods. The associated Recommendation set out the manner in which appraisal of salary levels might be achieved, and a suggested timetable for the implementation of the Convention.[99] Over one hundred

countries have ratified Convention 100 – almost the largest number of ratifications of ILO legislation – an indication according to the ILO that there is 'almost universal acceptance of the principle of equal remuneration without discrimination based on sex'.[100]

However, while member countries are committed to the principle of pay equity, there are numerous impediments in implementing pay equity in practice, including the segregation of women into job categories where there are few male comparison groups, limited resources in some countries for enforcing pay equity laws, and the exclusion by many governments of numerous job categories. As a result, pay equity is far from being a reality in the vast majority of ILO member countries and monitoring their progress is a difficult exercise.[101]

Other efforts to promote women's equality included the 1958 Convention (111) and Recommendation (111) aimed at preventing discrimination in employment and occupation in both the public and private sectors;[102] the 1962 non-discrimination Convention (117) aimed at eliminating discrimination against workers in a whole variety of areas, including conditions of work, vocational training, health and safety, and so on.[103] In 1964, the ILO adopted the Employment Policy Convention (No. 122) aimed at ensuring full employment and freedom of choice of employment and the promotion of equality of opportunity for all workers.[104] Also in 1964, the ILC adopted a resolution to address women workers in a changing world which was aimed at placing the problems of women from developing countries on the ILC agenda.[105]

In 1965 the ILO adopted Recommendation No. 123 outlining the various measures to be taken by governments and employers in order to facilitate women's 'double day'. These included efforts to determine with greater accuracy the real problems faced by these workers, and to pursue public education campaigns in this regard; the provision of child care facilities; the provision of vocational training for women and girls, and services to facilitate women's entry and re-entry into the workforce after raising children.[106]

The shift to an equality rights discourse, however, was not without its critics. Although the promotion of women workers was considered an improvement by many observers, it continued to promote a particular vision of women's roles in society and the family. The Recommendation was strongly criticised, especially by the United States and Scandinavian countries.[107] It was pointed out that the ILO continued to privilege the role of women in childbearing and rearing roles. Such a view did nothing to challenge existing norms concerning the role of women in childrearing. It continued to assume that women were the primary caretakers of children,

but that they must be promoted despite their role in childbearing and childrearing.[108] Rather than attempt to transform unequal power relations between women and men within the family, ILO legislation sought merely to alleviate that inequality while at the same time accepting it.

The gendering effects of an equality discourse had a similar impact on men as did the discourse around protection: it rendered them invisible. Protective legislation ignored men because their roles in childbearing and childrearing were not considered as important, or as fragile, as that of women. Men were rendered invisible through equality legislation because they were the comparison group. As that group which women were trying to achieve equality *with*, men existed only as workers. It is part of the contradictory nature of the way in which gender is constructed that this is both a privileged and invisible situation to be in. For, while women always find themselves compared to men as normal workers and so in this way always subordinate, men find that they do not exist at all, *except* as workers.

SINCE THE 1970s

The 1970s was an active time for the ILO in a number of respects. It suffered its most significant crisis of the post-war period when the United States began to withhold portions of its contribution to the ILO budget in the early 1970s and then in 1977 gave notice that it would withdraw from the ILO altogether. Two years later the US did withdraw, but it returned in 1980. Reasons given for the withdrawal focused on the 'erosion of tripartite representation' at the ILO, which meant that the United States did not believe trade union representatives from Eastern and developing countries were truly independent of their governments. Even though the United States contributed twenty-five per cent of the ILO budget, its withdrawal did not have the devastating impact that was anticipated, in part because of the two years' notice. When George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO and one of the main protagonists in the American withdrawal, retired, the US rejoined the ILO shortly after.[109]

For our purposes, the 1970s also marks the greatest burst of ILO activity concerning women. The focus by the seventies was almost exclusively on an equality rights discourse, and a number of important groups pressured the ILO in this regard. For one, the so-called second wave of the women's liberation movement emerged in numerous national contexts and focused on equality legislation. By the 1960s, equality rights also had the support of the international trade union movement. Finally, as Bob Reinalda argues,

the last and perhaps most important coalition partner for women was the representatives of 'Third World' countries who by 1970 had led to UN acceptance of a programme of concerted international action for the advancement of women, and by 1975 had been instrumental in the UN's organisation of International Women's Year.[110]

As part of the symbolic significance of this switch, ILO policies again began to reflect a re-evaluation of some of its original measures concerning women. As part of its activities around the United Nations International Women's Year, the ILO adopted a Declaration and two resolutions on equality of opportunity and treatment for women workers. The Declaration noted that all forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex are unacceptable and must be eliminated, and that measures must be taken to eliminate discriminatory legislation, educate the public, and provide equal access for boys and girls to basic education and vocational training.[111] In this way, the ILO 'strengthened the existing economic and legal norms in a more positive direction by linking it to the promotion of employment opportunities on an equal basis between men and women'.[112]

In 1977, the ILO first began publishing *Women at Work: An ILO News Bulletin*, which survived for more than a decade. *Women at Work* provided information on official ILO policy towards women, as well as critical commentary on that policy and the extent to which it was being observed in member countries. The ILO also began to note the extent to which its own policies sustained the inequality of women, and the extent to which women's absence from certain areas contributed to their inequality. For example, in 1977, an ILO study entitled 'Equality Between the Sexes in the Field of Employment and Special Regulations on Women's Work', suggested that many ILO instruments originally intended to protect women actually served to discriminate against them.[113]

Women at Work also provided sustained analyses of women's involvement in trade unions, the impact of maternity and other forms of protection, and so on. In 1981, the editors of *Women at Work* noted that despite the centrality of demands for a New International Economic Order from developing countries in the preceding decade, the subject of women had been largely excluded from these negotiations.[114]

A resolution adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1975 had requested the ILO to consider revising the Employment of Women with Family Responsibilities (no. 123), 1965.[115] Then in 1981 the ILO adopted two new policy instruments, a Convention (156) and a Recommendation (165) requiring equal treatment for men and women workers with family responsibilities.[116] The legislation calls for maternity leave, extended child-rearing leave and sick leave to care for dependents. In addi-

tion, it points to the need to develop child care facilities and social security.[117] As Krishna Ahooja-Patel noted:

> This event marks a major point of departure in the evolution of concepts to create an equality framework among workers irrespective of sex. By bestowing the title 'Workers with family responsibilities' (and not 'Women workers with family responsibilities'), the ILO instruments indicate that responsibilities of home and family are not the exclusive monopoly of working women and that other members of the household (male and female) might equally share them.[118]

In this way, the ILO attempted to overcome some of the earlier limitations of equality rights legislation, and spent much of the 1980s reviewing conventions and recommendations based on assumptions around special protection.[119] It also allocated between $700,000 and $800,000 bi-annually to its women workers' unit and emphasised the theme of women's work in its Medium-Term Plan for the period 1982–7.[120] In the plan, three lines of action were suggested: to promote better understanding of the ways in which women are discriminated against in employment and the consequences of this discrimination for economic and social development; to promote equality of treatment between women and men; and to facilitate women's entry into working life.[121]

In 1985, as part of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies that emerged at the end of the United Nations Decade of Women, the ILO also adopted a Plan of Action on Equality of Opportunities and Treatment of Men and Women in Employment, which focuses in part on increasing women's participation in development, to improve child care facilities for both women and men, research on women's employment during the recession, and so on.[122] The ILO also initiated a two-year project in 1992 called the Interdepartmental Project on Equality of Women in Employment which will examine existing equality rights legislation, obstacles to women's employment and strategies for addressing these problems. Research emerging from this project will be presented in 1994 at an ILO-sponsored International Forum on Equality for Women in Employment in a Changing World: Challenges for the Future.[123] Most recently, the ILO issued a report in early 1993 calling for the increased participation of women in trade unions arguing that 'women's participation in trade unions is generally perceived to be one of the essential efforts that need to be made to achieve equality for women in employment'.[124]

What these new policy prescriptions and emphases suggest is that rather than simply adapt to women's unequal status, through these measures the

ILO began to recognise, at least, the need to transform that status. By recognising that both women and men may be involved with, among other things, childcare, these instruments assume neither that women are solely responsible for these tasks, nor that men have no place in them. Thus the limitations of previous equality rights legislation are recognised at the same time that men are rendered increasingly visible.

While this is the effect of changing policy emphases, it is important to note that these struggles are not resolved once and for all, they remain ongoing. This will occur as the ILO attempts to make member-states comply with these various measures, and it is true also within the ILO itself. Notions about women's and men's equality have not been adopted without resistance, and as Ann Therese Lotherington and Anne Britt Flemmen note, in many cases ILO managers and bureaucrats do not understand the full significance of this changed direction, and when they do they have tried in numerous cases to ignore or avoid it.[125] Additionally, when those bureaucrats who are favourable to more recent ILO policies concerning women and men present their positions and seek to have ILO policies actually carried out in programmes and projects, they often find that their arguments must be presented in a way that is explicitly 'de-sexualized' and in which the feminist implications of their arguments are made invisible in order that they will not be dismissed outright.[126] Thus even when the outcome is one of greater visibility for both women and men, the strategies used to get there often must reproduce the silencing it is intended to recover.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has illustrated the ways in which ILO policies have reflected particular and changing understandings of gender relations. It was noted at the outset that ILO policy has made specific reference to women workers throughout its history. More than document those references, however, the focus here has been to explore the ways in which they have been constructed. The ILO has always been buffeted by the debate between 'equality' and 'protection' because its member-states have operated on different assumptions about women workers, as have the activists who lobbied the ILO around its policies toward women. Thus while the early period reflected an emphasis on the protection of women workers, this began to change in the 1930s and throughout the post-war period as most ILO legislation directed at women was aimed at promoting their equality.

These changes depended on changing material conditions and the activities of the actors involved. Women's organisations became increasingly

efficient at mobilising against protective legislation from the 1920s onwards, and the impact of both the Depression and policies of national governments to restrict women's employment made their efforts even more important given women's rising unemployment. After World War II, women's increasing workforce participation shaped the ideas held about their employment, and as more women entered the paid labour force their presence there seemed less anomalous.

By the 1980s, with the impact of the second wave women's movement and the Declaration of the UN Decade for Women, the ILO had begun to promote not only women's equality, but women's and men's equality. This was important not only because it made men visible within equality legislation, but because it finally began to acknowledge the ways in which previous efforts to promote women's equality had operated by accepting their inequality. Legislation which was aimed at enabling women to be both workers and primary caregivers to children and the elderly within the home served to reinforce the assumption that a 'double day' was somehow appropriate for women. By noting that both women and men may have family responsibilities, recent ILO legislation seeks to undermine that assumption.

We can see in this way how the changing material conditions and ideas about gender available to the ILO throughout its history affected its understandings of gender. The following chapter will present some concluding comments about the arguments made throughout this work.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of my 'Gender, International Relations and the Case of the ILO', *Review of International Studies*, 20(4), October 1994.
2. Jane Jenson, 'The Talents of Women, the Skills of Men: Flexible Specialisation and Women', in Stephen Wood (ed.), *The Transformation of Work* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
3. This history also is covered briefly in Anne-Marie Brocas, Anne-Marie Cailloux and Virginie Oget, *Women and Social Security: Progress Towards Equality of Treatment* (Geneva: ILO, 1990), pp. 1–2.
4. R.W. Cox, 'ILO: Limited Monarchy', in R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobson (eds), *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 102; David A. Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO and its Role in the World Community* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1969), p. 6; G.A. Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation: Its Work for Social and Economic Progress* (London: Europa Publications, 1970), p. 5; Ernest Mahaim, 'The Historical and Social Importance of International Labor Legislation', in James T. Shotwell (ed.), *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, Vol. I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 3–6; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 'The

United States and the International Labor Organization, 1889–1934', *Ph.D Dissertation*, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, August 1, 1960, pp. 7–8.

5. Antony Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation* (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 5–6; Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 6.
6. Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, pp. 7–11; Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 10; Sir Malcolm Delevingne, 'The Pre-War History of International Labor Legislation', in James T. Shotwell, *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, pp. 29ff. See also John McMahon, 'The International Labour Organization', in Evan Luard (ed.), *The Evolution of International Organizations* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), pp. 178–9.
7. John Mainwaring, *The International Labour Organization: A Canadian View* (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1986), p. 11; Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, p. 12. See also Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization', pp. 13–14.
8. Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, pp. 11–13; Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 9; Delevingne, 'The Pre-War History,' pp. 34–6; Mahaim, 'The Historical and Social Importance of International Labor Legislation,' p. 11; Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization', pp. 15–16.
9. Cox, 'ILO: Limited Monarchy', p. 102; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 3; Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 140.
10. Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony', *International Organization*, 31(3), Summer 1977, p. 387 and *passim*. See also, R.W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony: A Reply', *International Organization*, 34(1), Winter 1980, *passim*; Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization', p. 109.
11. Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 11; Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, pp. 14–15; Delevingne, 'The Pre-War History', p. 53; Carol Riegelman, 'War-Time Trade-Union and Socialist Proposals', in J.T. Shotwell, *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, p. 57.
12. Moynihan argues that one reason for the ready acceptance of the British plan was because other delegates, most especially the Americans, arrived at the meetings with only a minimum of preparation. See Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization', p. 113.
13. Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO*, pp. 5, 9; Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, pp. 12–13; McMahon, 'The International Labour Organization', p. 179.
14. Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 14; Charles Picquenard, 'French Preparations', in J.T. Shotwell, *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, p. 95; Edward J. Phelan, 'British Preparations', in *Ibid.*, *passim*.
15. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 143.
16. Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 13.

17. *Ibid.*; Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, p. 27; Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO*, p. 9; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 14.
18. Edward L. Morse, 'The Westphalia System and Classical Statecraft', in E.L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of Statecraft* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 28, 32–4.
19. Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, pp. 14–15.
20. Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, pp. 22, 30; Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO*, pp. 9–10. See also ILO, *Standards and Policy Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers* (Geneva: ILO, 1980), pp. 1–3.
21. Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, pp. 28–9; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, pp. 16–17.
22. Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 16.
23. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, pp. 143 and 196. See also Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization', pp. 159–61.
24. Moynihan argues that American officials such as Secretary of State Lansing and even President Wilson himself failed to fully explain the rationale behind international labour legislation and the ILO to the American people in general and the Senate in particular, thus contributing to the failure to ratify the treaties. See Moynihan, 'The United States and the International Labor Organization,' pp. 251–8.
25. Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, pp. 18 and 23; Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, p. 38. See also Harold B. Butler, 'The Washington Conference', in J.T. Shotwell, *The Origins of the International Labor Organization, passim.*
26. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, pp. 143–4 and 145–9 *passim.*
27. Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of the ILO*, pp. 10–12, 14; Johnston, *The International Labour Organisation*, p. 91; Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation*, p. 46.
28. Morse, *Origin and Evolution of the ILO*, p. 16; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 103.
29. This section relies heavily on chapters one and two of Carol Riegelman Lubin and Anne Winslow, *Social Justice for Women: The International Labor Organization and Women* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).
30. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 21.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–6; Mary Anderson and Mary N. Winslow, *Woman at Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951), p. 125.
33. Butler, 'The Washington Conference', p. 327.
34. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 27.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 32; Anderson and Winslow, *Woman at Work*, pp. 129–31.
36. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 29.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Bob Reinalda, 'Women as Transnational Political Force in Europe', Paper Prepared for the Inaugural Pan-European Conference of the EPCR Standing Group on International Relations, Heidelberg, Germany, 16–20 September, 1992, p. 7. See also Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, pp. 21–2, 30.

40. Jenson, 'Gender and Reproduction'; Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse'.
41. See Susan D. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism Between the Wars* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), chapter 5 and ILO, *Special Protective Measures for Women and Equality of Opportunity and Treatment* (ILO: Geneva, 1989), chapter 2.
42. Reinalda, 'Women as Transnational Political Force in Europe', p. 7.
43. 'Final Texts of the Labor Section', in J.T. Shotwell (ed.), *The Origins of the International Labor Organization*, pp. 424 and 449.
44. Marilyn Waring notes that she has encountered the 'constant irony that some of the best sources for information about the work that women do is published by ... the ILO. This same ILO is responsible for the definition that concludes that the vast bulk of the labor performed by women is not work.' See *If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988), p. 231.
45. Convention No. 4 was revised in 1934 and in 1948 in order to accomodate shift work in some industries, women in high managerial positions and at the request of governments during national emergencies. See ILO, *Partial Revision of the Convention (No. 4) Employment of Women During the Night (1919) and Convention (No. 41) Concerning Employment of Women During the Night (revised 1934)*, International Labour Conference, 31st Session, Report IX, 1948.
46. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 95; *Women at Work*, No. 3, 1977, p. 34.
47. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 29; Jenson, 'Gender and Reproduction', p. 18; 'Final Texts of the Labor Section', p. 449.
48. Reinalda, 'Women as Transnational Political Force in Europe', p. 7; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, chapter 2.
49. Sarah Eisenstein, *Give Us Bread But Give Us Roses: Working Women's Consciousness in the United States, 1890 to the First World War* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), especially chapter 4; Jane Lewis, 'The Working-Class Wife and Mother and State Intervention, 1870–1918', in Jane Lewis (ed.), *Labour and Love: Women's Experience of Home and Family, 1850–1940* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 99–122; Alice Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work: A History of Wage Earning Women in the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 142 and chapters 4 and 6 *passim*. See also Louise A. Tilly and Joan W. Scott, *Women, Work, and Family* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978); Gail Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War: The British Experience* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Angela V. John, 'Introduction', in Angela V. John (ed.), *Unequal Opportunities: Women's Employment in England 1800–1918* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Meta Zimmeck, 'Jobs for Girls: the Expansion of Clerical Work for Women, 1850–1914', in John, *Unequal Opportunities*.
50. Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, p. 64; Ross Davies, *Women and Work* (London: Hutchinson, 1975), p. 44; Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*, chapter 7.
51. Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*, pp. 188 and 191. See also Ann Corinne Hill, 'Protection of Women Workers and the Courts: A Legal Case History', *Feminist Studies*, 5(2), Summer 1979, p. 251. The exception here, as was

noted above, was the case of France which was a latecomer to the 'protectionist trend', adopting maternity leave legislation only in 1913 and providing also a daily allowance to compensate for lost wages. See Jenson, 'Gender and Reproduction', p. 16 and Jenson, 'Paradigms and Political Discourse', p. 241.

52. Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*, p. 21; Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*, chapters 3 and 4.
53. In Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*, p. 21.
54. Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*, p. 23.
55. Davies, *Women and Work*, p. 43.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Zillah R. Eisenstein, *The Female Body and the Law* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 202.
58. John, 'Introduction', in John, *Unequal Opportunities*, p. 16.
59. See also Rosalind Petchesky, 'Workers, Reproductive Hazards and the Politics of Protection: An Introduction', *Feminist Studies*, 5(2), Summer 1979, p. 240; Vilma R. Hunt, 'A Brief History of Women Workers and Hazards in the Workplace', *Feminist Studies*, 5(2), Summer 1979, p. 275.
60. See for example, Jane Lewis, *Women in England, 1870–1950: Sexual Divisions and Social Change* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp. 175–80; Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work, and Family*, p. 188; Ruth Frager,' No Proper Deal: Women Workers and the Canadian Labour Movement 1870–1940', in L. Briskin and L. Yanz (eds), *Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement* (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1983), pp. 50–7.
61. Frager, 'No Proper Deal', p. 51; Davies, *Women and Work*, chapter 4.
62. *Ibid*; see also Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*, pp. 30–1; Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, pp. 188–9. See also Deborah Thom, 'The Bundle of Sticks: Women, Trade Unionists and Collective Organization before 1918', in John, *Unequal Opportunities*, pp. 261–89.
63. Henri Fuss, Chief of the Unemployment, Employment and Migration Section, ILO, 'Unemployment and Employment Among Women', *International Labour Review*, 31(4), 1035, p. 465.
64. 'Maternity Protection: A Social Responsibility (ILO)', *Women at Work*, 1984, No. 2, pp. 1–2; see also 'ILO Survey on Working Mothers', *Women at Work*, 1985, No. 1, p. 31 and Brocas, *et al.*, *Women and Social Security*, p. 58.
65. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 83; ILO, *Standards and Policy Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers*, pp. 68–71, 83–6; 'Maternity Protection: A Social Responsibility', in ILO, *Women at Work*, No. 2, 1984, pp. 1–2; 'Women Workers: International Labour Standards', in ILO, *Women at Work*, No. 2, 1987, pp. 28–33; Marcel Robert and Luigi Parmeggiani, 'Fifty Years of International Collaboration in Occupational Safety and Health', *International Labour Review*, 99(1), 1969, pp. 85–136.
66. Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*, chapter 5; Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, p. 57; Barbara Brookes, 'Women and Reproduction, 1860–1939', in Lewis, *Labour and Love*, pp. 149, 166.
67. Eisenstein, *The Female Body and the Law*, p. 204.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 206; for an early example of this debate in ILO literature, see 'The Open Door International and Maternity Protection', *International Labour Review*, 21(2), 1930, pp. 217–8.

69. Michael J. Wright, 'Reproductive Hazards and "Protective" Discrimination', *Feminist Studies*, 5(2), Summer 1979, p. 303. See also Carolyn Bell, 'Implementing Safety and Health Regulations for Women in the Workplace', in *Ibid.*, p. 296 and Sandra Blakeslee, 'Fathers linked to child defects', *The Globe and Mail*, January 1, 1991, p. A1.
70. Wright, 'Reproductive Hazards and "Protective" Discrimination', pp. 304–5.
71. Bell, 'Implementing Safety and Health Regulations', p. 297.
72. Polyvinyl chloride is used in the production of rubber. Some companies in the United States that use this product have policies prohibiting hiring any women of childbearing age. In the late 1970s controversy erupted when a number of women underwent sterilizations to secure employment at one of these plants. See *Ibid.*, p. 297 and Petchesky, 'Workers, Reproductive Hazards, and the Politics of Protection', p. 237.
73. Although she is not writing of the ILO, this argument was found in Vilma R. Hunt, 'A Brief History of Women Workers and Hazards in the Workplace', *Feminist Studies*, 5(2), Summer 1979.
74. Hunt, 'A Brief History of Women Workers and Hazards in the Workplace', pp. 276, 278–80.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
76. I am grateful to Peter Strahlendorf for directing me to this point. For an examination of this problem in the context of Canadian public health and safety legislation, see 'PPE for Women: *Vive la Différence*!' *Occupational Health and Safety Canada*, 2(2), 1986, p. 62. See also Robert and Parmeggiani, 'Fifty Years of International Collaboration'; and L. Parmeggiani, 'State of the Art: Recent Legislation on Workers' Health and Safety', *International Labour Review*, 121(3), May–June 1982, pp. 271–285.
77. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women* also make this point, see pages 48 and 251.
78. Fuss, 'Unemployment and Employment among Women', pp. 463 and 465–9; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 41.
79. Fuss, 'Unemployment and Employment Among Women', pp. 493–4.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
81. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, pp. 8–9, 162–3, 172; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 39.
82. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, pp. 171, 175; League of Nations, *Handbook of International Organisations* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1938), pp. 269–70; 'The Open Door International and Maternity Protection', *International Labour Review*, 21(2), 1930, pp. 217–18.
83. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 45; Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, pp. 9, 165; Anderson and Winslow, *Woman at Work*, chapter 18.
84. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, pp. 176–7.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 178; Anderson and Winslow, chapter 19.
86. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, p. 178.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 177–8.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
89. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 213.
90. Ruth Milkman, *Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation by Sex During World War II* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 49. See

also Sherna Berger Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, The War and Social Change* (New York: New American Library, 1987), pp. 9–10. See also Margaret R. Higonnet and Patrice L.-R. Higonnet, 'The Double Helix', in Margaret Randolph Higonnet, *et al.*, (eds), *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, pp. 214–15; Lewis, *Women in England*, p. 153; Elisabeth Hagen and Jane Jenson, 'Paradoxes and Promises: Work and Politics in the Postwar Years', in J. Jenson, E. Hagen and C. Reddy (eds), *Feminization of the Labor Force, Paradoxes and Promises* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Isabella Bakker, 'Women's Employment in Comparative Perspective', in *Ibid.*; Gluck, *Rosie The Riveter Revisited*, chapters 1 and 2.

91. Tilly and Scott, *Women, Work and Family*, p. 215.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 217–8.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
94. Hagen and Jenson, 'Paradoxes and Promises', p. 3.
95. 'Meeting of Experts from the ILO Committee on Women's Work', *International Labour Review*, 54(3–4), 1946, p. 202; 'The Apprenticeship of Women and Girls', *International Labour Review*, 72(4), 1965, pp. 283–302.
96. Lucille G. Caron, 'A Question of Basic Human Rights', *Women at Work*, 1986 No. 2, p. 4.
97. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 95.
98. ILO, *Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers*, Report V(1), pp. 3 and 7.
99. ILO, *Standards and Policy Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers*, pp. 41–4; ILO, *Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value*, International Labour Conference, Thirty-Third Session, Reports V(1), V(2) Geneva 1950, and Thirty-Fourth Session, Report VII(2), Geneva 1951; 'ILO Instrument on Equality of Remuneration', *Women at Work*, No. 1, 1984, p. 6; 'Women's Wages', *International Labour Review*, 81(2), 1960, pp 95–109; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, p. 126.
100. 'Progress in Equal Pay Linked to General Status of Women and Men in Society', *Women at Work*, 1986, No. 2, p. 14; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 96.
101. 'Progress in Equal Pay', p. 14; 'Unequal Pay, Wherein Lies the Problem?', *Women at Work*, 1982, No. 2, p. 1; 'Women Workers: International Labour Standards', *Women at Work*, 1987, No. 2, p. 29; ILO, *Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Employment*, International Labour Conference, 71st Session, Report VII, 1985; ILO, *Equal Remuneration: General Survey of the Reports on the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) and Recommendation (No. 90), 1951*, Report III (Part 4B), International Labour Conference, 72nd Session, 1986, (Geneva: ILO, 1986), chapters 4 and 5.
102. ILO, *Standards and Policy Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers*, pp. 5–9.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
104. 'The Right to Work: Is it Equal for Women?', *Women at Work*, 1983, No. 1, p. 1; ILO, *Standards and Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers*, p. 49. See also 'The Apprenticeship of Women and Girls', *International Labour Review*, 72(4), 1965, pp. 283–302.
105. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, pp. 100–101.

106. ILO, *Standards and Policy Statements of Special Interest to Women Workers*, pp. 75–9. 'Women with Family Responsibilities Recommendation, 1965 (No. 123): an ILO Survey', *Women at Work*, 1979, No. 1, p. 33. For some of the ILO's historical treatment of women and child care, see Maria Baers, 'Women Workers and Home Responsibilities', *International Labour Review*, 69(4), 1954, pp. 338–55 and 'Child Care Facilities for Women Workers', *International Labour Review*, 78(1), 1958, pp. 99–109.
107. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 105.
108. M.-C. Séguret, 'Child-care Services for Working Parents', *International Labour Review*, 120(6), 1981, p. 711.
109. Galenson, *An American View, passim*; Mainwaring, *A Canadian View*, chapter 14; Cox, 'Labour and Hegemony', and 'Labour and Hegemony: A Reply'.
110. Reinalda, 'Women as Transnational Political Force in Europe', p. 8.
111. 'Official Documents', *Women at Work*, 1977, No. 1, p. 26; 'ILC Will Discuss Women Workers' Questions in 1985', *Women at Work*, 1984, No. 1, p. 4.
112. 'The Right to Work: Is it Equal for Women?', *Women at Work*, 1983, No. 1, p. 1.
113. 'Primary Study on Protective Measures', *Women at Work*, No. 2, 1977, p. 17.
114. 'Women Workers and the New International Economic Order', *Women at Work*, 1981, No. 1, p. 1.
115. 'ILO Activities: Report on the Employment of Women with Family Responsibilities', *Women at Work*, 1978, No. 1, p. 17.
116. ILO, *Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers With Family Responsibilities*, International Labour Conference, 66th Session, 1980, Report VI (1) and Report VI (2). See also Séguret, 'Child Care Services for Working Parents', p. 711; 'Recommendation Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities', *Women at Work*, 1982, No. 1, pp. 41–4; 'The ILO on Family Responsibilities', *Women at Work*, 1985, No. 1, p. 32; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 105.
117. Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 105; Brocas *et al.*, *Women and Social Security*, pp. 67–9.
118. Krishna Ahooja-Patel, 'Work and Family: The New ILO Norms', in ILO, *Women at Work*, No. 2, 1981, p. 1.
119. Reinalda, 'Women as Transnational Political Force in Europe', p. 10.
120. Brocas *et al.*, *Women and Social Security*, p. 10.
121. *Ibid.*
122. 'Future Trends and Perspectives for ILO Action on Women Workers', *Women at Work*, 1987, No. 2, pp. 48–51; 'ILO Activities for the 1988–89 Biennium', *Women at Work*, 1987, No. 2, pp. 51–2; Lubin and Winslow, *Social Justice for Women*, p. 118; Ann Therese Lotherington and Anne Britt Flemmen, 'Negotiating Gender: The Case of the International Labour Organization', in Kristi Anne Stølen and Mariken Vaa (eds), *Gender and Change in Developing Countries* (Norwegian University Press, 1991), p. 278.
123. 'The ILO Chooses an Interdepartmental Approach', *World of Work*, No. 2, 1993, p. 3.
124. Virginia Galt, 'Unions urged to promote women', *The Globe and Mail*, February 8, 1993, p. A6.
125. Lotherington and Flemmen, *passim*.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 295–6.

Conclusion

The previous two chapters have examined the ways in which IPPF and ILO policies and procedures have been informed by assumptions around gender relations. It has been argued that much of early IPPF policy attempted to de-link birth control from women's reproductive freedom and stressed instead its contribution to family, social and global stability. While explicit reference to women, men and the relations between them disappeared from IPPF policy, this strategy was nonetheless gendered. This is so because of the gendering effects that resulted from making women, their sexuality, and their reproductive freedom, invisible. This strategy implicitly reinforced traditional assumptions about nuclear family norms and moreover, served to disempower women through dissociating birth control from women's reproductive freedom. By privileging social stability over women's reproductive freedom, the IPPF could justify the adoption of policies which worked to the immediate detriment of women's reproductive autonomy.

As women were increasingly drawn into the workforce, gained better educations and demanded more political, economic and social rights, the IPPF's treatment of birth control began to change. By the mid-1970s, and increasingly in the intervening fifteen years, the IPPF has begun to recognise the centrality of birth control to women's reproductive freedom. This has been achieved not only through changing material conditions, but through the changing make-up of activists within the IPPF. These activists have begun to indicate explicitly the central place of birth control for the achievement of equality between women and men.

The ILO, by contrast, has always made explicit reference to women, but it has done so in a particular way. The bulk of early ILO policy directed toward women was concerned with protecting them by virtue of their reproductive roles. Indeed, the earliest attempts to establish international labour standards focused on limiting the night work of women because it was considered so uncontroversial. Thus rather than make women invisible, the ILO has sought actively to make them visible. But for the early part of ILO history, this visibility was accorded women only insofar as they were real or potential childbearers and raisers. Other roles that women may assume were ignored in early ILO policy.

Indeed, it was often men who were made invisible through the policies of the ILO. This happened in a number of ways. For one, protective legislation aimed at restricting women's employment because of the hazards

associated with industrial and agricultural work did so because of women's role in reproduction and child rearing. Men's roles were considered either irrelevant or unimportant. Likewise, as the ILO shifted to an equality rights discourse, men became both the privileged and invisible category. Privileged because it was men with whom women were compared, invisible because they did not exist outside of this category of comparison, that of the 'normal' worker.

As with the IPPF, changes in the material conditions of women's and men's lives shifted the ILO's understandings of the appropriate roles of women and men in society, family and workplace. After World War II, the ILO moved to a greater emphasis on equality rights legislation for women, reflecting their greater participation in the workforce. The women's movement also contributed to the ILO's changing treatment of women. Rather than see women only insofar as they differed from men as childbearers, the ILO began to recognise the myriad of roles performed by women in the workforce. This discourse also began to acknowledge the different activities in which men may be involved. Policies began to recognise the extent to which protective legislation often served to disadvantage women within the workforce, and the ILO began to acknowledge as well that both women and men can and should share certain family responsibilities, such as caring for the young, the sick and the elderly.

WHITHER FEMINIST THEORY?

With the examples of the IPPF and the ILO before us, it becomes clear why the concept of gender is such a useful notion for interrogating international relations. With the concept of gender we can see many things that would be overlooked had we been concerned strictly with 'women'. The case of the IPPF is particularly illustrative here, for in its attempts to make invisible the relationship between women, their reproductive freedom and birth control, notions about the specificity of women drop out of their policy discourse altogether. An analysis which had been focused strictly on women instead of gender would have been unable to recognise the gendered nature of IPPF policy, and would have thereby served to reproduce the 'malestream' assumption that feminist analyses can bring nothing new to the study of international institutional activity.

An analysis of the ILO which was concerned with locating 'women' would meet with more initial success than such an IPPF analysis. This is so because of the explicit focus of the ILO on women throughout its history. Both an analysis concerned with women and one concerned with gender

would be able to identify and discuss these various policies. Nonetheless, an analysis of gender again proves more useful in assessing the ILO. This is so because such an analysis of the ILO focuses not only on *how* women and men appear within ILO policies but *why* they appear in the ways that they do. Thus the argument in chapter 5 underlines the extent to which protective legislation emerged out of the struggles of social reformers, trade unions and women's organisations. It notes also the ways in which, as different organisations became involved in countering the push for protective legislation, ILO policies began to shift to an equality rights discourse.

Similarly, an analysis of women would not have shown us the ways in which gender is a relational notion. Both protective legislation and equality rights legislation had effects on the ways in which both women and men were understood through ILO policies. Under protective legislation, women were recognised only insofar as they were different from men. Men were the norm, and women were treated equally to men only when they could be seen to be like men.[1] But protective legislation also presented men in a particular way. An analysis of the location of 'women' would have accepted the notion of 'men as the norm', because it would have assumed it appropriate to add women to the institutions and structures of which men were already a part. Without an understanding of gender as a relational notion, analyses of the gendering effects of particular activities on men are not possible. Thus the ways in which men were made invisible through both the focus on protective legislation and then later through promotional efforts would have gone unanalysed.

It is seeing gender as relational which highlights the extent to which gender relations have been unequal relations, for women as a category or group do not exist independently of men in our example of the ILO (or the IPPF). They are defined according to men, and moreover, when they can be seen to be like men they disappear altogether. Important differences between women and men are also very specific ones, for they are concerned solely with women as childbearers. Other differences which might be useful to acknowledge through protective legislation are simply ignored. Acknowledging women only insofar as they are childbearers reproduces traditional assumptions about the appropriate role of women as childbearers and only as childbearers, and moreover makes men invisible. It ignores the multitude of ways in which women participate in society which are not concerned with their reproductive function and ignores men insofar as they *are* involved in reproduction.

Both of these cases also illustrate well the historical specificity of the construction of gender and the different ways in which 'women' may be understood across time. The relationship between women and reproduction, or the

assumed standards of women within the home or the workplace were not fixed, and in some ways varied considerably, especially given the relatively small segment of time under consideration here. An analysis which was able to locate 'women' within these institutions without recognising the historical specificity of the notion would have been unable to describe or assess the different policies which the ILO and the IPPF adopted. These institutions both reflected and actively organised notions of gender through the strategies they pursued, and an analysis which envisioned women as only a static category useful for identification purposes could not recognise this.

It is important to note also, however, that while in some ways understandings of gender changed considerably, in other ways they remained surprisingly constant; specifically, the ways in which gendered constructions of race were made invisible throughout most of the histories of these institutions. While recently each has devoted more attention to people of developing countries, and both usually included 'race and ethnicity' in equality rights provisions, notions such as 'women' and 'worker' implicitly assumed white western women and workers. In this way, it was only the dramatic movement of white married women into the workforce after World War II that began to affect prevailing assumptions around the appropriate role of women in the workforce. Likewise, it was the assumed 'instability' of families that fell outside white middle-class norms, and countries that fell outside of white industrialised country norms, that initially mobilised population control planners through Planned Parenthood and the IPPF.

Gendered understandings which assume that women and men are 'normally' white render the effects of racist understandings invisible. As with our discussion above, acknowledging women (or workers) only insofar as they are white reproduces racist assumptions about the position of women of colour and black women in the workforce. It ignores the ways in which black women and women of colour have traditionally been involved in paid labour, the circumstances under which they are involved there, their position in the labour market, and so on. It ignores also the multitude of ways in which work, reproduction, family and so on, are experienced and understood differently depending upon one's time, place and race and ethnic privileges and experiences. The homogenising impact of international institutional practices thus has as much an effect on racialised assumptions as it does on gendered assumptions.

Looking at gender rather than women lets us develop a feminist analysis within international relations even when explicit references to women or to race cannot be found; it shows us not only how women and men appear in the ways that they do, but why; it points also to the ways in which gender is both relational and historically specific. In short, the political imperatives

of an analysis of gender become clear through the example of these cases. Seeing that gender is organised, and is not simply some natural category defined by the terms 'woman' and 'man', shows us why essentialist understandings of these terms and adding women are simply not enough. Essentialist commitments to the meanings of 'woman' and 'man' do not permit any appreciation of the historical variability necessarily accorded to these terms or experiences, as illustrated by our examples of the IPPF and ILO.

On the other hand, 'adding women in' assumes a level playing field, at least insofar as the addition of women will necessarily right all wrongs. An analysis of gender in the IPPF and the ILO shows how these relationships and definitions of what it is to be a woman or man are structured relationships, and historically have been structured to disadvantage women.[2] It is not possible to simply add women in to particular structures (whether they be the study or practice of international relations, education, capitalism, etc.), because those structures are premissed and built upon the assumption that women are not appropriately, or equally, members of those structures. The ways in which we understand and recognise those structures is in part through their exclusion of women.[3] Moreover, if women are added in, it is often in racialised – that is, white – terms.

WHITHER IR THEORY?

A related but no less important question is what the impact of an analysis sensitive to gender will be on IR theory. While we examined in chapter two the spaces available within traditional IR theory to incorporate a gendered analysis of international relations, we did not consider the impact of this analysis on that theory. Or, to put it another way, is the intention here to save or to bury IR theory?

At a minimum, an analysis of international relations which is sensitive to gender challenges the traditional boundaries, or in Richard Ashley's terms, 'border lines', between individual, domestic and international politics. These boundaries are not reflective of some natural division found within the real world, but are the result of the disciplining effects of International Relations.[4] It is the manner in which IR has been created that constitutes questions as either appropriately, or not, within the realm of the discipline. In showing that gender is both reflected in international institutions and is in part organised by those institutions, this work marks a dramatic departure from those that seek to leave the boundaries of IR intact.

This is more than simply a restatement of the old 'levels of analysis problem' in International Relations, for this work seeks to do more than

simply play with border lines.[5] It opens up levels of analysis previously untouched within IR theory, for it challenges the essentialised visions of masculine and feminine that are created through the activities of international relations.[6] It argues that the very constitution of what it means to be a woman or a man is at least in part organised by the activities of international relations. This means that the impact of international relations is further felt than ever previously imagined, for it touches us in the most basic of ways.[7]

The primary commitment within mainstream IR theory to study inter-state rivalry thus becomes seriously challenged. As has been illustrated throughout this work, the study of inter-state activity as a discrete area of inquiry provides us with a narrow and incomplete picture of international practices. For, the activities of states, institutions, and even individuals are mutually constitutive and moreover, dependent at least in part on prevailing material and historical conditions. In an analysis of gender in international relations, we discover the ways in which international activities reflect and shape gender relations. Perhaps even more profoundly, however, we discover also the utter complexity of international phenomena – a complexity that is not captured within traditional modes of inquiry in the field.

WHITHER A FEMINIST IR POLITICS?

A number of political implications follow from this analysis. For one, it underscores the extent to which international relations affects all facets of our lives. International relations, understood this way, is not just about the ponderings of foreign diplomats or chief executive officers in large multinational corporations, but also about the ways in which population control organisations will make birth control available to women and men throughout the world, or the constraints placed on women seeking employment in a local factory and men seeking protection from hazardous substances. In this way, it gives voice to those people in the world most adversely affected by the machinations of international relations yet with little voice in the creation of international relations.[8]

Such an analysis points also to the sites of struggle in the re-creation of a more just and equitable international relations. This work has underlined repeatedly the extent to which notions about what it is to be a woman or a man, the appropriate roles of women and men in society, or the workforce are not given naturally but are socially constructed. What is constructed can be re-constructed, what is made can be re-made.[9] Taking into account

the ideas, material conditions and institutions involved in the organisation of any of these relationships gives not only analysts a sharper insight into the working of international relations, but gives activists a direction for recreating those relations.

During times of crisis, as is being witnessed currently within the IPPF, an opportunity to question previously held assumptions about gender is made available. Activists within institutions or those working outside them can reconstruct the ways in which women's and men's role in reproduction have been constructed. We are witnessing that very activism within the IPPF today. The impact of social movements also has enormous impact, as illustrated by the IPPF and the ILO. The ways in which movements redefine what is appropriately political can be reflected in the activities of international institutions, as they can elsewhere.

Thus rather than the mainstream vision of despair which depicts international relations as both inaccessible and unmalleable, the vision of international relations that is provided here is one which is both accessible and subject to change. While recognising the profound complexity of international practices, it is precisely because of that complexity that these practices are subject to change. Rather than monolithic states engaging in occasional anarchic collision, the understanding of international relations presented here is one in which we are affected by international relations in the most basic of ways. This includes the constitution of gender relations, as it does the organisation of race and class relations. If international relations can affect us in the most basic of ways, then so too can it be affected. In this way we see the extent to which we are all engaged in international practices, at all times. In this way too, sites of resistance are always available to those who oppose the status quo. World politics is both personal and possible.

Notes

1. Zillah R. Eisenstein, *The Female Body and the Law* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 205.
2. For a related point, see V. Spike Peterson, 'Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations', *Millennium*, 21(2), 1992, pp. 183–206.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War', in J. Der Derian and M.J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), *passim*. See also Patrick M. Morgan, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987), chapter 1.

5. Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory', *Alternatives*, 16 (1991), p. 100.
6. *Ibid.*
7. These observations would apply to all social relations, not simply gender.
8. Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: Pandora, 1989), p. 2 and chapter 1 *passim.*
9. *Ibid.*; and Jane Jenson, 'Different but not Exceptional: the Feminism of Permeable Fordism', *New Left Review*, 184, November–December 1990, p. 60.

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